Supreme Council of the Republic

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Supreme Council of the Revolution

بىرېن ئىنقىلاب ئالىي كېڭىشى
Biren Inqilobining Yuqori Kengashi
Coat of arms or logo
Type
Type
Leadership
Great Leader
Erkin Sabir
since 5 September 2002
Premier
Anvar Almas
since 18 June 2018
Structure
Seats40
File:Birenstan Council seating.svg
Political groups
Presiding:
  Great Leader (1)
Serving:
  Centrists: (15)
  Old Guards: (13)
  Reformists: (9)
Elections
Appointment by the Great Leader on advice of the Secretary-General
Meeting place
Kazakhstan Senate 2018-04-26.jpg
Taglikend, Birenstan Capitol, Birenstan

The Supreme Council of the Revolution (Biren: بىرېن ئىنقىلاب ئالىي كېڭىشى, Biren Inqilobining Yuqori Kengashi, lit. Supreme Council of the Biren Revolution) is the consitutional court of Birenstan, that also serves as a de facto upper house for the General People's Assembly and as an executive council by appointing members of the Service Sector and parts of the judiciary. Created to ensure that Birenstan continues to follow the principles of the peoples' state, the Council wields significant power and influence in the country's government.

The Council consists of the Great Leader and 39 serving members who serve until mandatory retirement at age 75. While the Leader is technically the highest ranking member, it is largely a presiding position; instead the Premier wields the most power. As the nation's consitutional court, it is tasked with ruling on whether laws and actions by the Peoples' Sector are in fact constitutional, with the power to strike down them down if it decides they are not. In addition the Council has legislative powers in the form of a limited veto against laws passed by the General People's Assembly. Although the Assembly can override the veto with a two-thirds majority, doing so is a major obstacle and vetoes usually stand. Finally, the council has the power to appoint high ranking members of the Service Sector and judges of the courts, although all appointments must be approved by the Assembly.

Before consitutional reforms were passed in 1993, the Council held an absolute veto and made appointments without approval from the Assembly. With the end of the Old Guards' dominance of the Council in the late 1990s, the body has become sigificantly less obstructionist to ruling governments in the Assembly. Despite the reforms, it is still considered by many to be the institutional heart of the peoples' state.