Double the Army

The Double the Army strategy, also translated as Using One Army on Two Fronts, was a military manoeuvre by Themiclesian general Gwjang M′ei. In 731, Gwjang prime minister, with five other senior figures, was campaigning with a large army 26 regiments (about 34,000 men) in Columbia. He was somewhat successful from March to October, but the prolongation of the war was threatening morale. Fearing that he would have to winter in Columbia, he sent for refurbishments frome home. However, news came that nomads from the east were preparing for an invasion. Themiclesia's envoy in the region had been killed without warning, and advance forces were moving westwards. This placed Gwjang in a difficult situation. His army was composed of men from 15 prefectures, over half of what the country had, and if a large nomadic invasion were to materialize, the country would be under-strengthed to defend itself, and the morale in the army he had would further plummet once news arrived; however, Gwjang was also unwilling to relinquish what he thought was a deserved victory in the coming spring.

Thousands of miles away from the eastern frontier, he reasoned that the nomads would take advantage of the current mobilization if they ever found out that several prefectures were lacking in manpower. With his colleagues assenting, Gwjang issued writs to mobilize in this specific way: for the prefectures not yet mobilized, one half of the available men were to be placed under arms but held in place; for the prefectures already mobilized, of the remaining men, one eighth were to be mobilized and marched to the eastern front but stopped half way, until those from the other prefectures mustered and caught up. This accomplished three objectives. First, the mobilized prefectures and their men in Columbia would receive news that the unmobilized ones were being mobilized, so that the burden of the battle was seen as shared fairly between regions. Second, the nomads would, in all likelihood, learn that all parts of Themiclesia were being mobilized to some degree, thus hiding the fact that half of the country's militias were fighting a sea away. Third, the force in Columbia would be bolstered by the news of a recent mobilization that may take their place soon.

As a result, Gwjang's campaign in Columbia was a resounding success, and the nomads to the east never invaded Themiclesia. And later historians have commented that this single army had a positive effect on two opposite fronts, lauding Gwjang for his creative thinking.