1981 Daekanese-Urranese conflict

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1981 Daekanese-Urranese conflict
1981 collage png 1.png
Clockwise from the top left: KJ-3 being launched by DPN Yulyeong, the DPN Geonjanghan sinking after being struck by Urranese missiles, a downed Urranese F-4 viewed from a JS-9s gun camera, the URS Jian on patrol
Date2 March 1981 - 24 March 1981
Location
East Daekan Sea/Tsushima Sea
Result Ceasefire
Belligerents
 Daekan
Supported by:
 Urran
Supported by:
Commanders and leaders
Daekan Hong Tae-Hyun
(Premier, Commander-in-Chief)
Daekan Chun Ji-Hu
(Minister of Defence)
Daekan Won Jong-Su
(Commander of the DPAN) <br
Urran Hayato Igarashi
(Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief)
Urran Xi Li Mai
(Minister of Defence)
Urran Yoshio Okada
(Grand Admiral of the Navy)
Casualties and losses
Daekan 1 destroyer sunk, 1 frigate heavily damaged, 3 aircraft shot down, 41 dead Urran 1 destroyer sunk, 1 destroyer lightly damaged, 2 aircraft shot down, 44 dead

The 1981 Daekanese-Urranese conflict, known in Daekan as the East Sea Incident (Daekanese: 동해 사고; Donghae sago) and in Urran as the Battle of Tsushima (Urranese: 対馬の戦い;Tsushima no tatakai), was an undeclared, 22-day long period (March 2 to March 24) of skirmishes between the People's Socialist Republic of Daekan and the Constitutional Republic of Urran. The conflict started when a Daekanese fighter flight got into a mock dogfight with Urranese fighters after the former got too close, with one of the sides opening fire soon after. The short conflict was mainly fought with naval and air forces on both sides, and ended in a ceasefire agreement signed on the 24th of March, 1981.

Background

The more aggressive and ambitious diplomatic posture the PSRD adopted in the 70s, emboldened by its rapid economic recovery, had severe repercussions in its relations with foreign powers, including Urran. Despite Urran's rather isolationist stance, it was viewed as a potential threat by the Daekanese leadership ( it was first mentioned as such, however, in the Forward Defence strategy adopted in 1966) on account of its "reactionary government" and sizable military, as well as its relations with Daekanese rivals such as Esgonia and Yamatai. The result was increased alert of Daekanese naval and air forces assigned to the East Daekan Sea, in particular the East Sea Fleet itself. Overflights of Urranese military as well as civillian vessels by Daekanese fighters and maratime patrol aircraft was also common. Actions like this increased from 1978, with the beginning of the Sixth 5-year plan.

However, with the catastrophic concequences to Daekanese economy that the failure of the Seventh 5-year plan brought about by 1980, Daekanese mentality shifted from ambitious posturing to desparate paranoia. The worsening relations with Daekan's formerly tusted partners such as Azenyanistan and Kirana also contributed to this. Many in Premier Hong Tae-Hyun's government suggested that Daekan should not allow potential threats to take advantage of the country's worsening economic situation. It was proposed that Daekan should project strength to ensure its security and make any potential aggression against it seem too costly. This resulted in the further intesification of naval and air patrols in both the East and the South seas, as well as on the Esgonian border.

Conflict

2nd of March incident

In the early morning hours of the 2nd of March 1981, a 2-ship flight of JS-9Bs from the DPAAF's 32nd Fighter Squadron out of Meolli AFB, was undertaking routine patrol roughly 400 kilometres north-east of Meolli island. In the cockpits were Captain Tae-Woong as flight lead and First Lieutenant Hu Seong-Ho as number two. At 5:39 AM, they spotted two contacts to their east on their radars. This was a three-ship flight of UAF F-4Es led by TBD, that had spotted them in return. The two flights approached each other for visual identification, as was the usual conduct in these cases, and entered visual range of each other at 5:45. The Daekanese and Urranese fighters flew northbound, parallel to each other for 5 more minutes before the JS-9Bs started probing the Urranese flight, sharply changing course toward and then away from them.

After 13 more minutes of back and forth, at which point both flights entered a deep cloud canopy at about 20,000 feet, a navigational error caused the Daekanese fighters to end up less than one kilometre .

Tensions increasing (3rd to 9th of March)

Action off Meolli island (9th of March)

Sinking of URS Jian (10th and 11th of March)

Continued posturing and talks (12th to 23rd of March)

Ceasefire signed (24th of March)

Aftermath

International reactions