Sinking of the RMS Stella del Nord
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 Colorized photo of the Stella del Nord, ca. 1905. | |
| Date | 3 May 1908 |
|---|---|
| Time | 1:20 AM – 3:20 AM |
| Duration | 2 hours |
| Location | South Malian Sea |
| Type | Maritime disaster |
| Cause | Collision with iceberg on 3 May |
| Outcome | Maritime and wireless operation policy changes |
| Deaths | 1,237 |
The RMS Stella del Nord sank in the early morning of 3 May 1908 in the South Malian Sea during her 106th voyage returning to Andria by way of Moddra from Kenlis. Although she was not the largest or most prestigious ocean liner in service during her time, she had an impeccable reputation for comfort and safety. She had an estimated 2,095 people on board when she struck an iceberg at around 1:20AM (ship's time) on sunday, 3 May 1908. Her sinking over the course of approximately two hours resulted in the deaths of more than 1,200 people making it the deadliest peacetime maritme disaster in Tyran's history.
Stella del Nord received three warnings of sea ice on 2 May 1908 and slowed down to half speed when her lookouts began to see ice on the horizon. A moonless and windless night, it was difficult to spot ice and at 1:10AM a large iceberg was spotted directly forward of the ship. Although only traveling at a speed of 10 knots, she glanced the iceberg on her starboard side and opened up four of her eleven compartments to the sea (all three holds and adjacent boiler room). Stella del Nord had previously suffered a similar glancing blow from an iceberg in 1903, but only two compartments had been breached. After Captain Taddea Fiorina had assessed the damage, it was clear that the ship would sink and the crew preceded to use distress flares and wireless messages to attract help as passengers were loaded into lifeboats.
In accordance with safety regulations at the time, which had not been updated since the late 1860s, the Stella’s lifeboat system was designed to ferry passengers to nearby recue vessels and not to hold everyone on board simultaneously. Despite the training and experience of the crew who loaded each lifeboat to maximum capacity before launching, this meant that there was no safe refuge for many of the remaining people on board.
Stella del Nord sank with over a thousand people with those who did not immediately drown perishing as a result of cardiac arrest, cold shock, and cold incapacitation. An effort was made by some of the lifeboat to return to those in the water and of the fifteen retrieved, only ten would survive. The Syaran cargo ship SCS Simple Truths and Ossorian ocean liner LPR Bradán Feasa arrived at 6:00AM and 7:00AM respectively and rescued all the survivors by 10:15AM the same day. The disaster shocked the nations of Tyran that resulted in two public inquiries which resulted in major changes to maritime safety and wireless policies and regulations.
Background
The RMS Stella del Nord was the first of two Star-class ocean liners being operated by the Cacertian Alberreno Line and possessed an unrivaled reputation for safety and comfort at the time of her sinking. Although she never held the title of largest or most luxurious ocean liner, she had garnered a reputation as an unsinkable ship after three previous accidents that would have likely foundered similar vessels.
On 4 December 1900, the Stella was making a return trip from Kenlis to Moddra when she struck an iceberg head-on at full speed in foggy conditions. Despite suffering a crushed bow, she was still able to complete her voyage to Moddra where she was subsequently repaired. In February 1903, a glancing hit from an iceberg opened up two of her compartments to the sea but a combination of her watertight bulkheads and pumps kept her safely afloat to reach Kenlis. In a third accident in October 1905, which occurred near Andria, Stella was rammed by the similarly sized RMS Cirano Rella but was unloaded at the time and only manned by her crew. Despite the large gash below her waterline, once again her watertight doors and compartments proved their durability and allowed her to return to port.
The ship was commanded by 44 year-old Captain Taddea Fiorina who had previously served on the Stella del Nord during the 1903 iceberg strike and had recently transferred back from the Stella del Sud when the Nord’s current Captain Giannino Contarini had fallen ill. She possessed two decades of seafaring experience, eight as captain, and commanded an equally experienced and trained crew.
2 May 1908
Iceberg Warnings
On 3 May 1908, Stella del Nord’s radio operators received three messages from other ships warning of drifting ice which had been observed by some of her passengers during the afternoon. The ice conditions in the Malian Sea were later considered to be the worst in several decades which contributed to the lookouts being unaware that they were about to steam into a field of drifting ice several kilometers wide and nearly four times as long.
The first warning came from the White Star Line’s RMS Cavaliere D’Argento which reported sightings of growlers and field ice. Captain Fiorina acknowledged receipt of the message and ordered a new course in an attempt to take the ship away from the approaching obstacles.
At 1:45 in the afternoon, the Ossorian ship LPR Tobar Sagais, which was to the Stella’s west, also reported seeing pack ice and field ice. This message was also acknowledged by Fiorina. The final warning received by the ship would come from the LG Abhainn an Lagáin which would be the first vessel to report seeing large icebergs at 8:30PM.
Captain Fiorina passed along to First Officer Amelio Califano and Second Officer Linda Cornelio to reduce speed if they deemed it necessary to safely proceed to their destination. This would be the crew’s seventh run from Moddra to Kenlis and, while they had acknowledged the danger of ice, the Stella had survived two previous encounters with icebergs which included a head-on collision in fog which crushed her bow and a previous glancing hit on her port-side. It is speculated by some that the Stella’s perceived durability contributed to the crew’s decision to continue their journey instead of stop for the night.
3 May 1908
Collision
On the early morning of 3 May, the majority of the ship’s passengers were still asleep in bed and command of the ship had passed from Second Officer Cornelio to First Officer Califano at midnight. In the hand-off for the watch, Cornelio had informed Califano that while on duty she had begun spotting growlers and pack ice, but nothing else of significant note and had maintained their course and speed. Lookouts Domenica Carafa and Ristoro Barbieri had taken their posts at the forward crow’s nest during the midnight changeover. Following the disaster, Carafa noted that the air temperature was near freezing and that the ocean was completely calm. At the time, it was not known that such conditions, particularly exceptionally calm water, were signs of close proximity to ice.
Not long after taking their posts, Carafa and Barbieri had reported seeing pack ice and “some icebergs, although they could not be sure”. In response, Califano ordered the ship to half-speed, hoping it would allow them time to maneuver the ship after proper warning from Carafa and Barbieri. Despite clear skies, it was a moonless night and with calm waters there was nothing to indicate the position of nearby icebergs. The lookouts were equipped with binoculars, but given the total darkness of the night, the binoculars were ineffective.
At 1:10AM, Carafa reported a large iceberg direct ahead of the ship and rang the lookout bell three times. She telephoned the bridge and informed Sixth Officer Anita Giordani that there was an iceberg directly ahead. Giordani quickly relayed the message to Califano who ordered Pilot Bastiano Alban to change the ship’s course. It is generally agreed that Califano had given the order “hard astarboard” would result in the ships rudder being moved all the way starboard in an attempt to turn the ship port.
The Stella avoided a direct head-on collision with the iceberg and several seconds passed in which the crew believed they had safely avoided the obstacle. However, nearly 30 seconds later, the Stella suffered a glancing blow from an underwater ice spur that is now hypothesized to have been jutting out from below the waterline several meters. Domenica and Ristoro, both of whom would survive the incident, later testified that they believed they had safely cleared the iceberg as “the distance between the ship and the berg appeared to be no less than six meters.” The iceberg scraped alongside the starboard side of the ship below the waterline for about six seconds. Not long after feeling the shudder and observing the collision, Califano ran to the bridge and immediately closed the vessel’s watertight doors later ordering the ship’s engines shut down.
Effects of the Collision
The iceberg spur had buckled the hull plates at the seams, suggesting that the rivets had snapped off or popped open to create gaps through which seawater began to flood. Third Engineer Katia Spinale and a stoker Ugo Raineri were both knocked off their feet by a jet of icy water in Boiler Room No. 3 and narrowly escaped once Califano had engaged the remote controls for the watertight doors. Lead Engineer Tamara Cerri immediately ordered the stokers and firemen to reduce the fires and vent the boilers as quickly as possible; she acknowledged the potential danger of the freezing seawater contacting the hot-pressure steam that was still in the boilers at the time of the collision.
The Stella’s lower decks were divided into eleven compartments, each of which were separated by a bulkhead running the width of the ship and could be sealed by watertight doors. These doors closed vertically and could be lowered remotely from the bridge, lowered automatically by engaging a float in the presence of water, or closed manually by the crew. The doors aboard the Stella took approximately 24 seconds to completely close and warning bells would be rung before the moment they would began the process of shutting; alternative escape routes were provided so that crew would not be trapped. At Deck III, the watertight doors shut horizontally and were either manually closed at the door or remotely from the deck above.
Despite a number of horizontal watertight doors, the Stella’s watertight compartments were not completely sealed at the top and, even though these compartments extended above the waterline, if she began to settle deeper into the water there was potential for floodwater to spill over the top of the bulkheads. During the collision, four of the ships compartments were breached; the iceberg had missed the ships forepeak, but caused buckling in all three holds and Boiler Room No. 3. The Stella had recently been overhauled and refitted in 1906 and was designed to float with any two or three compartments open to the ocean. However, the combination of four in consecutive order ensured that the bulkheads would be submerged and the ship would continue to flood.
After feeling the collision in her cabin, Captain Fiorina came to the bridge where she was informed of the situation by Califano and Giordani. Fiorina and Califano proceeded to go below decks to observe the damage and found that the forward cargo holds and the mail room completely flooded with Boiler Room No. 3 quickly filling. The ship’s engineering crew worked tirelessly to attempt to pump out the water, but it quickly became clear that the flooding could not be stopped or remediated. Giordani would later recall that Captain Fiorina stated to her crew that they had no more than a few hours to save as many lives as possible.
Preparing to Abandon Ship
At 1:40AM, twenty minutes after the collision, Captain Fiorina awoke the remaining crew and ordered the lifeboats to be uncovered. She also ordered the radio operators to begin sending distress calls and to inform any vessels that responded that they were in need of immediate assistance. Stewards began instructing passengers to put on their lifejackets. On the boat deck, the crew began preparing the lifeboats but it was considerably difficult to communicate over the noise of the high-pressure steam being vented from the boilers below. The crew was forced to use hand signals.
The Stella del Nord was equipped with fourteen wooden lifeboats on davits, seven on either side of the ship. On average, each boat could occupy 68 people each and could collectively accommodate 952 people, not even half of the 2,095 people aboard. The shortage of lifeboats was a direct result of maritime practices during the period. It was believed that, in an emergency, the lifeboats would be used to transfer passengers from a distressed ship onto a nearby rescue vessel and therefore it was common for liners to have far fewer lifeboats than needed to accommodate the total number of all passengers and crew.
Captain Fiorina, who was an experienced sailor, would have known that even if all the boats were fully occupied, more than a thousand people would remain on the ship with little chance of survival. Despite this knowledge, it was said that she behaved calmly and coolly and assisted passengers in putting on their life vests before personally overseeing the loading of the lifeboats. She did her bet to instill urgency to follow the directions of the crew for evacuation but also doing her best to prevent a panic.
Loading of the lifeboats began at 2:00AM, approximately 40 minutes after the collision. Priority was given to children and passengers under the age of 40 as it was common Cacertian practice at the time to prioritize the youth. First Officer Califano took charge of the boats on the starboard side and Second Officer Cornelio took charge of those on the port side. Both officers worked to make sure that lifeboats were near their full complement of 68 people before lowering them; this became a difficult task later in the sinking.
Launching of the Lifeboats
The first boat to depart was port-side lifeboat No. 2 at 2:10AM at full capacity with starboard-side No. 1 being launched not long after with a total of 65 people aboard. Each boat was launched with a minimal amount of crew in order to prioritize the ship’s passengers. There were also several accounts of crew members exchanging their seats with any passengers willing or able to man the boats’ oars.
The engineering and firemen crews worked tirelessly to maintain vital services aboard the ship as water continued to flood the lower decks. Aside from venting the steam from the boilers to prevent them from exploding, they also kept the electrical generators running to maintain lights and power throughout the ship. Chief Engineer Cerri also made a futile attempt to utilize a number of extra portable pumps to try and mitigate the flow. When this was deemed ineffective, she returned to Boiler Room No. 1.
At around 2:20AM, water began flooding Boiler Room No. 2 from below forcing the firemen and trimmers to evacuate Boiler Room No. 3. Chief Engineer Cerri, her engineering team, and a handful of volunteers stayed behind in the unflooded engine and turbine rooms. They continued to work on the remaining boilers in Boiler Room No. 1 and the electrical generators to keep the ship’s lights on and power available to the radio so that distress signals could be sent. It is believed that the engineering team remained at their posts until the very end; none of the ship’s 30 engineers and electricians survived.
The lifeboats were lowered every few minutes, but as the ship began to sink deeper the launches were made with more and more urgency. By the time life boats No. 6 and No. 5 were being lowered, they were only filled with 58 and 55 people respectively.
Distress flares began being launched at around 1:20AM every few minutes in an attempt to attract the attention of any nearby ships and the radio operators continued to send out a distress signal. Ignazio Pratico began with the original Cacertian distress signal MGA before incorporating the newer, more recently internationally adopted SOS at the suggestion of his colleague Angela Cardella. Several ships responded, of which the SCS Simple Truths was the closest and the LPR Bradán Feasa not far behind. Despite making full-steam and a maximum speed, it would take the Simple Truths nearly three hours to reach the Stella del Nord’s position. It would take a similar amount of time for the Bradán Feasa, but she was later halted by pack ice and icebergs.
Launching of the Last Lifeboats
By about 2:45AM, the ship was sitting very low in the water with a slight downward angle. This allowed the crew some more time to launch the remaining lifeboats, but panic did begin to set in as it became more clear that there would not be enough lifeboats for everyone aboard. The final boat to be launched was lifeboat No. 13 which had closer to 70 people aboard as it bean to row away from the ship.
Captain Fiorina made one final patrol of the deck, relieving the remaining crew members of their positions and informing them to do their best to continue to save as many as people as they can. It was unclear where she went following her final patrol and there are no accounts of her final fate as her body was never recovered.
Last Minutes of the Sinking
At approximately 3:15AM, the ship’s lights flickered and permanently went out and plunged the ship into darkness. Those on the lifeboats recalled seeing people clinging to the remaining unflooded portions of the ship as she continued to foundered. There were also several accounts of loud explosions, which many attributed to either boiler explosions or the sounds of the engines and machinery coming loose from their housings. The ship, having primarily been more centrally flooded, sank relatively level and eventually disappeared from view 3:20AM, 2 hours after striking the iceberg.
Survivors in the Water
In the aftermath of the sinking, the approximately 1,200 remaining people aboard were left freezing in the icy sea. The Stella’s descent to the seabed caused buoyant debris to rocket to the surface which injured and possibly killed some of those treading water. Some used the debris to keep themselves afloat.
The waters of the South Malian Sea were lethally cold. Second Officer Cornelio described her submerging into the sea as a feeling of a thousand knives. Sudden immersion into water of such a cold temperature often caused death in minutes, primarily due to cardiac arrest and cold incapacitation. Of those in the water, only a little over a dozen were eventually helped into lifeboats. The noise of the people screaming, yelling, and crying in the water came as a tremendous emotional shock to the occupants of the lifeboats; it was often described as listening to every human emotion possible: fear, agony, resentment, and anger.
Fifth Officer Sabino Rana attempted to organize a rescue attempt, but the process of transferring occupants from his lifeboat No. 9 to the adjacent Lifeboat No. 11 took nearly forty-five minutes. Third Officer Andriana Rosato followed suite and the two mostly empty lifeboats made their way back to the site of the sinking. By the time the two boats had arrived, almost all of those in the water were dead but they did manage to rescue fifteen people, five of whom would eventually die due to hypothermia.
Following their rescue attempt, there was little the remaining survivors could do other than await the arrival of any rescue ships. The air was still icy cold and the boats had no food or drinkable water.
Rescue and Departure
Stella del Nord’s survivors first spotted the mast lights of the SCS Simple Truths at 5:30AM and reported seeing green rockets being launched approximately ten minutes afterward. Captain Zitko Evgeniev Vasev had ordered the Simple Truths to turn around after initially receiving the Stella’s distress signals and made all haste. They had steamed through the night, pouring as much steam as possible into her engines and dodging a number of icebergs on the way.
The arrival of the Simple Truths cheered the survivors, but it took several hours to bring everyone aboard. A fully laden cargo vessel with a minimal crew, the Simple Truths did not have large amounts of supplies to spare, but Captain Vasev made every attempt to accommodate the survivors in any way possible. Not long after arriving on scene at 6:00AM, the ship’s Radio Operator Silvije Božić had received word from the LPR Bradán Feasa that she was navigating through the remainder of the ice field and would arrive to assist within the hour. Those aboard the Simple Truths were surprised to find themselves in the middle of a field of ice which included twenty to thirty large icebergs and countless smaller icebergs, growlers, and debris from the Stella.
The Bradán Feasa arrived on the scene at 7:00AM and stopped alongside the Simple Truths to begin taking on the survivors. The transfer took approximately two hours and once the transfer was completed, the Simple Truths resumed its course to Kylacky. The Bradán Feasa remained on site to continue a search for any additional survivors, despite the low probability, and finally left the scene bound for Kenlis at 10:30AM on 3 May.