1981 Daekanese-Urranese conflict

1981 Daekanese-Urranese conflict
Clockwise from the top left: KJ-3 being launched by DPN Kkamagwi, the DPN Geonjanghan sinking after being struck by Urranese missiles, a downed Urranese F-4 viewed from a JS-9s gun camera, the URS Jian on patrol
Date 2 March 1981 - 24 March 1981 Location East Daekan Sea/Tsushima Sea Result Ceasefire
Belligerents
Daekan Supported by:	Urran Supported by:
Commanders and leaders
Hong Tae-Hyun (Premier, Commander-in-Chief) Chun Ji-Hu (Minister of Defence) Won Jong-Su (Admiral of the FLeet) <br	Hayato Igarashi (Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief) Xi Li Mai (Minister of Defence) Yoshio Okada (Grand Admiral of the Navy)
Casualties and losses
1 destroyer sunk, 1 frigate heavily damaged, 3 aircraft shot down, 41 dead	1 destroyer sunk, 1 destroyer lightly damaged, 2 aircraft shot down, 44 dead

The 1981 Daekanese-Urranese conflict, known in Daekan as the East Sea Incident (Daekanese: 동해 사고; Donghae sago) and in Urran as the Battle of Tsushima (Urranese: 対馬の戦い;Tsushima no tatakai), was an undeclared, 22-day long period (March 2 to March 24) of skirmishes between the People's Socialist Republic of Daekan and the Constitutional Republic of Urran. The conflict started when a Daekanese fighter flight got into a mock dogfight with Urranese fighters after the former got too close, with one of the sides opening fire soon after. The short conflict was mainly fought with naval and air forces on both sides, and ended in a ceasefire agreement signed on the 24th of March, 1981.

Background

The more aggressive and ambitious diplomatic posture the PSRD adopted in the 70s, emboldened by its rapid economic recovery, had severe repercussions in its relations with foreign powers, including Urran. Despite Urran's rather isolationist stance, it was viewed as a potential threat by the Daekanese leadership ( it was first mentioned as such, however, in the Forward Defence strategy adopted in 1966) on account of its "reactionary government" and sizable military, as well as its relations with Daekanese rivals such as Esgonia and Yamatai. The result was increased alert of Daekanese naval and air forces assigned to the East Daekan Sea, in particular the East Sea Fleet itself. Overflights of Urranese military as well as civillian vessels by Daekanese fighters and maratime patrol aircraft was also common. Actions like this increased from 1978, with the beginning of the Sixth 5-year plan.

However, with the catastrophic concequences to Daekanese economy that the failure of the Seventh 5-year plan brought about by 1980, Daekanese mentality shifted from ambitious posturing to desparate paranoia. The worsening relations with Daekan's formerly tusted partners such as Azenyanistan and Kirana also contributed to this. Many in Premier Hong Tae-Hyun's government suggested that Daekan should not allow potential threats to take advantage of the country's worsening economic situation. It was proposed that Daekan should project strength to ensure its security and make any potential aggression against it seem too costly. This resulted in the further intesification of naval and air patrols in both the East and the South seas, as well as on the Esgonian border.

Urran for its part had, as mentioned above, remained rather isolationist and largely uninvolved in WWII and the various other conflicts that roiled the mid to late 20th Century. While on paper Urran was considered neutral, it was involved in a Cold War with Vanquaria, a close Daekanese ally, from the 1950s to the early 2000s. In order to protect itself, the island nation maintained a rather large and well-trained military force and close ties to both Yamatai and Esgonia. Administrations leading up to the incident had grown suspicious of an increasingly reactionary Daekan, being at ideological odds with their communist neighbor. In response to the increase in Daekan activity off their western coast, the Urranese military began to increase activities in the area.

Conflict

2nd of March incident

In the early morning hours of the 2nd of March 1981, a 2-ship flight of JS-9Bs from the DPAAF's 32nd Fighter Squadron out of Meolli AFB, was undertaking routine patrol roughly 400 kilometres north-east of Meolli island. In the cockpits were Captain Rang Kwang-Hoon as flight lead and First Lieutenant Hu Seong-Ho as number two. At 5:39 AM, they spotted two contacts to their east on their radars. This was a three-ship flight of RUAF F-4Es led by Major Kazuki Izumi, that had spotted them in return. The two flights approached each other for visual identification, as was the usual conduct in these cases, and entered visual range of each other at 5:45. The Daekanese and Urranese fighters flew northbound, parallel to each other for 5 more minutes before the JS-9Bs started probing the Urranese flight, sharply changing course toward and then away from them.

After 13 more minutes of back and forth, at which point both flights entered a deep cloud canopy at about 20,000 feet, a navigational error caused the Daekanese fighters to end up less than one kilometre west of the Phantoms. As the aircraft left the clouds and both sides realised that was going on, the Urranese fighters immediately went defensive. The JS-9s, outnumbered by one aircraft, started mauneuvering aggressively as well. At this point, Captain Rang called for reinforcements in the form of another two-ship flight of JS-9Bs, that were patrolling north of their current position. A little less than two minutes into the mock dogfight, 1st Lt. Hu launched a BL-4 infared AAM at the F-4E flown by Lt. Kanta Sato and his WSO, 1st. Lt. Jun Chujo , under unclear circumstances. The missile exploded beneath the Phantom's left wing, ripping it off and sending the aircraft into a spiralling dive. Both pilot and WSO managed to eject safely. The second F-4E, piloted by Captain Hikari Saito and 1st. Lt. Naomi Kamidate (the RUAF's first all-female aircrew), that had been trailing Hu since the start of the dogfight, immediately retaliated with a AIM-9L, which impacted Hu's aircraft directly behind the cockpit, killing him.

Captain Rang, who was at the six of the lead F-4 at a range of less than a kilometre, opened fire with his GSh-23L 23 mm autocannon but Major Izumi managed to evate the burst. Not wanting to waist time and risk getting shot down Cpt. Saito's F-4E that was now mauneuvering for a missile shot, Rang siwtched to his BL-4s and fired at a very close range, the missile expoding directly on the F-4s fuselage and cutting the Urranese plane in half. Both Major Izumi and his WSO, 1st Lt. Yoshito Chujo, were killed when their ejection seats failed. Rang attempted to shake off Captain Saito who was now on his tail, but the latter managed an AIM-9L that exploded close to the JS-9Bs engine, destroying it. Rang ejected successfully. The secondpair of JS-9Bs approaching from the north was now within range of their BL-7, and had Captain Saito's Phantom locked on. The flight fired two BL-7 at almost max range, but moth missed as Saito sped away east at full afterburner. The Daekanese fighters arrived at the scene only to see the two Urranese life rafts in the water bellow, and no sign of Cpt. Rang. As such, he was presumed as killed in action.

Tensions increasing (2nd to 9th of March)

Both governments were notified of the incident mere minutes after it ended, at around 5:50 AM. On the Daekanese side, the East Sea Fleet was put on high alert and preparations for the surface force to sail out were made. Flights from the then-recently built air bases on Ilmoll islands were increased, a it is rumoured that orders were given for stategic bomber squadrons from the western military regions to relocate east and be refitted with anti-shipping weapons. On the Urranese side....[TBD]. Premier Hong Tae-Hyun contacted Prime Minister Hayato Igarashi via direct call line at 6:01 AM. What exactly was discussed during the call has not been released to the public, but it is widely known that the two leaders found little common ground and couldn't agree on how to proceed to de-escalation.

The next few days were characterised by a further gradual increase in military activity on both sides. In the early morning of the 4th of March, the East Sea Fleet under Admiral Kim Jin-Sang sailed from Sangju Naval Bas in force. The force was composed of most of the ESF's sufrace units: the Daedamhan-class destroyers Daedamhan, Ppaleun and Geonjanghan, the Seongnan-class destroyer Chungsilhan, the Dogsuli-class frigates Dogsuli, Kkamagwi and Olppaemi as well as the Seutokeo-class frigates Baemjali, Neugdae and Hwangso. The fleet executed mauneuvers on the edge of the Daekanese EEZ, where it would continue to patrol for the duration of the crisis. DPAN Naval Aviation and DPAAF aircraft provided forward recon for the fleet, with at least two PY-5J maratime patrol aircraft in the air near the fleet at any given time.

[Urranese mauenuvers here]

Further attempts at negotiations failed. Some within the Daekanese government called for a more aggressive stance, going as far as to suggest a pre-emptive strike against the deployed Urranese assets. Meanwhile, encounters between the two sides' forces continued. On the afternoon March 5th, a repeat of the March 2 incident almost occured when four DPAAF JA-7Ds almost got into a dogfight with three Urranese Navy F-14As. The fight was avoided when the Daekanese broke off, presumably under direct orders from Admiral Kim, who had overall command of all forces that were deployed in the area. In the early morning hours of March 8th, the DPAN submarine chasers C671 and C672 spotted a submerged Urranese [TBD]-class submarine 130 km south of the main Daekanese fleet. The DPAN ships started moving into position to drop depth charges off to its side as a warning, but the submarine turned about and left the area. Later that day, two DPAAF JS-9As buzzed the Urranese Navy Ishikari-class frigate [TBD], then left the area several minutes later.

Action off Meolli island (9th of March)

At around 11 PM on March 8, the Daedamhan-class destroyer DPAN Geonjanghan and the Dogsuli II-class frigate DPAN Kkamagwi broke off from the main Daekanese fleet to patrol south under orders from Kim. This is assumed to be in response to the sighting of the Urranese submarine [Submarine-TBD] earlier that day. At 2:42 PM, the two ships were joinned by the submarine chasers C671 and C672 that had spotted the [TBD], and began a search pattern of 40 km. The choice of the Geonjanghan to lead this small flotilla was because it was one of the two Daedamhan-class to be retrofitted with an ASW helicopter. The flotilla was joined overhead by a flight of two JS-9Bs and later a PY-5J maratime patrol aircraft. At 5:23 PM, just as the fighter flight reached bingo fuel and had to return to base, the PY-5J spotted three surface contacts east-northeast, which were later confirmed to be the [TBD-Destroyer1], the [TBD-Destroyer1], the [TBD-Frigate1] and the the [TBD-Frigate2] of the Urranese Navy, led by [Commander-TBD].

Captain Mae Tae-Yeon, CO of the Geonjanghan and overall commander of the flotilla, reported the sighting to Kim, who ordered him to close to the Urranese vessels and shadow them so as to identify if they posed a threat to the main fleet. Mae complied, changing his course and closing the distance. The Urranese ships were sailing away from him, but their slower speed allowed Mae to catch up about 4 hours later. The [TBD-Destroyer1] spotted the DPAN ships at about 45 nautical miles away, and the Urranese flotilla shifted to a direct southbound course so as to not get caught inbetween Mae's force and the main DPAN fleet. This, however, allowed Mae to further close the gap. At about 10:51 PM, at a distance of around 25 nautical miles, the Urranese warned the DPAN ships to keep their distance. Mae complied, and proceeded to shadow the force. The PY-5J that had accompanied Mae had reached bingo fuel and was forced to return to base, with another PY-5J being prepared to take off from Meolli AFB.

At 11:18 PM, the Urranese ships again shifted their course to the north. At this point the distance between the two forces had closed to 22 nm. Mae, sensing this change in course a threat to the main fleet, tried to contact the Urranese and order them to change their course. Ther was no response to his message, and he assumed that the Urranese had ignored him. Later investigation revealed that there was an error in the Geonjanghan's long-range communication equipment, which contributed to starting the battle that followed. Mae commanded his vessels to change their course directly towards the Urranese ships so as to force them to turn away. Alerted by the sudden mauneuever of the DPAN ships, [Commander-TBD] signalled them to change course. Due to the comms error on the DPAN flagship, however, the warnings never got through.

Seeing that the DPAN ships weren't turning away and confident in his numercial superiority, [Commander-TBD] ordered the [TBD-Destroyer2] to fire a warning salvo with its Mark 45 5-inch gun to the east of the Daekanese ships. At 11:41 PM, at a distance of 19 nautical miles, the [TBD-Destroyer2] fired a burst of 5 rounds that landed closer to the DPAN ships than intended. Mae mistook the salvo as an actual attack, and ordered his ships to battle stations. He then turned to unmask his missile launchers, and at 11:45, the DPAN ships fired a salvo of 12 KJ-3 anti-ship missiles at the Urranese ships. The Daekanese ships then immediately turned away at full speed as per DPAN doctrine, and Mae messaged Admiral Kim to warn him of shots fired. Again, however, his message didn't get through. The Urranese flotilla immediately retaliated, with [TBD-Frigate1] and [TBD-Frigate2] firing a salvo of 16 Harpoon missiles at 11:46. Both sides begun deploying countermeasures and firing surface-to-air missiles to shoot down the ASCMs.

The DPAN ships had the advantage of the Geonjanghan's long-range air-defence capability with its HHC-5 SAMs, but even then these were almost outdated and the range was extremely close. The DPAN flagship managed to shoot down three Harpoons before the ASCMs got into range of the HHC-4s, that shot down a further three, with one more missile taken out by the destroyer's AK-630 CIWS. Four of the Harpoons missed their targets entirely, due to the shory range of the launch, clutter and jamming/countermeasures. Four made it through, however, with three impacting the Geonjanghan and one the Kkamagwi. One of the hits on the flagship ignited the HHC-4 magazine and caused a massive explosion that almost ripped the ship in half. The Kkamagwi was hit amidships with the missile causing heavy damage, including to the forward funnel, but the ship remained seaworthy. On the other side, the KJ-3s performed considerably worse. Six out of tweleve missile lost their lock mid-course or were jammed and landed harmlessly in the sea and five more were shot down by RIM-7 Sea Sparrows and the Phalanx CIWS. Only one hit was achieved on the [TBD-Frigate2], with the missile impacting bellow the main mast but failing to explode. It caused a small fire that threatened to ignite the missile fuel that leaked out of it was quickly put out by the crew. Three members of the crew were killed in the impact.

At 11:50, Mae gave the order to abandon ship. The sub chasers circled around the sinking and burning Geonjanghan to rescue as much crew as they could, while the crew of the Kkamagwi hastily went about reparing what they could and reloading the KJ-3 launchers. [Commander-TBD] was pressed by his officers to close the distance and finish off the remaining DPAN ships with guns, but his was reluctant as he feared the threat of Daekanese land-based aviation. The arrival of a PY-5J under fighter escort at 11:55 confirmed his fears, and he ordered his flotilla to turn about and return to port. The Daekanese rescue effort continued under air cover until 12:20 AM, when the ships left for port. Total casualties amounted for 35 dead and dozens of wounded.