Menghean Army
| Menghean Army | |
|---|---|
| 대멩 육군 / 大孟 陸軍 Dae Meng Yukgun | |
 Army Flag adopted in 2005 | |
| Founded | February 19, 1958 |
| Current form | May 25, 1988 |
| Headquarters | Dongrŭng, North Donghae Province |
| Leadership | |
| Supreme Marshal of Menghe (Dae-Wŏnsu) | Choe Sŭng-min |
| Marshal (Wŏnsu) | Kang Yŏng-nam |
| Personnel | |
| Military age | 18 |
| Conscription | 2 years 6 months |
| Active personnel | 2,400,000 |
| Reserve personnel | 2,750,000 (Mobilization Reserves) 12,000,000 (Emergency Reserves) |
| Expenditure | |
| Budget | $189 billion (2016) |
| Percent of GDP | 4.0% (Army only) |
| Related articles | |
| Ranks | see "Ranks" below |
The Menghean Army (Sinmun: 대멩 육군 Gomun: 大孟 陸軍, Dae Meng Yukgun, lit. "Great Meng Army"), formerly the Menghean People's Army (Menghe Inmin Yukgun), refers to the combined ground forces of Menghe. It includes several sub-branches, such as the Airborne Assault Forces, the Army Special Forces, and the Coastal Defense Forces. Because Menghe does not operate an independent air force, the Army also includes the country’s fixed-wing aircraft, which are administratively organized as Menghean Army Aviation. The Army's administrative headquarters is located in the city of Dongrŭng (동릉 / 銅陵) in North Donghae Province, about 200 kilometers southwest of the capital.
As of 2016, the Menghean Army consists of 2,400,000 active-duty personnel and 2,750,000 personnel in the Mobilization Reserves. These troops serve in 96 Mechanized Divisions, 59 Tank Divisions, 27 Coastal Defense Divisions, and 35 Artillery Divisions (totals include Mobilization Reserves), as well as a number of independent brigades and miscellaneous supporting units. An additional 12 million personnel serve in the Emergency Reserves, which are not included in the divisional totals. As in the Navy, these positions are filled by a nationwide program of compulsory military service, in which all male citizens (with some exceptions) must serve two and a half years after turning 18. Since the 2005 Military Reforms, the Menghean Army has devoted extensive attention to professionalizing and modernizing its forces, and it has experienced steady increases in budget relative to GDP. Its main adversaries on land are Maverica and the People's Republic of Innominada (Innominadan Socialist Republic before the 2014 partition).
History
Menghean People's Army
Today's Menghean Army originated as the Menghean People's Army, which was formed in 1958 during the Menghe War of Liberation. Prior to that time, anti-colonial resistance forces had relied on a disorganized collection of small militant groups. This resistance was divided into two major factions. Su-State Nationalists, many of them veterans of the Great Conquest War, fought out of continued loyalty to the Greater Menghean Empire, which had heavily indoctrinated its soldiers before and during the war. Alongside this older faction was a rural movement inspired by international Communism, which aimed to set up a Socialist state. These movements were frequently at odds with one another over the future of the country, impairing collaboration against the Republic of Menghe government.
The Army's eventual unification was made possible by the Sangwŏn Agreement, in which the Communist Party leadership agreed to tolerate Army ideological autonomy in exchange for a guarantee of military support. This was a pragmatic move at the time, uniting the resistance forces at a time when the Republic of Menghe was on the retreat, but it resulted in mutual distrust over the long term. The Menghe People's Army remained a bastion of nationalist conservatism under the Democratic People's Republic of Menghe, and its upper commanders often feared that the Party would attempt to seize full control.
Transitional Socialist Period
Army-Party tensions peaked in the mid-1980s, leading to the Decembrist Revolution - a military coup which overthrew the Menghe People's Communist Party and installed the Army in a position of interim control. During the transitional period, the Army purged its officer corps of soldiers loyal to the old regime, a move which allowed Choe Sŭng-min to consolidate his power as Marshal of the Army.
Following the officer purges and military downsizing, the Menghean People's Army of the 1990s emerged as a moderately large but poorly trained force. As the government devoted more and more of its resources to promoting economic growth, it allowed the military budget to decline, hoping to keep the same effectiveness at a lower cost by using one-year conscripts and retaining old equipment. It supplemented this force with a large pool of reservists, as one-year service produced a large turnover in ex-soldiers who then remained in the reserves until the age of 45. Officers at all ranks were generally promoted for political loyalty rather than commanding skill, and even in active units training often lapsed in favor of ideological training.
Late in 2004, the Socialist Republic of Menghe sent ground forces to intervene in the Ummayan Civil War. Choe Sŭng-min was in fact one of the main proponents of this push, though after 2005 the state made a conscious effort to mask his role in it. The move was necessary because the turn to expeditionary warfare failed on two levels: not only did it fail to win much international support for the Menghean regime, which refused to tighten its authoritarian control over society, it also unveiled the appalling unpreparedness of the poorly trained Menghean People's Army. Many units entered combat with obsolete equipment, and their officers employed them in wasteful massed attacks, resulting in needlessly high casualty rates.
2005 Military Reforms
After re-examining its poor performance abroad, the central government decided to initiate a thorough and comprehensive reform of the Menghean military. In the Menghean People's Army – renamed the Menghean Army during this process – these are simply known as the 2005 Military Reforms. A similar procedure had started in the Navy in 2004. Contrary to official propaganda sources, although Supreme Marshal Choe did step firmly behind these reforms once they were underway, he was not the initial source of the idea and did not play a direct part in its implementation.
Broadly speaking, the 2005 Military Reforms tackled three goals: to reorganize the Menghean Army around a defensive border role, to professionalize the poorly trained conscript force, and to modernize the Army’s aging equipment. High Command reorganized the general pool of divisions into five permanent field armies along the border with Maverica and the Innominadan Republic (the total would later rise to ten). The government also broke up the Menghean People's Air Force, handing its aircraft and personnel over to the branches of service as Menghean Army Aviation and Menghean Naval Aviation. The "2005" reforms in fact lasted until 2007, when High Command finally broke up the "Ji-byŏng" system, instituted in 1991, which had given each division considerable prestige but also a troublesome level of administrative independence.
Instead of abolishing the conscription system, High Command returned the mandatory service term to its pre-Revolution level of two years. The main aim of this policy was to give conscripts longer experience in their positions and reduce the proportion of personnel who were “fresh” when a new cohort arrived. In the short run, this also allowed for a prompt doubling in the size of the Menghean Army’s active units, which the government saw as a necessary response to the threat of war with Maverica or the Innominadan Socialist Republic. The Menghean government also set up new incentives for voluntary service and contract renewal, with the result that the proportion of volunteer soldiers in the Menghean Army climbed from under 10% in 2004 to over 50% in 2016. High Command reports that this has resulted in a major improvement in unit cohesion, professionalism, and discipline, claims that are corroborated by foreign information on the state of the Menghean Army.
Structure
Menghean Army Aviation
Unlike many other countries in Septentrion, the Socialist Republic of Menghe does not maintain an independent air force. Instead, all fixed-wing aircraft not serving with Menghean Naval Aviation are assigned to Menghean Army Aviation (대멩 육군 항공대, Dae Meng Yukgun Hanggongdae), and their personnel are distinguished from regular Army forces by their light blue rank insignia. They also have their own Vice Marshal (Chasu), though the Engineer Troops and Armored Forces enjoy similar top-level representation. The decision to dissolve the Air Force, made in 2005, was officially intended to improve coordination between surface units and aircraft, which had been a problem during Menghean operations in Ummayah.
Organizationally, the Army’s aircraft are grouped into eleven Army Aviation Corps, each of which is included as part of an Army’s organic units and directly subordinate to the General in command. Administratively, however, Army Aviation retains a distinct sub-grouping of staff concerned with training and doctrine to meet its special needs, similar to the Navy’s Marine Infantry. Likewise, it is internally divided between fixed-wing Army Aviation and rotary-wing Army Aviation, the latter of which is under more direct Army control and may be further divided among individual divisions.
Airborne Assault Forces
The Menghean Army operates eight Airborne Infantry Brigades, which are elite units trained to conduct parachute assaults behind enemy lines and seize critical objectives such as towns and bridges to support the ground forces’ advance. Most (though not all) of their combat units are mechanized, allowing them to move quickly and surprise enemy rear units with lightweight armored fighting vehicles. They are also among the best-trained units in the Menghean armed forces, composed entirely of volunteers rather than conscripts. Together, these form the Airborne Assault Forces (돌격 공수대, Dolgyog Gongsudae), who, like Army Aviation, wear light blue rank insignia but are otherwise divided into units subject to Field Army commanders.
In order to meet the special demands of this mission, the Airborne Forces employ a different combat organization than the standard ground forces. They also use different vehicles, most of which are based on the BSCh-8 family of lightweight tracked airborne vehicles. The BSCh-8 family is light enough to be dropped by parachute with crews inside, and offers adequate protection against small-arms fire, but remains more vulnerable than heavier IFVs like the BSCh-9 and BSCh-10. Airborne personnel can also be readily distinguished by their light blue rank insignia in place of the Army’s dark red, and wear slightly different camouflage patterns.
Notably, airborne units do not include dedicated helicopter-borne units. Transport helicopter formations are part of rotary-wing Army Aviation and do not include dedicated helicopter infantry. In combat, these units would draw on dismount personnel from Motorized Infantry Battalions. For deep assaults they may draw on Airborne Forces units instead, but priority for Airborne Forces units would go to parachute operations.
Mountain Infantry
The 9th Army, which fights on mountainous terrain over part of its frontage, operates two Mountain Infantry units, one of them in the 38th Corps and one in the General’s independent forces. These formations resemble a standard infantry brigade, but have some differences in organization and equipment; for instance, they use the ZT-77K rifle as standard-issue, in order to fight more effectively at long ranges. They are also composed entirely of volunteers, and trained to a higher standard than regular Army troops, with a special focus on heliborne assaults, rock climbing, sharpshooting, and endurance at high altitude.
The 27th Dŭngsanga (mountaineer) division, which sits on the front line, is responsible for pressing forward or maintaining a cohesive defense, while the 77th Dŭngsanga brigade is tasked with patrolling the rear areas against enemy special forces and inserting heliborne teams behind enemy lines. In this sense, it is a more flexible unit, serving a similar role to the Gunchal. Collectively, the Mountain Infantry are known as the Dŭngsan Bobyŏng (등산 보병).
Army Special Forces
In addition to the Airborne Forces, the Army also relies on the Army Special Forces (육군 특수부대, Yukgun Tŭksubudae) to conduct missions behind enemy lines. While the Airborne Forces are mainly concerned with seizing key objectives or attacking rear-area support units, the Special Forces conduct a wider range of missions, including deep reconnaissance, ambush and mining operations, and raids against high-value targets such as large-unit headquarters and forward airbases.
Army Special Forces organization and equipment is more flexible, with composite squads that may be assigned a different structure or set of weapons to fit the mission at hand. Like the Airborne Forces, they are made up entirely of volunteers, many of whom are veterans from other Army units, and must pass a strict physical fitness and ideological loyalty test.
Coastal Defense Forces
Not usually considered a separate sub-branch of the Army, the Coastal Defense Forces (해안 방비 군대, Haean Bangbi Gundae) are technically distinct from units on the land border, employing organization and operational doctrine adapted to their needs. They have the highest proportion of Mobilization Reserve personnel of any Army sub-unit, on the expectation that the Menghean Navy would be able to delay an enemy naval incursion long enough to mobilize the Coastal Defense Forces or even turn back the enemy force before it can land troops.
The Coastal Defense Forces contain a smaller subset of brigades known as the Haebyŏngdae (해병대). Unlike the rest of the Coastal Defense Forces, these are elite units with a large number of volunteers, much like the Mountain Infantry or Marine Infantry. They are kept in an active mobilization status in peacetime, and regularly train in fighting along the coastline and conducting small-unit counter-landings. In a wartime situation, it is anticipated that the Coastal Defense Forces would attempt to contain the enemy beachhead, allowing the Haebyŏngdae to counterattack along the coast and repel dug-in enemy forces.
There are two brigades of Haebyŏngdae permanently stationed on the border between Menghe and Altagracia, a Sylvan possession which the Menghean government considers to be part of its sovereign territory. In the event of war, it is expected that these Haebyŏngdae divisions would rely on "leapfrog" amphibious landings to move up the sides of Altagracian peninsula while mechanized Army forces drive down the center.
Organization
High Command Structure
Operational Organization
At the highest level of command, the Menghean Army is divided into eleven Armies. These have an average size of roughly 450,000 personnel, but vary in size based on the unit’s mission and scope; the 1st Army consists of five corps, while the 6th Army only consists of only three. These numbers include Mobilization Reserve units, which make up the entirety of the 12th Army but only small elements of the 4th Army.
Ranks
The present Menghean rank structure is displayed in the table on the right, which lists rank insignia, titles in Menghean, and approximate Western equivalents. In the Menghean Army proper, the insignia (for enlisted ranks) and backgrounds (for commissioned ranks) are crimson, as shown here. In other sub-branches, the ranks and insignia are the same, but the colors are different:
- Army Aviation: light blue
- Airborne Assault Forces: light blue
- Army Special Forces: black
- Marine Infantry: dark green
The insignia and rank names are carried over from the original Menghe Federal Army, established in 1902. During the 1960s, when the Menghe People's Army was a guerilla force working under Erusuian trainers and advisers, many of the names were replaced with their Erusuian counterparts (e.g., Maiyor for Major, Kyaptan for Captain). The original rank names were restored in 2005. The rank structure has undergone some other changes since then; the Brigadier rank of Junjiang was added in 2007, and the rank of Tŭkmusangsa followed in 2011. Between 1992 and 2003 there were also three Warrant Officer ranks, which resembled the Daeryŏng, Jungnyŏng, and Soryŏng ranks but without the star.
In addition to standard command ranks, there are two cadet ranks: Sagwan Hubosaeng (officer candidate) and Sagwan Haksaeng (officer student). The former is worn by officers in training, and is considered the “true” cadet rank, while the latter is worn by students at Gundae Hakkyo military high schools and lacks even the secondary benefits of a cadet rank. At the enlisted level, there is a similar rank of Jangjŏng, usually translated as “recruit.” This is the rank given to soldiers while they are enrolled in their training period but before they have been assigned to their units. Members of the Josŏndae also use this rank during field training exercises.
At the highest level, the Menghean Army has three "special ranks." Dae-Wŏnsu, usually translated as "Supreme Marshal of Menghe," is the highest rank in the country, and also stands at the top of the Navy's command structure. It is considered one of the three most powerful offices in the country, alongside General-Secretary of the Menghe Socialist Party and Chairman of the Supreme Council. Because it is a political or all-military rather than Army-only rank, the shoulder insignia of the Dae-Wŏnsu use a gold rather than a crimson background.
Wŏnsu, or "Marshal," is the highest officer rank in the Army proper. This rank is currently held by Kang Yŏng-nam. In addition to directing strategic operations and objectives for the Army in wartime, the Wŏnsu is responsible for major symbolic and administrative functions in peacetime. Beneath the Marshal are a number of Chasu (usually translated "Vice-Marshals") who are each responsible for administrative affairs within their given arm or branch and hold no real command authority. As of 2008, these consist of the following positions:
- Vice-Marshal of Mechanized Infantry
- Vice-Marshal of the Armored Forces
- Vice-Marshal of the Artillery
- Vice-Marshal of Army Aviation
- Vice-Marshal of the Airborne Forces
- Vice-Marshal of the Engineering and Signal Troops
- Vice-Marshal of Strategic and Operational Doctrine
Doctrine
Currently, the Menghean Army’s most likely perceived conflict is a major conventional land war on the border with Maverica and the People’s Republic of Innominada. The Menghean Army currently devotes four Field Armies to guarding this border, with three held in reserve further back. Because the Menghean Army is not in a position to conquer Maverica, given the latter’s rebellious population and extensive strategic depth, it would instead aim go inflict sufficiently heavy damage on Maverica’s conventional forces, seize a portion of territory as a bargaining chip, and sue for peace under a favorable treaty.
Like the Menghean Navy, the Army uses color-coded scenarios to refer to its responses to possible conflicts. Prior to 2014, War Plan Blue referred to a war against the Republic of Innominada, and War Plan Black referred to a war against Maverica. Currently, War Plan Blue refers instead to an offensive operation to reunify Innominada under the southwestern government.
Inhae Gyŏngjŏn
For most of its existence, the Menghe People’s Army relied on a doctrine of "Inhae Gyŏngjŏn" (인해 결전), usually translated as "Human Wave Decisive Battle." Although this conjures up images of suicidal bayonet charges, in practice it was a somewhat more nuanced approach: wherever possible, commanders would try to creep their forces as close as possible to enemy lines while evading detection, then launch concentrated attacks with massed mortar and artillery support. If a unit managed to achieve a breakthrough, it would pass this information on to higher levels of command, which would funnel additional reinforcements to that point in an effort to exploit a gap in the enemy’s defenses.
This tactic was well-suited to combat experience in the later stages of the Menghe War of Liberation, in which the Menghe People's Army had a large reserve of motivated personnel but little advanced equipment, and was fighting a thinly divided and poorly motivated opponent. For this reason, it remained the core of Army doctrine throughout the DPR Menghe era, and even after the Decembrist Revolution. Yet the advent of better military technology over the course of the late 20th century soon cast it into doubt, especially in the disastrous early battles of the Ummayan Civil War.
Post-2005 developments
In addition to modernizing the Menghean Army’s equipment and training, the 2005 military reforms also set out to improve its military doctrine. The new doctrine, sometimes referred to as "Deep Operations Theory" (종심작전이론, Jongsim Jakjŏn Ilon) gave greater initiative to lower-level commanders, encouraged wider use of precision-guided munitions, and shifted the emphasis from massed attacks to more careful reconnaissance ahead of a focused assault. At the strategic level, however, it retained the same overall focus on breaking through the enemy’s lines and allowing armored forces to spread into their rear areas, destroying supporting weapons and encircling forward concentrations of force.
In the wake of the 2014-2015 invasion and occupation of the Republica Innominada, there has been some talk among Menghean High Command of transitioning toward a more defensive stance, or at least a fluid transition between offense and defense at the operational level. This would place the Menghean Army in a better position to defend the relatively narrow strip of land between the Innominadan DMZ and the coastline. In the long run it could also go hand-in-hand with a transition from universal conscription to a smaller professional volunteer force.
Coastal Defense Forces
Due to the differing demands of defense against a foreign naval intervention, the Coastal Defense Forces follow a slightly different doctrine from the Army forces on the border. The primary objective in a foreign invasion/intervention scenario, coded as War Plan Red, would be to prevent enemy forces from making landfall in the first place, as a secure beachhead with access to port infrastructure would be much harder to repel and would also require the Menghean Army to fight in some of the country’s most densely populated areas. In the initial stages, this would mean working alongside the Menghean Navy to destroy or erode the enemy’s battlegroup far from shore, and working alongside Menghean Naval Aviation to deny the enemy air superiority over potential landing sites.
Barring this, the Coastal Defense Forces would seek to repel the landing force at its most vulnerable stage, as it approaches the beach. For this purpose, their organization assigns a larger number of supporting weapons, ranging from heavy recoilless rifles, ATGMs, and direct-fire field guns to mobile gun systems and non-line-of-sight missiles like the Podang PD-82. Upon mobilization of the Coastal Defense Forces, units armed with these weapons would be dispersed to concealed and hardened positions along the coast, and would attempt to disable or destroy LCACs and other landing craft ahead of a landing. Many of these units would employ prepared defensive positions, including concrete bunkers, concealed firing and observation posts, and artillery stations formed from last-generation tank turrets mounted on the ground. A 2010 international defense report suggested that the number of prepared defensive positions may exceed the number of CDF units assigned to them, in order to create additional diversionary targets and to allow Emergency Reserve units to fill empty spaces in the event of a successful enemy landing.
In order to concentrate active personnel along the land border with Maverica, where war could strike with much shorter notice, the Coastal Defense Forces have a very high proportion of reservists; it is estimated that only about 10% of their total personnel are in service at any given time, and most of their work consists of guarding, checking, and maintaining equipment for the rest of their units. The rest are Mobilization Reserves (see below), and mainly use Class 2 equipment, though in recent years the Menghean Army has distributed some advanced anti-tank missile systems to these reserve units. In the event that an enemy force manages to set up a successful beachhead, the Coastal Defense Forces would dispatch successively larger reserve units against them, eventually deploying the entire 10th and 12th Armies if necessary. At the same time, they may also call up large numbers of local Emergency Reserve units around the area of the beachhead, to contain the enemy landing force through sheer numbers until High Command can prepare a more organized counterattack.
Personnel
Since 1965, the Menghean Army has relied on a policy of conscription to fill its ranks, though the details of the policy have varied. Currently, Menghe relies on a policy of selective conscription, in which only about 30% of the cohort turning 18 each year enters the military. A standard conscription term lasts two years and six months, including training and reserve familiarization, and is served shortly after graduating from high school.
Since 2005, the Army has relied increasingly on volunteers to fill its ranks, especially in skilled and technical roles where low turnover and long-term experience are most valuable. Volunteers in the Menghean Army may also be concentrated in elite formations and sub-branches, such as the Airborne Assault Forces or combat posts in Kimsŏng divisions.
All commissioned officers in the Menghean Army are volunteers, and all have undergone training at the National Defense Academy in Dongrŭng.
Training
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Contrary to its name, a typical two-and-a-half year conscript term in the Menghean Army only includes two years of actual military service. The remaining half-year is divided into four months of preparatory training before service, and two months of reserve familiarization after service. This policy was implemented to ensure that every new cohort of recruits arriving in a unit already had extensive military training, eliminating the earlier phenomenon in which the Army’s preparedness would drop off every summer when new trainees arrived.
Reserve Forces
After finishing their active military service, all ex-servicemen of the Army are registered in the Army Reserve. This is true regardless of whether they served as a two-year conscript or a long-term professional volunteer, though as the latter are older when they leave the military they age out of the reserve pool faster.
The Army Reserves are further divided into two echelons based on readiness: the Mobilization Reserves (Dongwŏn Yebigun) and the Homeland Defense Reserves (Hyangto Yebigun). Upon completing their service, ex-soldiers first move into the Mobilization Reserves, and maintain this status for four years. Because the Army turns over roughly two-thirds of its personnel (including volunteers) every two years, the Mobilization Reserve contains about slightly more personnel than the active Army forces. After these four years, ex-servicemen move on to the Homeland Defense Reserves, which also include individuals who completed military training but not military service, such as members of the Youth Vanguard over the age of 18.
Units in the Mobilization Reserve were originally used to fill empty spaces in Divisions that were kept below their total personnel level in peacetime, but since 2011 the Army’s front-line units are all kept at full strength to increase readiness. Instead, Mobilization Reserve units are now fed into units known as "shell divisions." In peacetime these are maintained in forward-deployed bases and warehouses with all the necessary equipment to outfit an entire Division (usually of Generation 2 level), and staffed by a small group of active conscript personnel who are mainly tasked with maintenance and inspection of ready equipment. Their officers above Captain rank are also active service personnel, but in peacetime they are typically attached to active units as additional deputy commanders to maintain their experience leading units, a fact which remained hidden from public knowledge until 2014.
If the Menghean leadership were concerned about the imminent risk of a major war, or were preparing to take the offensive, it could order a full or partial mobilization, in which units affiliated with the Mobilization Reserves would report to their bases and take the equipment out of storage. Given the size of the Mobilization Reserves, this would more than double the total number of personnel in the Army. The authority to approve such a mobilization lies with the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Leaked transcripts of high-level meetings suggest that the Menghean Army's goal would be to accomplish a full mobilization of these reserves in under a week, but some analysts have suggested that this may be an optimistic estimate. Mobilization is reserved for high-risk situations and might only be partially implemented in a crisis, as it would pull a large number of young employees out of the workforce without further notice and it could mistakenly signal that the Menghean Army is preparing an attack.
To maintain combat readiness, units in the Mobilization Reserve train regularly. Since 2009, military personnel are told their new post and reserve unit and enrolled in two months of reserve familiarization training upon finishing their active service. In practice, depending on the complexity of their position they may be released for a few weeks and then called back for the final few weeks of the two-month period. Reserve familiarization is mainly intended to introduce soldiers to their new roles and units, as reservist units have slightly different organization tables and generally use older equipment which active soldiers may not have trained on.
Wherever possible, personnel from the same squad, platoon, and company are moved into a corresponding squad, platoon, or company in the Mobilization Reserves to maintain small-unit cohesion. After familiarization is complete, these personnel are released back into civilian life, but over the course of the next four years they are generally called up for two to three refresher training periods with their units and must attend monthly lessons in their local area. Refresher training periods generally last two weeks to one month, but may be shorter or longer depending on the importance of the reserve unit and the role of the individual, with the highest training requirements for reserve pilots and anti-air system operators. State laws prohibit employers from discriminating against new hires on the basis of the length of their reserve call-up obligation, and there are strong social norms against doing this.
After completing four years in the Mobilization Reserves, ex-soldiers then pass on to the Homeland Defense Reserves, where they remain until the age of 45 for enlisted roles. Reserve Officers are subject to higher age limits based on their rank. Homeland Defense units receive much less regular training, and although they may be summoned for mobilization exercises this is rare. Unlike Mobilization Reserves, they are not attached to permanent reserve divisions, and would instead form new units in their area of residence, a move intended to speed up mobilization by eliminating the need for soldiers to travel across the country to their units. These units would generally use 1st Generation formations and equipment, the oldest still in storage, and might need to go through additional training of at least a month and probably more before they are ready to fight. As such, they are only to be used in situations of a "severe threat to national existence," which presumably would include a successful beachhead by an invading force or a major failure on the Maverican front. During a less intense conflict members of the Homeland Defense Reserve would also be called up to provide home-front security and fill new posts in arms factories as they increased capacity. In the past the Menghean government has also mobilized local units of the Emergency Reserves to provide relief after natural disasters.
Equipment
Small Arms
| Name | Image | Type | Caliber | Introduced | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZT-107 | Assault Rifle | 5.45x39mm selective fire |
2007 | ZT-103 variant with BARS. Used by Gunchal and some Army Special Forces units, with plans to eventually make it standard across active units. | |
| ZT-103 | File:ZT-103 main.png | Assault Rifle | 5.45x39mm selective fire |
2004 | Currently the main service rifle of the Menghean Army. |
| ZT-67 | Assault Rifle | 7.62x39mm selective fire |
1969 | Mainly used by reserve units. Capable of firing rifle grenades. | |
| ZT-106 | Carbine | 5.45x39mm selective fire |
2012 | Special Forces variant of the ZT-103 with built-in suppressor | |
| ZT-104 | File:ZT-103 main.png | Carbine | 5.45x39mm selective fire |
2005 | Carbine version of the ZT-103. |
| PY-68 | Submachinegun | 7.62×25mm_Tokarev automatic |
1971 | Inexpensive SMG mainly used by vehicle crews in reserve units. | |
| ZT-115 | File:ZT-105.png | Light machine gun | 5.45x39mm automatic |
2015 | ZT-105 with BARS system installed. |
| ZT-105 | File:ZT-105.png | Light machine gun | 5.45x39mm automatic |
2005 | LMG version of the ZT-103. |
| ZT-71 | Light machine gun | 7.62x39mm automatic |
1973 | LMG version of the ZT-67. Mainly used by reserve units. | |
| ZT-77, ZT-77K | DMR | 7.62x54mm selective fire |
2002 | Standard weapon for designated marksmen; also used by mountain infantry and special forces. |
Ground Vehicles
Note: Where listed, totals refer to the combined totals for Active units and Mobilization Reserve units. They do not distinguish between these two categories. They also do not include equipment used by the Emergency Reserves, except where otherwise noted.
| Name | Image | Type | Number | Introduced | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SuChong-8 Ulsan | Main Battle Tank | 500 | 2015 | New MBT currently entering service. | |
| SuChong-9 | Airborne Light Tank | 250 | 2015 | Light tank using the DTD-8 chassis. Used by the Airborne Infantry Brigades; can be deployed by parachute with the crew inside. | |
| SuChong-7 | Light Tank | ~500 | 2007 | Amphibious light tank for the Army’s River Crossing Brigades and a few reconnaissance units. An additional 246 serve in the Marine Infantry. | |
| SuChong-6 | 300px | Main Battle Tank | 16,000 | 2004 | Standard in Class 3 Active units; still in production. |
| MinChong-5 | File:MinChong 5.png | Main Battle Tank | 24,000 | 1979 | Standard in Class 2 Mobilization Reserve; most in MCh-5Ch or D variants. |
| MinChong-4 | File:MinChong 4.png | Medium Tank | 4,000 | 1964 | It is estimated that an additional 20,000 are in storage for Emergency Reserve units. |
| DTD-9 | File:DTD 9.png | Infantry Fighting Vehicle | 9,700 | 2008 | Standard in most Class 3 units. |
| DTD-8 | File:DTD 8.png | Airborne APC | ~800 | 2000 | Used by the Airborne Infantry Brigades. |
| DTD-7 | File:DTD 3B.png | Armored Personnel Carrier | 27,000 | 1996 | Standard in Class 3 and some Class 2 units. |
| DTD-5 | File:DTD 5.png | Infantry Fighting Vehicle | 34,000 | 1975 | Standard in Class 2 Mobilization Reserve and some active units. |
| DTD-4 | File:DTD 4.png | Armored Personnel Carrier | 25,000 | 1973 | Standard in Class 2 Mobilization Reserve; being replaced by DTD-7. |
| SKAP-230 Zinzang | File:SKAP 230.png | Self Propelled Anti Air Gun | 2,400 | 1995 | Standard in active units, being phased into reserves |
| SKAP-422 | File:SKAP 422.png | Self Propelled Anti Air Gun | 1,500 | 1960 | All built or upgraded to SKAP-422K or K2 configuration |
| SBP-152/48 | ----- | Self Propelled Artillery | 1,500 | 1960 | Replacing SBP-152/27 as the active service divisional artillerypiece. |
| SBP-152/27 | File:SBP-152.png | Self Propelled Artillery | 9,000 | 1960 | Also in use as a regimental artillery gun in many active units. |
| RB-40-8 | File:RB 40 8.png | Heavy Multiple Rocket Launcher | 216 | 2007 | In active service at the Field Army level |
| RB-23-24 | ----- | Heavy Multiple Rocket Launcher | 648 | 1998 | In active service at the Corps level |
| RB-15-32 | ----- | Multiple Rocket Launcher | 800 | 2010 | Active service replacement for the RB-13-40 |
| RB-13-40 | ----- | Multiple Rocket Launcher | 2,600 | 1969 | In Class 2 units at the divisional level |
