Tsabaran Civil War

Tsabaran Civil War
Military situation in Tsabara as of 08 May 2021; Red, Tsabaran government, green United Irfanic Republic of Hamada
Date 17 January 2020-present 4 years, 10 months and 3 days Location Tsabara Status Ongoing
Belligerents
Transtsabaran Federation Supported by: Template:Country data Estmere Etruria Gaullica Werania Paretia	United Irfanic Republic of Hamada Supported by: Zorasan	Lions of the Homeland Haganah Beitar
Commanders and leaders
Nazim al-Qutayni Aslan Ocalan Wassim Karoubi Yeshayahu Samia	Faizan Salah  † Zakhir Namiq Zahran al-Amari Abdelrahman Zaza Nasser al-Din Nasir Hussein Ardashir al-Shar’a Hussein Al-Battar Mustafa Saab	Elezar-Ben Ya'ir Shimshon Alon  † Haim Adan Eyal Mordechai Moshe Erez Avigdor Eitar Rafael Dayan
Strength
Tsabaran Federal Armed Forces: 642,000a Provincial Guard Forces: 80,000-90,000 Federal Police: 45,000-50,000	Irfanic Liberation and Resistance: 96,000-100,000 (estimated) Tsabaran Resistance Brigades: 10,000-20,000 Al-Isbah: 3,000-5,000	Lions of the Homeland: 15,000-25,000 (estimated) Haganah: 8,000-10,000 (estimated)
Casualties and losses
13,928 killed 18,805 injured 269 missing	11,505 killed or injured (per Tsabaran government)	239 killed 113 injured 88 captured
19,924 civilians killed (per Ministry of Health) 20,000 civilians killed (per CBHRW) Total killed: 45,596 1,750,000 internally displaced 900,000-1,340,000 externally displaced a Current figures are estimates due to defections

The Tsbaran Civil War is an ongoing multi-sided civil war in Tsabara fought between the interim federal government of Tsabara led by President Nazim al-Qutayni, against the Irfanist-Rahelian nationalist Supreme Political and Resistance Committee led by Sheik Faizan Salah, and the Atudite nationalist and secessionist Lions of the Homeland, led by Elezar-Ben Ya’ir.

The immediate unrest in Tsabara began in January 2019 over the policies of the late president Atwan al-Tughluq, who attempted to dismantle the co-social system in benefit of the Rahelian-Irfanic population. Atudite resistance to these reforms saw the emergence of the Lions of the Homeland, which began a low-level insurgency against the federal government in March 2019. Counter-actions and crackdowns by the Al-Tughluq government resulted in a series of insurrections by Atudite units of the Tsabaran Federal Armed Forces and an outbreak of sectarian violence, as both these situations escalated, the government backed down on many of its planned reforms. On 7 October 2019, al-Tughluq died in office, he was succeeded illegally by his Premier Yahya Aboud who opposed the previous concessions to the Atudites, renewed violence and the threats of mass purges of Atudites from the armed forces, political institutions and the declaration of martial law led to a coup d'état, led by Nazim al-Qutayni, who proclaimed himself interim president. The new government promised to honour the agreement made by the Al-Tughluq administration, but anti-government protests erupted in the east. The civil war directly grew out of the 2019 Yeruham Attacks, conducted by Al-Isbah against the Atudite-majority city and the retaliatory 2020 Eastern Tsabara Attacks, conducted by the Lions of the Homeland.

The war is currently being fought by the federal government against the Supreme Political and Resistance Committee, which seeks overthrow the interim government and establish a Rahelian majoritarian state. The SPRC is a broad Irfanist-Rahelian nationalist coalition and is backed by Zorasan politically. Zorasan is also suspected of aiding the SPRC with materiel and training of its militias. The government is also fighting against the Atudite nationalist Lions of the Homeland, which seeks an independent Atudite state in the southwest, the Lions are also in conflict with the SPRC.

Attempts at a negotiated settlement were held between January 14-17 in Spálgleann, Caldia. The Caldish government led by Taoiseach Stiofán Mac Suibhne sought to find a mutually beneficial agreement between the government and the League of the Righteous (the primary Irfanist group, that leads the SPRC). However, these talks collapsed in wake of the 2020 Eastern Tsabaran Attacks.

Causes

Presidency of Atwan al-Tughluq

In 2004, Atwan al-Tughluq, a former governor of Qadessiyya province surged to public prominence when he founded his National Irfanic Party and began to champion causes close to the Rahelian-Irfanic population of Tsabara. He actively sought the support of the country’s politically engaged Irfanic clergy, ultimately he would secure the backing of the League of the Righteous led by Faizan Salah, the country’s most popular and telegenic cleric. The backing of the LR would prove pivotal in the 2006 presidential election where Al-Tughluq defeated his rivals on the back of unprecedented turn-out among Rahelian-Irfanic voters. His ascension to the presidency was confirmed with the backing of the Party of Irfanic Democracy, led by Nazim Al-Qutayni, whom was appointed Interior Minister by Al-Tughluq.

Atwan al-Tughluq served as President between 2006 and 2019. His policies are widely considered to be major causes for the ongoing crisis.

For the first four years, Al-Tughluq governed in accordance to the co-social system, and was primarily focused on rebuilding Tsabara’s economy following the 2005 Great Recession. Economic recovery proved swift enough to secure Al-Tughluq re-election in 2010 and his Irfanic Coalition won an increased majority. At this point, Al-Tughluq’s government also began to establish closer ties with Zorasan and Shangea, while also expressing various opinions that undermined the co-social system. Between 2010 and the 2014 presidential election, Al-Tughluq steadily replaced key officials with both Irfanic and Sotirian Rahelians within the executive, this also coincided with an aggressive, provocative and strongman-like approach to domestic issues and his critics.

His re-election for a third term in 2014 marked the rapid descent of his administration into authoritarianism and undermining the co-social system as official policy, remarking upon his re-election, "it is now time to reform our nation in accordance to the demographic reality of our society." This would also mark his ever growing hostility toward the Atudite population and the emergence of Atudite nationalist groups, who sought both to defend the community's rights within the system and see Al-Tughluq electorally defeated, but also other groups who sought to secure an independent Atudea.

Pro-Rahelian policies

From 2014 onwards, the Al-Tughluq government increasingly began to divert various resources toward Rahelian-majority provinces, both as a means of shoring up his popular support but also to close what he regularly described as the "discrimination of the coin." However, rather than effective direct investments, much of these funds were directed toward companies and provincial officials in exchange for loyalty and rarely if ever resulted in direct improvements to the living standards of Rahelians in the poverty-stricken east. Though corruption was common across much of Tsabara, the vast sums of money lost to embezzlement, bribes and kickbacks exceeded virtually all prior records. Aided by relatively high energy prices and a boom in petrochemical exports to Euclea, the Al-Tughluq government announced a €50 billion investment into infrastructure, hospitals and schools in the Rahelian provinces, while only €320 million was allocated to the Atudite and Sotirian provinces along the western coast.

As corruption skyrocketed and the gross over-focus on the Rahelian provinces began to rile the Atudite and Sotirian parties in the Chamber of Representatives, tensions beyond in society began to rise. Inter-ethnic and sectarian clashes and crimes began emerge in Yeruham, Adunis and Qa'ah, often fuelled or exacerbated by rhetoric emerging from pro-Al'Tughluq quarters.

The government also began to focus on recruiting predominately Rahelians to law enforcement agencies and the military. Throughout the post-Communalist period, the Tsabaran Federal Armed Forces had been divided per unit by ethnicity and religion, opting for segregating units. This was done originally to avoid tensions within the armed forces, but as the system became entrenched, primarily due to opposition within the officer corps to reform (this was mostly blamed on unit traditions and the financing of units). The Al-Tughluq government announced a modernisation of its Rahelian units ostensibly to "close the qualitive gap" between Rahelian and Atudite units of the army specifically. This further deepened concerns among Atudite politicians that they're role within Tsabaran governance and security was being undermined at the same pace as the wider co-social system.

Constitutional weaknesses

In 2018, Al-Tughluq was elected for a fourth term, by which time his own personal health and ability was on the wane. The preceding four years had seen continuous erosions of the constitutional order primarily using patronage, bribes and contracts by Al-Tughluq and his allies within the government. The vague wording of the 1983 constitution regarding impeachment and other measures necessary to tame a corrupt or authoritarian administration denied the ever-growing anti-Tughluq coalition, further exacerbating tensions among the ethno-sectarian communities.

Though re-elected, Al-Tughluq’s coalition saw a significantly reduced majority as Rahelians began turn against his government over corruption and the failure in vast sums of money reaching society due to the former. Al-Tughluq became entirely reliant upon Nazim Al-Qutayni’s Party for Irfanic Democracy for its majority. In many ways, the inability of the legislative branch to restrain the excesses of the executive branch fed directly into the radicalisation of many elements within the Atudite community, who saw consistent failings

In 2018 and 2019, Al-Tughluq announced plans to alter the distribution of seats on the Supreme Court, with Rahelians to gain two at the expense of one from the Atudite and Sotirian communities. This would have effectively destabilised the judiciary and provided the administration a compliant court. The very suggestion violated the co-social system and the 1983 constitution, which prohibited any change to the ethno-sectarian make up of the court. This coupled with the replacement of the heads of the national broadcaster, national radio and various agencies would provoke the emergence of Atudite nationalist groups, including the Lions of the Homeland.

Socioeconomic background

Tsabara stands as one of the most unequal societies in the world. Socioeconomic inequality was considered "concerning" by some economicsts under the Communalist regime, which failed to diversify the economy and remained reliant upon oil revenues throughout its existence. Industrialisation during the 1960s and early 1970s benefited the Atudite-Sotirian dominated coastal regions. However, inequality increased significantly after free market policies were initiated by the new democratic governments during the 1980s and 1990s, and it accelerated prior to the 2005 recession. With an emphasis on the service sector and manufacturing sectors, these policies benefited a minority of the nation's population, mostly the more developed and educated coastal regions, and members of the Irfanic merchant class of Qaa and Tebessa. In 2016, Tsabara's nominal GDP per capita was only $3,834 (on average), comparable to Bahian countries such as Habasha and far lower than its neighbors such as Zorasan. Per capita for the Atudite population was significantly higher at $13,503, while in coastal cities such as Elyakhin and Savyon it stands at almost $19,000. Also, with an annual growth rate of 4.39%, it falls below most other developing countries.

The country also faced particularly high youth unemployment rates among the Rahelian population. At the start of the crisis, discontent against the economic situation was strongest in Tsabara's poor interior areas, predominantly among conservative Arta Irfanis. These included cities with high poverty rates, such as Tamanrasset and Hitteen, and the poorer districts of large cities.

Rise of Pan-Irfanism

Following Al-Tughluq's rise to the presidency in 2005, he brought with him elements of Political Irfan. Though driven by his desire for retaining office, his useage of political Irfanism as an electoral tool ultimately led to the rise of groups across the south and east aligned with his positions. The most prominent to emerge was Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) in 2012, led by Faizan Salah. Other groups included the Association of Imam Ardashir, Imam Hussein Foundation and the Association of the Three Acts. Problematic for Al-Tughluq was that as he became more reliant upon these groups for mobilising the Irfanic religious vote, he became influenced by their agendas, which by 2018 had evolved toward Pan-Irfanism. These groups as a result came to advocate a closer relationship with Zorasan and came to view many minorities and the Atudites as "agents for Euclean influence."

Sheik Faizan Salah emerged during the early 2010s as the principal leader of political Irfan in Tsabara.

Yehiel Bar a former leader of the Atudite People's Party wrote in 2018, "as the President smothers our democracy through his strongman antics, his ear has ever more strongly held by Arta Irfanic groups that seek to Irfanicise all of Tsabara. Worringly still, these groups are directly backed and funded by Zorasan." The rise of Arta Irfanic groups saw the spread of theological arguments that Adunis' control by Irfanics alone, would herald the first "success in averting the End-Times." Owing to the Eschatological focus of Irfan, many groups, AAH and ATA especially, have publicly advocated the eviction of Atudites and Sotirians from the holy city to enable an Irfanic renaissance.

Pre-war phase

January-September 2019

From early January 2019, popular opposition to the government's policies and reforms aimed at expanding Rahelian control over federal institutions grew exponentially. Initially protests arranged by Atudite nationalist parties were small in number, yet the protests grew in Yeruham, Adunis, Manara and Savyon. Most protests were peaceful, with limited police action. Yet, despite the protests, the government refused to change course.

Sfira Attack

On the 1st of September, 2019, the Women's First Recon Battalion stationed at Sfira collected weapons from the other units stationed at the base and took hostages in a bloodless coup. The government maintained that the base was attacked by terrorists, specifically the Lions of the Homeland led by El'azar ben-Ya'ir, and had been repulsed, but this claim was denied by Ya'ir who insisted the Lions declined responsibility for the attack.

The cause of the Sfira mutiny was traced to the recent issues arising in Tsabaran society; including the expansion of the supreme court to 'account' for population changes that threatened the careful religious balance in the country. Tughluq's commission had recommended to add a further two judges to the Irfanic side; creating a sectarian court. Further issues included curfews in Atudite majority cities and general unrest.

By the 5th of September, the government confirmed the speculation that the base had indeed been held hostage from within.. In spite of evidence linking the Lions to the attack, the federal government re-introduced its arrest warrant for El'azar ben-Ya'ir and increased the reward for information pertaining to the Lions from €10,000 to €18,000. Furthermore, the government issued a command to begin to purge Atudites from specific roles within the government: specifically within security and law and order.

Members of the ruling coalition urged for calm and peace, as did the Party for Irfanic Democracy whilst elements of the military indicated that there would be no quarter for the insurrection. The Minister for Defence, Saad Jadid, is recorded as having told reporters that there would be "No mercy. No quarter."

Despite these calls by the 16th of September Sfira base had been surrounded by elements of the federal army and it was confirmed that negotiations were currently on going between the government and the disgruntled elements of the military. The government had reprioritised its intentions into rooting out what it regarded to be insurrectionism with reconciliation within the armed forces, largely in part due to the internal backlash the governing coalition received over its overreaching. In protest of the attempts to purge Atudite members from within law and order, the Minister of the Interior Nazim al'Qutayni and his Party for Irfanic Democracy left the governing coalition. Al'Qutayni's actions brought down the government majority, deprived them of 43 crucial seats in the House of Representatives and halted the government campaign and Salah's orders to remove Atudites from intelligence services and their roles as police chiefs.

The government announced that it was undergoing a period of negotiations with the forces occupying the Sfira military base. On the 30th of September, to the surprise of many within and without Tsabara, a successful deal was negotiated: in return for amnesty, military de-escalation and the removal of several contentious government policies the Sfira occupiers would supply the government with information pertaining to the Lions of the Homeland. Conditionally, the forces would release the hostages in the base in three stages -- a third at a time..

See also

• Origins of the Tsabaran Civil War
• Operation Eghtedar-e Entegham