Anabe Matakoshi

Anabe Matakoshi
Native name	穴部復輿 (Anabe no Matakoshi)
Nickname(s)	Best Sharpshooter of Themiclesia
Born	(1920-02-20)February 20, 1920
Died	January 24, 1997(1997-01-24) (aged 76)
Allegiance	Dayashina
Service	Imperial Dayashinese Army
Years of service	1938 – 1950
Unit	Dayashinese Imperial Special Operations Group

Anabe Matakoshi (Dayashinese: 穴部復輿／あなべのまたこし, Anabe no Matakoshi; Feb. 20, 1920 – Jan. 24, 1997) was a Dayashinese soldier in the Pan-Septentrion War, first active in Meridia as a sharpshooter then sent on an infiltration mission in Themiclesia to assassinate the Themiclesian emperor. He is most renowned for his widely-published, 1960 account of the infiltration operation, Too Good, later interpreted into the 1966 film of the same name.

Military career

Themiclesia

Having been selected in D/ISOG's focus group on the Themiclesian monarch, Anabe followed the [unit] to Themiclesia, where he deliberately escaped from his unit and surrendered to Themiclesian authorities. According to his own account, the first official to receive him was the treasurer of the 12th Regiment of Foot, of Rak Prefecture (洛步癸校廷府令史, rak-bah-grji-krawh-lêng-bjo′-ringh-srje′). The regiment honoured the government's commitment to award 300 m′rjing (approx. $112,000 Int'l, adjusted to 2018) in cash to the first soldier from an enemy unit to surrender. He then declared himself an official defector. He was transported to the capital city, interviewed by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of War; he was awarded a small house in Nem-dêrh Prefecture and a further 600 hmrjing of money, a small fortune at the time.

Since settelement, he sought to enlist with the Themiclesian Marines. This proved challenging, as he now lived inland, where the Marines did not have recruit. Due to wartime rationing, train tickets were difficult to obtain without a government letter. Eventually, arguing that he wanted "to see the sea a little", he persuaded the Nem-dêrh Marshal (南地尉) to telegraph the Navy for a letter to travel, which was forthcoming. The Marines were happy to accept him, as a seasoned soldier. He was assigned to the 4th Regiment in 1940.

Reaching the garrisons of the 4th in Blim-tsi, he was distributed into the 3rd company of the regiment. Very soon after his arrival, he was greatly surprised by the atmosphere of the 4th Regiment: there were few required exercises, and morning row-calls were virtually the only regular event. As a result, Matakoshi often spent his time at the shooting range, which was very poorly utilized, since most of the regiment were "totally uninterested in shooting", and the colonel in charge, who was a commodore coming out of retirement, did nothing about it. His incredible accuracy at the shooting range soon attracted onlookers, and Yoshida Fuyusaki (吉田冬崎) noticed that Matakoshi's shooting routine was the same the IDA's sharpshooters in Meridia. This information quickly filtered to the Admiralty, which, in the absence of other incriminating evidence, decided quietly to renege on his service contract, paying him six years' salary as compensation. Matakoshi later referred to this as "hush money".

Works

Papers

In the 1980s, Anabe started to work on a series of papers recounting his experience in the Themiclesian Marines on a more technical level, since his previous monograph Too Good was intended for a more casual audience and adapted for theatrics. He considered the force to have some astonishing characteristics that could, if generalized to other parts of the Themiclesian armed forces, be useful. One such was training proceeding at a more sedate pace. New recruits were placed into columns interspersed between veterans during exercises and encouraged to co-operate horizontally; at other times, they would be assigned to a variety of less important positions but to familiarize themselves as though it were critical. He considered this preferable on the individual level to the IDA's approach of rapid and programatic training that garnered a reputation for brutality as well as inflexibility. He observed that many Themiclesian soldiers there had the implicit qualities for non-commissioned officer positions and attributed this to the more reflective and empirical approach made possible by the long training period (up to 12 months to fully-trained and front-line ready). Moreover, this meant that NCO were often directly drawn from their units, fostering a great deal of familiarity and trust between officers and men.

On the other hand, he also criticized the approach for its ill fit to the scale of warfare in the modern age, calling it "a relic of a better past in Themiclesian eyes". He commented that the fundamental assumption in this manner of training is that veterans are available in quantity and that there was no immediate pressure to produce more soldiers. While the 20-year term of service was in effect, they are rightly expected to be available, but inculcation of the correct mindset and physique still took much longer than a "cookiecutter" training system such as practiced by the IDA; moreover, benefits of the Themiclesian method for the line soldier are not obvious in the short term. Themiclesian historian Ng′jarh cites Anabe and explains this inclination, stating that this type of training probably originated in the 14th century, when new recruits were immediately placed into fleets; training thus had to happen onboard and in the face of the enemy. It was more sensible then for veterans to face more dangerous enemies, while new recruits either assisted or dealt with lesser threats. After a period of "on the job" training, the soldier would qualify for the first line, which corresponds to the end of the one-year probationary period that Anabe did not face in 1940 (by reason of his ejection).

See also

• Yamabe Oshimaro
• Dayashina
• Themiclesia