Supreme Council of the Republic
Supreme Council of the Revolution بىرېن ئىنقىلاب ئالىي كېڭىشى Biren Inqilobining Yuqori Kengashi | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Type | |
| Type |
|
| Leadership | |
Leader with Honor | Erkin Sabir since 5 September 2002 |
Premier | Anvar Almas since 18 June 2018 |
| Structure | |
| Seats | 40 |
| File:Birenstan Council seating.svg | |
Political groups | Presiding: Leader with Honor: 1 seat
Serving: Centrists: 15 seats
Old Guards: 13 seats
Reformists: 9 seats
|
| Meeting place | |
 | |
| Taglikend, Birenstan Capitol, Birenstan | |
The Supreme Council of the Revolution (Biren: بىرېن ئىنقىلاب ئالىي كېڭىشى, Biren Inqilobining Yuqori Kengashi, lit. Supreme Council of the Biren Revolution) is the consitutional court of Birenstan, that also serves as a de facto upper house for the Great People's Assembly and as an executive council appointing members of the Service Sector and the courts. Created to ensure that Birenstan continues to follow the principles of the people's state, the Council wields significant power and influence in the country's government.
The Council consists of the Leader with Honor and 39 serving members who serve until mandatory retirement at age 75. While the Leader is technically the highest ranking member, it is largely a presiding position; instead the Premier wields the most power. As the nation's consitutional court, it is tasked with ruling on whether laws and actions by the Peoples' Sector are in fact constitutional, with the power to strike down them down if it decides they are not. In addition the Council has legislative powers in the form of a veto against laws passed by the Great People's Assembly. While the Council lacks legislative initiative, or the ability to propose a new law, its veto powers makes it a major part of the legislative process. Finally, the council has the power to appoint high ranking members of the Service Sector and judges of the courts, although all appointments must be approved by the Assembly by a majority vote.
Before Consitutional reforms were passed in 1993, the Council held an absolute veto and could make appointments without approval from the Assembly. Along with the end of the Old Guards' dominance of the Council, the body has been sigificantly less obstructionist to ruling governments in the Assembly. Despite the reforms, it is still a powerful body, and it is considered by many to be the institutional heart of the peoples' state.