Library:HSH-B-2023/4

Dossier Information

Editor's Note: Obviously, if this file has just landed on your desk, I apologize for the filing concerns. This builds on work done in the PRCO in 2019-2020 before its dissolution [SEE:ARK-PRCO-20201906/SHRH-BSM1]. Now with the reconfiguring of [REDACTED] this doesn't come as much suprrise that classification levels remain all over the place, but I just wanted to warn you that I am under orders directly from [REDACTED] to get this sent out in readable form to every branch of the OSO and OSC. So, use your best judgement.

This is the Intelligence Threat Assessment - Belisaria for the 2023-2024 organizational year. We've had several recent developments in the last few months and so it should go without saying to use common sense when applying this information to HUMNIT. ███████████ will be recieving this as part of █████████████████████████████████, just as they have prepared their own equivalent report for ██████████████████████████████████████. Obviously, after Gadir, we also have a presence in the area, but recent developments have required a narrowing down of operational scope onto just Belisaria for the time being. Expect an HSH-S by █████████████████████████████████████████████████████. Breaking with PRCO tradition, this dossier will be organized by the scale of the percieved threats, and not alphabetically or by nation, region, etc.

International

Barderec-Pshenets-Zarinsk Axis

PDC Liason, ORVOS & APKO have all recommended an increased level of intelligence scrutiny on the BPZ axis (Barderec-Pshenets-Zarinsk; i.e. Ostrozava-Zamorodna-Velikoslavia [SEE:REP-RBOS-20221024/NNO-ZK1]) following not only the successful execution of Operation Throwing Knife but also Operation ███████████ in the region in the last fourteen months. Despite IDR-related concerns persisting, Namdak's death has shifted potentialities for IDR activity southwards around the purported location of Arnt Andelfingen (see below). Of higher concern in this region is the potential for proto-Invictism. Analytics and ███████████████████ have both reported marked rises in variations on pan-Baderianism or pan-Orthodox nationalism. While it is the opinion of the Primar and of the RBOS director that pan-Baderianism by itself is not a threat and may even be beneficial to the Prime Republic, care should be taken that these movements are not co-opted by foreign, subversive, or otherwise nihilistic actors.

While the Hetmanate has largely cooperated in the aftermath of Operation Throwing Knife, much to our pleasure as Primar Král has reported publicly, there exist areas where instability between relations could be generated either endogenously or exogenously. Of particular interest to RBOS security measures is the Barabash VRK group [SEE:REP-PRCO-20020529-BARABASH; REP-RBOS-20230111-BRBSHPT]. While our colleagues in the Strakosko and Baderia Civil Guard RSV have rightfully looked at their potential impact on union-busting operations perhaps directly or indirectly affiliated with their Ostrozavan equivalents, our security file suggests that we may need ███████████████ in order to properly ascertain potential scenarios of combat contact between OSO forces and Barabash paramilitaries, whether regionally or beyond. If possible, we should look into ways to entirely reveal their income stream in the case of such an event, thus precluding any claims of plausible deniability.

Zarinsk is a medium-sized Velikoslavian city at the border with Baderia, and, alongside Garagorsk on our side of the border, is the primary hub of Ostrozavan-Velikoslavian economic interaction, particularly with regard to freight shipping of raw materials. Velikoslavian law is notably loose on regulation here, and ██████████████ has ordered us to take a closer look at examining the legality of some of these transnational transactions. Our concern is that some of these income streams may be weaponized by Invictist, IDR, or perhaps even Velikoslavian state elements. ████████████████████████████, which is a notable disadvantage in data collection on this front; this should be rectified by Q2 2024 if at all feasible. [SEE: