Fyrd title system
Stemming from the War of Sylvan Succession (WSS), the need to raise units rapidly became a sensitive military and political matter. Absolute chaos gripped the nation in the run-up to war, resulting in a melee of subpar engagements from Byzran to Eagla, which deeply eroded national military confidence. Ultimately, the pre-war cadres (Fyrish: gedryht) were too few, the industry too disorganised, and the Fyrd's needs too great. Moreover, penny-pinching became a pressing reality for the post-war Fyrd, as the nation's damaged finances returned their immediate attention to the Fyrflota. The preeminent solution, advocated by the newly appointed Chief of the General Staff, Shad Harlan, was the cadres' consolidation and the title system's introduction in 1920.
Background
The title system arose out of the aforementioned pressures. Rumours that the Fyrd was on the chopping block were strife as the war's end drew close — the General staff might expect as little as six standing divisions post-war — so potential solutions began churning among staffers by late 1918. Worse still, the Fyrd never reached its intended size during the WSS, yet its intended size reflected an accepted reality below the ideal. So in a potential future conflict of a similar scale, the Fyrd would have to raise more units from fewer standing divisions — a daunting prospect.
Prior to the title system, the Fyrd maintained divisions in varying states of readiness under cadres — outfits of commissioned and non-commissioned officers — whose role was to train and make ready inducted recruits. The readiest divisions comprised stood-up full-strength units, middle readiness comprised stood-down under-strength units, and low readiness comprised stood-down skeleton units, each under a cadre. In theory, the Fyrd could stand-up as many divisions as it possessed whole cadres (about 1,200 men per), which served the nation well for the myriad of small-to-medium scale conflicts in its recent history. However, the cadre system became a major stumbling block during the WSS, owing to the vast gaps in training standards between cadres, the separation of cadre from unit post-training, and outright lacking the necessary commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The latter issue was particularly exacerbated by poor unit rotation in peacetime, with some skeleton units remaining as such for years, leading to poor officer retention in all but the most active cadres.
The title system
What became known as the title system began as the consolidation of the existing cadres and the reformation of their structure in 1920.
First and foremost, the stratification of standards in training had to end. The WSS had demonstrated difficulty in corralling multiple units whose practises differed soo much, which became readily apparent in the drastic differences in results between units ostensibly performing the same task. These differences directly resulted from the cadres, as there was no universal standard or even familiarity with their peers' standards in many cases. Forcing cadres to train under one standard would be ideal, though this standard would only emerge much later. In addition to tackling the training, bringing the cadres together could increase officer retention, as most disliked manning skeleton units.
Secondly, separating the cadre from its newly trained recruits during the war proved a tough loss in experience — depriving green soldiers of their highly experienced NCOs and officers, leaving them in the less capable hands of newly promoted stand-ins. However, in a war of significant scale, such as the WSS, the cadre would inevitably have to leave to raise the subsequent division. But, if a substantial portion of the cadre could be left behind, newly raised units would suffer significantly less on their debut. Therefore, a considerably larger cadre which could dilute itself as ever greater numbers of divisions stood-up would be ideal. Ultimately in another industrial war, even the larger cadres would quickly dilute. Still, for lower-intensity actions requiring fewer divisions to stand-up, the benefits would be two-fold: reduced stand-up time and increased unit quality.
Thirdly, the General Staff accepted that any system that could heed the war's lessons and perform its traditional roles would expand the officer corps and require access to troops with at least some experience. As such, this emerging reality called for deeper integration of the Fyrd and Milite — forces partly maintained by the shires — which, until the war, had principally operated independently. In addition, the Milite provided a large pool of manpower familiar with military duties, which, combined with the enlarged cadres, could raise competent units exceptionally quickly.
Lastly, the shape of things to come presented itself in the form of an expected 6-12 standing divisions — which is a problem. There was insufficient room to condense a larger officer corps, as envisaged, into such few divisions. The solution, in the form of the title system, came from forward-thinking and prominent reformist Chief of the General Staff, Shad Harlan. His idea took a literal approach to 'bringing the cadres together', to form entire divisions from the newly enlarged cadres. At the time, the Fyrd still used square divisions, each consisting of about 18,000 men, so each would now comprise five cadres numbering around 3,600 — three times larger than previous cadres. However, the resulting overlapping chains of command required a flexible approach in peacetime.
Similar to brevetting, the title system confers an ad hoc chain of command which allows units comprising mostly of officers to function. A title might grant an individual a role three positions above or below their rank, acting as the defacto peacetime chain of command. If cadres split to raise divisions, a title only confers authority from respected individuals as much as their rank or experience allows — akin to commissioned officers' respect for senior NCOs despite their nominally lower position. For example, a Captain may be titled up to a Colonel or titled down to 1st Warrant Officer in peacetime — he would be expected to function as his title suggests. Depending on his unit's status, subject to the Chief of the General Staff, he might also function as his title in minor conflicts.
Benefits and problems
One of the intended benefits of the title system is that the soldiery became acutely aware of and adept in the roles of their subordinates and superiors. Not only did this awareness cultivate a deeper trust between ranks, but it also rewarded individual initiative as the title system allowed elevated ranks to shine. Titles also forced upon the Fyrd a means to constructively criticise superiors within the etiquette of the day, which proved beneficial for doctrinal and tactical development in the years following. Further, the reforms which enabled the title system successfully supported the Fyrd's role, ensuring it had the necessary tools to expand rapidly should the need arise again.
However, issues persisted with the title system for some time until military cultural norms had sufficiently adapted to such changes. The old school of military thought, notably General Oswine Wulfric, harshly criticised the system right until he died in 1922. Wulfric's position underlined the importance of a single chain of command, though counter-critics argued this was an issue of application — how the Fyrd should apply each chain.