Operation Kwelanga 99

Operation Kwelanga 99
Part of the Third Uhlangan Civil War
Vice-Captain Jebar's air squadron on route to its target.
Date 2 February 1963 Location central and eastern Phansi Uhlanga Result Iqozi victory
Belligerents
Democratic Iqozi	Cuhonhico
Commanders and leaders
Supreme Leader Kalala Ulwazi Gen. Moshe Khethang Dda. Maja Zofañu (VAS) Dda. Meɣiɣda Massan (VAS)	Teyacanani Camali Chiczin Gen. Iccapon Ixtliquiahuitl (KIA) Gen. Nelli Thalpin (executed)
Units involved
Iqozi Air Force	Cuhonhicah Air Force
Strength
~200 aircraft including ~140 crossing into Cuhonhico 210 ballistic missiles and unguided rockets	100s of SAM sites & AAA guns 140 F-86s dozens of other aircraft ~10s of naval combat vessels
Casualties and losses
69 aircraft shot down 6 pilots taken prisoner 27 personnel killed	~200 aircraft destroyed ~2 dozen navy ships 34,741 personnel killed 8,420 civilians killed

Operation Kwelanga 99 was an operation launched by the Revolutionary People’s Front Air Force in retaliation to surprise airstrikes on Democratic Iqozi by Cuhonhico, which had begun Operation Nahui Ollin just three hours before. It involved nearly 200 aircraft, including nearly 140 aircraft crossing into Cuhonhico, and was the largest Iqozi air operation of the early war period. Cuhonhico had finished striking multiple airfields deep into Democratic Iqozi hours prior and falsely believed that all or most of their aircraft had been destroyed on the ground. As a result, the Cuhonhicah invasion force launched from airstrips and staging grounds expecting little to no resistance. This momentary lapse in security allowed an immediate Iqozi strike force led by Maja Zofañu, the daliri dji ala (“wing commander”) of the First Volunteer Air Service, to penetrate enemy airspace without notice and bomb air and naval bases at Niokazi, Mashipoto, Sherikisika, Mesoyasanga, Chebala and Mambazi, as well as several smaller associated targets. The effects of Kwelanga 99 were obvious and immediate, as the Cuhonhicah were unable to achieve universal air superiority during the first two years of the invasion, while being similarly forced to scale back their plans for a simultaneous naval invasion. Since the end of the war, the operation has been extensively depicted in media both in Phansi Uhlanga and abroad.

Prelude

Just a few hours prior, the Cuhonhicah Air Force struck numerous targets in Operation Tesiutl. These strikes were intended to destroy its Iqozi counterpart while the latter was still on the ground, thereby leaving Cuhonhico with total air dominance over the battlefield. These strikes were a component of a larger plan for Operation Nahui Ollin, or the Cuhonhicah invasion of Iqozi. While Tesiutl was going on, Cuhonhicah ground and naval forces had been simultaneously massed along the border and at key forward harbors, disembarking with an intended arrival on target just after the initial strikes had ended. Iqozi intelligence however had received advanced warning of the invasion thanks to sympathetic informants within the neighboring Olochtist regime and had made necessary defensive preparations. Much of its aircraft were relocated to hardened underground bunkers in the Lithaba Botala mountains and deep into the Nyeleti rainforest. Part and parcel of this effort, undertaken by Democratic Iqozi in total operational secrecy, was the propagation and distribution of sophisticated decoys to bases near the border. This deceived the Cuhonhicah into believing the Iqozi had failed to detect the military buildup on its border and then again into believing that their strike had been successful.

Brigadier General Moshe Khethang, commander of the Revolutionary People’s Front Air Force, planned the operation with Dda. Maja Zofañu and Wing Commander Meɣiɣda Massan in the weeks prior to the attack. Zofañu and Massan were the overall heads of the Volunteer Air Service, which had begun as a joint effort by Tyresia and Talahara to train and advise the Iqozi on building up a modern air force. News of the impending invasion however would see these foreign technicians and advisors pressed into service as fighter and bomber pilots. The VAS would remain nominally under Iqozi command and would on paper be funded by them, in practice however it operated as an independent unit funded by the Rubric states. Within hours of the Cuhonhicah attack, which succeeded mainly in cratering the runways of select air bases, virtually all damage was repaired and planes were taking off.

Battle of Mesoyasanga

At 4:00 AM, elements of the First Volunteer Air Service including 99 Electric Lightning and P61 Lightning II jets took off from Ngondabwala and Gamarulelo air bases with the intent to strike enemy air and port facilities in and around Mambazi, Chebala, Sherikisika, and Mesoyasanga. Armed with AS.12 air-to-surface missiles and bombs, among other munitions, the assembled air regiment flew towards the coast and over the Ozeros, refueling mid-air at maximal distance in order to penetrate Cuhonhicah airspace at the very edge of the latter’s capacity for detection. At the same time, half a dozen ships of the Revolutionary People’s Front Navy departed from hidden facilities along the coast, including vessels holding Iqozi naval infantry, intending to synchronize with the air mission for a full scale attack on the invasion force. The Iqozi plan was to use the element of surprise afforded to them by the failure of Operation Tesiutl to deliver a devastating blow to the northern Cuhonhicah port facilities being used as launching points. Naval infantry with the support of the air force would seize offshore natural gas drilling platforms critical for the Olochtists to finance the war, forcing their navy to fight a costly campaign of artificial island hopping. The naval infantry, ferried in MP-64 “Lark” and SO.1221 Djinn helicopters, rapidly overwhelmed the targeted drilling platforms’ defenders in a short firefight, at which point they placed a large number of mines and explosives which successfully detonated shortly after the attackers were evacuated.

While this destruction was taking place, the Volunteer Air Service’s assembled forces split into four distinct squadrons, 24 fighter-bombers in the first three with an additional 3 joining the squadron targeting the Mesoyasanga island. These squadrons were codenamed Kwelanga-24, 48, 72, and 27 respectively. Kwelanga-27 was under overall command of Vice-Captain Pelinor Jebar, who flew so low during the attack on Mesoyasanga that billboard became affixed onto the tail of her Lightning II. This was discovered only after returning to base. Photos taken of the aircraft during landing, in which the snagged billboard resembles a victory banner, became the immediate focus of propaganda efforts by the Iqozi government. Other pilots throughout the operation consistently flew so low that power and telephone cables from targeted cities attached themselves to the tails of their aircraft, which became a significant flight risk if the pilots were insufficiently prepared. Kwelanga-27 successfully blew up numerous berthing facilities, drilling platforms, hangars and airstrips, as well as critical observation facilities such as radar stations that severely retarded the effectiveness of Operation Nahui Ollin.

Just a few minutes later the other three squadrons would strike similar targets at Chebala, Mambazi, and Sherikisika, dealing significant damage to each and forcing the Cuhonhicah to divert reserve air units away from a counterattack on Kwelanga-27. Vice-Captain Jebar shot down two separate Cuhonhicah F-86s in separate dogfights during the battle, the latter of which has become a subject of many films as the engagement saw him maneuver abruptly above an enemy fighter and destroy it with machine gun fire directly into the cockpit. This event happened in the latter stages of the battle, when elements of the Cuhonhicah defenders peeled off to respond to diversionary attacks elsewhere. Several Iqozi Lightning II’s were shot down during said attacks, however they were successful in eliminating the Cuhonhicah SAM sites preventing further attack. Several Iqozi Komar-class and Osa-class missile boats simultaneously blockaded the ports at Sherikisika and Mambazi, preventing the movement of more than sixty ships with sea mines and heavily shelling port facilities. In response, the Cuhonhicah navy swifty dispatched several Mk I Swift Boats as well as a Boston-class cruiser. This response force was able to sink two of the Komars, which allowed them to then focus on the Osas. However, Air Group fighter-bombers by that point forced the Cuhonhicah response force into retreat before additional losses were incurred.

Elements of the other three Air Group squadrons still possessing bombs and ammunition then flew to link up with Kwelanga-27, with the amassed aircraft then covering the retreat of the Iqozi naval task force. Several more aircraft were shot down during this withdrawal but the Cuhonhicah were unable to mount a coordinated response in kind.

Battle of Niokazi

The Battle of Niokazi, also called the A4 Airstrike, was a surprise air operation conducted in the opening hours of the Third Uhlangan Civil War. Conceived of as being constituent to Operation Kwelanga-99, it consisted of 36 fighter-bombers and 6 tankers penetrating Cuhonhicah airspace well below the range of their radar and striking the Ahuiltiatl-4 military base. Ahuiltiatl was a sprawling “super-base” complex set up to support Olochtist operations during the Impfondo Crisis which had become the primary staging point for Operation Nahui Ollin’s Army Group Center. Located on the southern bank of the Uhlanga river adjacent in the industrial heart of Niokazi, across its thirteen kilometer expanse was a collection of small Iqozi villages nestled against the Great Escarpment south of the Botala mountains. Beyond these settlements was the Phulanoha, a network of gently sloping valleys which for millennia had been considered a backdoor into Iqozi’s western highlands. Operation Nahui Ollin, whose secrecy had been spoiled months before, would see Army Group Center launching a massive thrust across the Uhlanga and sweeping up westward through the valleys in order to lay siege to Ngondabuala, which had become an important industrial site owing to the mines there. Key to this was Operation Tesiutl, which was to wipe out the Iqozi air force before the invasion could commence but which had instead been almost totally foiled.

Though Niokazi was located right on the Cuhonhicah border, flying directly toward it would have caused the strike force to be detected by air defense bases equipped with modern surface-to-air missiles. This would have led to the loss of all 36 combat aircraft, necessitating instead a long, dangerous and indirect route be flown instead over the Matobe basin, where detection would be much less likely. At 4:05 AM, the squadron entered Cuhonhico about 120 kilometers southeast of Mpongondundu. The assembled aircraft flew at such a low altitude as to put them at risk from the treetops of the Nyeleti rainforest beneath. The air regiment flew under total radio silence to avoid detection and refueled approximately 80 kilometers in, with the tankers then returning under escort from a small separate interceptor force. At which point the Lightning IIs then proceeded southwest directly to Niokazi with their radars switched off in order to further reduce recognition possibilities by Cuhonhico. About three quarters of the squadron possessed the maximum number of air-to-surface missiles and bombs, leaving the remaining fourth (armed with air-to-air missiles) acting as a guard. About 1 hour prior to the strike, Iqozi conducted multiple rocket attacks across the border at sites about 40 kilometers west of the border as a diversionary tactic. This had little destructive effect but was successful in fooling the Cuhonhicah regarding the nature of Iqozi’s response.

At around 10 kilometers outside of the target, the air regiment divided into thirds so as to allow the force to attack Niokazi from three separate directions. While several of the fighters were briefly detected on the approach they were mistaken for Cuhonhicah aircraft owing to the extreme operational secrecy of Nahui Ollin. Achieving virtually total surprise, every airfield located at the A4 base was bombed in a series of five passes. Runways were struck first to prevent any of the base’s assembled aircraft from taking off, making the base’s hangars easy targets for the regiment. A coordinated anti-air response by the Cuhonhicah during that time was impossible owing to the chaos of the bombing and a subsequent Iqozi rocket attack launched shortly after the culmination of air operations. By the time the last pass had finished and the remaining Iqozi jets were returning home just two had been shot down and another damaged by AA fire.

Aftermath

The Iqozi were able to destroy more than 15 F-84s, 11 F-86s, 21 other fighter-bombers, 4 transports, a tanker, 27 helicopters and 9 B-52 bombers delivered the week before. Another 9 were damaged beyond repair, including 2 bombers. Seventeen Cuhonhicah pilots were killed as well as several hundred other assorted military personnel, including Bridadier General Iccapon Ixtliquiahuitl who was killed while inspecting a hangar containing the new bombers. The A4 air base was unable to conduct military operations for more than six months following the attack, greatly delaying the intended timetables for Operation Nahui Ollin and retarding the combat effectiveness of Army Group Center by as much as 55%. The Cuhonhicah general staff had intended for the base to provide air support to Army Groups West and Center directly in their initial push into Iqozi, while its prodigious littoral facilities would serve as a launchpad for Center’s mad dash to the Thaba Botala mountains. The strike however destroyed much of these facilities and necessitated that the base next to nearby Tufibwala, which had not been extensively targeted, be used as the primary launchpad instead. This base however was located where the Uhlanga river was almost seven kilometers wider than at Niokazi and was built on lower ground, making it less effective in that task. Army Group Center had to be extensively and rapidly reorganized in light of the airstrike, with much of its planned air support now having to come instead from attack helicopters.

This move also weakened Army Group East, which itself now had to buttress its invasion of the marshy Matobe basin with airborne helicopter troops. The ports at Sherikisika, Chebala and Mambazi had been badly damaged during the operation, with much of their facilities still burning by the end of the day. At Mesoyasanga, the damage was especially severe owing to the large buildup of materiel and munitions. The battle in the harbor destroyed more than two dozen ships on its own as well as two wings of aircraft intended to provide support to the planned naval invasion of eastern Iqozi. The damage was severe enough as to force the Cuhonhicah high command to merge the remnants of the 1st and 2nd Ozerosi Flotillas into a single outsized fleet. This new naval force, hastily commissioned as the “Great Northern Fleet”, now had the unenviable task of simultaneously defending the Cuhonhicah coast, protecting its merchant fleet in the Ozeros, neutralizing the Iqozi navy, landing naval infantry to support the invasion, and enacting a blockade of Iqozi. This was considered overly ambitious of the Teyacanani by the General Staff even with the prior two fleets. This caused hours of fierce argumentation among Chiczin’s generals who repeatedly pleaded with the dictator to scale back his plans, to which he ultimately relented.

Teyacanani Camali Chiczin and the Cuhonhicah military were dealt a major blow by Kwelanga-99, both in terms of its material effect on Operation Nahui Ollin and the demoralization of its invasion forces. General Nelli Thalpin, overall commander of air defenses around Mesoyasanga, was charged with espionage and conspiring against the Teyacanani with a foreign adversary and publicly burned to death. At least seventeen other staff officers were demoted and transferred to combat units while Thalpin’s family was imprisoned in a concentration camp. The latter move proved especially unpopular among the Cuhonhicah officer class, which generally represented the aristocratic elements of society of which the Thalpins were considered prestigious. Despite the success of the operation however it also left the Iqozi air force significantly weakened. The losses included more than 40% of its total air force, which had already been gravely weakened in the previous civil war and subsequent purges by the revolutionary government. In total, more than 100 aircraft were lost across the whole of Kwelanga-99, which caused the air force to take a backseat role providing air defense around key cities during the early years of the war. The Volunteer Air Service suffered comparatively moderate losses and became Democratic Iqozi’s de facto air force until late 1965.