Septentrion Treaty on Atomic and Nuclear Disarmament: Difference between revisions
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==Provisions== | ==Provisions== | ||
The STAND agreement contains provisions on both non-proliferation and disarmament. The non-proliferation provisions, which build on earlier partial test ban agreements, forbid signatories from | The STAND agreement contains provisions on both non-proliferation and disarmament. The non-proliferation provisions, which build on earlier partial test ban agreements, forbid signatories from building or testing nuclear weapons. Member states which already possess confidential schematics and test data are also forbidden from sharing their data with states that did not previously possess nuclear arms. Theoretical design work is not expressly regulated, but assembly of prototype warheads is forbidden, even if fissile material is not installed. | ||
The disarmament provisions, uniquely stringent for their time, required all nuclear-armed states to completely dismantle their stockpiles in accordance with a set of comprehensive, state-specific timetables. Nuclear disarmament was carried out with an international team of SL inspectors present, to ensure that all warheads were properly dismantled, and it also required that all formerly nuclear-armed states disclose a full accounting of their previously owned nuclear weapons in order to ensure that no weapons were concealed and kept. | The disarmament provisions, uniquely stringent for their time, required all nuclear-armed states to completely dismantle their stockpiles in accordance with a set of comprehensive, state-specific timetables. Nuclear disarmament was carried out with an international team of SL inspectors present, to ensure that all warheads were properly dismantled, and it also required that all formerly nuclear-armed states disclose a full accounting of their previously owned nuclear weapons in order to ensure that no weapons were concealed and kept. |
Revision as of 17:33, 11 April 2020
The Septentrion Treaty on Atomic and Nuclear Disarmament (abbreviated STAND) is an international treaty in Septentrion which was drawn up in 1979 and entered into force in 1980. Motivated by the Sieuxerr-Tyrannian Conflict of 1978, which saw the use of tactical nuclear weapons by both sides and narrowly avoided further escalation, it banned the development and testing of nuclear weapons and required all nuclear-armed member states to dismantle their nuclear arsenals.
History
In April 1978, an international dispute between Anglia and Lechernt and Sieuxerr over the status of Portcullia escalated into an open conflict, which involved the detonation of six nuclear devices totaling 250 kilotons TNT equivalent. Although the two countries were able to negotiate a ceasefire by April 30th, the conflict sparked international fears about the danger posed by nuclear escalation; an exchange of strategic weapons in Casaterra could have killed millions and left one of the region's most densely populated areas uninhabitable.
In the months after the conflict, an unlikely coalition of anti-nuclear activists and military planners formed a special working group at the Septentrion League to discuss an arms reduction treaty. As momentum for arms control grew, the final treaty developed into a binding document requiring total nuclear disarmament, with all nuclear-armed nations as signatories. Drafting of the treaty was finalized in early 1979, and it entered into force on January 1st, 1980, following ratification by all members of the Septentrion League General Assembly.
Provisions
The STAND agreement contains provisions on both non-proliferation and disarmament. The non-proliferation provisions, which build on earlier partial test ban agreements, forbid signatories from building or testing nuclear weapons. Member states which already possess confidential schematics and test data are also forbidden from sharing their data with states that did not previously possess nuclear arms. Theoretical design work is not expressly regulated, but assembly of prototype warheads is forbidden, even if fissile material is not installed.
The disarmament provisions, uniquely stringent for their time, required all nuclear-armed states to completely dismantle their stockpiles in accordance with a set of comprehensive, state-specific timetables. Nuclear disarmament was carried out with an international team of SL inspectors present, to ensure that all warheads were properly dismantled, and it also required that all formerly nuclear-armed states disclose a full accounting of their previously owned nuclear weapons in order to ensure that no weapons were concealed and kept.
Enforcement
THe STAND agreement is also distinguished by a uniquely strict enforcement provision, imposed to ensure that rogue states with suspected nuclear programs did not take advantage of other states' disarmament. Under the treaty's provisions, if inspectors and monitoring officials find evidence that a country is developing nuclear weapons in violation of the agreement, they may report this violation to the Septentrion League. If the Septentrion League Security Council determines that the evidence is credible, its members may then vote to impose near-total trade and travel restrictions on the member state which violated the agreement. STAND's sanctioning framework permits exceptions for refugees and certain diplomatic staff, but allows trade restrictions on all other goods, including humanitarian aid, to ensure that maximum pressure is applied. Per STAPNA's terms, these sanctions can only be lifted once the violating state agrees to suspend development work and dismantle its arsenal under the oversight of an international team of SL inspectors.
The enforcemnt clause was first activated in November 1984. The Democratic People's Republic of Menghe detonated a 2-kiloeton nuclear device at Naran Gaja on November 4th, confirming the existence of a widely suspected but unverified nuclear arms program. The Security Council voted unanimously to apply maximum sanctions to Menghe on November 9th, making an exception only for refugees and diplomatic personnel essential to arms negotiation.