Battle of Lyndon Ridge

Battle of Lyndon Ridge
Part of the Ochoccola War
Ochoccolan anti-tank missiles on Lyndon Ridge, two days before the battle
Date 20–21 April 1994 Location Lyndon Ridge, Ochoccola Result Ochoccolan victory
Belligerents
Cuthland-Waldrich	Ochoccola
Commanders and leaders
Edward H. Lewin Oswin E. Stone	Hasse Ola Yaholo
Units involved
2nd Battalion, Royal Wynndale Rifles C Battery, King's Own Artillery Regiment	7th Armored Brigade 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment
Strength
620	2,800
Casualties and losses
88 killed 312 wounded 154 captured	16 killed 70 wounded 7 captured
2 civilians killed

The Battle of Lyndon Ridge was a military engagement fought between Cutho-Waldish and Ochoccolan forces during the Ochoccola War. The battle occurred when elements of 2nd Battalion, Royal Wynndale Rifles of the Royal Cutho-Waldish Army seized a lightly defended Ochoccolan outpost located on Lyndon Ridge, a key terrain feature overlooking the port city of Pinhoti. Cutho-Waldish commanders hoped to lure Ochoccolan forces out of their defensive positions in Pinhoti and provoke them into counterattacking, allowing for their destruction in open terrain using the reserve elements of 2nd Battalion supported by artillery and mortar fire. Although the intelligence provided to 2nd Battalion indicated that Pinhoti was defended by no more than a battalion of light infantry, Lyndon Ridge soon came under attack by elements of the Ochoccolan 7th Armored Brigade. The outpost was quickly overrun, forcing the remainder of 2nd Battalion to withdraw from the ridge and abandon the operation. The battle resulted in upwards of 90% casualties for 2nd Battalion, including nearly 100% of the soldiers located at the outpost. A total of five Cutho-Waldish soldiers were awarded the Order of Saint Wybert for their actions during the battle, three of which were awarded posthumously.

Two investigations were held in Cuthland-Waldrich in the aftermath of the battle, including a Royal Commission of Inquiry requested by the Wittenmoot. The results of the commission, which were released to the public in 1997, found that senior ground commanders had repeatedly ignored intelligence reports indicating the presence of Ochoccolan armor in Pinhoti, as the rigidity of the military planning process had bred a culture where field-grade and general officers were unwilling to refine or abort operations that were already in the advanced stages of planning, even in light of new intelligence. The commission also criticized the lack of fire support knowledge among maneuver commanders, who vastly overestimated the effectiveness of artillery and mortar systems against armored vehicles and falsely believed that any residual armored units present in the area of operations could be effectively engaged by the 120mm mortar and 155mm artillery assets provided to support the operation. The investigations led to reprimands for nine officers, and prompted substantial changes to Cutho-Waldish military doctrine.

Military historians often regard Lyndon Ridge as one of the greatest military disasters in contemporary history. The battle left a substantial impact on popular culture in both Cuthland-Waldrich and around the world, and has been the subject of numerous books, movies, songs, television shows, and video games in subsequent years.

Background

After a lengthy air and naval campaign, Cutho-Waldish forces landed at Oktamulke Beach on 8 April. The initial beachhead took several days to consolidate as Ochoccolan air, naval, and ground forces continually attacked the landing force and its supporting naval and air assets, but by 12 April the ground offensive had begun in earnest. Cutho-Waldish forces led by the 3rd Armored Brigade advanced south along the east coast towards Cahulga, where the bulk of Ochoccolan ground forces had consolidated their positions. The ensuing battle proved costly, and saw Cutho-Waldish and Ochoccolan forces engaged in some of the fiercest urban combat since the Melasian Crisis.

By 17 April, Cutho-Waldish government officials began to pressure military leaders for a decisive early victory to boost morale at home and bolster support for the ground campaign. In response, ground commanders targeted the northwestern port city of Pinhoti as the location for a small but decisive engagement that would effectively give Cutho-Waldish forces control over the entirety of northern Ochoccola. Although one of Ochoccola's largest population centers, Pinhoti was not originally considered strategically significant to Cutho-Waldish commanders, who preferred a swift and direct assault on the major southern cities that lined the corridor to the capital of Socapatoy. However, the city provided an attractive opportunity for a propaganda victory, as the heavy fighting around Cahulga had prompted Ochoccolan commanders to withdraw most of their units from the country's north in order to prevent a breakthrough by Cutho-Waldish forces in the south. Cutho-Waldish intelligence indicated that the 7th Armored Brigade, which was garrisoned at Fort Lamochattee in the northern outskirts of Pinhoti, had been deployed to assist in the fighting around Cahulga, leaving the city defended by a battalion sized element of the Ochoccolan National Guard.

Key to the defense of Pinhoti was Lyndon Ridge, a chain of steep hills which overlooks the city and forms the eastern boundary of its urban area. Lyndon Ridge was home to a National Guard armory that had been repurposed as a defensive outpost during the war, giving Ochoccolan forces excellent visibility of all routes into the city. Immediately prior to the battle, Cutho-Waldish intelligence indicated that the outpost was manned by a single National Guard platoon, equipped with anti-tank missiles and light mortars.

Prelude

Cutho-Waldish forces

Ground commanders sought to avoid a protracted urban battle similar to the ongoing assault on Cahulga, and recognized Lyndon Ridge as decisive terrain in any potential assault on Pinhoti. As such, the planned operation focused around seizing the National Guard outpost with a company sized force and luring Ochoccolan forces into launching a counterattack. Cutho-Waldish commanders believed that presenting a relatively small element would provoke the National Guard battalion in Pinhoti to retake the outpost, bringing them out of their defensive positions and into the open farmland surrounding Lyndon Ridge. A larger force held in reserve on the other side of the ridge would then engage the National Guardsmen using a combination of mortar and artillery fire, destroying the battalion and allowing additional Cutho-Waldish forces to enter the city from the south largely unopposed.

2nd Battalion, Royal Wynndale Rifles, a light infantry unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. Lewin, was tasked with the assault on Lyndon Ridge. Lewin's soldiers were supported by C Battery, King's Own Artillery Regiment, a 155mm field artillery battery commanded by Captain Oswin E. Stone. The subsequent attack on Pinhoti itself was assigned to 1st Battalion, Royal Bexford Fusiliers, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Cenhelm D Buckley.

-No air support because it's all being used in Cahulga

Ochoccolan forces

-Intel showed that all of the tanks in the 7th Armored Brigade that Cuthland-Waldrich thought were operational had left Fort Lamochattee, with only a bunch of motorpools filled with inactive equipment left -Whoops, turns out those were operational, about two battalions worth actually -Satellites actually showed activity a few hours before the attack, intel dudes wanted a flyover by air force reconnaissance aircraft, but commanders said no because the operation was already too far along and they didn't want to lose the element of surprise -Besides, 155mm howitzers can take out a T-72, right? ...right?

The Battle

-Surprised Pikachu face when everything goes to shit -Farmer tells 7th Armored Brigade commander about reserve companies, commander is actually kinda smart and realizes that they're planning an ambush, but think that Ochoccolan forces are smaller than they actually are

Legacy

Military analysis

Cuthland-Waldrich

-Poor fire support knowledge -Poor communication within the chain of command -Overreliance on satellite intelligence