Clean Space Act (Septentrion)

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The Clean Space Act is an international treaty in Septentrion which regulates the design and testing of anti-satellite weapons in order to avoid ablation cascade effects. It was signed in 2008 and has been ratified by all major powers in Septentrion.

Background

During the 1960s and 1970s, several countries in Septentrion conducted preliminary research on anti-satellite weapons as a tool to destroy enemy reconnaissance and communication assets. In the absence of a long-term standoff between blocs, they received little priority, with some design and simulation work but no actual flight tests of an anti-satellite weapon.

By the early 1990s, some of these anti-satellite programs had matured, driven in part by fears over Menghe's nuclear weapons program. Tír Glas conducted the first successful intercept of a decommissioned weather satellite in 1995, and Dayashina conducted two tests of land-based ASAT missiles in 2001 and 2002, the second of which was successful. Both programs were relegated to low priority as relations between blocs improved.

While the initial Glasic test struck a small, low-level satellite, the 2002 Dayashinese test used a larger weather satellite, which produced a significant cloud of high-velocity orbital debris. This led to some post-launch debate about whether renewed ASAT tests could result in Kessler syndrome, a cascade effect in which debris from one satellite shatters others, eventually knocking out worldwide low-level satellite networks and preventing later space launches. Within a few years, most of the debris had fallen out of orbit and burned up on re-entry, but the topic remained a matter of some concern.

In spite of these warnings, several other countries went ahead with ASAT development during the mid-2000s. Menghe announced that it was making progress on a kinetic-kill anti-satellite missile in January 2006, and there were widespread rumors that Fyrland was modernising its own anti-satellite systems in secret. Letnia, another leader in aerospace development, was reportedly working on the NIS (Novii Istrebitel-Sputnik, New Killer Satellite), which used a kinetic warhead instead of a shrapnel charge on the earlier IS proposals.

NIS test incident

On May 11th, 2007, Letnia conducted a test launch of the NIS-1 missile, targeting a large ocean surveillance satellite which had stopped functioning two years earlier. The test was a success, but it produced a large number of fragments, one of which collided with a Dayashinese communications satellite and knocked it out of operation. Other satellite and space station operators scrambled to maneuver their vehicles onto trajectories outside the path of the debris cloud.

Although the Dayashinese satellite did not fully fragment, and no other satellites were struck, the NIS debris cloud came as a wake-up call on the dangers of orbital debris. Menghe announced shortly afterward that it had indefinitely postponed its own ASAT test, and Fyrland followed suit.

Clean Space Convention

In the hopes of making the suspension official, several civilian space agencies and international NGOs began lobbying for a formal Septentrion League treaty preventing future ASAT tests. After some initial discussion of the treaty terms, the SL Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space convened a special session to draw up a permanent ASAT test ban treaty.

During negotiations, much debate centered on how the treaty would distinguish between dedicated anti-satellite missiles and kinetic-kill anti-ballistic missile systems, which were under development in several countries and could theoretically be used against satellites in Low Septentrion Orbit. Delegates eventually arrived at a compromise which would allow ABM testing and development but prohibit tests on orbital targets, as well as the use of ABMs as anti-satellite weapons in war.

The treaty, officially named the Treaty on the Prevention of Kinetic Anti-Satellite Weapons but popularly known as the Clean Space Act, was passed by the SL General Assembly on June 4th, 2008. By the end of the year, it had been ratified by all Septentrion countries with active space exploration programs, as well as a number of minor states.

Treaty provisions

The major provisions of the Clean Space Act can be summarized as follows:

  • All signatories agree not to conduct live-fire weapons tests against targets in orbit.
  • In times of war, all signatories agree that they will not employ kinetic or explosive weapons against enemy satellites.
  • Whether in peace or war, all signatories agree that they will promptly report any disabled or non-functional satellites to the SL Office for Outer Space Affairs. Signatories with aerospace programs for tracking orbital debris will also share their data with SL-OOSA, which will manage a central orbital debris database.
  • SL-OOSA will make said information publicly available to all member states, allowing them to safely plan space launches and correct satellite orbits in a timely manner.
  • If a defunct satellite is believed to pose a hazard on its present course, either through collision with other debris or re-entry over a populated area, a kinetic intercept may be conducted, but only after extensive prior review by SL-OOSA to ensure that the existing threat is plausible and the debris risk is small.

The treaty does not apply to anti-ballistic missiles, including ABM tests. Tests against targets on non-orbital trajectories, including ballistic missiles converted to target rockets and satellites de-orbited into the atmosphere, are still permitted, and do not need to be announced to SL-OOSA. This allows for the unrestricted development of missiles with anti-satellite capability, as long as they are not tested against targets in orbit or used operationally in war.

In its current form, the Clean Space Act also specifically refers to kinetic and explosive anti-satellite weapons, those which kill the target through explosive force or direct impact. Ground-based jamming systems are still permitted. This loophole has also led some countries to invest in the development of laser-based anti-satellite weapons, which would not shatter the target but could blind it or damage its communications equipment.

Advocates for a stronger treaty have also criticized the Clean Space Act on the grounds that it does not provide an adequate enforcement mechanism. Peacetime tests could be met with sanctions and international litigation, but there is no "hard" provision preventing a country from developing a long-range anti-space missile under the guise of ballistic missile defense and using it in wartime. Thus far, efforts to amend the treaty have met with little success, as major regional powers including Menghe staunchly oppose regulations that could interfere with anti-ballistic-missile and satellite jamming system research.

See also