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The '''legal systems of Themiclesia''' are the pre-modern modes of legal thought that gave rise to penal and civil law immediately preceding the introduction of Casaterran jurisprudence in the 1700s. | The '''legal systems of Themiclesia''' are the pre-modern modes of legal thought that gave rise to penal and civil law immediately preceding the introduction of Casaterran jurisprudence in the 1700s. | ||
Penal law is the oldest extant legal jurisdiction in Themiclesia, which survived due to its codified nature, importance to traditional philosophies of governance, and function in the bureaucratic tradition. The primary purport of the penal law is stated to be "forbidding of evil" (禁惡, ''krjemh-′ak''). | ==Penal law== | ||
Penal law is the oldest extant legal jurisdiction in Themiclesia, which survived due to its codified nature, importance to traditional philosophies of governance, and function in the bureaucratic tradition. The primary purport of the penal law is stated to be "forbidding of evil" (禁惡, ''krjemh-′ak''). In many cases, crimes do not have obvious victims but remain punishable. This is encapsulated in the word ''′ak'' "evil" in [[Shinasthana]], cognate to ''′agh'' "hate", which is often held as the opposite of ''hu′'' "prefer". Thus, philologists understand ''′ak'' to describe things that are subjectively offensive. The philosophy is also gleamed from terminology used in criminal proceedings, where guilt is summarized by the phrase ''pje-brjanh'' "inconvenience". In earlier centuries, ''′ak'' may have represented religious pollution or a similar concept, but by the start of the Common Era it was understood as an impediment to the state. Later scholars have concluded that the the criminal offence is intrinsically evil in its nature; it is not punished because it generates a tangible loss. | |||
In historic treatises about penal law in Themiclesia, its purpose in statecraft as an incentive is most emphasized. Many authors encouraged the understanding that rewards and punishments are the two foremost tools wielded by a successful ruler. Between them, punishments came first: if a ruler cannot reward, then the lack of punishment is also a form of reward, punishments generally cost little to impose, and frequent rewards create expectations on the ruler, becoming an impediment to arbitrary rule. Theorists also identified a perpetrator's different interests that could be punished: his honour, limb, property, and affections. In view of its function as an incentive to compel obedience, all four were considered legitimate sujects of punishment, regardless if they are criminal or not. The extreme form of this doctrine is the "three clan eradication" (夷三族, ''li-srum-tsok''), where punishment is explicitly inflicted on the innocent and uninvolved, so that the perpetrator may feel burdened by the consequences of his actions. Under this school of thinking, the purpose of punishment is to impose a disproportionate loss: if a man loses only as much, he is not deterred by the law. | |||
While this thinking encourages very thorough and harsh punishment, it discourages unpredictable punishment. It argues that if punishment is to serve as an incentive to behave a certain way, that way must be free of punishment, absolutely if possible. It is hypothesized that if two options exist and both lead to an equal punishment, then subjects would lose the incentive to behave according to the state's wishes; if one led to a lesser punishment, then it is only more beneficial by the margin from the severer one. Since infliction of punishment ultimately leads to dissatisfaction, it is preferable that the marginal benefit be absolutely free of punishment. | |||
In the political interpretation, this meant in each case where the government wished to compel a certain behaviour, every alternative should lead to a form of punishment, to maximize the attractiveness of the option the state has laid out. In order to convince the subject that his best option is the one chosen by the state, the government must not only relentlessly legislate but also seek out offenders and punish them. According to this theory, which is summarized by an anonymous writer in the 1st c. CE, "only the ignorant complain laws are too many, for the wise complain that there are not enough." | |||
==Civil law== | |||
==See also== | |||
*[[Themiclesia]] | |||
[[Category:Themiclesia]][[Category:Septentrion]] | [[Category:Themiclesia]][[Category:Septentrion]] |
Revision as of 05:05, 6 February 2020
The legal systems of Themiclesia are the pre-modern modes of legal thought that gave rise to penal and civil law immediately preceding the introduction of Casaterran jurisprudence in the 1700s.
Penal law
Penal law is the oldest extant legal jurisdiction in Themiclesia, which survived due to its codified nature, importance to traditional philosophies of governance, and function in the bureaucratic tradition. The primary purport of the penal law is stated to be "forbidding of evil" (禁惡, krjemh-′ak). In many cases, crimes do not have obvious victims but remain punishable. This is encapsulated in the word ′ak "evil" in Shinasthana, cognate to ′agh "hate", which is often held as the opposite of hu′ "prefer". Thus, philologists understand ′ak to describe things that are subjectively offensive. The philosophy is also gleamed from terminology used in criminal proceedings, where guilt is summarized by the phrase pje-brjanh "inconvenience". In earlier centuries, ′ak may have represented religious pollution or a similar concept, but by the start of the Common Era it was understood as an impediment to the state. Later scholars have concluded that the the criminal offence is intrinsically evil in its nature; it is not punished because it generates a tangible loss.
In historic treatises about penal law in Themiclesia, its purpose in statecraft as an incentive is most emphasized. Many authors encouraged the understanding that rewards and punishments are the two foremost tools wielded by a successful ruler. Between them, punishments came first: if a ruler cannot reward, then the lack of punishment is also a form of reward, punishments generally cost little to impose, and frequent rewards create expectations on the ruler, becoming an impediment to arbitrary rule. Theorists also identified a perpetrator's different interests that could be punished: his honour, limb, property, and affections. In view of its function as an incentive to compel obedience, all four were considered legitimate sujects of punishment, regardless if they are criminal or not. The extreme form of this doctrine is the "three clan eradication" (夷三族, li-srum-tsok), where punishment is explicitly inflicted on the innocent and uninvolved, so that the perpetrator may feel burdened by the consequences of his actions. Under this school of thinking, the purpose of punishment is to impose a disproportionate loss: if a man loses only as much, he is not deterred by the law.
While this thinking encourages very thorough and harsh punishment, it discourages unpredictable punishment. It argues that if punishment is to serve as an incentive to behave a certain way, that way must be free of punishment, absolutely if possible. It is hypothesized that if two options exist and both lead to an equal punishment, then subjects would lose the incentive to behave according to the state's wishes; if one led to a lesser punishment, then it is only more beneficial by the margin from the severer one. Since infliction of punishment ultimately leads to dissatisfaction, it is preferable that the marginal benefit be absolutely free of punishment.
In the political interpretation, this meant in each case where the government wished to compel a certain behaviour, every alternative should lead to a form of punishment, to maximize the attractiveness of the option the state has laid out. In order to convince the subject that his best option is the one chosen by the state, the government must not only relentlessly legislate but also seek out offenders and punish them. According to this theory, which is summarized by an anonymous writer in the 1st c. CE, "only the ignorant complain laws are too many, for the wise complain that there are not enough."