Directions on Conduct Abroad
The Directions on Conduct Abroad was a special order issued by the Secretary of State for War in 1929 concerning the conduct of Themiclesia troops that were occupying Dzhungestan since earlier that same year.
Context
Themiclesia has not fought a war following the major reforms to its armed forces in the middle of the 19th Century. Though capital punishment was applied for a range of crimes in the unreformed army (pre-1847), there was considerable debate whether the same laws could apply after capital punishment was abolished by edict in 1852. Military law was not codified for dealing with foreign civilians or prisoners of war, and questionable acts were recorded at the front; when newspapers that were noted to have a position against the war reported such activities, they scandalized the public. Fearing that such reporting would undermine public support for the war, the Secretary of State for War Drrien Ghruehng-leei issued the order on May 2nd, 1929.
Content
The full text of the order is as follows:
Secretary of State for War Tam Gjul-rai, in obedience to edict, makes known to all officers and soldiers:
In the past, soldiers are amongst the “four vile” groups, as they are by nature violent and not amenable to culture and decency. Since the T’ais-‘an reign, the country has been lacking in its defence and suffered enmity from all directions. Then, it was considered that soldiers ought be men of decent standing; hence, civil officials of high station were appointed to govern armies, and commoners of a decent background were enlisted as soldiers; the vileness was abolished, and faulty policies discontinued. From then til now, 70 years have elapsed, and we have achieved much to be envied about and imitated. You soldiers should also recall the empathy of former prime ministers and ministers and embody it in your acts abroad, lest foreign states hold you in jest, not knowing that you are men of decency.
1. Those that kill or main prisoners of war or foreign civilians will be punished
2. Those that do not provide housing, food, water, and medical services to prisoners of war or foreign civilians as provided by legislation will be punished
3. Those that enslave prisoners of war or foreign civilians will be punished
4. Those that deprive of prisoners of war or foreign civilians of their possessions will be punished
Comments
Noted scholar Randolph C. Merrick considered this order to be "temporary" in character, since it reminds its audience of semi-relevant historical conditions and utilizes social expectations to compel soldiers to behave in accordance with the government's wishes; he also believes that the Themiclesian government would have wanted to amend its military penal code to include punishments for mistreatment of foreigners and prisoners, though various issues prevented this until 1947, after the conclusion of the war. Equally, he pointed out that the order did not stipulate how offenders would be punished, suggesting that the government did not intend for this order to be permanent, and this is consistent with the reaction at the front, which handed out punishments without much consistency, compared to foreign troops.
Tairo Aramura agrees with Merrick about the general nature of the order but sought to demonstrate that the issuance of the order did correspond with a rise in the rate of prosecutions for offences that would be expected in a front and in dealing with prisoners—particularly allegations of molestation, larceny, and unruly behaviour.
Implementation
Prior to the introduction of conscription in 1936, it is generally agreed that the Themiclesian Army maintained good behaviour in observation of the order. Whether the order itself is instrumental in creating this situation is debated, since the conduct of the Army (into the 1900s) was not poor, and the early reports of misbehaviour may be attributed to initial shock or confusion, or even shown to the public out of context to create anti-war sentiment. During the occupation of Dzhungestan, there were few major incidents of violence to the local population, and in most situations courts-martial cited precedents of domestic misbehaviour to determine the culpability and sentence of misbehaving officers and men in Dzhungestan.
However, conscription in 1936 brought over 520,000 new soldiers to the Army, and, in view of the Army's unpreparedness, soldiers were poorly trained in the use of their equipment and proper conduct. Such new units were also placed under the command of "acting officers" without proper qualifications, and discipline in them was erratic. However, by this point, the front was located in Themiclesia and away from major centres of population, so interaction with civilians were not acutely problematic. Some Menghean units captured by Themiclesians complained of poor treatment, such as inadequate accommodation or rations, but this may also be occasioned by the same lack of experience rather than outright indiscipline or malice. As the war continued, conventions developed for adjudicating cases where foreigners were involved. Caning was the general punishment for minor indiscretions, while violence was met with imprisonment. Caning was often done publicly to show the public that the offender had been punished, though officers and technicians (who would be prevented from performing their duties after caning) were fined instead.
The matter of complicity was more complex. If an illegal act was commanded by an officer but carried out by a soldier, both parties were liable to punishment; until 1944, a office second-in-command was also liable to punishment, should he be privy to the illegal order and do nothing to prevent its issuance. Penalties were meted out to entire chains of command for particularly heinous acts, such as intentional burning of houses, including superiors of the officer in question. For example, if a captain caused a soldier to commit the crime, then the commander of the battalion, brigade, and division of which his company is part would also be punished by demotion. This practice dates to antiquity and is meant to compel officials to monitor their superiors, subordinates, and colleagues. In all cases, commanders were punished with the full rigour of the law, while the soldier would be caned 600 times for obeying an illegal order. If it could be shown that the soldier did not know the order was illegal, his punishment may be substituted by a fine instead. There are at least 343 recorded cases where caning (up to 2,400 strokes, double the civilian maximum) have resulted in a fatality; this may, in turn, create the situation where the officer is imprisoned while the soldier is killed. In general, penal decisions were comparatively severe for minor offences in the Themiclesian Army.
On the other hand, Themiclesian troops were widely reported by Menghean soldiers to be very prone to mocking them for their manner of speech, which is related to the Themiclesian language but lacks tones. Such minor offences were mostly unpunished, but there is at least one case where an "acting" officer of Menghean descent had such a soldier caned 300 times for mocking Menghean; the officer was later dismissed for abuse of power, since the maximum sentence for verbal insults and indiscretions was 50 strokes.