Battle of Lyndon Ridge

Battle of Lyndon Ridge
Part of the Ochoccola War
Ochoccolan anti-tank missiles on Lyndon Ridge on 13 April. The missiles pictured were moved from the outpost prior to the battle.
Date 20–21 April 1994 Location Lyndon Ridge, Ochoccola Result Ochoccolan victory
Belligerents
Cuthland-Waldrich	Ochoccola
Commanders and leaders
Edgar A. Tadman Edward H. Lewin Oswin E. Stone	Hasse Ola Yaholo
Units involved
2nd Battalion, Royal Wynndale Rifles C Battery, King's Own Artillery Regiment	7th Armored Brigade 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment
Strength
620	2,800
Casualties and losses
88 killed 312 wounded 474 captured	16 killed 70 wounded 7 captured
2 civilians killed

The Battle of Lyndon Ridge was a military engagement fought between Cutho-Waldish and Ochoccolan forces during the Ochoccola War. The battle occurred when elements of 2nd Battalion, Royal Wynndale Rifles of the Royal Cutho-Waldish Army seized a lightly defended Ochoccolan outpost located on Lyndon Ridge, a key terrain feature overlooking the port city of Pinhoti. Cutho-Waldish commanders hoped to lure Ochoccolan forces out of their defensive positions in Pinhoti and provoke them into counterattacking, allowing for their destruction in open terrain using the reserve elements of 2nd Battalion supported by artillery and mortar fire. Although the intelligence provided to 2nd Battalion indicated that Pinhoti was defended by no more than a battalion of light infantry, Lyndon Ridge soon came under attack by elements of the Ochoccolan 7th Armored Brigade. 2nd Battalion was completely encircled and overrun, resulting in the death or capture of more than 90% of the unit. A total of five Cutho-Waldish soldiers were awarded the Order of Saint Wybert for their actions during the battle, three of which were awarded posthumously.

Two investigations were held in Cuthland-Waldrich in the aftermath of the battle, including a Royal Commission of Inquiry requested by the Wittenmoot. The results of the commission, which were released to the public in 1997, found that senior ground commanders had repeatedly ignored intelligence reports indicating the presence of Ochoccolan armor in Pinhoti, as the rigidity of the military planning process had bred a culture where field-grade and general officers were unwilling to refine or abort operations that were already in the advanced stages of planning, even in light of new intelligence. The commission also criticized the lack of fire support knowledge among maneuver commanders, who vastly overestimated the effectiveness of artillery and mortar systems against armored vehicles and falsely believed that any residual armored units present in the area of operations could be effectively engaged by the 120mm mortar and 155mm artillery assets provided to support the operation. The investigations led to reprimands for nine officers, and prompted substantial changes to Cutho-Waldish military doctrine.

Military historians often regard Lyndon Ridge as one of the greatest military disasters in contemporary history. The battle left a substantial impact on popular culture in both Cuthland-Waldrich and around the world, and has been the subject of numerous books, movies, songs, television shows, and video games in subsequent years.

Background

After a lengthy air and naval campaign, Cutho-Waldish forces landed at Oktamulke Beach on 8 April. The initial beachhead took several days to consolidate as Ochoccolan air, naval, and ground forces continually attacked the landing force and its supporting naval and air assets, but by 12 April the ground offensive had begun in earnest. Cutho-Waldish forces led by the 3rd Armored Brigade advanced south along the east coast towards Cahulga, where the bulk of Ochoccolan ground forces had consolidated their positions. The ensuing battle proved costly, and saw Cutho-Waldish and Ochoccolan forces engaged in some of the fiercest urban combat since the Melasian Crisis.

By 17 April, Cutho-Waldish government officials began to pressure military leaders for a decisive early victory to boost morale at home and bolster support for the ground campaign. In response, ground commanders targeted the northwestern port city of Pinhoti as the location for a small but decisive engagement that would effectively give Cutho-Waldish forces control over the entirety of northern Ochoccola. Although one of Ochoccola's largest population centers, Pinhoti was not originally considered strategically significant to Cutho-Waldish commanders, who preferred a swift and direct assault on the major southern cities that lined the corridor to the capital of Socapatoy. However, the city provided an attractive opportunity for a propaganda victory, as the heavy fighting around Cahulga had prompted Ochoccolan commanders to withdraw most of their units from the country's north in order to prevent a breakthrough by Cutho-Waldish forces in the south. Cutho-Waldish intelligence indicated that the 7th Armored Brigade, which was garrisoned at Fort Lamochattee in the northern outskirts of Pinhoti, had been deployed to assist in the fighting around Cahulga, leaving the city defended by a battalion sized element of the Ochoccolan National Guard.

Key to the defense of Pinhoti was Lyndon Ridge, a chain of steep hills which overlooks the city and forms the eastern boundary of its urban area. Lyndon Ridge was home to a National Guard armory that had been repurposed as a defensive outpost during the war, giving Ochoccolan forces excellent visibility of all routes into the city. Immediately prior to the battle, Cutho-Waldish intelligence indicated that the outpost was manned by a single National Guard platoon.

Prelude

Ground commanders sought to avoid a protracted urban battle similar to the ongoing assault on Cahulga, and recognized Lyndon Ridge as decisive terrain in any potential assault on Pinhoti. As such, the planned operation focused around seizing the National Guard outpost with a company sized force and luring Ochoccolan forces into launching a counterattack. Cutho-Waldish commanders believed that presenting a relatively small element would provoke the National Guard battalion in Pinhoti to retake the outpost, bringing them out of their defensive positions and into the open farmland surrounding Lyndon Ridge. A larger reaction force held in reserve on the other side of the ridge would then engage the National Guardsmen supported by a combination of mortar and artillery fire, destroying the battalion and allowing additional Cutho-Waldish forces to enter the city from the south largely unopposed.

Command of the operation was delegated to Colonel Edgar A. Tadman, commander of the Cutho-Waldish 3rd Infantry Brigade. 2nd Battalion, Royal Wynndale Rifles, a light infantry unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. Lewin, was tasked with the assault on Lyndon Ridge. As the majority of Cuthland-Waldrich's fire support assets in Ochoccola were required in Cahulga, Lewin's soldiers were supported only by C Battery, King's Own Artillery Regiment, a 155mm field artillery battery commanded by Captain Oswin E. Stone. The subsequent attack on Pinhoti was assigned to 1st Battalion, Royal Bexford Fusiliers, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Cenhelm D. Buckley.

Cutho-Waldish intelligence indicated that the 7th Armored Brigade, commanded by Colonel Hasse Ola, was understrength at the outbreak of the war, with nearly two full battalions worth of equipment nonfunctional and in various stages of disrepair. The remaining functional equipment was believed to be consolidated in two battalions, both of which had been observed departing Fort Lamochattee on 16 April. In reality, the two battalions of the 7th Armored Brigade remaining in the Pinhoti area of operations, 1st Battalion, 50th Armored Regiment and 3rd Battalion, 22nd Armored Regiment, were only partially understrength, with four companies worth of operational equipment between both units. Nevertheless, Cutho-Waldish forces believed that the only Ochoccolan forces in and around Pinhoti were limited to 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment of the Ochoccolan National Guard, under the command of Lietuenant Colonel Yaholo. The Lyndon Ridge outpost itself was manned by 1st Platoon, C Company, under the leadership of 1LT Emistesigo.

On the evening of 19 April, just eight hours before the assault was planned to begin, Cutho-Waldish satellite images revealed vehicle movement in motorpools previously believed to house only nonfunctional equipment. Military intelligence officials urged ground commanders to delay the operation and verify the status of the 7th Armored Brigade with reconnaissance aircraft. General Dunstan A. Newey, commander of all Cutho-Waldish forces in the Ochoccolan theatre of operations, was made aware of the new intelligence and consulted with his senior staff members, as well as Lieutenant General Godric O. Stanton, the land forces commander for the Ochoccolan theatre. After a discussion, GEN Newey decided to proceed with the operation as planned. Theatre staff argued that the purported intelligence was unreliable, as it conflicted with multiple previous intelligence reports indicating that no operational armored units remained at Fort Lamochattee. LTG Stanton argued that a reconnaissance flyover would cost Cutho-Waldish forces the element of surprise, and that delaying the operation risked squandering the opportunity to strike while the enemy was weak and unprepared. Stanton also claimed that any operational Ochoccolan armored vehicles could be easily destroyed by the 155mm artillery assets that were assigned to support the operation, as well as the mortar assets organic to both maneuver battalions. Neither COL Tadman nor his subordinate battalion commanders were made aware of the new intelligence.

The Battle

The assault on Lyndon Ridge began at 0330 on 20 April, when 60mm mortars organic to A Company, 2nd Battalion, Royal Wynndale Rifles began firing on the Ochoccolan outpost. LTC Lewin opted not to use artillery or battalion mortars for the initial assault, so as not to reveal that more than a single infantry company was involved in the operation. The initial mortar strikes killed three of the National Guardsmen stationed at the outpost, and prompted more than half of the inexperienced remaining soldiers to flee down the ridge and towards Pinhoti. A Company began its assault minutes later, meeting only minimal resistance. Within ten minutes, Cutho-Waldish forces had secured the outpost, taking seven of the Ochoccolan soldiers prisoner and killing five while taking no casualties of their own. B and C Company remained in the wood line one kilometer down the ridge as the reaction force, attempting to remain undetected and prepared to respond to a counterattack. LTC Buckley's 1st Battalion, Royal Bexford Fusiliers staged five kilometers south of Pinhoti just off of Highway 1 for the planned attack on the city itself.

Ochoccolan forces in Pinhoti first learned of the attack when 1LT Emistesigo notified the C Company command post of incoming indirect fire. The information quickly made its way to LTC Yaholo's tactical operations center in central Pinhoti, where observers could see smoke coming from Lyndon Ridge. Several failed attempts were made to reach the outpost by radio after 1LT Emistesigo's initial report; unbeknownst to the Ochoccolans, the Lieutenant had been killed and his radio destroyed by a mortar round only seconds after his final transmission. LTC Yaholo immediately radioed Fort Lamochatee to inform COL Hasse Ola of the attack and instructed the remainder of C Company to move up Lyndon Ridge and reinforce the embattled outpost. However, at 0410 the National Guardsmen who had successfully escaped from the battle arrived at C Company's defensive positions and informed the company commander, Captain Yayatustenuggee, that Lyndon Ridge had already been captured by Cutho-Waldish forces. A reconnaissance team sent by CPT Yayatustenuggee reported that around 100 Cutho-Waldish soldiers now occupied the outpost, equipped with infantry weapons ranging from small arms to light mortars.