House of Lords (Themiclesia)

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House of Lords

門下省

men-gra′-srêng′
Type
Type
Term limits
hereditary or life
History
FoundedFebruary 21, 1845 (1845-02-21)
Preceded byCouncil of Ordinary Attendants
Council of Royal Attendants
Seats178
Meeting place
Chamber Ultraporte

The Themiclesian House of Lords (門下省, men-gra′-srêng′) or more formally the House of Princes, Peers, and High Counsellors is the upper house of the Themiclesian parliament. It was created in 1845 from several existing organizations involved in the legislative process on the model of the Tyrannian House of Lords, as a compromise with the parliamentary Liberals, demanding franchise reform, to secure Conservative influence. Its powers originally extended over legislative, executive, and judicial affairs, though its has been considerably restricted in many subsequent reforms. Currently, it consists of around 170 members and primarily exercise an advisory and cautionary role.

History

Formation

Since the Great Settlement of 1801, which established the power of the elected Council of Protonotaries to control legislation and taxation, the Conservatives as a political party dominated the house, with the primary agenda of supervising executive misconduct and preventing immoderate taxation and expenditure. As Themiclesia's merchant class recovered and were saturated with the ideals of Enlightenment, the traditional form of election to the Council was considered arcane and undemocratic.[1] Previously, merchants sought to gain influence in the legislative process through bribery of gentle electors, but due to their financial security and unaccountability once elected, it was rarely effective. By 1840, frustrated at the effective monopoly of representation of established gentle houses, the merchant leagues began several disruptive "trade actions", whereby industrialists refused to process the agricultural products from farms owned by rural gentry as a form of protest. This so greatly injured the commercial interests of the upper class that reconciliation was immediate.

The Liberals proposed to grant the franchise, on the Tyrannian model, to all educated and propertied males. The land-owning, aristocratic Conservatives were concerned that the reform would produce a gross Liberal leaning in the Council. The Conservatives sought to consolidate influence by formalizing a second chamber that retained veto power over bills from the elected house. This second chamber drew on the existing Council of Royal Attendants (侍中省) and Council of Ordinary Attendants (常侍省), which provided advice to the Emperor on how his powers should be exercised. The function of these two bodies, as non-partisan advisors, became already more pronounced when the executive and legislative had become partisan and consistently troubled the throne with conflicting requests. Technically, legislation could not receive royal approbation until one Royal Attendant and Ordinary Attendant had advised the Emperor of the bill; however, as there was no limit to the number of either of them, passing a bill was extremely easy, provided the emperor was inclined to assent. The new house would require the assent of at least half their number in the legislative process, rather than merely any two of them.

To create the widest Conservative bloc possible, the princes and peers were granted the house's membership; formerly lacking an effective way to enter politics, they assented enthusiastically. The Liberals, while not entirely satisfied with the situation, found the compromise acceptable. According to the first Liberal prime minister, the Conservatives lost nothing, and the Liberals gained something (the Conservatives had a veto before and after the reforms, but the Liberals gained representation). The emperor was given considerable control over the membership of the house, still allowed to appoint Royal and Ordinary Attendants and create peers at will. Ironically, the emperor was made more politically important by this change in affairs. Additionally, since the institution of rural election was not abolished, Conservatives still expected to dominate the higher rungs of the civil service, from which most new members of the upper house were expected to be appointed. The bill was passed in 1844 and came into effect after the election of 1845, which, as the Conservatives had feared, produced a massive Liberal majority.

Reforms

As the upper house was conceived as a Conservative body, conflict with the elected house was a constant (and some argue, dominant) theme in its history.

Function

Legislative

The primary function of the House of Lords is as a second chamber in the legislative process, having the power to propose, debate, amend, and pass bills. The chamber initially enjoyed all the formal authorities that the Commons possessed—including the right to propose and amend money bills, or to refuse passage, but this particular right has been curtailed by statute in 1913.[2] The Lords in the house or committees have power to summon experts to acquire opinions on bills.

The Lords maintain the power to refuse passage of a bill from the Commons, until a general election has occurred and it is passed again by the Commons. At this point, the support of any two members of the house will be sufficient to pass the bill, regardless of how the rest of the Lords vote.

Executive

The power of the Lords over executive actions is directly inherited from the traditional powers of the Councils of Attendants. Any act of the government that requires the assent of the crown must be presented to the House of Lords, where it is given a pro forma reading and presented to the sovereign for approval. Generally, little debate occurs on these acts. In recent years, some governments has resented even this degree of scrutiny and sought to abolish this formality, since any speeches made may influence the reputation of the government. The Reductions in Formalities Act of 1975 provides that secondary legislation may be presented to the sovereign directly, without passing the House of Lords; however, both the Liberals and Conservatives have generally sought to follow this custom despite its being non-mandatory.

Judicial

Review of capital sentences

The judicial role of the House of Lords is, again, connected to those of its predecessors. Prior to the abolition of capital punishment in 1853, the Lords retained an absolute veto on its use. After the Exchequer of Appeals and Home Secretary had reviewed the capital sentences meted out during the year, the list of sentences would be read, one-by-one, to the Lords; members would be called by name and declare either "Upon my conscience, this case is satisfactory", indicating that the punishment was justified, or "Upon my conscience, this case is not satisfactory", indicating the punishment was unreasonable. A simple majority in the chamber was required to validate the sentence. Scholars have asserted that, since the lords were called upon, by name, individually to give their judgment, it resulted in a very restrictive use of capital punishment, as few wanted to be seen as profligate with capital punishment. After abolition, this procedure became obsolete.

Impeachment and attainder

The Lords have power to try impeachments that the Commons pass but not to begin impeachment proceedings, except against the house's own members. When impeachment trial begins, the Commons command the President of Tribunes or one of his subordinates to present its arguments to the Lords. The defendant, depending on his identity, can only be arrested by the Commons, if not a courtier, or by the Lords, if a courtier. The royal family, nobility, and civil servants above a certain rank were deemed courtiers. The Lords may summarily refuse to proceed on impeachments if they refused to admit the President of Tribunes. After the defedant has been brought before the house, arguments are heard much as a normal trial. If the defendant was a commoner, he is represented by a member of the house and is not present in person; if no member of the house sponsors the defendant's case, the Lord Speaker is at liberty to appoint a member to do so.

After arguments, the members of the house act as judge of both fact and law; a simple majority is required for conviction. If a conviction is secured, the house also determines punishment by a simple majority. Historically, any punishment found in the law may be imposed, including any form of capital punishment, unlimited fines, imprisonment, and punishments that extended to the family of the convicted. After the establishment of the House of Lords in 1845, this procedure has rarely been used. But after the 1948 and 1950 impeachment trials of Lieutenant-general Kraw and Rear Admiral Tsro, respectively, the question of separation of powers came into public attention and was subject to much criticism. Particularly since Kraw was sentenced, in absentia, to hang himself largely due to public anger in Dayashina rather than any domestic capital crime, the susceptability of the upper house to act impulsively on the perceived prejudices of the upper class was well-articulated by public commentators and members of the lower house.[3] The Limitations on Judicial Powers Act of 1953 limited the range of possible punishments to removal from office and personal debarrment from public service.

Seat

  1. Traditionally, the gentry of each prefecture met every third year to rate candidates for public service. One candidate per prefecture would receive the rate of Second Class, whose customary appointment was to the Council of Protonotaries, where their duties were to draft legislation. Though not legislators in the modern sense, these individuals were historically expected to represent the opinions of the rural gentry, who constitutionally formed the enfranchised class. It is through this power that, in 1801, the Council began to block government business, establishing the principle of legislative oversight in Themiclesia.
  2. Historians think this is related to the share of revenues influenced by the shifting economic structure. As the Commons represented the commercial and industrial classes, which came to dominate the economy approaching the end of the 19th century, it was believed the Lords, whose income was primarily agricultural, should not be able to interfere with the spending of the Commons.
  3. Lieutenant-general Kraw was implicated in a mysterious case of indecent contact with an underaged female while in Dayashina. The female subsequently committed suicide, accusing in a letter Kraw of violating her and causing her shame. The Dayashinese press printed the letter, engendering public fury against the occupation forces (of which Themiclesia was not one). In view of the danger it may case for the occupational powers, the upper house chose to try Kraw by the process of impeachment and use its reserve powers to impose a specific punishment to soothe public discontent. Domestic jurists noted that the sentence was problematic because even if the alleged crime were true, it did not carry capital punishment, so that the sentence to hang himself was "not within the law". Nevertheless, the sentence was not subject to appeal, so Kraw eventually hanged himself.