Battle of Nowa Grudak (1924)
| Battle of Nowa Grudak (1924) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Kyotakavian-Svogardan Conflict | |||||||
 Union Guard on the Mbersk Road. (19 August 1924) | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 KLA Union Guard |
 PISF SVDF USC | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Regan Klaidev Tomasz Kelskiv Boris Wazkon † Elaria Vodin Katlania Tzekic Mattias Holgav |
Col. Emirus Talian Lt. Col. Terion Gallus † Lt. Col. Eric Malion Uzluz Rex † Breton Kalionox † Ferus Malliox Eurius Nelton † Kaston Kevrani † Alexandra Longian † Darion Zelanius | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
3,500 7,800 Total: 11,300 |
4,000 8,200 2,500 Total: 14,700 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
|
158 killed, 313 wounded, 14 missing |
582 killed, 1,006 wounded, 29 missing 7 armoured cars destroyed | ||||||
|
2,137 civilians killed and wounded | |||||||
The Battle of Nowa Grudak was a street battle that took place throughout late 1924 in Nowa Grudak. Kyotakavian paramilitaries fought their Svozgardan counterparts who were aided (and chiefly directed) by the Protectorate Internal Security Force and was seen as the last battle of the larger, and long-running Svozgardan-Kyotakavian conflict, before the beginning of the Third War for Independence.
Background
Nowa Grudak is one of the most ethnically divided cities in Kyotakavia, with the northern portion of the city being around 52% ethincally Svozgardan. The two sections are almost divided entirely down the Mbersk Road and PISF checkpoints into the north of the city rested almost entirely along it with a permanent presence of approximately 2,000 officers. The southern portion, whilst nominally still under the authority of the PISF, in practice had several major 'bandit-country' regions where Union Guard checkpoints would be the primary authority. Two Union Guard Regiments were drawn almost entirely from the city and had headquarters in the southern portion as well as the command for the 2nd 'Nodstok' Front which totalled around 30,000 soldiers in the entirety of Nodstok. Additionally, the KLA had almost the entirety of its 11th Division in the city, having moved a large oppeartional capacity in Nowa Grudak over the course of the 1920s as recruitment bolstered as a result of the 'collaborationist' government that had won the 1920 election.
Between 1920 and 1924, incidents of violence steadily rose, and in the Kyotakavian nationalist movement, there was a growing desire to 'test' the Svozgardan resolve in the city, and to give the PISF a bloody nose. Additionally, it would show Kyotakavian paramilitary resolve to protect Kyotakavians living in the north of the city, many of whom were prevented from voting in elections by Svozgardan paramilitaries such as the Svozgardan Volunteer Defence Force (SVDF).
As the 1925 election loomed, a general strike was called by the KUWC in response to economic downturn and closures of mines in Nodstok, and the Union Guard Army Council called a meeting in early July to discuss the possibility of moving to conduct military action. The proposal was dismissed narrowly, however two weeks later, the Government called for Svozgardan troops, specifically the PISF, to help them put down the strike. A second, emergency meeting was held, and almost unanimously it was agreed that if the KLA would agree to support the move, a concerted campaign would be undertaken. Three days later at a joint-meeting between the two groups Nodstok Commander's, a guarantee of support would be given.
The shooting of picketers (including KUSSC Representative for Albaniv Georgikov Alexi) in Stenzgord four days later saw KLA intervention that prevented a massacre as PISF officers opened fire, only prevented from overruning the picketers when KLA soldiers who had been sent to observe, acted without orders and charged the PISF, resulting in heavy casualties but providing time for picketers to flee. The move, whilst tactically a failure, and costing the KLA unit dearly, cemented KLA and Union Guard cooperation in Nodstok. PISF forces had been moved out of the city to help tackle the general strike and so rapid planning and preperation was undertaken to commence a campaign in Nowa Grudak at the end of the month.
The Union Guard informed the KLA of its preparations being completed on the 26 July, however agreed to wait until the 29 July as to provide the KLA time to complete its final planning a preparation, which secretly included plans to blow bridges in the west of the city along the Mbersk Road to provide the Union Guard an easier time in their attacks. Two days following, the KLA agreed to commence military operations the next morning and the KLA National Command provided the final approval.
The Battle
July Campaign
Elements of the 3rd Union Guard Regiment commenced an attack along the western section of the Mbersk Road on the 29 July at 09:00, successfully overrunning a PISF outpost on Jarn Street, killing 3 and wounding 7, before taking up positions along the stretch of the Mbersk Road running down to Katzan Lane. Sporadic firefights broke out into the Svozgardan section, with machine gun fire that overshot, hitting a building down Katzan Lane and injuring two civilians. By 15:15, the first SVDF units had mobilised to support the PISF in an effort to retake the street, however, after a four hour long battle and twenty casualties, the Svozgardan units withdrew to take up barricade positions in anticipation of a further Union Guard push.
Such a move was not to happen however, strict discipline was maintained as Union Guard leadership didn't want to become bogged down in a street-to-street bloodbath running up the roads and back-alleys into the Svozgardan section, resolved instead to test both the SVDF and PISF's ability to respond to such moves. Sniper overwatch was set up in a church on the corner of Katzan by the Union Guard, and at 19:05 Emirus Talian, Chief of the PISF was spotted arriving. After a brief discussion, an attempt was made by the sniper positioned in the church tower to hit Talian, however the shot missed and hit an aide stood less than a meter away.
In response three armoured cars were brought up to renew an attack before nightfall, however the vehicles, proceeding in a column, came to a halt almost immediately as the lead vehicle was struck by a petrol bomb, thrown from the third story window of a house on the street. The house was stormed, and the KLA member inside was killed after shooting and killing the officer who burst through the door. The attack floundered, the armoured car was impossible to move under sustained Union Guard fire and by 22:10, the PISF withdrew to their starting locations. Fifteen minutes later, two battalions of the 5th Union Guard Regiment stormed two forward barricades erected down the Mbersk Road from the positions of the 3rd Regiment, taking fourteen casualties but successfully driving the PISF out from the two mile stretch of the road.
Earlier in the day, a KLA bomb attack destroyed the Tamzkon Bridge in the western portion of the city, cutting off the company of PISF soldiers stationed at an outpost down Redon Road. Immediately following the blast, a subsequent Union Guard attack by the 12th Union Guard Regiment began, approaching from up Mbersk Road and down Redon Road, encircling the troops in the outpost. The PISF commander ordered an armoured car to provide cover from the other side of the bridge, delaying the Union Guard advance for over two hours before a KLA member, armed with a .55 inch anti-tank rifle killed the gunner and forced the driver to abandon the vehicle. Without the support of a machine gun, and running out of ammunition, the PISF soldiers were pushed out of the outpost and forced to ditch their equipment and jump into the Dansk River.
Overnight, the PISF additionally withdrew from other exposed positions across the Mbersk Road and incrementally began bringing up reinforcements. This however was stopped by the early morning as four KLA bombs killed one and disabled three convoys of supplies and men. A fifth bomb was detonated outside the PISF headquarters in northern Nowa Grudak, forcing the evacuation of staff members and necessitating the return of Talian from the Mbersk Road. The chaos created throughout the day of 30 July enabled the 3rd and 5th Regiments to secure almost an entire 5-mile stretch of the road, whilst the 12th Regiment build barricades on the other side of the river from the Tamzkon Bridge.
The SVDF responded to bombing attacks in the north of the city with retaliatory mortar strikes on Union Guard positions, initially seeing some success as a company of the 3rd Regiment broke under an SVDF counter attack along Statsk Street, however the arrival of reinforcing KLA as well as Union Guard leadership Mattias Holgav brought up reinforcements to plug the gap, forcing SVDF paramilitaries to withdraw from the advance after four hours of fighting. Mortar strikes and SVDF skirmishing with the 5th Regiment along the central-eastern section of the road was far less successful however, with the majority of mortars missing their targets and Union Guard having far more cover, turning it into a sniper battle. By the evening of 30 July, the attacks had stopped and PISF had organised a leadership meeting to discuss tactics to reclaim the Mbersk Road.
On the morning of 31 July, the plan was put into effect. Two columns of officers, one from western Nowa Grudak in a Svozgardan exclave would move to the western Mbersk Road held by the 12th Regiment. Simultaneously another column would cross the Rakic Bridge a mile down from the blown Tamzon Bridge, moving along the road to attack from the east. Both would be supported with armoured cars and officers would move street-to-street.
The eastern advance was cheered by nearby Svozgardan residents as it cross over the river before rifle fire from across the bridge forced people to retreat into their houses and officers to take to the ground. For the next three hours, sporadic rifle fire would slow the advance before a .55 anti-tank round blew the engine out of the lead armoured car, blocking the bridge whilst the PISF attempted to clear it under fire. The southern advance ran into immediate difficulties, as a large picket from the ongoing strike protested along the route. The streets were blocked with vehicles and sandbags and several rocks were thrown at officers who attempted to push the crowd back and as a result the advance was extremely slow, making them an easy target for the KLA. Two molotovs were thrown less than 1 mile into the advance, torching one of the armoured cars before a pipe bomb, set up behind one barricade, flipped the lead vehicle and killed four officers, resulting in retaliatory fire into the crowd. By now the southern push had completely stalled, and sniping efforts from Union Guard and KLA members in buildings forced the PISF to withdraw over the course of the day.
By sunset, the push on both fronts had completely failed, and very little progress had been made for almost no reward, a second meeting of PISF leadership would be called, with a plan hammered out to rely on night time raids of Headquarters, rather than assaulting the forward positions of the Union Guard and KLA. It reflected a move from the PISF, less as a simple military force, and more towards military policing, a task that had received little training but was decided was the only practical way for the PISF to achieve success against the paramilitaries who could rely on plenty of public support to hamper efforts of advance.
Mbersk Road car-bombing
Three days after the street battles had begun, on the 1 August, Alexandra Longian, an SLA Representative for a list seat and overall Commander of the United Svozgarda Corps paramilitary, visited a forward USC post along the Mbersk Road's western section, stopping for five minutes to converse with local commanders. During that time, KLA member Josiv Celkov ducked into her car and planted a 5-pound bomb inside the boot with a timer set for twenty-minutes before fleeing the scene with the help of KLA observers. Longian climbed back into the car with the local commander, intending to drive up Mbersk Road, before turning into the Svozgardan section of the city and driving to the USC headquarters.
The twenty-five minute drive brought Longian into view of the building, where she stood to wave to a nearby supporter who gave her a thumbs up. The bomb detonated only a few seconds later, propelling Longian out of the car, blowing out the back, killing all three nearly instantly and sending shrapnel flying, causing three injuries.
The brazen nature of the attack shocked the Svozgardan paramilitary movement; the SVDF would attempt to increase its assassination campaign, meeting very little success as thirteen mortar rounds launched in the evening killed thirteen civilians but not KLA or Union Guard personnel, the USC on the other hand became engaged in a five month leadership struggle which left the paramilitary with no direct command, and very little oversight of its local commanders with it not even recovering by the outbreak of the Third Independence War. Local USC commanders resorted to taking action without direct orders, launching a wave of reprisal assassination attempts that all failed, killing only 1 KLA member, and injuring numerous civilians, or by taking orders from the SVDF commanders.
August Campaign
Following the Mbersk Road car-bombing, and the effective decapitation of the USC that the attack delivered, a series of other bombings would take place, not aimed at the assassination of specific people, but to disrupt Svozgardan infrastructure and supply routes, with particular attention paid to PISF Precincts with four being hit by attacks over the course of the 2 - 15 August. Two car bombs were also detonated at a local garage in the north of the city, destroying thirteen PISF cars and causing thousands in damage.
Throughout the period, the PISF was engaged in running street battles with the Union Guard over Mbersk Road, driving the 3rd Regiment from the western Mbersk Road on the 6 August, only to be pushed out again on the 15, and suffering heavily in repeated attempts to break out from southern exclaves and retake the destroyed Tamzkon Bridge. The east saw brutal house-to-house fighting over the fortnight of the 6 to 15 August, with up to a hundred houses being torched over the course of the fighting and heavy economic damage inflicted on the area. SVDF mortar attacks during this period also ramped up, but with issues; as on the 14 August, a mortar fired by the SDVF struck a PISF vehicle driving up the Mbersk Road, blowing it apart and killing both men instantly.
Further down Mbersk in the west, engineering attempts to repair the Tamzkon Bridge were driven off by the Union Guard three times. There was also a second bombing at the Rakic Bridge just down the Mbersk Road which killed six and wounded nearly fifty and by the end of the 10 August, PISF attempts to retake the western portion of the Mbersk Road had been abandoned, with heavy casualties and two of five bridges destroyed. SVDF mortar attacks in the west were far more sporadic, and aimed usually at Union Guard positions rather than civilian targets, but a shortage of ammunition, poor communication and terrible coordination, especially between paramilitaries and the PISF, meant that attacks were rarely concentrated at the same time, and the few times they did, they were either light, or so poorly aimed as to force the PISF back themselves due to risk of friendly fire (with an incident involving a dud mortar round landing beside the vehicle of a PISF commander resulting in a brief breaking off of cooperation between the SVDF and PISF).
Atzan Lane bombing
On the 27 August 1924, Deputy Chief of the PISF, Lieutenant Colonel Terion Gallus entered a meeting with the SVDF Eastern and Western Commanders; Uzluz Rex and Breton Kalionox, at the Atzan Loyalist Club in Northern Nowa Grudak. It was arranged as a planning meeting between the PISF and SVDF, to arrange and plan a strategy to push the Union Guard out of Mbresk Road and a total of 13 SVDF and PISF senior officers were in attendance. After brief introductions, Terion, Uzlus and Breton entered the second floor office where 4 SVDF, and 2 PISF attendees were in discussion. Three minutes later, a 25-pound explosive device, planted by the KLA two nights prior, detonated, killing all 9 people in the room immediately. A guard stationed outside the bathroom opposite the room was also killed, as well as 2 civilians who were walking past the building when the bomb went off. A total of 38 people were injured, of which 21 were SVDF members, and windows of the neighbouring building were blown whilst the second floor collapsed onto the first.
The bombing would be the only time the KLA successful killed a member of PISF leadership, but the attack additionally crippled the SVDF and threw the succession of the Western and Eastern commands into disarray for nearly a month. It was the second time that the KLA had managed to kill commanding figures in the Svozgardan paramilitary movement in just one month and reprisal mortar attacks were conducted on the 28 and 29 of August in retaliation for the assassination.
Vozyn Ambush
On the 30 August, 16 PISF officers successfully ambushed a 10 man KLA patrol escorting the KLA Nowa Grudak Southern Command leadership Lieutenant General Boris Wazkon and Major General Elaria Vodin. Whilst driving down down Vozyn Lane, in the south of the city early in the morning, the lead car was disabled by an anti-tank bullet fired by a PISF officer if the building next door, blowing the engine block apart and forcing the 2 men inside to bail out. Both were struck by gunfire and killed as 35 PISF officers stormed out of the buildings both sides of the road, opening fire on the KLA as they tired to pull out. The vehicle to the rear was hit a total of twelve times, hitting neither the driver or passenger who continued to return fire, however the second to last vehicle was struck by a second anti-tank round that destroyed the front-right wheel.
A gunfight ensued between the two sides for over three minutes with over a hundred rounds fired, however when the smoke had settled the PSIF had succeeded in killing 8, including Boris in the only successful assassination attempt against a leadership figure in the KLA by the PISF. Several wounded PISF members were needed to be bused to the nearby Precinct and three of the KLA, including Boris' Deputy Elaria Vodin who clambered into the rear car when as it drove away.
Following the ambush, the KLA claimed that the PISF had refused the surrender of the KLA, shooting at least two members as they held a white flag in surrender, with the KLA statement labelling the PISF "Svozgardan butchers, whose tools are the bullet and baton rather than a meat cleaver." The PISF strictly denied that any members had attempted to surrender, and claimed that a false flag had been shown, before throwing grenades at the PISF when they stopped firing to take prisoners. Nonetheless, the result of ambush was a strict 'No Prisoner' policy on the part of the KLA when it came to the PISF, with soldiers under orders to refuse surrender, and indeed the story, along with other incidents of trapped KLA members shot rather than captured, reduced the willingness of members to surrender, with no such incidents of surrender occurring again for the duration of the battle with a widespread assumption that the PISF would shoot any survivors out of hand if they caught them.
Unlike the assassination of SVDF leadership three days prior, the KLA Southern Nowa Grudak Command didn't suffer from leadership turmoil, and Vodin succeeded Wazkon as the head of the Command a day later. The major differences in the command structure between Kyotakavian and Svozgardan paramilitaries meant that the assassination of senior leaders had a far lesser effect on the overall command and control of units on the ground and ultimately meant that the few successful assassinations pulled off by the PISF and SVDF ultimately had a far lesser impact on the KLA and Union Guard whose organised structures (with the National Command and Army Council respectively) enabled them to promote successors and maintain order in the paramilitaries.
September Campaign
October Campaign
November Campaign
December-early Campaign
Tostan Club Shooting
On the 17 December, the SVDF Eastern Commander, Kaston Kevrani entered the Tostan Club, often visited by SVDF and USC members, in order to speak to to the Mbersk Road West Brigadier Valus Kerian. As he entered the club at 11:12, two cars containing a total of 8 KLA members, drove up Tostan Street and parked both vehicles two buildings down from the club before waiting. After three minutes had passed, all 8 climbed out of the car and jogged down the sidewalk to the club, pushing their way past people in front of them, and burst through the front door armed with pistols, grenades and molotov cocktails. All 8 opened fire into the club, moving through the ground floor and throwing grenades into rooms as they went past. 2 moved upstairs; throwing molotov cocktails into two offices on the second floor before firing a total of twenty rounds through the walls and door. Kevrani as well as two other junior SVDF commanders were killed in the downstairs backroom when three men burst through the door firing semi-automatic pistols at close range, hitting Kevrani a total of eight times.
After four minutes of shooting, all 8 men, with one injury, fled the building, taking small arms fire from three SVDF members who had been in a local café five doors down. A total of thirty shots were fired in the street, with no hits to either side until the KLA fled back to the cars before driving away. They left 13 dead, and 28 injured SVDF and USC members inside the club whilst a fire raged on the second floor, destroying almost five hundreds intelligence documents which had been passed to the group by the PISF just a week earlier. It was the largest single loss of life in an assassination attack for the SVDF, and yet again the SVDF Eastern found itself leaderless as well as having lost numerous other junior and senior officers over the last five months of fighting.
The KLA ran a PISF checkpoint approaching the Mbersk Road, hitting and injuring one civilian in the process, and firing wildly into the guard post, ultimately hitting no one, whilst the already injured KLA member was hit by a stray rifle round just below the elbow which lodged itself into the back of the seat in front of him. The attack was ultimately hailed as a success at the KLA headquarters, with Vice-Brigadier Kostiv allegedly remarking that they'd "put the entire SVDF leadership into the ground" with the attack.
December-late Campaign
Polling Day violence
At 14:29 the SVDF launched three mortar rounds towards the polling station off of Wolnst Street, deep in the south of the city. All rounds missed, but the clear indication of threat to Kyotakavian polling stations stirred the KLA who had otherwise kept themselves to along the Mbersk Road. A further mortar attack of six rounds were directed to a polling station on Ulsk Lane at 14:57, and then five rounds towards another on Qersk Street at 15:32. 6 civilians were killed in total in the attacks, however a fourth attack conducted againast a polling station on Jaron Street at 16:08 was interrupted after the first two rounds as a section of the KLA's 2nd Division threw pipe bombs and molotovs. It is not exactly certain what happened, but reports indicated that a pipe bomb detonated one of the mortar dumps by the pit, setting of an explosion that sent a fireball thirty meters into the sky, killing all 11 SVDF men at the pits, and injuring three Kyotakavians. For the rest of the day, mortar attacks were called off as a result, with the positions moved elsewhere to prevent KLA retaliation.
In the south of the city, PISF officers attending polling stations were forced out by the arrival of KLA and Union Guard troops and though broadly, most withdrew with very little incident, at least two saw ferocious fighting. Along the Mbersk Road, polling stations were manned by Union Guard personnel, whilst in the north at least one was overrun by KLA militia who prevented voting for Svozgardans in a heavily ethnically Svozgardan area. Turnout amongst Svozgardan voters was significantly supressed, and the constituency seat that they held in Nowa Grudak was lost, largely attributed to the violence and threat of attack.
Aftermath
The Mbersk Road stretch of Nowa Grudak was devastated by the fighting with many shops closing down simply due to the threat of sniper fire and mortar attacks that had occurred almost daily. The transition towards peace was a slow one, and SVDF mortar attacks would continue, albeit sporadically over the next 4 weeks, until eventually the last attack on the 5 February. In the south of the city, regular mortar attacks by the SVDF had destroyed several buildings, brought local economies to a standstill, and further enflamed ethnic tensions as Svozgardans not already living in the exclaves or the north left to move there.
Casualties
A total of 1,442 people were killed over the course of the battle, making it one of the bloodiest of the wider conflict and especially noted for the high number of civilian casualties resulting from indiscriminate mortar attacks that had become a staple of the SVDF by August 1924. This means that the majority of casualties were focused in the southern portion of the city, specifically civilians who were killed by bombardment with very few KLA or Union Guard members killed during such attacks.
Actual casualties resulting from firefights during street battles remained relatively low, only around 35% of all paramilitary and security force casualties came from such engagements with the majority being caused by the KLA bombing campaign that targeted either specific leadership figures, or local Headquarters.
Responsibility
Approximately 75% of civilian casualties were killed by Svozgardan loyalists, 7% by security forces and 18% by Kyotakavian nationalists. The SVDF was responsible for around 38% of all casualties, with the KLA responsible for 30%.
| Responsible party | Paramilitary | Security forces | Civilians |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kyotakavian paramilitaries | |||
| KLA | 306 | 61 | 103 |
| Union Guard | 102 | 111 | 53 |
| Svozgardan security forces | |||
| PISF | 89 | N/A | 60 |
| Svozgardan paramilitaries | |||
| SVDF | 57 | 2 | 554 |
| USC | 12 | 0 | 102 |
| Total | 566 paramilitary members, 174 security force members, 872 civilians | ||
Assassinations
Throughout the battle, both sides made numerous attempts to assassinate the leadership of paramilitary and security forces of their opponents. Security force assassination attempts usually involved the storming of headquarters or ambushes of senior figures though because of the regular use of both tactics broadly, it can be hard to accurately assess how many were done explicitly as assassination attempts. The PISF had some overall success regardless, successfully ambushed the Southern KLA Commander Boris Wazkon in August 1924 and killing three senior KLA members during a storming of the Northern HQ on Mbersk Road. Both the SVDF and USC made multiple attempts on KLA Leadership throughout the battle, including 4 bombing attempts against Regan Klaidev, leader of the NLP, in a single day. Success was rare however, and Svozgardan Paramilitaries struggled to launch effective attempts into the Southern portion of the city often resorting to indiscriminate mortar attacks that killed numerous civilians.
Kyotakavian paramilitaries had far more success in assassination that their Svozgardan counterparts; the Union Guard rarely made attempts outside of sniping efforts, which successfully killed Eurius Nelton, the successor to SVDF East Commander Breton Kalionox who was killed by the KLA in early-October. The KLA on the otherhand made multiple bombing attempts on senior leadership of both security forces and paramilitaries with at least 7 were personally targeted at PISF Colonel Emirus Talian though with no success. This however, was an exception rather than the rule, of the other 19 bombing attacks made against leadership figures, 17 were successful, and the KLA bombing campaign ultimately resulted in the decapitation of the SVDF leadership following the Atzan Lane bombing in late-August, which killed both the Western and Eastern SVDF commanders as well as the Deputy Chief of the PISF.
So effective was the KLA assassination campaign that by the end of the conflict, they had killed 4 SVDF Commanders, the USC Commander-in-Chief and the Deputy Chief of the PISF, at least 39 other senior commanders in both the security forces and paramilitaries, and a numerous junior officers which had functionally decapitated the entirety of the SVDF Eastern Command, and substantially damaged the Western SVDF's leadership structure.
| Responsible party | Attempts | Successful | Success Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kyotakavian paramilitaries | |||
| KLA | 29 | 19 | 65.5% |
| Union Guard | 6 | 1 | 16.7% |
| Svozgardan security forces | |||
| PISF | 9 | 2 | 22.2% |
| Svozgardan paramilitaries | |||
| SVDF | 41 | 3 | 7.3% |
| USC | 18 | 0 | 0.0% |
| Total | 93 | ||