Anabe Matakoshi: Difference between revisions
(→Papers) |
|||
| Line 65: | Line 65: | ||
In the 1980s, Anabe started to work on a series of papers recounting his experience in the Themiclesian Marines on a more technical level, since his previous monograph ''Too Good'' was intended for a more casual audience and adapted for theatrics. He considered the force to have some astonishing characteristics that could, if generalized to other parts of the Themiclesian armed forces, be useful. One such was the unusually-long term of service of 20 years, which allowed training to proceed at a more sedate pace. New recruits were placed into columns interspersed between veterans during exercises and encouraged to co-operate horizontally; at other times, they would be assigned to a variety of less important positions but to familiarize themselves as though it were critical. He considered this preferable on the individual level to the IDA's approach of rapid and programatic training that garnered a reputation for brutality as well as inflexibility. He observed that many Themiclesian soldiers there had the implicit qualities for {{wp|non-commissioned officer}} positions and attributed this to the more reflective and empirical approach made possible by the long training period (up to 12 months to fully-trained and front-line ready). Moreover, this meant that NCO were often directly drawn from their units, fostering a great deal of familiarity and trust between officers and men. | In the 1980s, Anabe started to work on a series of papers recounting his experience in the Themiclesian Marines on a more technical level, since his previous monograph ''Too Good'' was intended for a more casual audience and adapted for theatrics. He considered the force to have some astonishing characteristics that could, if generalized to other parts of the Themiclesian armed forces, be useful. One such was the unusually-long term of service of 20 years, which allowed training to proceed at a more sedate pace. New recruits were placed into columns interspersed between veterans during exercises and encouraged to co-operate horizontally; at other times, they would be assigned to a variety of less important positions but to familiarize themselves as though it were critical. He considered this preferable on the individual level to the IDA's approach of rapid and programatic training that garnered a reputation for brutality as well as inflexibility. He observed that many Themiclesian soldiers there had the implicit qualities for {{wp|non-commissioned officer}} positions and attributed this to the more reflective and empirical approach made possible by the long training period (up to 12 months to fully-trained and front-line ready). Moreover, this meant that NCO were often directly drawn from their units, fostering a great deal of familiarity and trust between officers and men. | ||
On the other hand, he also criticized the approach for its ill fit to the scale of warfare in the modern age, calling it "a relic of a better past in Themiclesian eyes". He commented that the fundamental assumption in this manner of training is that veterans are available in quantity and that there was no immediate pressure to produce more soldiers. For the prolonged 20-year term of service, the availability problem is largely resolved, but inculcation of the correct mindset and physique still took much longer than a "cookiecutter" training system such as practiced by the IDA; moreover, benefits of the Themiclesian method for the line soldier are not obvious in the short term. Themiclesian historian Hngjanh cites Anabe and explains this inclination, stating that this type of training probably originated in the 15th century, when new recruits were immediately placed into fleets; training thus had to happen onboard and in the face of the enemy. The most sensible answer to these challenges would then be for veterans to face more dangerous enemies, while new recruits either assisted or dealt with lesser threats. After a period of "on the job" training, the soldier would qualify for the first line, which corresponds to the end of the one-year probationary period that Anabe did not face in 1940 (by reason of his ejection). Another Themiclesian historian, ′Up replied that the Themiclesian Marines have | On the other hand, he also criticized the approach for its ill fit to the scale of warfare in the modern age, calling it "a relic of a better past in Themiclesian eyes". He commented that the fundamental assumption in this manner of training is that veterans are available in quantity and that there was no immediate pressure to produce more soldiers. For the prolonged 20-year term of service, the availability problem is largely resolved, but inculcation of the correct mindset and physique still took much longer than a "cookiecutter" training system such as practiced by the IDA; moreover, benefits of the Themiclesian method for the line soldier are not obvious in the short term. Themiclesian historian Hngjanh cites Anabe and explains this inclination, stating that this type of training probably originated in the 15th century, when new recruits were immediately placed into fleets; training thus had to happen onboard and in the face of the enemy. The most sensible answer to these challenges would then be for veterans to face more dangerous enemies, while new recruits either assisted or dealt with lesser threats. After a period of "on the job" training, the soldier would qualify for the first line, which corresponds to the end of the one-year probationary period that Anabe did not face in 1940 (by reason of his ejection). Another Themiclesian historian, ′Up replied that the Themiclesian Marines have, for multiple centuries, been fixed, size-wise, to the fleet; exactly as it was not possible to produce ships instantly, it was probably not necessary to produce the naval infantry on them as rapidly. | ||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
Revision as of 08:15, 17 October 2019
Anabe Matakoshi | |
|---|---|
| Native name | 穴部復輿 (Anabe no Matakoshi) |
| Nickname(s) | Best Sharpshooter of Themiclesia |
| Born | February 20, 1920 |
| Died | January 24, 1997 (aged 76) |
| Allegiance | Dayashina |
| Service | Imperial Dayashinese Army |
| Years of service | 1938 – 1950 |
| Unit | Dayashinese Imperial Special Operations Group |
Anabe Matakoshi (Dayashinese: 穴部復輿／あなべのまたこし, Anabe no Matakoshi; Feb. 20, 1920 – Jan. 24, 1997) was a Dayashinese soldier in the Pan-Septentrion War, first active in Meridia as a sharpshooter then sent on an infiltration mission in Themiclesia to assassinate the Themiclesian emperor. He is most renowned for his widely-published, 1960 account of the infiltration operation, Too Good, later interpreted into the 1966 film of the same name.
Early life
Military career
Meridia
Themiclesia
Having been selected in D/ISOG's focus group on the Themiclesian monarch, Anabe followed the [unit] to Themiclesia, where he deliberately escaped from his unit and surrendered to Themiclesian authorities. According to his own account, the first official to receive him was the treasurer of the 12th Regiment of Foot, of Rak Prefecture (洛步癸校廷府令史, rak-bah-grjii-krawh-dêng-bja-mlings-srje). The regiment honoured the government's commitment to award 300 hmrjing (approx. $112,000 Int'l, adjusted to 2018) in cash to the first soldier from an enemy unit to surrender. He then declared his intention to serve the Themiclesian cause in the war, which made him an official defector rather than prisoner in the government's cognizance. As typical for defectors, he was transported to the capital city, interviewed by the Foreign Office (for valuable intelligence) and then by the Ministry of War; he was awarded a small house in Nem-dêrh Prefecture and a further 600 hmrjing of money, a small fortune at the time.
Since settelement, he sought to enlist with the Themiclesian Marines. This proved challenging, as he now lived inland, where the Impress Service (航官) did not have recruitment operations. Due to wartime rationing, train tickets were difficult to obtain without a government letter. Eventually, arguing that he wanted "to see the sea a little", he persuaded the Nem-dêrh Marshal (南地尉) to telegraph the Impress Service for a letter to travel, which was forthcoming. The Marines were happy to accept him, as a seasoned soldier. He passed the largely pro forma trials to qualify as "Light Naval Engineers" (海輕寺工), which was required before he could operate firearms.[1] With the government's grant, he had no issue purchasing them and uniforms. He was assigned to the 4th Regiment in 1940.
Reaching the garrisons of the 4th in Blim-tsi, he was distributed into the 3rd company of the regiment. Very soon after his arrival, he was greatly surprised by the atmosphere of the 4th Regiment: there were few required exercises, and morning row-calls were virtually the only regular event. The Admiralty had only prepared one regiment's worth of reserve officers, who were split between the two new Marines regiments, resulting in both being half-filled. The lack of officers was most responsible for the dearth of activity that regimental members recollect. As a result, Matakoshi often spent his time at the shooting range, which was very poorly utilized, since most of the regiment were "totally uninterested in shooting", and the colonel in charge, who was a commodore coming out of retirement, did nothing about it.[2] His incredible accuracy at the shooting range soon attracted onlookers, and Yoshida Fuyusaki (吉田冬崎) noticed that Matakoshi's shooting routine was the same the IDA's sharpshooters in Meridia. This information quickly filtered to the Admiralty, which, in the absence of other incriminating evidence, decided quietly to renege on his service contract, paying him six years' salary as compensation. Matakoshi later referred to this as "hush money".
Later service
Life after retirement
Works
Papers
In the 1980s, Anabe started to work on a series of papers recounting his experience in the Themiclesian Marines on a more technical level, since his previous monograph Too Good was intended for a more casual audience and adapted for theatrics. He considered the force to have some astonishing characteristics that could, if generalized to other parts of the Themiclesian armed forces, be useful. One such was the unusually-long term of service of 20 years, which allowed training to proceed at a more sedate pace. New recruits were placed into columns interspersed between veterans during exercises and encouraged to co-operate horizontally; at other times, they would be assigned to a variety of less important positions but to familiarize themselves as though it were critical. He considered this preferable on the individual level to the IDA's approach of rapid and programatic training that garnered a reputation for brutality as well as inflexibility. He observed that many Themiclesian soldiers there had the implicit qualities for non-commissioned officer positions and attributed this to the more reflective and empirical approach made possible by the long training period (up to 12 months to fully-trained and front-line ready). Moreover, this meant that NCO were often directly drawn from their units, fostering a great deal of familiarity and trust between officers and men.
On the other hand, he also criticized the approach for its ill fit to the scale of warfare in the modern age, calling it "a relic of a better past in Themiclesian eyes". He commented that the fundamental assumption in this manner of training is that veterans are available in quantity and that there was no immediate pressure to produce more soldiers. For the prolonged 20-year term of service, the availability problem is largely resolved, but inculcation of the correct mindset and physique still took much longer than a "cookiecutter" training system such as practiced by the IDA; moreover, benefits of the Themiclesian method for the line soldier are not obvious in the short term. Themiclesian historian Hngjanh cites Anabe and explains this inclination, stating that this type of training probably originated in the 15th century, when new recruits were immediately placed into fleets; training thus had to happen onboard and in the face of the enemy. The most sensible answer to these challenges would then be for veterans to face more dangerous enemies, while new recruits either assisted or dealt with lesser threats. After a period of "on the job" training, the soldier would qualify for the first line, which corresponds to the end of the one-year probationary period that Anabe did not face in 1940 (by reason of his ejection). Another Themiclesian historian, ′Up replied that the Themiclesian Marines have, for multiple centuries, been fixed, size-wise, to the fleet; exactly as it was not possible to produce ships instantly, it was probably not necessary to produce the naval infantry on them as rapidly.
Notes
- ↑ The Themiclesian Navy went through several phases of development. At first, sailors both controlled the fleet and served as troops engaging with enemy fleets. The need to manoeuvre while engaging prompted the non-military complement to become naval infantry, who originally wielded melée weapons. When gunpowder was introduced, the navy's engineers both minted guns and operated them onboard, in addition to their duties maintaining ports and fortifications on land. As guns developed into heavy, fixed guns and light, mobile ones, the engineers who operated the heavy guns gradually merged with the sailing complement, while those who operated light guns merged with naval infantry, becoming the modern marines. This is why modern Themiclesian sailors are called "engineers", short for "heavy engineers", if qualified to operate weapons systems.
- ↑ Too Good, Matakoshi.