Lèse-majesté and related laws in Themiclesia

In Themiclesia, lèse-majesté (不敬, pje-krjangh) is criminalized in Article 224 of the Penal Code. It is formally unlawful in Themiclesia to be irreverent to the Sovereign, but the law does not explicitly define what constitutes punishable irreverence. Certain acts against the monarchy, Parliament, and the judicial system are explicitly criminalized in other laws.

In Casaterran nomenclature, many instances of lèse-majesté are symbolic or cultural infractions, while others instances can be interpreted as crimes against political and social order, especially the supremacy of the sovereign. More direct offences fell under the category of treason. Prior to 1853, lèse-majesté could be a capital crime. The law formerly permitted the government much latitude in deciding the final punishment, as all convictions were subject to the Emperor's review before promulgation.

To reduce its potency as a political weapon, frequently threatened in the early 19th century though never brought, the Attorney-general was legally prohibited from levying this charge without permission from both the throne. In 1907, there was broad parliamentary support to clarify that "irreverent speech" did not constitute a crime; though this never passed into law, it was in practice accepted. Governments have not prosecuted under this heading since 1924.

Lèse-majesté

Statute text

Throughout the evolution of Themiclesia's penal law, lèse-majesté has always been treated as a crime against the crown, whose punishment is declared in the opening sections. Typically, provisions for treason and sedition immediately precede it, leading scholars to believe that lèse-majesté was conceived as a political crime that threatened the political order with the crown at its apex. The Penal Code of Tsjinh (256 – 421) provides:

Lèse-majesté shall be punished by decapitation. If committed by mistake or under doubt, it is to be submitted [for decision by the crown]. The family of the offender shall be enslaved to the state, and it shall not be permitted to ransom them. If committed unintentionally, it is not punishable.

— Penal Code of Tsjinh, c. 310

These provisions have largely been maintained by subsequent dynasties.

When capital punishment was abolished in 1853, lèse-majesté was ameliorated to a less severe offence that warranted between 3 and 22 years in prison, with hard labour. In 1875, the maximal penalty was reduced to ten years, and then again in 1910 to five years. In 1921, the minimum was set at six months in prison, and maximum at two years; courts of law acquired discretion to impose amercement instead of imprisonment. This change would have rendered the penalty for physically harming the monarch lesser than that for the same to ordinary citizens, so Parliament provided that if physical harm was done to the monarch, the laws punishing the same to ordinary citizens should apply instead. Thus, lèse-majesté became purely a symbolic offence, punishing things which held the crown in contempt but did not injure the sovereign.

Scope

The lack of any formal definition of lèse-majesté has been much studied in legal history. Some scholars, such as B. Torson, believes that

what constitutes lèse-majesté is meant to change with social expectations and customs. The vagueness is intentionally present to allow the judicature to punish those whom society regard as irreverent and to acquit those whose causes were worthy of sympathy in its eyes. In a way, the law protects the image and stature of the Sovereign in the public view according to public, fluid standards, rather than static attributes.

Yet others, such as R. Gerald-MacIntyre, think that

while the flexibility may have served the functions of Torson's description, its original purpose can only be the maximization of the state's power in punishing any offender upon any evidence. There are natural and political limits to its operation, but it is very wide by intention.

While there seem to be few limits as to its operation to protect the Emperor, there are also instances where it was invoked to punish critics of the court (朝廷, ntrjaw-lêng) in general. This is an extention of the Emperor's position as the head of the court. This use of the law is limited mostly to commoners who have written or spoken inflamatory things criticial of no political leader in particular; however, aristocrats not in government have done the same thing with impunity, and at times to praise, described as "conscience and duty". The law also protected those whose status is deemed equivalent to the emperor, namely the empress and empress(es) dowager, in largely the same ways as towards the emperor. The heir apparent, the crown prince, is not protected by the same law.

Historically, there is a "bewildering proliferation" of acts that have been punished as lèse-majesté. Torson classifies them into four categories:

• Ritualistic pollution of the sovereign and his milieu
  • Opnely urinating or becoming drunk in the palace hall
  • Stealing offerings meant for the State Cult
  • Not observing the taboo on the emperor's personal name in official writing
  • Shouting, running, fighting, or bleeding in the Palace Hall
  • Not being in proper attire before the emperor
  • Not removing shoes and socks before entering the Palace Hall
  • Making lewd statements or inappropriate comparisons or analogies of the emperor to other persons or things, before the emperor
• Infringement of the sovereign's privileges and political rights
  • Facing south when ceremonies are in progress in the emperor's presence
  • Failing to shuffle when moving in the emperor's presence
  • Disrupting the emperor's procession
  • Lying to the emperor
  • Making portraits of the emperor
  • For visitors, to disobey ushers in rendering proper courtesy to the emperor
• Physical harm to the sovereign
  • Smacking or punching the emperor
  • Soiling the emperor's attire, food, bed, any other items in close contact
  • Stealing the emperor's affects (only those already crafted and delivered to the Royal Storage)
• Threatening the emperor's safety
  • Unsheathing an weapon in the Palace Hall (regardless of intention)
  • Bringing a disallowed weapon into the Palace Hall
  • Entering into the emperor's presence unannounced
  • To bring contraband substances into the emperor's presence
  • For the Royal Guards, to make sudden movements or failing to prostrate in the emperor's presence

Protection of elections

Lèse-majesté has been applied at least once to protect political institutions other than royalty and court. In the 1804 civic elections, Trjên Ko (展股), a discharged military officer, attacked an elector supporting the Lord of Gar-lang and the partial dismantling of the Colonial Army, which Trjên claimed led to the loss of Columbia. While the elector was not injured, Trjên was arrested and quickly sentenced to death by decapitation, on the charge of lèse-majesté. His representatives argued that Trjên's intentions were pure but misguided, yet the court ruled that violence against the civic election was violence against the emperor, as it prevented franchise-holders from electing their representatives according to the royal edict. The Council of Peers told Emperor 'Ei that Trjên attacked an elector who obeyed his command to participate in an election without stating Trjên's motives; he was executed only 19 days after conviction.

Contempt of Parliament

Contempt of parliament in Themiclesia is a mixture of the Western concept of the same name and the royal dignity that protected the predecessors of both houses of the Themiclesian parliament. The general justification for punishing individuals who either showed disrespect towards Parliament or obstructured its business, formerly perceived as the same offence, shifted from protection of royal dignity to the legislature's ability check the executive. To this day, signs remind visitors to bow to the speaker's chair (in the Commons) or to the throne (in the Lords) when entering or exiting the galleries, and those commanded to deliver statements have generally observed these formalities.

It is an offence against the House of Commons

to batter any member of the House or to intrude upon the House.

— Standing Orders of the House of Commons, c. 90

to display flagrant discourtesy and contempt to the assembled House of Commons, to arrest or restrict its members, sitting or travelling to and from the House, without the permission of the House, and to resist or prevent its officers from executing the lawful commands of the said House or as commanded them under the Standing Orders, or to batter them so doing.

— Standing Orders, c. 91

to demolish, deface, or make unfit for use the house, horse, vehicle, and clothing of any member of the House, or to deprive from him his manservant, coachman, or any [employee] that has accompanied him in this House or to and from this House. (The term "employee" originally read "dependent", in the sense of an servant bound to an MP indefinitely; the term was modified after 1889 when the concept of contractual dependents was abolished.)

— Standing Orders, c. 92

to make vexatious suits at courts of law against any member of the House, or to summon them vexatiously as witnesses in any civil or criminal cause, or likewise to cause summonses to be issued to them in the same.

— Standing Orders, c. 93

to threaten force or menace against any member of this House.

— Standing Orders, c. 94

to issue warrants for the entering or seizure of the house of a member without the permission of the House.

— Standing Orders, c. 95

A similar set of rules applies to the House of Lords.

For the entirety of the 19th century and until recently, most, if not all, judicial commentaries agreed the House of Commons held extensive powers over its seat and to punish those that offended its dignity. The defendant is not entitled to appear either in person or by counsel while the House proceeds against him, which is by a simple majority of at least 30 members present. The House may thereby impose a fine of any size or imprisonment of any length. These powers were meant both for House's members and officials, and visitors. The House's decisions are not subject to review or appeal, and only the House may pardon anyone it convicts.

Admiral Hru was commanded to deliver a report to the House in June 1973, and a marine that followed him failed to bow to the House as he left; when the Gentleman-Captain reminded him to do so, he barged through the officer to catch up with the admiral. The Gentleman-Captain and Doorkeepers informed the Speaker of the fact, and upon a motion by Gup, the House voted to convict the marine under c. 91 and sentenced him to six months in prison. He was pardoned after three months, when the Progressives convinced the Procedures and Privileges Committee that the matter did not constitute a substantive obstruction to the House's business. Since then, it is generally agreed that simple discourtesy such as the 1973 case should not be punishable by imprisonment, unless a "substantive obstruction" to the House's business is recognized.

Several views surfaced following this incident. Certain liberal scholars suggested that the House should amend its rules to include limits on sentences and permit the defendant to be present personally or by counsel, so that he may be defended, which were the defendant's "natural rights" in the judicial system. Dr. Nuk To, an independent conservative scholar, advised maintenance of the House's powers, as "the sitting House of Commons exercises the supreme and unlimited power in the name of the people, which should be protected against indignity or slight. The majesty of Parliament, and with it the dignity of democratic institutions, cannot stand naked before these affronts."

Substantive obstruction has been construed broadly by some officials of the House. In 1979, a stolen police pistol was fired within the grounds of the House of Commons, though not injuring anyone. The man firing the pistol was convicted of such a "substantive obstruction", as the House had to suspend sitting for the rest of the day to address security implications. In 1981, an official of the Ministry of Health was convicted of the same for delivering statements that mislead Public Services Committee's investigation on inefficiencies of the civil service. In 1999, several military officers were convicted of pressuring several witnesses, already summoned by the House of Lords, to reveal the contents of their testimonies and to alter them. The upper house provided that as soon as the summonses were issued, the witnesses were before the House already and thus may not be swayed by superiors officers.

The House of Commons retained complete power to decide the severity of its sentence until 1998, when a statute was passed limiting parliamentary imprisonment to the life of the parliament. In the 41 instances where non-members have been convicted for contempt, they have been sentenced to remain in prison until the end of the day, the end of the session, or the end of the Parliament, the last and most severe option only once. As parliamentary sessions may continue for several months and one parliament up to five years, any sentence longer than one session is regarded as atypically severe.

Contempt of court

Contempt against the House of Lords in its judicial function is not legally distinct from that in its legislative functions.

Compared to the offence of contempt of Parliament, a court of law may convict those before the court for disrupting the procedures of the court. Junior tribunals, such as magisterial and probate courts, may impose up to six months of imprisonment or fines not exceeding €20 for each offence; senior courts, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, have statutory power to impose unlimited imprisonment and unlimited fines. However, this power is limited in practice by the doctrine of merger, whereby lesser offences are absorbed into more serious ones, and precedent in setting the severity of its sentences. The most severe sentence meted out has been one year in prison in the modern era, for throwing the court's papers and upturning the judges' benches and lawyers' desks. Contempt of court is subject to appeal to a higher court of law.

In most courts, the trial judge will voluntarily refer a case of contempt to other judges active at the same court; the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords is the sole exception to this custom, but if a judge finds himself emotional implicated, he must recuse himself from the decision of a case of contempt.

In both criminal and civil cases, it constitutes contempt of court if a party repeatedly enters pleas that can reasonably be assumed are irrelevant to the case at hand, whether to bide for time or another reason. This had been more relevant when the senior courts imitated the Tyrannian judicial year, where the justices only sat for around half a year and spent the remainder in vacation. It is likewise punishable for police officers to refuse to execute the court's lawful warrants without a reasonable excuse, such as the warrant being unclear or endangers the lives of policemen; however, the latter excuse is limited in usefulness, as the court can usually find instances where the local police have put their lives at greater risk than what the warrant demands. In this case, the court can imprison recalcitrant police officers for each instance a warrant is not executed properly, leading sometimes to friction between the two institutions.

Additionally, the police can be imprisoned for intentionally withholding information from either the crown or defendants, regardless whether the outcome of the trial has been affected. There is dispute over what constitutes a quanta of information.

See also

• Themiclesia