Torédo Doctrine: Difference between revisions
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*Parity or near-parity (advantage attacker) between the attacker and opposing supplier OR where the range distance causes parity | *Parity or near-parity (advantage attacker) between the attacker and opposing supplier OR where the range distance causes parity | ||
*Rational actors, where the chances of direct intervention/assault onto the attacker's homeland is minimized and threat of WMD use is either non-credible or approaching zero | *Rational actors, where the chances of direct intervention/assault onto the attacker's homeland is minimized and threat of WMD use is either non-credible or approaching zero | ||
[[File:Toredo doctrine01.jpg|Situation where BLUFOR is successfully able to directly intercept and deny REDFOR access to the proxy conflict]] | [[File:Toredo doctrine01.jpg|thumb|Situation where BLUFOR is successfully able to directly intercept and deny REDFOR access to the proxy conflict]] | ||
===Null Assumptions=== | ===Null Assumptions=== | ||
Torédo Doctrine cannot be successfully applied when the following assumptions are true: | Torédo Doctrine cannot be successfully applied when the following assumptions are true: | ||
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*Significantly stronger forces, wherein the opposing supplier can functionally defeat the attacker in >50% of engagements in the supply chain process OR holds a probable chance of victory in the attacker's homeland | *Significantly stronger forces, wherein the opposing supplier can functionally defeat the attacker in >50% of engagements in the supply chain process OR holds a probable chance of victory in the attacker's homeland | ||
*Irrational actors, wherein there is a very real chance the opposing supplier would resort to some form of WMD attack or other mass-casualty event | *Irrational actors, wherein there is a very real chance the opposing supplier would resort to some form of WMD attack or other mass-casualty event | ||
[[File:Toredo doctrine01.jpg|Situation where BLUFOR is unable able to directly intercept and deny REDFOR access to the proxy conflict, and is at a geographic disadvantage compared to REDFOR]] | [[File:Toredo doctrine01.jpg|thumb|Situation where BLUFOR is unable able to directly intercept and deny REDFOR access to the proxy conflict, and is at a geographic disadvantage compared to REDFOR]] | ||
==Criticism== | ==Criticism== | ||
Revision as of 18:42, 24 January 2024
Torédo Doctrine is one of several strategic doctrines practiced by the armed forces of Inyursta. Specifically, Torédo Doctrine is used as a means of mitigating, avoiding or escalating proxy conflicts. It is named for Generàle Ferdinand Torédo, successor to Enrique Javez, who came to the conclusion that the Red Insurgency would be near-infinite if supplies to Marçon de Rouje were not indefinitely severed.
History
At the time, Generàle Torédo did not name the doctrine after himself, but rather called it "Plán d'Anacònda Grande" (Great Anaconda Plan) - an attempt to "constrict" the territory of Tirméno.
Both critics and supporters to this day argue if Torédo Doctrine helped lead to the 1986 Guerrocan War, where even some supporters may admit that the actions taken against North Guerrocan shipping may have contributed to the conflict and even some detractors admit that Guerroca was likely to blitz the peninsula regardless.
Assumptions
A number of assumptions must be true for Torédo Doctrine to be applied successfully.
- The attacker is either closer to the conflict zone than the opposing supplier OR possesses a significant advantage in power projection and range of military assets
- Parity or near-parity (advantage attacker) between the attacker and opposing supplier OR where the range distance causes parity
- Rational actors, where the chances of direct intervention/assault onto the attacker's homeland is minimized and threat of WMD use is either non-credible or approaching zero
Null Assumptions
Torédo Doctrine cannot be successfully applied when the following assumptions are true:
- Situations where the conflict is closer to the opposing supplier's homeland or permanent and significant base of operations than to the attacker OR the proxy force is directly fighting against the opposing supplier
- Significantly stronger forces, wherein the opposing supplier can functionally defeat the attacker in >50% of engagements in the supply chain process OR holds a probable chance of victory in the attacker's homeland
- Irrational actors, wherein there is a very real chance the opposing supplier would resort to some form of WMD attack or other mass-casualty event
Criticism
A number of criticisms have been levied at Torédo Doctrine. First, the risk of direct conflict - even if limited and generally fought with air/sea assets, is more costly than fighting even a long, drawn out proxy war. Second, that a state can never truly be confident if its opposition is in fact rational or irrational, thus leading to increased risk of catastrophic escalation.