Great Sea Theory

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The Great Sea Theory (大海論, dais-hme'-gluns) is a Themiclesian naval policy developed in the mid- to late 1800s in response to the international competition of naval arms. The policy directs Themiclesia to ignore advancements of foreign navies except as it pertains to the Halu'an Sea, or the Great Sea in Shinasthana; the word "ignore" (不理) means not attempting to match the arms of foreign navies but does not forbid defensive strategies to be developed in case those arms should be applied to Themiclesia.

Original text

The phrase "Great Sea Theory" is coined to isolate a single paragraph in the policy paper Mja Seng, Secretary of State for Commerce, wrote in 1905:

列國之眾也,不可以兼拒。今欲揮兵外國,盡皆賴艦航。其國將拒之,則拒之海上。海之深廣,船之高聳,不可以交兵,所以逞砲。欲拒砲則厚其甲,甲足拒砲則大其砲,至乎破甲焉。一國大其砲,萬國厚其甲;一國厚其甲,萬國大其砲。周復而又始,糜有所竟止。列國皆相兼拒,此害之甚,不刊可知。

國家頹百年之弱,百姓疲五代之敝,艦航之營,在乎止盜賊、保商航焉。兼拒列國之大害,斷不可事。我不預外國之事,外國自預預者之事。幸者列國所以營航也,在航之大小強弱,不預商事焉。大海為商旅之途,艦航足遏海寇足矣,況寇且大,則不單害我,若時艦大者自有所止,不賴我航焉。

Because the states are numerous, we cannot resist all of them at once. Today, whenever military action is set for abroad, it is the navy that facilitates it. If such an invasion is to be stopped, it must be stopped at sea. By the width and depth of the sea and the height of the ships, combat [by conventional weapons] is impossible, hence the use of cannons. If cannons are to be resisted, ships' armour must be thickened; once the armour is thick enough to resist cannon fire, the cannon's calibres are enlarged, until they once more can penetrate armour. When one state enlarges their calibres, all the states must thicken their armours; when one state thickens their armours, all states must enlarge their calibres. Once and again it revolves around this cycle, and there is no end to be reached. That the states are taking every other as their enemies is such an enormous detriment, it is known without argument.

This country has languished in the weakness of a century, and its people have been tormented by the impoverishment of five generations; [for all our history] the purport of keeping our navy is to stop pirates and protect merchants. We must never give in to the great detriment of engaging every state. If we do not meddle with other states' affairs, there are still a large number of states that relish it, and the enmity of states can be left towards those who relish conflict arising therefrom. What we must cherish is that the navies of the states compete by their size and strength, but little is devoted to commerce. The Great Sea (i.e. Halu'an Sea) is the way of commerce, and our navy shall be sufficient at stopping pirates. If the pirates are stronger, then they will not only harm us; at that time, those with more powerful navies shall take note and do away with them, and that comes at no obligation on our navy.

Main objectives

Though credited for the transformation of Themiclesia's navy from one that had ocean-going ambitions (though not necessarily the means) to one that was focused purely on coastal defence, the policy paper itself does not explicitly call for this specific change in paradigm. However, by renouncing the purchase of new ships with superior armaments, it essentially barred the navy from having much ocean-going capacity.