1993 Krasnyy Marsh fire
On June 11, 1993 a fire broke out aboard the Soviet aircraft carrier Krasnyy Marsh after an electrical fault caused an Kh-31 antiship missile mounted on an Alexeyev-Leonov ALe-29K fighter to fire, sending it streaking across the deck to strike a Dy-27PS helicopters which was preparing for take off. Though the missile did not detonate, it did rupture one of the second aircraft fuel tanks, sending 1,500 liters of aviation fuel spilling onto the deck and igniting a fire, which subsequently caused ordinance being loaded onto nearby aircraft to detonate. The resulting fire killed 177 personnel, injured over one hundred more, and took more than 17 hours to bring under control. The incident is one of the largest non-combat disaster in the Soviet Order's naval history.
The intense fire, severe damage and extreme number of injured personnel forced the ship to withdraw from its station in the northern Thetian Ocean. Being unable to return to a suitable Soviet port due to higher levels of Allied naval activity on the western coast at the time, the ship was forced to seek refuge in the Großes Ostreich. The Decmeber 1993 strategic nuclear exchange between the OSSR and the Republic of Licana that ended the Omandan Continental War saw the Krasnyy Marsh stranded in Ostlichtor. The ship was eventually appropriated by the government of Ostlichtor in June of 1994, and recommissioned as the Reichsschiff Bettner in 2001.
Background
The ship was originally built by the Vakya Shipyard in Transnapastain and commissioned in the Naval Forces of the Soviet Order as the Krasnyy Marsh, or Red March, named for the 1867 popular revolution that ushered the Transnapastaini Soviet Socialist Republic into being. The vessel, launched in 1970, saw extensive service during the Omandan Continental War, and was damaged, often significantly, during several operations, but was never sunk, earning her the nickname Krasnyy Vechnyy (Red Eternal) from her crew, and was used extensively as a propaganda piece by the Ministry of Culture.
Arrival in the northern Thetian Ocean
By the beginning of 1993, the Allied and Licanan navies had essentially established sea superiority over much of the central Theatian Ocean, having won several decisive victories against Soviet Order naval battlegroups in a series of engagements off the western Omand coast, most notably the victory at the Battle of Mistoilya which allowed the Allied Forces to close the Straits of Mistoilya. In addition to inflicting severe losses on the Soviet Order Seventh Fleet, its remnants were thereafter trapped within the Kranso Sea. This closure of the Straits of Mistoilya prevented deployed Soviet Order vessels from returning to some of the nation's most developed and protected ports, hindering their ability to conduct operations. The majority of ports in the northern regions of the Soviet Order were not equipped to handle the demands of high intensity naval operations, and many lacked the facilities to service larger warships. The only remaining port with sufficient facilities to supply and support ongoing naval operations was at the port city of Arbizhal, located on the western coast of the Adoyeva Soviet Socialist Republic and situated within the Bay of Otlichnayaryba. However, Arbizhal was under near constant air attacks by allied forces, and was thus not an attractive port for Soviet Naval vessels seeking repairs. Further, Allied naval vessels ranged up and down western coast of the OSSR, presenting a hazard to any Soviet Naval vessels operating in the area. By March of 1993, only soviet submarines presented a real threat to Allied naval vessels operating in the central Thetian Ocean.
Near the end of May 1993, Soviet Fleet Command ordered the Krasnyy Marsh and its escort forces to the northern Thetian Ocean with the intention of the carrier conducting airstrikes against Allied naval vessels sighted by land based observation points set up by the Opolcheniye and submarine forces. Supplies for the vessels would be gathered and shipped via the naval station located on Otdalennyy Island and delivered via underway replenishment and carrier onboard delivery. These attacks would be supplemented to land based naval aviation aircraft of the Armada of the Soviet Order.
The Krasnyy Marsh and her escorting battlegroup, the Shershen-class helicopter carrier Admiral Vostrikov, the Khrabryy-class anti-submarine destroyer Zhelezkin, and two Pochet-class guided-missile destroyers, the Mikhail Polenin and the Yevgeni Petrov. arrived on station on June 6, 1993, four days after their anticipated arrival date, having been delayed by a hurricane crossing the region. The carrier task group took up station about 250 miles to the southeast of Eilínótt. Combat operations began almost at once, with 8-10 large sorites and constant combat air patro operations conducted launched every day between June 6th and the morning of June 11th.
Issues with degraded ordinance
Due to the intensity and length of the Omandan conflict, Soviet stocks of munitions were being depleted and prodigious rate, however, the sheer industrial capacity of the OSSR general allowed Soviet Order forces to remain relatively well supplied. This situation began to change as Allied forces advanced across central Omand and began to occupy areas of the OSSR and its satellite states which contained significant industrial facilities. Further, as Allied forces advanced further into central Omand, industrial facilities within the OSSR itself were within range of airstrikes and, later, cruise missiles strikes by warships operating in both the Theatian and Boreal Oceans. By 1990, it was estimated that no less than 45 percent of the OSSRs industrial output was under threat of attack by Allied forces at any time, and had been diminished by at least 20 percent. By 1993, those numbers had risen to 65 and 33 percent respectively. Due to the shortall in production of war materials, Soviet Forces were required to utilize older equipment from reserve stockpiles, which included munitions for armored vehicles, aircraft and naval vessels. Much of this equipment had been improperly stored and maintained and was prone to failure.
On June 10, 1993, the MV Yulius Fuchik arrived into the operational area to provide supplies, including munition, to the task force. While taking on supplies, once officer supervising the loading, noted that the APR3301 ASW torpedoes being delivered appeared to be excessively corded, covered in rust and grime. APR3301 torpedos had been manufactured in the mid-1940s, and deck hands recalled noting some of the production dates indicated manufacture as early as 1941. It was well known that explosives compositions used in older Soviet munitions had a dangerous tendency to become more sensitive if it was old or improperly stored. Many of the ordinance crewers had never seen a APR3301 torpedo before and were unaware of the danger dated ordinance might present if handled imporperly or suddenly jarred, and were also unaware that older explosives compositions had greater shock and heat sensitivity. The Krasnyy Marsh's ordinance officers reported the situation to the vessel's commander, Kapitan 1 Ranga Nikolay Bogolepov, and informed him the torpedoes were, in their assessment, an imminent danger to the ship and should be immediately jettisoned overboard. Kapitan Bogolepov noted the situation, but also noted that commands from Soviet Fleet Command dictated that they accept delivery of the ordinance to allow the vessel to continue its required pace of operations.
Degraded safety practices
Due to the intense pace of combat operations demanded of the Krasnyy Marsh and her crew, many safety practices that were standard with the Soviet Armada were disregarded by crew or eliminated by officers to speed up turn around time for sortie launches. One such safety practice that was disregarded which played a significant role in the 1993 fire aboard the Krasnyy Marsh was the practice of only removing weapon safety pins when the aircraft had been positioned for launch from the flight deck. Removing the safety pins after mounting the weapons to the aircraft was seen as expedient by crews interesting in increasing turnaround time, as it removed the need for aircraft crew to pull these pins when preforming a final pre-launch inspection of the aircraft. The safety concern as considered minimal as the weapons required an electronic signal to fire and the pilot would keep the aircraft "master arm" switch in the safe position until after launch.
Fire and explosions
While preparing for the forenoon sortie on the morning of June 11, 1993, the aft portion of the Krasnyy Marsh was loaded with aircraft being prepared to be moved to the carriers three launch positions. On deck in the aft area were six ALe-29K aircraft, seven Lyadov Ly-33 multirole fighter aircraft being prepared to replace the currently aloft combat air patrol, and both of the carriers Dayneko Dy-27 ASW helicopters, one of which was being readied to supplement helicopters flying off of the Admiral Vostrikov due to reports of possible submarine contacts from the ASW picket Zhelezkin operating several miles south of the task force, the second acting as the carriers ready combat search and rescue helicopter, which was preparing for take off from the the number 4 rear helicopter landing zone, with the Dy-27 ASW helicopter positioned nearby on the Number 3 rear landing zone. A total of 24 of the carrier's 30 aircraft onboard were on deck. Several pallets of ordinance, including several of the APR3301 torpedos, were being stored amidst the assembled aircraft in the "bomb farm" aft.
At 11:45:36 hours, an Ale-29K (tail number 01KM-11) piloted by leytenant Pytor Ourumov was situational on the port side of the ship, facing inward towards the deck, and was preparing to move to the number three take off position. In preparation for this, Kapitan-leytenant Ourumov switched from external to internal power. This action initiated an electrical surge which caused one of his Kh-31 antiship missiles to malfunction and fire. It was later determined that the safety pin that may have prevented the surge from reaching the weapon had been removed in spite of safety regulations to the contrary, but a practice that had been adopted on board the Krasnyy Marsh for expedience. The missile flew across the deck and clipped rear section of the Dy-27PS rescue helicopter (tail number 05KM-02), which was at that moment beginning to lift from the deck, before continue over the side of the carrier and plunging into the sea. The strike caused the pilot of the helicopter, Michman Emiliya Simonova, to lose control, heeling to the left and slamming back into the deck from a altitude of about 10 feet. Though the helicopter landed on its wheel, its sideways motion caused its rotors to strike the deck, spinning the helicopter backward and causing extreme damage. During the crash, the helicopter fuel tank was ruptured, spilling aviation fuel onto the deck between the number 3 and number 4 landing zones.
Although the Kh-31 missile failed to detonate, it broke apart on impact with the helicopter, sending numerous fragments of burning rocket propellant swilling around the crash site and causing an instantaneous conflagration. A fragment also punctured the external fuel tank of a nearby Ly-33 (tail number 03KM-03, adding additional fuel to the growing fire. Lastly, the fire was being fanned by 32-knot (59 km/h; 37 mph) winds and the exhaust of at least three jets.
The ship was called to action stations by Kapitan 1 Ranga Bogolepov at 11:46:41 hours, which required all hands to secure the ship for maximum survivability, including closing the fire-proof steel doors that separate the ship's compartments. The fire rapidly spread across the deck and into the "bomb farm" area containing the APR3301 torpedos being prepared for loading aboard the ASW Dy-27M aircraft (tail number 05-KM02). Firefighters arrived on scene to battle the blaze. The firefighter team leader, Starshina 1 statie Ilia Kortnev, without taking the time to locate and put on protective clothing, immediately attempted to smother the bomb with a fire extinguisher, attempting to delay the fuel fire from spreading and give the pilots time to escape their aircraft. Based on their training, Kortnev and his team believed they had a ten-minute window to extinguish the fire before the bombs casing would melt resulting in a low-order explosion.
Meanwhile, pilots strapped into their aircraft and preparing to launch when the fire started immediately attempted to escape their aircraft. Leytenant Pavel Rozhkov, pilot of ALe-29K 02KM-12, next to Ourumov's, was among the first to notice the flames, and escaped by escaped by jumping out of his cockpit and rolling off the flight deck and into the starboard man-overboard net. Leytenant Boris Sergetov, in an ALe-29K, escaped by crossing the flight deck and ducking under the tails of Ly-33's spotted along the starboard side. All three crew members of the second Dy-27 fled from their aircraft as well after noticing the flames spreading towards the torpedos, as they had been apprised of the decayed state of the munitions. The operations officer pf the 115th Shipborne Fighter Aviation Regiment, Kapitan-leytenant Mikhail Chernyavin, who was in the Krasnyy Marsh combat information center to serve as liaison officer between the vessel and the aloft aircraft, left his post to proceeded to take command of an ad-hoc firefighting team assembling on the hanger deck.
While Kortnev and his team were attempting to fight the fire burning in the "bomb farm", Kortnev noted that one of the torpedo's casings had split open. As he watched, the exposed explosive compound inside began to glow brightly. Recognizing that a lethal cook-off was imminent, Kortnev shouted for his firefighters to withdraw, but the torpedo detonated one minute and 12 seconds after the start of the fire. At the time of the explosion, near 40 personnel were in close proximity to the detonating torpedo. Kortnev and all but four of his personnel were killed instantly. thirty-four crewers were injured. Based on the testimony of the survivors, including that of Kapitan-leytenant Chernyavin, saw that Starshina 1 statie Kortnev was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Order posthumously.
The first torpedo detonation destroyed several aircraft on deck, including the nearby Dy-27 ASW helicopter, which had been abandoned by its crew. Further, it blew a crater in the armored flight deck, and sprayed the deck and crew with bomb fragments and shrapnel from the destroyed aircraft. Burning fuel poured through the hole in the deck into occupied berthing compartments below. In the tightly packed formation on the aft deck, every aircraft, all fully fueled and bomb-laden, were damaged and several men were seen jumping into or were blown into the ocean. Several more of the unstable torpedos exploded approximately 10 seconds after the first, and another blew up 44 seconds after that. A total of eight torpedos exploded during the fire. Bodies and debris were hurled as far as the bow of the ship. in less than five minutes, seven or eight other devices exploded on the flight deck. The explosions tore seven holes in the flight deck. About 150,000 L of burning jet fuel from ruptured aircraft tanks poured across the deck and through the holes in the deck into the aft hangar bay and berthing compartments. The explosions and fire killed 47 night crew personnel who were sleeping in berthing compartments below the aft portion of the flight deck. Sixty-one additional crew members were killed in internal compartments in the aft portion of ship. Personnel from all over the ship rallied to fight the fires and control further damage. They pushed aircraft, missiles, rockets, bombs, and burning fragments over the side. Sailors without training in firefighting and damage control took over for the depleted damage control teams. Unknowingly, inexperienced hose teams using seawater washed away the efforts of others attempting to smother the fire with foam.
Fires controlled
The destroyer Mikhail Polenin pulled men who had jumped or been thrown overboard from the water and directed its fire hoses on the burning Krasnyy Marsh. Another destroyer, Yevgeni Petrov, maneuvered as close as 20 feet (6 m) to the burning carrier for 90 minutes, directing her own on-board fire hoses at the burning flight and hangar deck on the starboard side. At 13:51, Krasnyy Marsh reported the flight deck fire was under control. About 30 minutes later, they had put out the hanger deck fires. Firefighting crews continued to fight fires below deck for many more hours. Throughout the day, the ship's medical staff worked in dangerous conditions to assist wounded sailors, many of whom suffered severe burns from the fires. Firefighting was greatly hampered because of smoke and heat and cases of oxygen deprivation and smoke inhalation were also common as crews continued to fight the fires. The number of casualties quickly overwhelmed the ship's medical teams, and Kapitan 1 Ranga Bogolepov ordered the helicopter carrier Admiral Vostrikov to use its helicopters to assist in transferring wounded sailors to other ships in the task force, as the Krasnyy Marsh's sickbay was overfilled. This left only the destroyer Zhelezkin not engaged in rescue operations and providing security for the task group; a dangerously unfavorable situation in the option of Kapitan 1 Ranga Bogolepov.
At 17:25 hours, a muster of the Krasnyy Marsh's crew was ordered in an attempt to gain an accurate count of dead and wounded. This count was hampered by the fact that many crewers, including wounded, had been transfered of the ship or picked up by the carrier's escorts after going over the side into the water, while others had been blown overboard and not recovered or had been burned beyond recognition. Additional holes in the flight deck to help fight fires in the compartments below. By 20:00 hours, the fires in the 02 and 03 levels were contained, but the areas were still too hot to enter. At 03:31 hours on June 12, it was reported that all fires had been brought under control. Crew members continued to put out hot spots, clear smoke, and cool hot steel on the 02 and 03 levels onto 07:51 hours, when the fires were official declared to be out.
Aftermath
The fire left 177 men dead and 209 more injured. Of the 30 aircraft aboard the carrier, 15 were destroyed: 7 Ale-27Ks fighter aircraft, 5 Ly-33 fighter aircraft, 1 Dy-31 helicopter and both Dy-27 helicopters.
Kapitan 1 Ranga Bogolepov reported to Soviet Fleet Command via the naval station at Otdalennyy Island that his ship had been rendered combat ineffective and that the task force required assistance. After several hours, Soviet Fleet Command reported that no assets were available to relieve the task force. Bogolepov requested permission to depart from the area of operation at 16:41 hours as damage control crews continued to battle the fires. At 17:05, permission was granted for the task force to depart, but, no instructions on where to proceed were forthcoming. Bogolepov requested several times for a destination to be relayed before the task force could get underway, and by 19:00 that day, he had been ordered to proceed west towards the Großes Ostreich as it was unlikely the task force could return to Arbizhal undetected, and that the wounded carrier would be immediately targeted by Allied aircraft.
Traveling at a reduced speed of only 11 knots, it took the task force 6 days to reach the port of Hoffnung on the eastern shore of Ostlichtor. Arriving on June 18, the ship was assigned to a commercial berthing space, usually reserved for very large supercargo vessels of the Handelsmarine. Her crew was unloaded and placed into temporary interment by the Ordnungspolizei, the Ostlander national police force, and then turned over to the custody of the Reichstreitkräfte until their diplomatic status could be determined. Though not a formal ally of the Soviet Order, the Großes Ostreich was one of the few nations in Annwynn that retained friendly relations with the OSSR during the Omand Continental War. Meanwhile, the ship was transferred from its berth to a drydock owned by Agricola AG, a maritime construction company, for repairs.
In 1993, a strategic nuclear exchange between the OSSR and the Republic of Licana effectively ended the Omand Continental War, and the OSSR was in no position to continue work on, or retrieve, the damaged carrier, which had only had minimal work done on it by that time. In 1994, the vessel was appropriated by the government of Ostlichtor, repaired, refurbished, and overhauled over the next 7 years, and recommissioned as the Reichsschiff Bettner in 2001.