Nuclear gap

The Nuclear gap is a term coined from the leaked 1950 Study on Atomic Warfare, referencing the perceived Fyrish vulnerability to a strategic nuclear exchange. At the time of the report, the Fire Territories had yet to build an atomic weapon, which would not arrive until 1951. The term became popular during the 1955 elections, when the Liberals presented the leaked document to the Popular Assembly, exposing weaknesses in Conservative defence policy.

Other appearances

Physicist Eadgar Tafari Desta as he appeared in a 1941 newspaper column regarding his lobbying efforts.

Although widely credited with the first use, the 1950 report is thought to have borrowed the phrase. While the report and its subsequent leaking undoubtedly popularised the term, its use likely dates back to 1941. Renown Fyrish physicist Eadgar Tafari Desta unquestionably referred to a nuclear gap during this time, as he undertook extensive lobbying efforts. Not only was Desta acutely aware of the atomic weapon concept, he also understood the potential consequences arising from one nation alone possessing such a device. Therefore, it is likely that during Desta's lobbying within government circles, members of the Directorate of Defence became aware of the phrase through Desta's work.

Background

The 1945 Anglian nuclear bombing of Menghean Dongrŭng and Anchŏn highlighted the devastation of atomic weapons. Chiefly concerning for Fyrish politicians of the time, however, was the lack of any retaliatory capability, which reflected poorly on the Conservative administration. Technologically speaking, the Fire Territories had made considerable strides in closing the Casaterran-Fyrish scientific imbalance of just 30 years ago. Nevertheless, the lack of a Fyrish nuclear weapon in 1945 presented the chasm yet still to be traversed.

It was not until 1951 that the Fyrish nuclear programme yielded results, with the detonation of the first atomic bomb on May 6. However, by this point, the Watt administration was significantly weakened following poor Conservative performance in the 1950 elections. In the mid-50s the Conservative position proceeded to weaken further still, as the ongoing Great Lake war began exacting a heavy toll on the Fyrish backed Eran forces. These events all came to a head in the 1955 elections, as public confidence in the Conservative's military policy diminished drastically. Ultimately, the Liberal's leak of the atomic warfare report proved to be the Watt administration's undoing. The nuclear gap phrase, coined from the report, exposed public fears of a nation wholly ill-equipped for a nuclear exchange. Regardless of the report's inaccuracies and outdated nature, the Conservative parity policy had failed in the public's eye.

1950 Study on Atomic Warfare

Directorate of Defence chair Whitney Fairchilde addressing the press in 1952.

Projected numbers of Casaterran nuclear weapons.

Commissioned on March 12 1949, with the opening of the Strategic Air Command, DoN chair Whitney Fairchilde oversaw efforts to conduct a study into a theoretical nuclear war. The resulting 1950 National Intelligence Study on Atomic Warfare, the official name given to the report, presented a grim picture. Primarily due to the report's unflattering demeanour, the Conservative Watt administration, running for re-election, buried the report to prevent a possible public outcry.

The report laid bare the realities of Fyrland's position. Heretofore the Fyrish nuclear programme was behind schedule, the 1949 Hallian nuclear test was fresh in memory, and murmurs of an imminent Sieuxerrian test were present. Acknowledging these claims the report noted that Hallian and Sieuxerrian weapons production could start in 1950, with no reasonable expectation of a Fyrish production weapon until 1953. Worse still, the study claimed that New Tyran already possessed 100 nuclear weapons, with Hallia and Sieuxerr potentially having the capacity to each produce 100 by 1954. The paper underscored that at current progress, Fyrland would possess ten weapons by that time. This conclusion was highly incendiary and could have devastated the Watt administration.

Report inaccuracies

Although aware of and ultimately responsible for the Fyrish nuclear programme, the Directorate of Defence was not privy to the specifics, owing to the extreme secrecy. This lack of precise knowledge invariably hampered the 1950 report's accuracy, which reflected heavily in the report's claims.

Unbeknown to anyone outside of Project Fenix, the claimed figures for Casaterran weapons production far exceeded reality. Ultimately, producing a nuclear weapon exceeded all time, money, and research estimates, which led to botched claims. However, where the report failed, it succeeded in alarming the public to the benefit of the Liberals.

Effects

Like previous defence scares, the nuclear gap phrase became popularised through politics as a tool to win seats. Successive Conservative military blunders unquestionably contributed to the Liberal victory in 1955; however, the leaked report undoubtedly provided the final blow to a bearish 15-year Conservative tenure.

Widely accepted for several years, perceived Fyrish nuclear inferiority created strong bipartisan cooperation following the 1955 elections. Ultimately, the nuclear gap matured into a political talking point and defence expenditure crux for decades following. Notably, the Fyrish armed forces became accustomed to defence scares as means to find funding, which proved extremely effective. This tactic is known as policy by press release and grew ever more popular in the latter 20th century.

See also

• Strategic Air Command (GLb)
• Directorate of Defence (DoN)
• 1955 Federated Fire Territories general election