Tsabaran Civil War

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Tsabaran Political Crisis
DateJanuary 2019-present
Location
Status Ongoing
Belligerents
Tsabara Tsabaran federal government
Tsabara Tsabaran Federal Armed Forces
Tsabara Federal Police
Lions of the HomelandEmblem.png Lions of the Homeland
Haganah Symbol.svg Haganah
Beitar
Tsabara Atudite units of the TFAF
Flag of alIsbah.png Al-Isbah
TBR Emblem.png Tsabaran Resistance Brigades
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
Commanders and leaders
Tsabara Atwan al-Tughluq (2019)
Tsabara Yahya Aboud (2019-)
Tsabara Gen. Amir Salah (2019-)
Tsabara Gen. Rafiq Ali Benjedid (2019-)
Elazar-ben Ya'ir
Avraham Begin
Yair Ben-Avi
Hanna Markovna
Flag of alIsbah.png Hussein Ardashir al-Shar’a
Flag of alIsbah.png Hussein Al-Battar
Mustafa Saab
Samir Badreddine
Faizan Salah
Strength
~790,000 soldiers
114,385 police
Lions of the HomelandEmblem.png ~6,000-15,000 fighters
Haganah Symbol.svg 3,000-4,500 fighters
2,500-3,500 fighters
Tsabara ~11,000 soldiers
Flag of alIsbah.png 3,000-5,000 fighters
TBR Emblem.png 4,000-10,000 fighters
10,000-19,000 fighters
Casualties and losses
Per Tsabaran Government: 218 killed
358 injured
Per CBHRW: 613 killed
1,194 injured
Per TLDA: 777 killed
2,000 injured
Lions of the HomelandEmblem.png 191 killed or injured
~300 arrested
Haganah Symbol.svg 105-340 killed or injured
205 arrested
Flag of alIsbah.png ~88 killed
17 arrested
TBR Emblem.png +100 killed
+200 arrested
300-568 civilians killed (per Ministry of Health)
600-1,100 civilians killed (per CBHRW)
558-900 civilians injured

The Tsabaran Political Crisis or Tsabara Crisis is an ongoing ethno-sectarian conflict and political crisis in Tsabara. It began in response to political reforms under President Atwan al-Tughluq, in which the ethno-sectarian balance of power and representation was undermined in favour of the Badawiyan Irfanic population. President al-Tughluq died on 7 October 2019 from a heart-attack. His death led to a powergrab by Premier Yahya Aboud and a subsequent escalation in tensions. The political tensions have been deepened by widespread sectarian and ethnic violence, that has left an estimated 300-1,100 people dead.

While inter-sectarian tensions existed prior to 2019 over the political agenda of Atwan al-Tughluq, subsequent reforms at the start of 2019, including the removal of Atudite justices from the Supreme Court and their replacement by Badawiyans and the introduction of pro-Badawiyan taxation policies led to a significant increase in actions by the Lions of the Homeland-Tsabara. Repeated government efforts to undermine the confessionalist system alienated many mainstream Atudite figures and politicians. Tensions were further enflamed by the rise of Badawiyan pan-irfanics within Tughluq's government. Anti-government protests in Atudite-majority areas began in the Spring of 2019, which were met with harsh police responses. In August, the situation escalated significantly with the 2019 Sfira Attack, in which Atudite military units of the Tsabaran Federal Army entered the military base, attacking the base commanders and taking the estimated 2,500 Badawiyan soldiers hostage. An estimated 111 Badawiyan soldiers were killed and led to negotiations between the Atudite attackers and the government. President al-Tughluq agreed to a series of concessions to avoid storming base in late August, before dying on 7 October.

Following al-Tughluq's death, Premier Yahya Aboud assumed the office of President, without relinquishing the office of Premier. This led to widespread condemnations by Atudite and Sotirian political parties, accusing Aboud of a powergrab. Mass anti-government protests broke out, while the situation in Sfira was left uncertain. Inter-ethnic and sectarian violence escalated significantly, while Pan-Irfanic factions began to agitate the Badawiyan population against the Atudites. On the 2 November, seven Atudite-majority states threatened to secede from the Tsabaran federation if Aboud did not step down and call elections.

Origins

Communalist regime

Following the collapse of the Atudite-Pied Noir government, due to Red September in 19XX, a popular revolution backed by left-wing military officers established the Communal Republic of Tsabara on 1 October 19XX. Under the leadership of the All-Tsabaran Party of the Left (ATPL) between 1948 and 1950, the national ideology of Communalism was developed. Communalism, a leftist ideology sought to "unify the peoples and races of Tsabara, through reason and leftist solidarity." This resulted in the creation of a single-party state and the adoption of draconian laws enforcing secularism. Communalism viewed religion as the principal obstacle to a united and harmonious Tsabara, while the Communalist regime also worked for over four decades to undermine ethnic identity alongside sectarian.

The Communalist regime enforced its anti-ethnosectarian policies harshly, pursuing members of the Atudite, Irfanic and Sotirian clergies. It imprisoned thousands of clerics, laypeople and shuttered hundreds of places of worship. The holy sites in Adunis were left untouched and all religious ceremonies were kept under tight surveillance and government control. Those who celebrated or advocated ethnic identities and customs were also ruthlessly punished, while the regime worked to established a singular Tsabaran identity.

Prominent Tsabaran historian, Michel Gemayel wrote in 2006: "the Communalist regime saw religion and racial identity as foolhardy and obstacles toward equalism, while simaltaneously, it saw them as threats to social harmony in Tsabara. It was double-edged sword, well meaning but only kicked the can of ethno-sectarian identitarianism down the road."

Between 1948 and 1986, the Communalist regime restricted civil liberties and freedoms, while its economic policy proved highly centralised and ineffective in alleviating inequality. Furthermore, its economic policy in some areas worsened the divisions between the Atudites and Badawiyans, as it used its petrochemical exports to fund development of the fast-growing coast. The lack of development of the interior and strict restrictions on internal migration, essentially "imprisoned the Irfanic-Badawiyan population in the destitute and backward interior", while enriching and improving the living standards of the Atudite-Sotirian coastal regions.

The decline of the Communalist regime began in 1975 with Tsabara's entry into the Irvadistan War, in support of its ally, the People's Republic of Irvadistan against the Union of Khazestan-Pardaran. During the four-year conflict, over 86,000 Tsabaran soldiers would be killed and 150,000 injured. The loss of life forged a long-sought after bond between Atudites and Badawiyans, though ironically, it led to united opposition to the Communalist regime. The war's human cost though heavy, fell far short of the economic cost - Tsabara's economy had all but collapsed in 1978 after a series of daring UKP air attacks on Tsabaran oil and gas facilities, as well as rail and road networks. Inflation skyrocketed, while the centrally-planned economy struggled to provide basic goods. Over the next seven years, sporadic armed uprisings by both Atudites and Badawiyans would undermine the integrity of the regime, mass protests and a general strike between 1983 and 1984 ultimately led to the peaceful transition to democracy .

Commentators and historians have noted that the systemic failures of the Communalist regime to reform the economy or use its vast oil revenues to develop the Badawiyan-dominated interior entrenched the dismal disparities in wealth and living standards. Its strict restrictions on internal migration maintained the stark divisions of ethnicity geographically speaking, while also denying Badawiyans access to the wealthy coastal areas. The involvement in the Irvadistan War devastated government budgets, which effected the Badawiyan population disporportionately, owing to their reliance on the weflare state. The war and subsequent resistance until 1986, led to a resurgence in ethno-sectarian idenities.

Presidency of Atwan al-Tughluq

Atwan al-Tughluq served as President between 2006 and 2019. His policies are widely considered to be major causes for the ongoing crisis.

Failure to reform the economy

Pro-Badawiyan policies

Strongman rule

Constitutional weakenesses

Economic disparity

Income inequality

Rise of Pan-Irfanism

Timeline

January-March 2019

April-June 2019

July-September 2019

October-December 2019

Sfira Attack

Einat Kibbutz attack

Neogitations

Death of Al-Tughluq

Mass anti-government protests and threats of secession

Armed groups

Atudite

Badawiyan

Other

Reactions

Domestic

International