Hanaki War: Difference between revisions
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===Onekawa-Nukanoa=== | ===Onekawa-Nukanoa=== | ||
===Pulacan=== | ===Pulacan=== | ||
The war began in Pulacan through another campaign of subterfuge and espionage. The Union State was still relatively new, and as a consequence was politically fragile. Numerous elements, including the tribes that saw themselves as losing the previous generation’s Brothers’ War, were still fundamentally opposed to a unified Pulatec state. The Pulatec general election of 1926 was similarly divisive, with staunch radical Republican Dumelang Tsogwane and his cohorts receiving limited power in government thanks to a divided opposition and spoiler candidates. The Tsogwane government was subsequently viewed as weak and ineffective. MaZanzi agents were involved in agitating disgruntled tribal dikgosi as early as 1925, but the program intensified following the inauguration. By early 1927, MaZanzi agents were actively promoting open rebellion from within. Seretse IV, the influential kgosi of the Tshekedi nation, was the first and primary chief to revolt against the government; the opening salvo of the rebellion was the raid and seizure of a military munitions convoy in the remote Djebe highlands at | The war began in Pulacan through another campaign of subterfuge and espionage. The Union State was still relatively new, and as a consequence was politically fragile. Numerous elements, including the tribes that saw themselves as losing the previous generation’s Brothers’ War, were still fundamentally opposed to a unified Pulatec state. The Pulatec general election of 1926 was similarly divisive, with staunch radical Republican Dumelang Tsogwane and his cohorts receiving limited power in government thanks to a divided opposition and spoiler candidates. The Tsogwane government was subsequently viewed as weak and ineffective. MaZanzi agents were involved in agitating disgruntled tribal dikgosi as early as 1925, but the program intensified following the inauguration. By early 1927, MaZanzi agents were actively promoting open rebellion from within. Seretse IV, the influential kgosi of the Tshekedi nation, was the first and primary chief to revolt against the government; the opening salvo of the rebellion was the raid and seizure of a military munitions convoy in the remote Djebe highlands at Motopi on February 2nd, 1927. | ||
Contrary to MaZanzi expectations, the rebellion quickly foundered. Despite having the advantage of guerrilla tactics on their side, the rebels found it difficult to recruit supporters from war-weary tribes. Many, even if they held great disdain for the central government, did not wish to risk the compromise position they held, so soon after a devastating conflict well within living memory. As such, manpower and civilian support proved to be chronic issues. Attempts to engage the Pulatec Security Forces in open combat, too, proved ineffective. Pulatec experiments in combined arms and close air support were tested on the irregular rebel forces to marked success. By August, the rebellion was all but extinguished. Despite this, many in MaZanzi military high command felt obligated to increase support for the rebels. Public opinion in Zanzali was largely sympathetic to the rebels, thanks to government depictions of a “kindred struggle” against non-Komontu oppressors. After intense debate, an MaZanzi expeditionary force crossed the border on September 12th, 1927, and laid siege to the fortifications protecting the major city of Mtsanga. This action caught the unprepared local forces by surprise, and the defenders were routed. It was hoped that the bulk of Pulatec manpower would be too heavily committed toward combating the rebellion to allow for a proper defense to be mounted, and that the coastal areas of northern Pulacan would easily fall away. Pulatec commanders, aware but not prepared for the threat of invasion, opted to engage in mobile defense, refusing to commit to full battles while slowing the MaZanzi advance and allowing for sufficient reinforcements to be mobilized and redirected to the front. Despite this strategy, the coast fell to MaZanzi troops by December, 1928. Remaining Pulatec forces in the area either retreated or melted into the wilderness as guerrilla fighters against the occupation. | Contrary to MaZanzi expectations, the rebellion quickly foundered. Despite having the advantage of guerrilla tactics on their side, the rebels found it difficult to recruit supporters from war-weary tribes. Many, even if they held great disdain for the central government, did not wish to risk the compromise position they held, so soon after a devastating conflict well within living memory. As such, manpower and civilian support proved to be chronic issues. Attempts to engage the Pulatec Security Forces in open combat, too, proved ineffective. Pulatec experiments in combined arms and close air support were tested on the irregular rebel forces to marked success. By August, the rebellion was all but extinguished. Despite this, many in MaZanzi military high command felt obligated to increase support for the rebels. Public opinion in Zanzali was largely sympathetic to the rebels, thanks to government depictions of a “kindred struggle” against non-Komontu oppressors. After intense debate, an MaZanzi expeditionary force crossed the border on September 12th, 1927, and laid siege to the fortifications protecting the major city of Mtsanga. This action caught the unprepared local forces by surprise, and the defenders were routed. It was hoped that the bulk of Pulatec manpower would be too heavily committed toward combating the rebellion to allow for a proper defense to be mounted, and that the coastal areas of northern Pulacan would easily fall away. Pulatec commanders, aware but not prepared for the threat of invasion, opted to engage in mobile defense, refusing to commit to full battles while slowing the MaZanzi advance and allowing for sufficient reinforcements to be mobilized and redirected to the front. Despite this strategy, the coast fell to MaZanzi troops by December, 1928. Remaining Pulatec forces in the area either retreated or melted into the wilderness as guerrilla fighters against the occupation. | ||
The Pulatec Navy was largely concentrated in the north of the country, and with the fall of its support bases to the MaZanzi imminent, it was decided that the fleet had to evacuate to avoid capture. Onboarding injured personnel and local authorities at Mabesekwa Naval Base on July 17th, 1928, the Ozeros Sea Flotilla departed that same day under cover of darkness. Equipped with a dreadnought battleship as the flotilla's core, the group was theoretically capable of combatting enemy naval forces; as its route to evacuate crossed the waters prowled by both the Pulaui and MaZanzi naval forces, however, it was decided that the risk of engagement was too high and to avoid confrontation at all costs. On October X, off the coast of Y, [INSERT NAVAL BATTLE HERE]. Despite incurring losses, the battered Pulatec navy was able to escape the engagement and limp to safety at the northern Onekawan island of Motonui. This evacuation, known as the Flight of the Fleet, allowed for the bulk of Pulacan's naval power to survive the early invasion and prove useful by the end of the war. | |||
On land, plans to reconquer the northern coast were being put into place almost as soon as they fell to Zanzali. | |||
===Kayatman Theater=== | ===Kayatman Theater=== | ||
{{see also|Second Cross-Strait War}} | {{see also|Second Cross-Strait War}} | ||
Revision as of 08:02, 11 May 2023
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The Hanaki War was a continent-spanning conflict in Malaio. Waged between 1927 and 1931, the four-year long conflict saw the forces of a resurgent and irredentist Zanzali pitted against much of the rest of the Malaioan region. Their efforts to unite the coastline under ShiMzanzi rule were ultimately confounded.
The war saw several advances in technology, including in the fields of automatic firearms and aerial attack doctrine. Politically, the war saw the end of the monarchy of Zanzali and a total rearrangement of the balance of power in the Malaio-Ozeros region. The political legitimacy of the Pulatec Union State was confirmed by the defeat of rebel forces. The war reaffirmed the Nukanoa's control of Onekawa-Nukanoa following their own devastating civil war in the years immediately before.
Prelude
Onekawa-Nukanoa Civil War
Main article: Onekawa-Nukanoa Civil War
Outbreak of war
Open hostilities on the MaZanzi front first broke out in April of 1927. Prior to this point, the MaZanzi government had been engaging in a campaign of subterfuge in western Onekawa. Agents from Zanzali were involved both in arming sympathetic Komontu populations with arms and in inciting Onekawan locals into ethnic violence against the Komontu. MaZanzi military units were even involved in false flag attacks on Komontu groups. The aim of the MaZanzi government was to create a credible narrative that the weakened post-civil-war Nukanoa government was incapable of protecting minority groups in the region. During one such incident, the Pūmāhumākū Incident of March 25th, 1927, one such false flag attack was repulsed by the chance intervention of a nearby Onekawan military unit. Following this, the Onekawa-Nukanor government issued an ultimatum to Zanzali, demanding the cessation of all subterfuge and espionage activities in the region. The government of Zanzali responded with a counter-ultimatum that either a plebiscite on the region’s entry into Zanzali be held or that Zanzali’s military would enter the region to enforce the security of minority groups. International intervention, including the Parrada Diplomatic Mission, failed to resolve the crisis. On April 14th, with no answer being provided to either ultimatum by either nation, the MaZanzi military crossed the Hanaki River in force and began a full-scale invasion of Onekawa-Nukanoa.
Course of the war
Onekawa-Nukanoa
Pulacan
The war began in Pulacan through another campaign of subterfuge and espionage. The Union State was still relatively new, and as a consequence was politically fragile. Numerous elements, including the tribes that saw themselves as losing the previous generation’s Brothers’ War, were still fundamentally opposed to a unified Pulatec state. The Pulatec general election of 1926 was similarly divisive, with staunch radical Republican Dumelang Tsogwane and his cohorts receiving limited power in government thanks to a divided opposition and spoiler candidates. The Tsogwane government was subsequently viewed as weak and ineffective. MaZanzi agents were involved in agitating disgruntled tribal dikgosi as early as 1925, but the program intensified following the inauguration. By early 1927, MaZanzi agents were actively promoting open rebellion from within. Seretse IV, the influential kgosi of the Tshekedi nation, was the first and primary chief to revolt against the government; the opening salvo of the rebellion was the raid and seizure of a military munitions convoy in the remote Djebe highlands at Motopi on February 2nd, 1927.
Contrary to MaZanzi expectations, the rebellion quickly foundered. Despite having the advantage of guerrilla tactics on their side, the rebels found it difficult to recruit supporters from war-weary tribes. Many, even if they held great disdain for the central government, did not wish to risk the compromise position they held, so soon after a devastating conflict well within living memory. As such, manpower and civilian support proved to be chronic issues. Attempts to engage the Pulatec Security Forces in open combat, too, proved ineffective. Pulatec experiments in combined arms and close air support were tested on the irregular rebel forces to marked success. By August, the rebellion was all but extinguished. Despite this, many in MaZanzi military high command felt obligated to increase support for the rebels. Public opinion in Zanzali was largely sympathetic to the rebels, thanks to government depictions of a “kindred struggle” against non-Komontu oppressors. After intense debate, an MaZanzi expeditionary force crossed the border on September 12th, 1927, and laid siege to the fortifications protecting the major city of Mtsanga. This action caught the unprepared local forces by surprise, and the defenders were routed. It was hoped that the bulk of Pulatec manpower would be too heavily committed toward combating the rebellion to allow for a proper defense to be mounted, and that the coastal areas of northern Pulacan would easily fall away. Pulatec commanders, aware but not prepared for the threat of invasion, opted to engage in mobile defense, refusing to commit to full battles while slowing the MaZanzi advance and allowing for sufficient reinforcements to be mobilized and redirected to the front. Despite this strategy, the coast fell to MaZanzi troops by December, 1928. Remaining Pulatec forces in the area either retreated or melted into the wilderness as guerrilla fighters against the occupation.
The Pulatec Navy was largely concentrated in the north of the country, and with the fall of its support bases to the MaZanzi imminent, it was decided that the fleet had to evacuate to avoid capture. Onboarding injured personnel and local authorities at Mabesekwa Naval Base on July 17th, 1928, the Ozeros Sea Flotilla departed that same day under cover of darkness. Equipped with a dreadnought battleship as the flotilla's core, the group was theoretically capable of combatting enemy naval forces; as its route to evacuate crossed the waters prowled by both the Pulaui and MaZanzi naval forces, however, it was decided that the risk of engagement was too high and to avoid confrontation at all costs. On October X, off the coast of Y, [INSERT NAVAL BATTLE HERE]. Despite incurring losses, the battered Pulatec navy was able to escape the engagement and limp to safety at the northern Onekawan island of Motonui. This evacuation, known as the Flight of the Fleet, allowed for the bulk of Pulacan's naval power to survive the early invasion and prove useful by the end of the war.
On land, plans to reconquer the northern coast were being put into place almost as soon as they fell to Zanzali.
Kayatman Theater
The Kayatman archipelago would become engulfed with two major conflicts as part of the Hanaki War. The first being far-right nationalist elements within Pulau Keramat who sought to restore the ancient Tahamajan Empire to its previous glory by incorporating Kajera, but also due to hostile action by the nascent Republic of Jin from the Ochran mainland who sought to absorb Daobac as part of its domain. As the successors of the Huang Dynasty] the Republic of Jin was primarily driven by their desire for revenge against the Daoans and Tsurushimans, who had defeated the Jin in the First Cross-Strait War and imposed a humiliating peace treaty against the Jin. To accomplish the Jin realized the must be discreet, taking great care to avoid overt action. In the aftermath of the First Cross-Strait War the Jin state underwent a period of political turmoil resulting in the establishment of the Republic of Jin. This new republican government was well received by the international community, with the Jin adopting a friendly and much less hawkish attitude towards its immediate neighbor. This change in attitude led to the international community, including Daobac, to provide foreign aid for reconstruction efforts of the nation. Many had hoped that with a stable and strong economy would lead to a more stable Jin state in the region. However in secret the Jin continued to harbor their desire for revenge against the Daoans and funneled some of the foreign aid it had received to secretly rearm its armed forces. To maintain this facade of a friendly and stable state, the Jin government signed a new Non-Aggression Pact with Daobac in the hopes of leading the Daoans into a false sense of security. When Kajera was attacked by Pulau Keramat in 192X, Daobac focused much of its attention to its southern maritime borders. The Daoans believed that the Jin's new friendly posture towards its neighbors, the recently signed NAP and the establishment of the demilitarized zone in the Jin's southern coast led to the Daoan government to believe that they were able to divert some of its military resources to the south to support the Kajerans in their war efforts against the Pulaui. The Jin, biding its time by letting sufficient military resources from Daobac to be diverted to the south, finally launched a surprise attack against the Daoans in 1928.