Firestorm tactics
Firestorm tactics (Syaran: огнена бура, ognena bura) were a set of tactics utilized by the Royalists during the Refusal War against the Wardens.
Following the Royalist defeat in the Battle of Slocova, it was evident that the pre-war doctrine of the Army of the Syaran Republic that the Royalists were attempting to emulate was ill suited towards combating the Warden armies. Pre-war doctrine had emphasized rapid and aggressive mechanized maneuvers intended to encircle and annihilate enemy formations in a series of rapid, compounding offensive actions. These actions were designed with Ruvelka in mind based on experience with the Seven Day War; the Syarans would launch rapid attacks aimed at destroying Ruvelkan formation in quick succession, with the expectation of a limited conflict over a short, high intensity period of combat operations. The Royalists struggled to implement this doctrine for a number of reasons.
As Syarans themselves, the Wardens were aware of VRS doctrine and thus were often able to predict Royalist intentions based on terrain and assessed objectives. Second, conducting aggressive, rapid offensive action required motivated soldiers to close in and engage the enemy, sometimes in close quarters. With many of their troops recently raised conscripts, the Royalists struggled to implement a level of aggression necessary for infantry assaults. Additionally, Warden emphasis on fluidity and mobility made such aggressive actions risky and often liable to be cut off and destroyed. This was compounded by the fact that the Wardens retained much of the VRS's NCO corps, providing the Wardens with the low level tactical leadership that enabled Warden battlegroups to outmaneuver Royalist forces. Thus, although the Royalist armies typically enjoyed superior firepower along with better operational command and control, these did not translate into immediate success.
By 1985 it was clear that the Royalists were unable to decisively defeat the Wardens outright without a significant change in fighting style and approach. Field Marshal Sivo Hadjiev had identified a need to "even the odds", namely to eliminate the numerical and occasional tactical superiority of the Wardens in order to offset Royalist disadvantages. Because of the limitations of troop control as a result of utilizing a largely conscript force considered less motivated than its adversaries, the Royalists attempted to avoid placing too much emphasis on aggressive offensive action for their forces, instead relying on smaller elements of more capable regulars to accomplish difficult objectives. Instead Royalist forces aimed at exploiting their advantages in firepower, especially air strikes, to compensate.
Royalist formations were thus divided into separate unofficial categories; mobile squadrons and static forces. Mobile squadrons consisted of well trained and well armed infantry and armored forces that would bear the responsibility for most major assaults, while static forces would carry out more generalized shaping operations. Mobile squadrons would often employ heliborne assaults to seize important objectives or locations, or utilizing combined arms tactical elements consisting of mechanized infantry, tanks, and self-propelled artillery pieces. Static forces by comparison would launch only limited offensive operations, with the main goal being to seize easily defensible territory, ideally locations which could then threaten Warden positions or forces. From there, the static forces would dig in and attempt to "bait" Warden troops into attacking, forcing the Wardens to expose themselves to Royalist artillery and air power. Once the Wardens had been depleted and mauled by fires and airstrikes, static forces could then transition towards the offensive and eliminate the already stricken Wardens.
Firestorm tactics therefore placed significant emphasis on tactical maneuver followed by strong operational positioning designed to force the Wardens into costly attacks, bleeding them of manpower and resources. Often mobile forces would play the part of goading or pressing Warden forces into designated kill zones, where static forces could them obliterate them with superior firepower. Firestorm tactics had become the mainstay of Royalist doctrine by 1985 and remained so for the duration of the conflict.
While Firestorm was a sensible solution to Royalist ills, it was not without its issues. Reliance on a small cadre of elite troops to carry out important actions resulted in a high attrition rate to said forces, depleting the Royalists of high quality troops that were difficult to replace. Without mobile squadrons the remainder of the Royalist forces often enjoyed little to no advantage over their Warden counterparts. Furthermore, by assuming a largely defensive posture Royalist forces often left the initiative to the Wardens, who gradually developed increasingly effective counters to Royalist air power and artillery. By late 1986 static forces had lost the ability to reliably defeat Warden assaults, and proved a major contributor to the eventual Royalist defeat.