Library:HSH-B-2023/4

Dossier Information

Editor's Note: Obviously, if this file has just landed on your desk, I apologize for the filing concerns. This builds on work done in the PRCO in 2019-2020 before its dissolution [SEE:ARK-PRCO-20201906/SHRH-BSM1]. Now with the reconfiguring of ███████████████████████████████ this doesn't come as much suprrise that classification levels remain all over the place, but I just wanted to warn you that I am under orders directly from █████████ to get this sent out in readable form to every branch of the OSO and OSC. So, use your best judgement.

This is the Intelligence Threat Assessment - Belisaria for the 2023-2024 organizational year. We've had several recent developments in the last few months and so it should go without saying to use common sense when applying this information to HUMNIT. ███████████ will be receiving this as part of █████████████████████████████████, just as they have prepared their own equivalent report for ██████████████████████████████████████. Obviously, after Gadir, we also have a presence in the area, but recent developments have required a narrowing down of operational scope to just Belisaria for the time being. Expect an HSH-S by █████████████████████████████████████████████████████. Breaking with PRCO tradition, this dossier will be organized by the scale of the perceived threats, and not alphabetically or by nation, region, etc.

Domestic

███████████ Personal Concerns

In late 2022, it was brought to our attention that ███████████ has been ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████, with the intent of ███████████████████████████. While not an immediate security concern, this is ███████████████████████████████████████████████████████. This is a matter of utmost secrecy, and we shouldn't counter ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ with █████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. Regardless of what ██████████████████████████████████████████████, new regulations remain in place and are expected to be followed with regard to ███████████████████████. As per █████████████████████████████, our representatives should probably levy this issue with ███████████ directly, but while maintaining tact to any potential reply in the name of █████████████████████████████████████████ [SEE:BIO-20210204-████████████].If all else fails, we may need to ██████████████████████████████████████████, regardless of its effect on ████████████████████████, due to its moral imperative.

International

Barderec-Pshenets-Zarinsk Axis

PDC Liason, ORVOS & APKO have all recommended an increased level of intelligence scrutiny on the BPZ axis (Barderec-Pshenets-Zarinsk; i.e. Ostrozava-Zamorodna-Velikoslavia [SEE:REP-BD-20221024/NNO-ZK1]) following not only the successful execution of Operation Throwing Knife but also Operation ███████████ in the region in the last fourteen months. Despite IDR-related concerns persisting, Namdak's death has shifted potentialities for IDR activity southwards around the purported location of Arnt Andelfingen (see below). Of higher concern in this region is the potential for proto-Invictism. Analytics and ███████████████████ have both reported marked rises in variations on pan-Baderianism or pan-Orthodox nationalism. While it is the opinion of the Primar and of the RBOS director that pan-Baderianism by itself is not a threat and may even be beneficial to the Prime Republic, care should be taken that these movements are not co-opted by foreign, subversive, or otherwise nihilistic actors.

While the Hetmanate has largely cooperated in the aftermath of Operation Throwing Knife, much to our pleasure as Primar Král has reported publicly, there exist areas where instability between relations could be generated either endogenously or exogenously. Of particular interest to RBOS security measures is the Barabash VRK group [SEE:REP-PRCO-20020529-BARABASH; REP-Z-20230111-BRBSHPT]. While our colleagues in the Strakosko and Baderia Civil Guard RSV have rightfully looked at their potential impact on union-busting operations perhaps directly or indirectly affiliated with their Ostrozavan equivalents, our security file suggests that we may need ███████████████ in order to properly ascertain potential scenarios of combat contact between OSO forces and Barabash paramilitaries, whether regionally or beyond. If possible, we should look into ways to entirely reveal their income stream in the case of such an event, thus precluding any claims of plausible deniability. Should Dmitry prove unmalleable, it would be best to ████████████ instead of resorting to violence.

Zarinsk is a medium-sized Velikoslavian city at the border with Baderia, and, alongside Garagorsk on our side of the border, is the primary hub of Ostrozavan-Velikoslavian economic interaction, particularly with regard to freight shipping of raw materials. Velikoslavian law is notably loose on regulation here and ██████████████ has ordered us to take a closer look at examining the legality of some of these transnational transactions. Our concern is that some of these income streams may be weaponized by Invictist, IDR, or perhaps even Velikoslavian state elements. ████████████████████████████, which is a notable disadvantage in data collection on this front; this should be rectified by Q2 2024 if at all feasible. [SEE:RPT-VK-20230505-GRVL1].

Magnish Belisaria

Aureumterra, Schaumberg, and Garima have more than tripled in security priority since the Gadir incident; Gariman authorities have, of course, notably "ended detente" with the Prime Republic as a result; Schaumberg is purported to be a growing hotspot of IDR activity [SEE:RPT-PRCO-20171204-IDRSCH3]. While it is unlikely that Arnt Andelfingen is in either his home country or another neighboring monarchy, we must nevertheless anticipate the possibility of his reappearance in the region, perhaps under a pseudonym. Across all three borders, the situation has been stable, albeit the concerns levied against the Velikoslavian state also apply here, albeit in diminished form. Particular care should be taken in examining the potential influence of Pan-Magnism on certain cohorts of the society in Rheigen, as well as potential influences by religious and spiritual institutions in the region. Aureumterra's historical animosity towards the Prime Republic remains stable in its expression, but we should, of course, keep an eye on diplomatic developments, troop movements, etc.

Brumen, though a Kingdom, has been an unlikely source of comfort for the Prime Republic in the region, likely propelled by shared secular values. We should continue encourage purchases of military gear by the Grand Army of the Realm whenever possible. Our colleagues in the Diplomatic Corps have assured a lukewarm attitude towards the Prime Republic persists within certain circles, and this should be pressed if possible. In 2020, the PRCO classified ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. If change comes to that region it likely will not need any assistance from us, and maintaining the status quo while expanding relations is considered a top priority.

Ottonia & North Belisaria

There is no doubt that recent developments in Ottonia have decidedly turned out in our favor. While it is unlikely we are to witness a Belisarian regime of monarchists quite so incompetent in security management going forward, there is nevertheless a potentially open door for increased security cooperation with Ottonia. The modus operandi then, is to maintain and grow intelligence and defense cooperation whenever possible. Before any attempt at a Gadir-esque base in the region, care should be taken to deepen both intelligence links and to ease Ottonia and Ostrozava's neighbors into the feasibility of the idea. Particular care should be taken with regard to deepening intelligence cooperation on Aureumterra; if a technology gap in military or surveillance technology emerges there, we should work closely with our Ottonian allies with regards to bridging it as fast as possible. Thankfully, according to ██████████████████████████████, this is not yet the case.

Peuramaa and Lumisaari, Nekulturnya, and Zamorodna have a noted mutual defense pact. This levies a secondary concern compared to Aureumterran and Velikoslavian cooperation, but it remains nevertheless significant that the Prime Republic is a noted primary defensive concern on their end. If at all possible, relations should be smoothed over, and any further operations in the area equivalent to Operation Throwing Knife should be done more tactfully, with a higher regard for actual or illusory cooperation. Another factor to emphasize here is Ostrozava and Peuramaa's shared security concern of growing Aureumterran influence. Containment of any growth in identitarianism remains starkly encouraged; this includes supporting any Põjhamaa sentiments.

True Dmitry, a religious extremist Orthodox preacher of Nekulturnyan origin, earlier (falsely) claimed responsibility for the attack on Gadir. Further research should go into investigating Dmitry's potential links to Nekulturnyan and/or foreign intelligence services, and if proven nonexistent, the movement could become an asset. Such religious movements rarely arise in ideationally stable societies; a potential bridge, then, would be a shared disgust of nihilism. However, as per Ordinance ██████████, all agents are advised to remember that fostering foreign terrorists is off-limits and will be punished severely [SEE:RPT-NK-20221104-PRAVDIDMITRY].

Drevstran & Ludvosiya

Drevstran and Ludvosiya are seen as prime candidates for increased diplomatic, military, and economic cooperation in the Karminian sphere, and a proposal for intelligence-sharing should be encouraged between these states and the Prime Republic with urgency; these appeals should be focused on our shared security issues concerning the potential rise of both identitarian neo-Rytierism and IDR-related anarchist or ordosocialist sentiment. While the Angrast Accord already exists, any further development of relations, as has been indicated by █████████████████████████, should not be focused on the Angrast Accord and instead should be fostered through new avenues.

The completion of the Kupalnitsa Canal continues to be a major economic and military concern, especially after Gadir, but any promotion of this project should be done with respect to maintaining the current economic relationship between Ostrozava and Drevstran; we also should take care to not be seen as "nagging" the Ludvosiyans to finish the admittedly-difficult construction project. This applies to both clandestine and diplomatic means. Diplomatic intelligence should instead focus on slowly nudging Drevstranese economic dependency away from Latium with the purpose of fostering greater economic cooperation in Kupalnitsa. The Drevstranese are notably reticent to support any effort of further integration of the sphere, so any efforts to do this are ideally to be done tactfully and without any clandestine elements.

There is also the issue of the neo-Rytieri present within Drevstran, who we know to be involved deeply with some aspects of the economy of the Alban Pentapolis, particularly the Valdavian Club gridiron team [SEE:RPT-D-20230914-RYTIERISPORT]. Any major figures in the Valdavian Club coming to Ostrozava for next year's season should be thoroughly investigated and tracked. If we can ██████████████████████████████████████, it would be an objective HUMNIT success and may lead to information useful in any future counter-terrorism or legal proceedings against their community leaders. We should make tying the Valdavian club directly into the Neo-Rytieri a top priority in Kuplanitsan security for 2024.