Aerial warfare of the Zemplen War

Aerial warfare of the Zemplen War
Part of the Zemplen War
Two Syaran Zephyrs intercept two Ruvelkan Dragos.
Date 23 May 2008 – 19 July 2010 (2 years, 1 month, 27 days) Location Ruvelka, Syara Result Ruvelkan Victory
Belligerents
Ruvelka	Syara
Units involved
Ruvelkan Imperial Air Force	Commonality Air Force
Strength
1,893 combat aircraft (Peak)	2,141 combat aircraft (Peak)
Casualties and losses
493 fixed wing combat aircraft destroyed 633 helicopters destroyed 849 UAVs lost	525 fixed wing combat aircraft destroyed 383 helicopters destroyed 1,012 UAVs lost

Aerial Warfare in the Zemplen War began shortly fighting broke out in May 2008, but did not reach significant intensity until the August Offensive. Air combat and air operation subsequently became a constant affair throughout the duration of the conflict. Both the Commonality Air Force (Заедништво воздушни сили, Zaedništvo vozdušni sili, or ZVS) of Syara and the Ruvelkan Imperial Air Force (RIAF) fielded large air fleets of modern combat aircraft both domestically produced and foreign supplied. The RIAF and ZVS both engaged in air combat operations, close air support, aerial reconnaissance, and bombing campaigns designed to destroy enemy ground forces and inhibit the other's ability to make war.

The ZVS initially enjoyed the advantage in the air during 2008 owing to its larger fleet and the destruction of many of the radar control stations the RIAF relied upon for coordination and operations. By 2009, however, reforms to Ruvelka's air command and control, along with the withdrawal of much of its air fleet beyond the Kurilla Mountains, allowed the RIAF to swing the balance of power towards Ruvelka thanks to its larger supply of fighter jets. Neither side was able to gain air superiority throughout the conflict, though certain sections of the front could temporarily be dominated by one side by massing aircraft in the region. At their peak in mid-2009, both sides were carrying out nearly 10,000 sorties a day. Sortie rates and air combat operations began to decline shortly afterwards as shortages of pilots and airframes through attrition led to the decline in capability in both the ZVS and RIAF. By the end of 2009 both sides had largely sidelined major air operations in order to preserve their remaining fleets, leading the Syaran Commonality Armed Forces to established a front-wide "free fire zone" where virtually any aircraft detected would be fired upon by Syaran air defense systems and surface-to-air missiles. Air operations and sortie rates surged during Operation Homefront before the end of the war in July 2010.

The air campaigns of the Zemplen War were the largest aerial operations in the history of modern warfare and immediately became the focus of much study and observation. The Zemplen War also saw the largest instances of "dogfights" between helicopters. Despite the frequency of air-to-air combat during the conflict, engagements between fighter aircraft only occasionally resulted in a shootdown and the majority of aircraft lost were downed by anti-air or ground fire. A Syaran study published in 2014 stated that nearly 70% of aircraft shot down during the war could be attributed to anti-air weaponry, a calculation concurrent Ruvelkan studies have largely confirmed.

Background

In aerial warfare, probability of kill (Pk) refers to the likelihood (expressed in numbers or percentages, such as 0.5 or 50%) of a successful "kill" on another aircraft when fired upon with an air-to-air missile. Numerous factors can influence whether or not an air-to-air missile (from here on referred to as an AA missile) will strike its target (the missile does not need to necessarily impact the aircraft physically to destroy it, as a nearby explosion and dispersion of shrapnel can also down an aircraft). This includes pilot skill (understanding when and where the best opportunity for the missile to hit), the maneuvers of the aircraft such as dodging and weaving to avoid the missile, weather conditions (sunlight and heat can impact the performance of infrared or heat seeking missiles), and countermeasures such as chaff or flares. Missiles may also fail due to poor maintenance or damaged components, reducing their effectiveness and the probability of kill.

In the early months of the war, the standard Pk rates across all missiles utilized by both sides varied between .10-.25; in other words, a successful shootdown of an enemy aircraft occurred in just 1/10th to 1/4th of the time, with the lower end range typically reflecting air-to-air combat between fighter aircraft and the higher end typically involving shootdowns of non-fighter aircraft by fighters. The low rate of fighter-on-fighter shootdowns was largely the combination of lack of experience and strategic posture. During the initial periods of intense combat during the August Offensive and Operation Aspis, both Syaran and Ruvelkan pilots were still learning about the capabilities of their own aircraft and that of their enemies in combat, along with their weapon systems and defensive measures. During early combat phases pilots on both sides had to deal with developing counter-measures to the various different tactics and capabilities of their opponents, which often had to be done in a trial-and-error fashion between flights of aircraft. In addition, the decision of the Ruvelkan Imperial Air Force to avoid attempting to contest the airspace above the border to preserve air power for later battles meant that many Ruvelkan pilots declined to engage. The higher rate of 1-in-4 typically involved fighter aircraft engaging non-fighter aircraft such as ground attack aircraft, which were typically slower and less maneuverable.

As the conflict raged on, pilots became more familiar with the capabilities of the aircraft and weapons involved in the air war. This resulted in a steady increase in Pk rates throughout 2009, peaking during the heavy fighting of the Syaran Spring Offensives and the Ruvelkan Autumn Counter-Offensive. Pk rates during this period could range from .20 to .60. The range in this set was predominantly due to differences in pilot training. Pilots who were trained exclusively in air-to-air combat and maneuvers performed better than their counterparts who also trained and were employed as ground attack; Syaran Zephyr pilots averaged a Pk of over .60 during this time, compared to Celaeno pilots who averaged just about .30.

Pk also varied heavily depending on the nature of the combat. Ruvelkan pilots typically attempted to engage within-visual-range, relying on jamming pods and ECM to neutralize Syaran advantages at beyond-visual-range. Zephyr pilots favored their high-altitude, high speed engagements, but suffered from a lack of numbers necessary to force a strategic advantage against the RIAF.

Towards the end of 2009 however Pk rates began to significantly decline largely due to decreased sortie rates and increased emphasis on force preservation. After nearly a year of extensive and continued combat, exhaustion of crews, pilots, and airframes saw significant declines in squadron readiness, in addition to increased wariness of exposing aircraft to unnecessary risk. Instances of pitched combat between fighters dropped off as pilots were instructed to avoid unnecessary engagements, resulting in most dogfights devolving to one plane each firing off a single missile before both aircraft broke contact, with Syaran pilots diving for the protection of their air defense network and Ruvelkan aircraft flew east beyond the Kurilla Mountains. During the final months of the war, Pk rates picked up as fighting intensified during Operation Homefront. By June 2010 however the Syarans were in retreat and the CAF was forced to commit to helping stall the Ruvelkan advance, leading to increased instances of air combat and shootdowns.

Despite the amount of resources and effort poured into it, air-to-air combat between fighter aircraft was relatively infrequent during the war. Rarely did two groups of fully armed and fueled aircraft engage one another on equal terms; rather patrols of fighters engaged one another usually while conducting other missions such as ground attack or air cover. It was more common for aircraft to engage on unequal terms where limitations in fuel and payload often determined the outcome of the engagement before any missiles were actually fired. In many cases pilots simply refused to engage and bugged out without firing or after only firing once, and as a result just 20% of air engagements actually resulted in a shootdown.