Battle of Portcullia
| Battle of Portcullia | |||||||||
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 Model of a ship of uncertain nationality from the era | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Themiclesia |
 Menghe | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Djen Nglakw-ka (淳樂詁) | |||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||
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Parts of the South Sea Fleet Porticullia garrison | |||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
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32 combatant vessels approx. 1,500 men | 100 combatant vessels | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
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30 vessels lost 229 men accounted for | |||||||||
The Battle of Portcullia (Shinasthana: 岌之海役, ngjep-tje-hme-les) was a series of naval and land engagements between Menghe under the Yi dynasty and Themiclesia under the Drjen Dynasty. Themiclesia administered the island since the 1050, and merchant fleets have used its natural harbour since the 8th century. In 1323, a detachment of Menghean ships arrived at the island, requesting the Themiclesian administration to surrender the island to Menghean authorities; the administration rejected the proposal. Subsequently, a new Menghean emperor ordered much larger fleet to vindicate this perceived defiance 1324. The battle first occurred when Menghean troops landed in the harbour and attempted to take the fortifications there; gunpowder was used but mainly had a psychological effect. Mengheans acquired the fortress and pursued the Themiclesian forces, which evacuated with the isle's civilians by sea. A naval battle happened afterwards, seeing several Themiclesians vessels captured or sunk. This battle was seen to herald the decline of Themiclesian naval power in Meridia, to be cemented in the Battle of Tups (濧之海役) in 1352.
Themiclesian presence on Porticullia
Porticullia first appeared in Themiclesian records c. 845 in surviving journals kept by merchant sailors, who recorded the altitude and azimuth of celestial bodies in relation to geographical features as navigational guides. Though it remains doubtful if the 845 record actually demonstrates Themiclesian presence on the island itself, unmistakable notes identifying the shapes of mountains as observed from due north have been considered proof that some Themiclesian navigators knew about Porticullia; excavated coinage of Themiclesian affinity also appeared in northern and western Meridian settlements, corroborating the theory that Porticullia was a known entity with a specific locale and name.
The geography and oceanography of the Porticullia Inlet placed it ideally as a natural port for fleets crossing the Porticullia Strait from Hemithea. Such fleets, particularly Themiclesian ones, usually travelled along the Maverican coastline, then that of Innominada, then across the Strait at its narrowest point. The narrow mouth of the inlet and the mountain range enveloping it prevented hostile fleets from entering en masse or easy ambushes from another landing point on the island. As piracy initially flourished in the calm waters on the Meridian coast, the court eventually saw the need for a permanent, local defence force to protect the expanding commercial activity there; with such a decision, Porticullia was officially surveyed between 1048 and 1049, and it appeared as Ngjep County in Themiclesian arhcives starting from the taxation year of 1050.
Commercial activity was taxed by the Ngjep County authorities at a fairly consistent rate. Contracts relating to sale of real property were fined at 0.4% the transaction value as well as a fixed stamp duty of one coin per page of paperwork. Merchandise entering the port were not taxed, but all goods exiting were dutiable according to their market value; rates ranged from as much as 10% on goods in demand in Meridia, to around 2.25% for staples. These proceeds went towards maintenance of the relatively elaborate defences on the island and represented a dependable source of income for the court in Kien-k'ang.
Contemporary accounts suggest that by 1100 the island supported a population in excess of 5,000 residents without significant agricultural or fishing activity, indicating that a merchandise economy had assumed shape on the island; the diversity of this population was considerable, as the local magistrate appointed interpreters for multiple languages to adjudicate disputes arising between different trading parties.
Menghean discovery of the island
Court policy on island
Initial contact and Menghean reaction
In 1323,[3] a small fleet consisting of five ships (eight, according to Themiclesian sources) docked in the harbour; a Menghean emissary name approached the local magistrate and relayed the Menghean court's policy on the island, namely to annexe it. Records from both nations indicate the meeting was polite and civil, though some interpretation was requisite. Allegedly, the Themiclesian magistrate declared that he "may not default on an office and receive remuneration from it" (既受俸祿，不能瀆職). When pressed, he contended that the most he could do was to refer the message to Kien-k'ang, and he did so immediately. Deciding that prolonging the conversation may expose him to suspicion locally and at court, he sent the Menghean emissary away with a letter detailing his position on the matter.
O great ruler of the country that sent this emissary to Ngjep County during my adminstration, your emissary was well-cultured, civil, and most respectable in his conduct. I have reported to my government the requests that you have instructed your emissary to deliver to me, yet therein is a thing which I cannot give away, despite my great desire to fulfill your requirements, for I am aware that your country, wherever it is, must be wealthy and potent to produce such an excellent emissary. My credentials are but fourth-tier, and my rank only the eighth class. My humble origins destine me unable to fulfill your imperious demands. Ngjep County, though of only a thousand odd households, to me is as great as the expanse of the zenith. O ruler, your request is akin to asking a mountain of silver, a pot of gold from a peasant's pocket. If you, o ruler, must have Ngjep County, take this opportunity to deliver a message to Kien-k'ang, where ministers will have the power to respond.
Battle
Siege and pursuit
On account of the message delivered to Kien-k'ang in 1323, the court ordered the fleet to be ready for evacuation of civil and military personnel; when the Menghean fleet arrived, the magistrate of Ngjep County (岌縣, ngjep gwians) commanded the local garrison commander and the floatilla to delay Menghe's advance for as long as possible, to obtain time for an orderly evacuation. However, the Menghean advance was not halted for nearly as long as the Themiclesians have hoped, and the garrison and the part of the naval infantry on land soon were fighting to cover the rear of the evacuation. Themiclesian forces took considerable losses in this engagement, and morale reportedly plummeted due to the court's want of commitment (or ability) to defend the isle. Mengheans' explosive ordnance in hand-held and animal-drawn formats also alarmed Themiclesian soldiers and stunned them greatly, even though their power was very limited. The fortification, which had been mostly deserted, became the site of a brief siege, as the defence there attempted to divert the attention of Menghean forces from the evacuating convoys; this tactic did not last for long before the evacuation became apparent; the defenders then proceeded to flee the fort on horses, hoping to cut ahead of the Menghean detachment and join the evacuation. The following morning, the convoys arrived at a smaller bay, where merchant and some naval ships set aside were docked in anticipation; the Mengheans in close pursuit, civilians, mostly merchants still clinging onto their goods, were required to abandon them to hasten the departure and to distract the Menghean soldiers.
While the Themiclesian fleet was initially able to sail away from Portcullia, it faced a choice as to either take an unusual detour and resolve the navigational challenges it posed or to sail closer to the Portcullian coast and cross the Strait from a more familiar point. Merchants argued the fleet should sail north from the accustomed point, but the admiral in charge believed it was too dangerous to sail back to the north of Portcullia, as the Mengheans could still be there. Furthermore, the deputy admiral mentioned that the Menghean pursuers would have returned to the primary harbour by this point and alerted the Menghean fleet as to the Themiclesians' escape. The decision came to a compromise: they would sail half-way back to the Menghean-occupied port and proceed north from there. However, as this was an atypical decision, the navy spent several hours notifying the ships in the merchant fleet one-by-one, appointing the sinking of Antares beyond the horizon the following morning as the point the fleet would set sail. During the night, a Menghean scouting ship seems to have discovered the Themiclesian fleet about ten leagues from the coast. Rather than engaging, it returned and informed the Mengehan fleet of the whereabouts of the Themiclesians.
When the fleet did set sail the following morning, about half the Menghean fleet intercepted their opponents in a semi-circle formation, blocking its northwards path. The Themiclesian navy signalled for the merchant vessels to escape due west and follow another plot of constellations home while it engaged the Mengheans. This put 32 Themiclesian warships against about 50 on the Menghean side. As Themiclesian ships possessed no cannons, their only option was to sail head-on into the Menghean fleet and board. Positioned still in a circular formation for protection of merchant ships, it entered battle out of its favoured formation. Again, Menghean ships opened fire when the Themiclesian fleet came into range, but their lower decks meant that most cannonballs simply lobbed over them and landed closer to other Menghean vessels. Few injuries to vessels or men were sustained, and According to accounts, all 32 vessels were functional as they engaged. Themiclesian troops were demoralized by gunpowder and were apparently mortified by its conjectural application for on-board battle; the Themiclesian admiral, realizing that cannons were primarily installed on the larger ships, decided to prioritize their acquisition, despite the mariners' fears.
At this point, the other half of the Menghean fleet appeared, encircling the Themiclesian fleet. During the early phases of the battle, Themiclesian mariners were temporarily able to take control of a number of Menghean vessels, especially the larger, cannon-equipped ones. Both the Themiclesian crew and troops were more familiar with combat at sea, and hopes were high when they captured some of the largest Menghean ships, encountering only sparse resistance. For those captured, they severed the cabling to its sails and co-ordinated several ships to prevent maneovring, yet they did not have sufficient men to mount attacks on other ships. However, even this degree of success was short-lived; the scarcity of Menghean marines onboard turned out to be an illusion, as the Menghean admiral had them stationed on much smaller ships that Themiclesians, from their taller decks, ignored as supply and communications ships; these small ships were powered by oars and could navigate with more agility. It turns out that Menghean marines were scarce aboard the larger ships was because a gun crew had to be accommodated, leaving insufficient space for marines. Their Themiclesian analogues were stationed in equal quantities aboard each ship and primarily fought only those ships that engaged their own; in retrospect, this made the effects of their numerical inferiority more drastic. Given encirclement by a great number of Menghean ships, the ones that Themiclesians controlled could not be converted to aid Themiclesia's position. Themiclesians were also confused as to the status of the Menghean gun crews: conventions dictated that they should not engage any unarmed person, and the gun crew were, indeed, unarmed personally.
Conversely, the Menghean strategem allowed their troops to concentrate offensive action. From Menghean sources, as many as 500 marines could be stationed on these small ships to deploy against a single, larger enemy ship. Theoretically, they would be vulnerable to ramming, but their agility and the fixed positions of larger Themiclesian ships made ramming a remote threat. Thus, while the Menghean fleet outnumbered the Themiclesians three-to-one generally, they could outnumber local opponents by as much as ten-to-one, in individual boarding episodes. Especially when they were deployed to ships whose troops have already boarded a Menghean vessel, the Themiclesian crews were left with no choice but to capitulate, and the Menghean boarders arrested the crew, so that even if they were recovered, they would be paralyzed. After capturing Themiclesian vessels, Menghens simply followed the bridge or rope that Themiclesians used, to recover Menghean ships. In each case, the Themiclesians were desperately outnumbered, and the small number of ships initially captured were quickly restored to Menghean control. Adding to the disparity of capacity, Menghean troops were also notably better armoured and, in execution of their tactics, trained. After a half-day of battle, Themiclesians lost all but a handful of ships and most of their crew; yearning for respite, the admiral took advantage of a small opening in the encirclement and a sudden gust to escape. Of the 32 ships that engaged, two survived to land in Tonning back in Themiclesia.
Aftermath
The outcome of the battle did not come as a surprise to the court in Kien-kang, as Themiclesia found itself embroiled in a much more expensive conflict in what is now the Organized States; the great majority of combatants in the South Sea Fleet were stationed along the west coast of OS in defence of maritime and terrestrial trade facilities against Rajian incursion. However, it was declarative in affirming Menghe's position as a seafaring power since the 1300s and opened a new path of opportunities for Menghean exploration and trade in west Meridia and indirectly with Casaterra. Knowledge from this exploration is ultimately connected to the spread of Menghean technology, such as gunpowder and paper, to Casaterra, and the introduction of Casaterran artifacts to Menghe.
In Themiclesia, this battle received much attention at court, provoking essays decrying the naval indignation and loss of revenue. The Themiclesian finance minister analyzed the situation in illuminating terms in his report to the emperor in 1326:
Not only shall we lose 12 to 15 million hmrjing of revenues from transit duties and market taxes in Portcullia, our merchants will be burdened by the same or possibly greater exactions, imposed by the Eastern State [i.e. Menghe], where they must rest and resupply and most conveniently market their goods. We shall necessarily need to reduce taxes domestically to avoid taxing our merchants' goods twice. Both issues will reduce our revenues. Additionally, we have little idea of the disposition of the Menghean court in Meridia; our merchants may not enjoy the same peace and safety that our navy will ensure for their benefit. We must therefore address this problem urgently.
Rather than addressing the most direct cause of the defeat—that Themiclesia's boarding action was less effective than Menghe's in every way—the Finance Secretary made enlargement of the fleet and acquisition of cannons his first priority. While Themiclesian admirals reported that the Mengheans troops outnumbered theirs on every turn, it was analyzed as simply not having a sufficient number of ships. The distributional and control problem, which was the key to the Mengheans' victory in 1324, was not addressed or even presented as such to the Finance Secretary. It is debated amongst historians if the admiralty actually understood the tactical implications of the Menghean employ of their troops, since policies later would suggest the Finance Secretary thought the sheer size of the fleet would deter any sort of engagement. This might not have been as illogical as it seemed, since the navy observed a ratio of crew to boarding troops. Increasing the number of ships, then, meant increasing the number of boarding troops, which would address the admiralty's submission that they were "outnumbered". Tyrannian naval historian, M. Parker, called the Themiclesian response the "brute force approach" of "having more of everything while thinking very little of their effectual use".
The effects of gunpowder was described to the court (and cited as the primary cause for defeat) for its psychological effects rather than physical ones, frightning and demoralizing the men. It seems the Finance Secretary deeply believed these reports and eagerly sought out its formula, which was quickly obtained around 1331 from travelling Menghean alchemists, who sometimes came to Themiclesia to access rare minerals or to sell their potions. By 1341, the South Sea Fleet was enlarged from a total size of about 80 ships to about 250 ships, though this increased size (which was placing a great strain on the treasury and not meant to be permanent) did not help in the following battle, for other reasons.
Analysis
Battle
Maritime historians have been perplexed how the Yi navy, ostensibly at one of their first battles, would appear to have routed the Drjen one, which had been dominating the ocean for centuries at this point. Some researchers have remarked that Menghe's strong "land warfare mentality", though usually detrimental at sea, has fortuitously carried the day at Portcullia.[5] The idea of fielding troops in small, non-seaworthy ships (across the open ocean anyway) to attack larger enemy targets, depriving them on a stable area to operate from and to which to retreat, has been linked to the use of shock cavalry on land, of which Yi-era Menghe was famous. Exactly as shock cavalry could penetrate infantry and enjoyed mobility due to their mounts, the small Menghean ships filled with marines could navigate around larger Themiclesian ships and attack, in superior numbers, them serially, rather than individually. The aggregation of resources to create an advantage over a limited target was achieved by the Themiclesians through maoeuvring the main warships themselves, which carried the additional advantage of using battering rams and projectiles to clear decks before attempting to board and to block the targeted ship from escape. This was successful in the early segments of the war when Themiclesia did capture a number of large, important ships.
It is therefore questioned why Themiclesia did not have such small boarding craft or did not attempt to attack them in the first place. Both can be attributed to the paradigm that seaworthy ships are the main combatants, whose capture would decide the battle; that is, once Themiclesia captured all the seaworthy ships, the marines on the small ships would have no choice but to surrender, since those small ships could not carry them home for lack of a crew and a sufficient arrangement of sails or have space for provisions to sustain them for long. So, to the Themiclesian admirals, having the marines on such non-seaworthy boats, rather than defending the capital ships, may have appeared as an absurd tactical error; their impression would have only strengthened when the capital ships that were, initially, causing distress due to their guns, were found poorly defended and captured with remarkable ease. The Themiclesian complement would have swept aside those in Menghean capital ships for their better experience and, in select cases, even numerical superiority. Yet when the small boats proved potent vessels of war and overwhelmed the Themiclesians' own capital ships, they were very much defeated according to their own definitions.
After the Battle of Tups, fought 18 years after Portcullia, the Menghean fleet was summarized by Themiclesian courtiers as "an army on water", which widely differed from the organizational principles of the Themiclesian navy. Modern researchers complement the comment by tagging the Themiclesian one as "a fleet with attached soldiers". Contrasting demands have occasioned these differences. Whereas the Menghean fleet, before and after this time, only set sail to engage with a certain enemy, the Themiclesian navy was almost permanently at sea, touring the coastal areas, to suppress piracy, escort merchants, deliver diplomats, and shipping money and goods, often with branching missions and deputizations in liaison with local authorities. Combat with pirate ships formed the diet of the Themiclesian navy at that time, though larger engagements with raiding fleets of Hallia were not uncommon. However, since individual tours could last upwards of a year, posting a very large number of soldiers (who do not help sailing) or having ships that were incapable of navigation was infeasible from a supply perspective.
Politics
While this battle is not the first defeat Themiclesia has suffered abroad and at sea, historians have described it as indicative of Themiclesian power declining in Meridia. This process was neither quick nor shocking in Themiclesia, and Themiclesia's navy remained influential in the Halu'an Sea and around the western Hemithean coast. The battle was notable as the first in recorded history to see naval use of gunpowder. As Portcullia was a major trading post that hosted Themiclesian, Menghean, and Hallian traders, its acquisition by Menghe informed the Casaterran continent of the advent of gunpowder. Only a few decades later, a Menghean mariner was abduced by Rajian forces and compelled to divulge the formula for gunpowder, and within a century its use was common in Casaterra. On the other hand, loss of Portcullia was a major loss for Themiclesia in both strategic and financial terms, since Portcullia was both the fleet's home port and a major collection point for customs and transit duties. The geographic position of Portcullia allowed the Menghean navy a permanent base of operations and easy access to Meridia, largely the same privilege the Themiclesians possessed for several centuries prior.
From the Mengean perspective, this battle hails the waxing of the Menghean Yi Dynasty's power and evertion of its expansionist policies in Hemithea. In 1352, the Battle of Tups would cement that control to make the Menghean navy the undisputed force in the Meridian continent and sea. In 1385, the Yi cavalry traversed the Dzhungestani Desert and forced Themiclesia to pay tribute to Menghe for more than a century, which also barred Themiclesia from further military action there until the collapse of the Yi in 1518. Some historians name this period the Pax Mengheana in respect to the Yi Dynasty's overwhelming influence in its vicinity.