Measured Battle Doctrine

Measured Battle Doctrine (Syaran: измерена борбена доктрина; izmerena borbena doktrina) was a military doctrine employed by the Army of the Syaran Republic for much of the 20th Century. Measured Battle Doctrine was developed out of Syaran experience in the Divide War and came to fruition during the interwar years, and was utilized in full during the Siduri War. Measured Battle Doctrine was defined by the use of slow moving, large scale offensives supported by overwhelming artillery and armor support for the infantry, which were comittited slowly over a broad front. The intent was to overwhelm an enemy force through superior firepower and a steadily escalating drive that focused on the entire length of the front line, rather than attempting to open singular breaches in the enemy's lines. The "Measured Battle" was employed by the Syarans between 1918-1938, at which point it fell out of disuse. Some elements of the doctrine were revisited during the Zemplen War, but many of the key elements were deemed outdated with the advent of modern tanks, aircraft, and increasing levels of mechanization in the battlefield.

Origin

Measured Battle Doctrine had it's origins in Syaran experience in the Divide War. In 1917 the Cacertian Empire had invaded northern Syara, beginning the Desopya Campaign. Cacertian forces, compared to Syaran troops, were far better trained, armed, and experienced, resulting in lopsided losses for the Syarans for much of the war. Throughout Autumn and Winter of 1917 it became clear to the Syaran High Command that the Army of the Syaran Republic was unable to meet the Cacertians on equal terms and would have to tip the balance through numbers or firepower to be effective. After the failure of numerous offensives aimed at breaking through Cacertian lines in Desopya, Colonel General Atanas Endekov deduced that it was impossible to singularily break through Cacertian lines, as the Cacertians were able to repeatedly and effectively isolate breakthroughs and funnel reserves to any breaches in their lines thanks to reconnaisaince from observation airships and counter-attacks by early tanks, which the Syarans initially had no counter to.

In April 1918 Cacertian forces under the command of Division General Orsa Calderara defeated several Syaran field armies in battle and forced the Syarans to retire to secondary and tertiary defensive positions along the Alekso Line. Fearful that another drive on Zovahr was imminent, Endekov quickly drew up plans for a counter-offensive. Rather than focusing on a single sector, Endekov ordered all nine Syaran armies occupying the front to attack. The attack, known as Operation Zhivka, proved to be an unexpected success. Forced to spread out their reserves to cover the entire front, the Cacertians were forced to abandon much of the territory they had conquered. Recognizing the success of the offensive, Endekov intended to follow up with another full scale assault, but the arrival of General of Armed Forces Demetria Marik and her third wave of Cacertian tanks interrupted planning, resulting in the ultimately unncessful August Offensive. Subsequent Syaran counterattacks, marked by slow moving infantry never advancing beyond the range of their artillery, succesfully drove back Cacertian forces and resulted in their withdrawal from Syara in September 1918.

In the years after the Divide War Endekov and many other Syaran generals continued to study and refine what they had learned during the war, in particular their late 1918 successes against the Cacertians. Recognizing the dangers and capabilities of tanks, as well as the dominant role artillery played, the Syaran High Command published "On Doctrinal Tasks and Operations" in the summer of 1925, which would go on to to be the blueprint by which Syaran forces would operate for the approaching Siduri War.

Metholodogy and Usage

Measured Battle Doctrine was emphasized the fluid nature of the balance between offense and defense. Under the Measured Battle, Syaran forces would begin any operation or campaign from well dug in positions, perferablly trenches or other fighting positions. Artillery was to be pre-sighted and ready to support attacking infantry with a steady creeping barrage, or to defend against possible avenues of attack. The ability to immediately shift back to the defensive was a major component of Measured Battle; Syaran commanders were to be prepared for any spoiling attack and the infantry needed to be able to immediately take up defensive positions to repulse any pre-emptive strikes. Communication between higher levels of command and officers in the field was paramount, therefore numerous means of communication, including radio, telephone, runner, and carrier pigeon were to be maintained at all costs. This would allow the steady and rapid flow of information between echelons.

Artillery was the principle arm of Measured Battle. No offensive was to be undertaken unless a proper correlation of artillery was possible; according to "On Doctrinal Tasks and Operations" was expected to have at least one battalion per 5 kilometers of front. Thus a 100 kilometer frontline offensive would be expected to be supported by over 1,000 artillery pieces (including mortars). Artillery barrages were to occur by two methods; a several hour long barrage, which was to be used against a wide expanse of front, or more direct "firestorm" barrages. "Firestorm" barrages were short, intense strikes against particular sectors by a mixture of high-explosive, incendiary, and smoke shells, usually directed against known enemy fortifcations or strong concentrations of enemy troops. Long, steady barrages against isolated sectors of the front were discouraged due to their tendency to inform the enemy where the offensive was aimed at. Artillery was divided into two categories; mobile batteries meant to support advancing infantry that were usually located closer to the front (and mostly made up of mortars and lighter pieces) and stationary batteries that were longer ranged and placed further back, just close enough to hit enemy forces and defenses.

Infantry were ultimately the decisive arm of the Measured Battle and were meant to occupy and assault objectives once the artillery had begun firing. Syaran infantry were expected to attack slowly and in close conjunction with company and battalion level fire support, as well as additional support from tanks. Once an enemy force or position had been sighted, fire support from company, and if necessary, battalion and above levels would be called in while the infantry deployed. Syaran infantry squads of the Siduri War era were centered around a two-man machinegun team, with the rest of the squad providing cover and support for the machinegun team. The infantry were to be supported directly by engineers to help dismantle obstacles and minefields, as well as to help dig in and fortify positions. The infantry were never to advance beyond the range of their own artillery, nor were they to lose contact with their higher level command to ensure cohesiveness of the front.

Tanks were given a subsidary role in Measured Battle Doctrine with their main goal being to support the infantry. Syaran tank designs reflected this, either being very light and meant for scouting, or heavy and slow to provide the infantry with cover or additional firepower to destroy enemy bunkers, or absord machinegun fire. Most critically the Syarans did not see tanks as a viable independent arm of their own, and even divisions centered around tanks were usually utilized as diversionary elements meant to draw away focus from the infantry. Like the infantry, Syaran tanks were heavily supplied with radios and other methods of communication in order to keep the flow of information steady and reliable.

Weaknesses and counters

Measured Battle had it's advantages; the steady rate of advance and slow committemnt of forces meant that Syaran forces were able to avoid traps and ambushes more easily than hard charging or fast moving armies. The emphasis on clear communications allowed Syaran commanders to react to counterstrokes and new developments. The heavy focus on artillery gave Syaran generals a keen understanding of the value of logistics, meaning Syaran forces were rarely short of munitions and supply in theater.

Measured Battle Doctrine neverthteless contained several inherent flaws. The "big picture" outlook gave operational planning good insight, but meant that lower level commanders were strongly prohibited from deviating from the plan of attack, even in the face of extraordinary circumstances. The emphasis on fluidity between offense and defense meant that Syaran forces were unlikely to seize the iniative. The emphasis on divisional and corps artillery meant that Syaran forces at the regimental level and below could often find themselves outgunned by contemporary adversaries. Above all, Measured Battle Doctrine relied on a series of pre-requisites; the Syaran Army held the advantage in numbers and firepower. This worked fine against isolated Cacertian forces in the Desopya Campaign or against the Ruvelkans in 1934, but when faced against the numerically superior armies of the Common Axis in 1935-1938, this was often not the case.

The underutilization of tanks has often been labeled as the most critical flaw of Measured Battle Doctrine. Syaran theorists failure to identify the utility of tanks as independent armored formations, breaking through enemy lines and wreaking havoc in the rear echelon, proved to be a rude awakening in the fighting in Quenmin and Tennai, where Cacertian mobile armored forces repeatedly devestated Syaran lines and units. Some Syaran commanders, like Zdravko Merakovski, attempted to implement independent armored forces, but overall the Syarans struggled to implement the idea. Measured Battle Doctrine ultimately failed to adapt to changes within combined arms tactics, and was largely discarded after Syara's surrender in 1938.