User:Vjaarland/Sandbox3

First Battle of Willishaven
Part of the Ochoccola War
Smoke rises from Willishaven during a Cutho-Waldish artillery strike
Date 12 May 1994 Location Willishaven, Ochoccola Result Ochoccolan victory
Belligerents
Cuthland-Waldrich	Ochoccola
Strength
500	120
Casualties and losses
34 killed 118 wounded 53 captured	10 killed 47 wounded
15 civilians killed

The First Battle of Willishaven was a ground engagement between Cutho-Waldish and Ochoccolan forces during the Ochoccola War. The battle occurred on 12 May 1994, when elements of the Royal Cutho-Waldish Army launched an assault the small coastal town of Willishaven. Initial Cutho-Waldish intelligence reports suggested that the town was defended by no more than two lightly armed Ochoccolan platoons, and was not expected to pose significant resistance to advancing forces. As a result, the vast majority of Cutho-Waldish fire support assets within the Ochoccolan area of operations were allocated to support the much larger Battle of Cahulga, which was ongoing at the time of the assault and comprised the main effort of the Cutho-Waldish ground offensive. Although new satellite imagery gathered immediately prior to the assault suggested that Willishaven was much more well defended than Cutho-Waldish intelligence sources initially estimated, including the presence of T-72 main battle tanks, ground commanders decided to proceed with the operation as planned.

The assault began during the early morning when B Company, 2nd Battalion, Royal Wynndale Engineers attempted to breach the outer defenses of Willishaven. The engineers were quickly pinned down by the unexpectedly well armed defenders, sustaining heavy casualties as Ochoccolan armored units attempted to overrun their positions on the outskirts of the town. Realizing that the town was significantly more well defended than expected, the commander of the Cutho-Waldish task force, LTC XXX XXXXXXXX, attempted to abandon the assault and use mortar fire to provide cover for a retrograde from the town. However, the commanding general of the Ochoccolan area of operations, GEN XXX XXXXXX, ordered him to proceed with the operation. LTC XXXXXXXX decided to begin the main effort of the assault and engage the Ochoccolan tanks using the task force's organic mortars and a single artillery battery that had been reallocated from the operation in nearby Cahulga. However, XXXXXXXX overestimated the effectiveness of mortar and artillery fire against armored vehicles. The two infantry companies that had been designated as the operation's assault force quickly became pinned down alongside the breaching engineers, and the Ochoccolan T-72s began to overrun the Cutho-Waldish positions. Realizing the severity of the situation in Willishaven, Cutho-Waldish theatre command began reallocating air assets to Task Force XXX to cover their retrograde. By nightfall, all Cutho-Waldish forces had been withdrawn from Willishaven. Cutho-Waldish forces successfully captured the town two days later in a second assault using significantly greater numbers and fire support assets, which ended in the controversial massacre and summary executions of many captured Ochoccolan soldiers and civilians in the town.

Although relatively minor in terms of personnel and equipment involved, Willishaven is notable both for its intensity and its status as one of the few military defeats for Cutho-Waldish forces during the war. The battle received significant international media attention, with many media outlets in BDTA countries deeming Willishaven to be the "martyr city of democracy" in Ochoccola. In Cuthland-Waldrich, the defeat led King XXXXXX to relieve GEN XXXXX of command and spurred major doctrinal changes within the military establishment regarding the familiarity of maneuver commanders with fire support capabilities and the effective dissemination of intelligence to decision makers.

• Intel failures
  • No T-72s believed to still be present in Ochoccolan hands
  • No armor initially believed to be in Willishaven, but new reports just hours before the battle indicated that at least two platoons of T-72s had been moved into the AO
  • New reports were written off as inaccurate due to it contradicting previous intel
  • Planning was in the late stages and it was believed that it was too late to make major changes
• Unrealistic expectations for fire support capabilities
  • Maneuver commanders expected artillery and mortars to be able to destroy enemy armor, proved ineffective
• Lessons learned
  • Greater emphasis on fire support in maneuver schools
  • Fire Support Officer position established at the company level
  • Changes to intelligence gathering procedures allowing new intelligence to flow more rapidly to ground commanders