Bakhriyan Civil War
| Bakhriyan Civil War | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
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Bakhriya
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United Liberation Front
Coalition Supported by: | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Halder Van Kroezen |
Gamsolufechi Agu (De-facto BLF leader) Shuya Hachiya (commanding officer of 25 DSAS) | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
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Bakhriyan Armed Forces
Bakhriyan Civil Mobilisation
Allied Nations Airborne Expeditionary Forces
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Bantu Liberation Front
Chantrist Liberation Army
Shijukunese Forces
Eukrasi Forces
Dayashinese Special Air Service
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
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Bakhriya 446 killed 660 wounded |
Bantu Liberation Front 12 wounded | ||||||
The Bakhriyan Civil War was a war occurring in 2019 and 2020, resulting from a decades-long buildup in ethnic tensions. Originally, the conflict involved the Bakhriyan government fighting against the Bantu Liberation Front. As tensions devolved, the Bantu Liberation Front grew in number and very quickly established a hold over territory dense with ethnic Bantus. As the BLF gained strength quickly in the early stages of the conflict, Berber nationalists in the north of Bakhriya declared the formation of the Chantrist Liberation Army, opening up another front of rebellion in the conflict. The Bakhriyan Army, after about two weeks of disarray, eventually reorganised within conflict territories and was able to make major strides into rebel-held territories in a series of offensives undertaken with the support of the Bakhriyan Air Force. Quickly finding themselves on the back foot, the Bantu Liberation Front and Chantrist Liberation Army sought to vie for support from states bordering Bakhriya, Shijuku and Eukras.
After a series of diplomatic meetings and talks with rebel envoys, the governments of Shijuku and Eukras formed a coalition, which would lead, combined, nearly 100,000 troops into the conflict zone. In a coordinated initial decapitation campaign, the Shijukunese and Eukrasi air forces and navies struck disastrous blows on the Bakhriyan Armed Forces, completely incapacitating the Bakhriyan Navy and promptly establishing air superiority over the conflict. Although the Shijukunese and Eukrasi decapitation campaign was widely effective, the Bakhriyan air defence network around their capital was successful in fending off a series of strikes on key government positions in Bahra. Following the decapitation campaign, the Shijukunese and Eukrasi Armies would mobilise into Bakhriya, in support of the BLF and the CLA respectively.
Insisting in the enforcement of the Meridian Doctrine, and the sanctity of the Bakhriyan state, the Allied Nations eventually deployed an expeditionary fleet and air attachment including approximately 25,000 airmobile troops to reinforce the Bakhriyan Armed Forces. The deployment garnered high levels of international scrutiny, particularly in relation to criticism of the Meridian Doctrine. In response, multiple unaligned parties such as Chantli declared their diplomatic support for the United Liberation Front and the Coalition, while Entente Cordiale members remained largely indifferent to the Maracaiban response in the conflict. The deployment proved to be effective in slowing the Coalition advance, with Shijukunese elements being forced to find ways to work around the Maracaiban forces to avoid international incidents. Despite this, several direct engagements between Shijukunese forces and Maracaiban forces on the ground and air were reported and mutually confirmed, the most significant of which, nearing the end of the conflict, resulted in 21 Shijukunese casualties and 52 Maracaiban casualties. The Maracaiban personnel, with their experience in counter-insurgency war, proved highly effective in slowing the Bantu Liberation Front advance, often completely stalling it when unsupported by Coalition elements.
The war drew a massive level of international attention, outside of the participating parties. Ships of the Dayashinese, Hallian, and Sieuxerran navies drifted around the conflict zone as a deterrent between the Shijukunese and Eukrasi navies, who were reasonably suspected to be planning attacks on the Allied Nations of Maracaibo's expeditionary fleet. Chantli, having declared its diplomatic support for the ULF and Coalition, transported hundreds of non-combat medical personnel to the conflict zone, who would serve to provide extra medical attention to Shijukunese and Bantu forces up to the highest pressure of situations. Prime Minister Daichi Noru of Dayashina condemned the grounds of the Maracaiban response to the conflict, and declared that Dayashina would support its ally in Shijuku. The Hallian Commonwealth reportedly considered an amphibious peacekeeping deployment into Qartoum in order to put a stop to ethnic violence. The Entente Cordiale made no statement on the conflict as it was ongoing, but insisted on a number of changes to the Meridian Doctrine after the conflict ended at the behest of Prime Minister Noru.
It was later de-classified, by the Republic of Dayashina Defence Forces themselves, that the Dayashinese Special Air Service, in the form the 25th Regiment, was involved in frontline operations in assistance to the Shijukunese Army and the Bantu Liberation Front. Despite the formal de-classification, the involvement of Dayashinese forces was already suspected, as images leaked on the internet of individuals who appeared to be in Dayashinese uniforms, carrying Dayashinese armaments. It was reported that the Dayashinese Special Air Service was highly involved in training the Bantu Liberation Front's 1st Division, which proved to be highly effective in combating both Bakhriyan and Maracaiban forces across all counts. Furthermore, it was revealed that the DSAS was was instrumental in the protection of Gamsolufechi Agu in the very early days of the conflict, fending off attacks on Agu's gubernatorial compound by the Bakhriyan Army for over a week before BLF reinforcement and relief. DSAS was also reported to be present in several frontline engagements with the Bakhriyan and Maracaiban forces, being utilised by the Shijukunese Army to break a number of difficult chokepoints and stalled areas on the front. The deployment drew large scrutiny from the Dayashinese Liberal Party as well as significant elements of Maracaiban politics.
After the conflict, a massive humanitarian relief campaign was launched across a divided Bakhriya. Shijuku leads the effort to relieve Bangana, with significant Dayashinese support. Eukras leads the effort to relieve Inumiden, with significant Hallian support. Maracaibo leads the effort to relieve territory still under the Bakhriyan government.
Background
Ethnic tensions
The buildup to the conflict is very much the result of a tipping point within the context of several decades of built-up ethnic tensions between the dominant Batavians/Bahranis and the largely subjugated and repressed ethnic Bantu and Berbers.
Petroleum rights disputes
In 2017, sizeable oil reserves were discovered within territory occupied by ethnic Bantu. The Van Kroezen regime and his dominant Bakhriyan Unity Party wanted to exploit these reserves immediately to promote Bakhriya's share of the oil market and attract more foreign investment, which would aid economic development under his regime. Despite this, ethnic Bantu, led by then-governor of Bangana Gamsolufechi Agu, ferociously protested and resisted the government extraction plans. Agu and his growing number of followers argued that, since they had found the reserves, their provincial government of Bangana should develop and establish the infrastructure and business around the new-found oil, which Van Kroezen and his regime rejected.
As tensions rose, Van Kroezen reckoned that the Bantu intended to "steal from Bakhriya" and accused of treason anyone involved in the resistance. Several hundred arrests were made, and dozens killed as the government began to suppress protests using lethal force. At the same time, a Bantu ethnic separatist group, the Bantu Liberation Front, recruited broadly from the protestors for a planned insurgency.
On the side of the Berbers, persecution continued on the basis of their ethnicity and pagan Chantrist faith, as the majority Christian government deemed their practice unlawful and heretical. Although less is known in this regard, it is widely accepted, that similar to the Bantu Liberation Front, an insurgent separatist group had been recruiting for several months as tensions rose, leading eventually to their separatist movement as well.
Diplomatic mediation
Themiclesian diplomats attempted to bridge these political differences at the last-minute. Themiclesian corporations have made investments on both sides of the ethnic boundary since the late 80s, and the government was committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, which it became aware through its connections in the Bakhriyan and Shijuku business community. According to some estimates, the value of these investments, in the textile and agricultural sectors, surpass $300 million and are vulnerable to domestic disorder.
The Lra Government in January 2017 ordered the Themiclesian consulate in the Bantu region to approach local leaders with schemes to share proceeds from the oil market, while the ambassador began dialogue with senior figures in President Von Kroezen's administration. While some early concessions were forthcoming on both sides, the Themiclesians were unable to prevent the insurgencies from amassing men and arms, and the administration's position hardened, demanding disarmament before commercial talks could proceed. The Themiclesian mission offered a loan (amount undisclosed) to the Bantu-majority provincial banks, intended as a financial incentive to support local businesses and make prospectus for more oil fields, as a last-ditch attempt to prevent escelation of conflict, to no avail. Confidential documents in the Themiclesian Foreign Office provide that such a loan may be insufficient to soothe tensions in the face of a much larger expected profit from petroleum, and to persuade the leaders of the insurrection to discharge their men for other employ.
On the administration's side, the Themiclesian mission made much effort to detail the potential negative consequences of a violent suppression the insurrection. The ambassador was of the opinion that the President stands to have his repuatation further impugned amongst not merely the Bantu but also the Berber regions, as such a suppression will inevitably lead to the withdrawal or destruction of foreign capital in the former and made demands on the administration's coffers, which principally stands on the latter, to restore basic governance and public amenities. Mobilization in the Berber regions is also estimated to cost Bakhriya more there, while oil revenues, even if received wholly by his exchequer, will not recuperate the costs in the short term. Themiclesian diplomats further made representations to the Bakhriyan Ministry of Finance that oil revenues, from the current prospect or anticipated future prospects, will not likely wholly be at the President's disposal, due to Shijuku intrigue in the vicinity, at which disunity with the Bantus is a liability.
In November 2017, envoys re-iterated that "the mission can foresee no plausible outcome under current policies that Bakhriya will, as a whole, profit from petroleum prospect, and the Themiclesian government will be profoundly regretful that its investments may thereby be adversely affected."
Beginning and early combat
Eventually, it was discovered that Gamsolufechi Agu was at the top of the Bantu Liberation, and BLF insurgents began to engage in combat with government forces as they dispersed the protests. As this happened, Agu officially declared the separation of the province of Bangana from the "hostile occupation" by Bakhriya, rescinding his Bakhriyan loyalty and declaring Bangana to be a nation for the Bantu people. At nearly the same time, Berber separatist leaders declared their own separation, and began an insurgency across their ethnic lands.
Because Bakhriyan government forces were concentrated heavily in Bangana as they were attempting to reach the oil reserves, combat in the city of Bangana took place on a large scale, as government forces slammed their way into the center of the city before the BLF forces were able to organise. As BLF concentrated their forces in the city, however, combat eventually came to a grinding standstill, as government forces and BLF insurgents fought across the city in close quarters, door-to-door combat. The government forces were able to sortie aircraft with fair consistency, striking BLF positions with success early on. Though, as the combat dragged on, BLF MANPADs and low-level SAMs/AD (suspected to have been supplied by Shijuku) proved to be a problem for Bakhriyan aircraft, restricting their freedom of operation severely. Despite this, government forces eventually made a breakthrough, and concentrated their offensive into the hole in BLF lines, leading to the 6 day long siege on Agu's government compound.
Early involvement from Dayashinese Special Air Service
It was revealed in a post-conflict, early 2020 Republic of Dayashina Defence Forces declassification that Dayashinese Special Air Service forces, specifically the 25 DSAS consisting of 124 combat personnel, had been in Bangana for at least two months prior to the conflict. They reportedly were heavily involved in training the first recruits of the Bantu Liberation Front, which would eventually become the BLF's 1st Division, their most effective combat unit against both Bakhriyan and Maracaiban units. When combat kicked off in the city of Bangana, the 25 DSAS were directly involved in fighting Bakhriyan government forces, most notably during the siege on Agu's compound.
Attack on Agu Compound
After a breakthrough in the fighting in Bangana, government forces funneled hundreds of soldiers and equipment into a gap that had formed directly in the center of BLF lines. Moving quickly and ferociously, with reportedly little regard for casualty prevention, the Bakhriyan Army stormed a deep line through the center of the city, the BLF forces being unable to do anything but stall the rapid offensive for a short time as the other forces consolidated a defence. To the dread of the BLF, they realised that the government forces were pushing to attack Gamsolufechi Agu's compound, with obvious intentions to capture or kill the leader of the newfound insurgent movement. Thus, BLF forces retreated, regrouped, and consolidated around the Bakhriyan Army offensive, surrounding them into a precarious gap. Regardless, the Army had made it within visual range of his compound, and launched a week long effort to attack and destroy the compound, with intentions to kill or capture Agu, who refused to leave.
25 DSAS was instrumental in the defence of this compound. An estimated 24 total DSAS operatives consolidated in the BLF leader's compound along with a further several dozen members of the BLF's 1st Division. Using their expertise, 25 DSAS led the effort to defend the compound. Bakhriyan Army forces tried on at least four separate occasions to storm and enter the compound using overwhelming force and numbers, each of which were thwarted. When these attacks weren't happening, Bakhriyan Army soldiers and vehicles were barraging the compound from afar with small arms and explosives, eventually culminating to the compound nearly entirely collapsing, yet left, quite miraculously, still standing. The Bakhriyan Army is estimated to have sustained over 300 deaths in their efforts to take the compound alone. 25 DSAS reported no deaths, but 10 serious injuries among them, while the BLF 1st Division units reported 4 deaths and 20 serious injuries. As the Bakhriyan Army had to overextend to reach the compound, the casualties eventually became unsustainable, and the attacks presented several opportunities for BLF insurgents to counter-attack and push the Bakhriyan Army units back out of their gap and back to the original lines. Here, combat stalled out again.
International reactions
International reactions to the conflict were largely varied. Primarily due to active combat occurring on the borders of both Shijuku and Eukras, both nations heavily bolstered their presence on their borders, but made no official statements in relation to the conflict. A minor crisis in the oil markets in Meridia had already been occurring, and the discovery of new reserves in Bangana compounded with active conflict in the area only worsened the crisis.
Dayashina responded to the conflict by re-affirming its commitment to the defence of its ally in Shijuku. Additionally, Prime Minister Noru confirmed his stances on the nature of the conflict, announcing his wholesale diplomatic support for the separatist forces, lamenting the Bakhriyan government for their long-time mistreatment of ethnic minorities, and praising the Bantu and Berber for standing up for their people. At this point, however, it had not been declassified that the Dayashinese military was actively involved in the conflict, with DSAS members having been in Bakhriya for several months.