COSTAL Accords: Difference between revisions
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==Background== | ==Background== | ||
===Inyurstan Ambitions=== | ===Inyurstan Ambitions=== | ||
As the major "schemer" behind the COSTAL Accords, Inyursta traced back its national mythos of "maritime territorialism" to its pre-independence days. Historically, pirates were seen as folk-heroes, robbing from foreign colonial elites exploiting the land and its people. During the [[ | As the major "schemer" behind the COSTAL Accords, Inyursta traced back its national mythos of "maritime territorialism" to its pre-independence days. Historically, pirates were seen as folk-heroes, robbing from foreign colonial elites exploiting the land and its people. During the [[Inyurstan Uprising of 1836]], Captain [[Jean-Claudio Moncarrét]] - a pirate himself - expressed the view "''for our new republic to continue to exist and prosper, we must make known to the empires of the world that our waters are not their playgrounds''". However, following the conclusion of the war of independence, the post-colonial government of "Grande Inyursta" would ignore the advice of its "navy" and the popular opinion of the coastal populaces. | ||
Grande Inyursta would later sign ISAAC's CLOS, though when the modern state of Inyursta would emerge from the [[Inyurstan Civil War]], they would decline to fill "Grande Inyursta's" ISAAC seat and make a dubious claim of 56km/30NM - but this was never seriously contested or enforced. Still, a number of scholars would postulate that uncontrolled and uncontested allowance of foreign ships through Inyurstan waters was a poor strategy on two accounts: 1) as it allows foreign competition a passive advantage over Inyursta, both at the national macroeconomic leve and firm or business microeconomic level 2) that failing to utilize advantageous geography constituted a lost opportunity cost (LOC). In this case, they would claim that Inyursta is thus paying an LOC for a disadvantageous position. Furthermore, not all levels of dependency on shipping-based imports and exports are not equal across all nations, and in such a situation both the LOC and the competitive advantage can be significantly higher. | Grande Inyursta would later sign ISAAC's CLOS, though when the modern state of Inyursta would emerge from the [[Inyurstan Civil War]], they would decline to fill "Grande Inyursta's" ISAAC seat and make a dubious claim of 56km/30NM - but this was never seriously contested or enforced. Still, a number of scholars would postulate that uncontrolled and uncontested allowance of foreign ships through Inyurstan waters was a poor strategy on two accounts: 1) as it allows foreign competition a passive advantage over Inyursta, both at the national macroeconomic leve and firm or business microeconomic level 2) that failing to utilize advantageous geography constituted a lost opportunity cost (LOC). In this case, they would claim that Inyursta is thus paying an LOC for a disadvantageous position. Furthermore, not all levels of dependency on shipping-based imports and exports are not equal across all nations, and in such a situation both the LOC and the competitive advantage can be significantly higher. | ||
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Inyurstan negotiators were able to secure the support of Nifon on 3 conditions: 1) any new treaty not allow for interruption of commercial trade through international waters, 2) Nifonese-flagged vessels would be allowed through all Inyurstan waters without significant or systemic hindrance, 3) Inyursta promised to export oil to Nifon on a fixed price cap, to safeguard against extreme fluctuations in the market. | Inyurstan negotiators were able to secure the support of Nifon on 3 conditions: 1) any new treaty not allow for interruption of commercial trade through international waters, 2) Nifonese-flagged vessels would be allowed through all Inyurstan waters without significant or systemic hindrance, 3) Inyursta promised to export oil to Nifon on a fixed price cap, to safeguard against extreme fluctuations in the market. | ||
===Courting Cuscatlan=== | |||
[[Gran Cuscatlan]], Inyursta's land-borne neighbor and pre-SACTO ally, was initially hesitant about Calderone's claim over the Straits of Juarez and reports that the Inyurstans were planning on charging neutral and unfriendly nations to pass through into the Sea of Jaurez - this threatening business for Cuscatlan which was already making money charging ships to pass through the Martinez Canal. In response, Inyursta agreed to the Martinez-Juarez Shipping Route, a profit-sharing agreement which ensured that ships already planning on entering the Martinez Canal would be charged once entering the Sea of Juarez or once entering the Martinez Canal from the west and then passed through the secondary destination without additional charge. The subsequent profits were then split between both governments, though Inyursta was willing to agree to a biased 60-40 split, due to Cuscatlani costs spent maintaining and operating the canal (and other "administrative fees" for well-connected officials in Cuscatlan). | |||
===Courting the Merick Isles=== | |||
Lastly, Inyursta approached its historic ally, the Merick Isles. The Merickis, like the other two, also saw potential flaws in Inyursta's proposition when applied to their nations. Despite their relationship, Inyursta had yet to openly declare both Raerno and the smaller Al-Tahal (also known as "Patrocium") as Mericki soil. Now, in order for the Merick Isles to sign off on anything regarding to territorial rights, the Inyurstans would have to publicly recognize the disputed islands as territory of the Merick Isles. Further, should Inyursta not recognize such beforehand, it could also have implications of where the marine border is drawn between the two states. | |||
Calderone pressured the Inyurstan [[Departémenté d'Estáte]] to formally recognize Raerno and Patrocium as Mericki territory. However, in true [[Inyurstan Customs#Mericki Bargaining|Mericki Bargaining]], they then pushed for a secondary alliance contract, calling for Inyurstan military support in the case of "any Qaeiromani occupation of Mericki territory". Though this was later whittled down to "any Qaeiromani invasion of currently held Mericki territory", the move drew domestic criticism. | |||
==Signing== | ==Signing== | ||
Latest revision as of 00:38, 22 January 2024
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 | |
| Abbreviation | COSTAL |
|---|---|
| Formation | July 2016 |
| Type | Accord |
| Legal status | 14 current signatory nations, recognized by several more |
| Headquarters | Castille de Térro; La Républiqua D'Inyursta |
Official language | |
The Convention for Stability, Armament and Liberation (COSTAL) is an accord dedicated to redefining maritime boundaries to better fit modern technological advances.
Background
Inyurstan Ambitions
As the major "schemer" behind the COSTAL Accords, Inyursta traced back its national mythos of "maritime territorialism" to its pre-independence days. Historically, pirates were seen as folk-heroes, robbing from foreign colonial elites exploiting the land and its people. During the Inyurstan Uprising of 1836, Captain Jean-Claudio Moncarrét - a pirate himself - expressed the view "for our new republic to continue to exist and prosper, we must make known to the empires of the world that our waters are not their playgrounds". However, following the conclusion of the war of independence, the post-colonial government of "Grande Inyursta" would ignore the advice of its "navy" and the popular opinion of the coastal populaces.
Grande Inyursta would later sign ISAAC's CLOS, though when the modern state of Inyursta would emerge from the Inyurstan Civil War, they would decline to fill "Grande Inyursta's" ISAAC seat and make a dubious claim of 56km/30NM - but this was never seriously contested or enforced. Still, a number of scholars would postulate that uncontrolled and uncontested allowance of foreign ships through Inyurstan waters was a poor strategy on two accounts: 1) as it allows foreign competition a passive advantage over Inyursta, both at the national macroeconomic leve and firm or business microeconomic level 2) that failing to utilize advantageous geography constituted a lost opportunity cost (LOC). In this case, they would claim that Inyursta is thus paying an LOC for a disadvantageous position. Furthermore, not all levels of dependency on shipping-based imports and exports are not equal across all nations, and in such a situation both the LOC and the competitive advantage can be significantly higher. Outspoken economic and "game theory" scholars would find a surprising new ally in the wake of the Lolloh-Ruol Wars - The Inyurstan military. The later had come realize the underestimated vulnerability of naval forces to land and air-based attacks; and had come to the conclusion that operations within 100km or so of a hostile coast is tantamount to suicide, ergo any such "freedom" of navigation operation would be a completely vulnerable, exposed and unable to carry out their mission.
The final catalyst would come in 2017, when terrorists with links to Bashriyyan dictator Muhammed Al-Nashid detonated a liquid natural gas (LNG) tanker in Porte des Larmes in Les Sonorailles - causing significant damage to the port's infrastructure and a high casualty toll. While the details of the attack are still debated and uncertain - including the real target - the attack caused significant fears, and added an additional security concern to the existing arguments in favor of Inyursta openly declaring and enforcing its claims.
In 2018, newly-elected Presidente Jean-Baptiste Calderone formally announced that Inyurstan territorial waters extended out to 74km from the shore, and that the Straits of Juarez were sovereign Inyurstan waters.
Courting Nifon
The 2017 Port des Larmes Attack also caused shock and concern in Nifon. Nifonese officials expressed support for means which allowed for more freedom to address foreign ships approaching its coastlines and vital ports. However, unlike Inyursta, Nifonese culture lacks the historical disregard for norms - in fact, quite the opposite, as Nifonese culture is extremely centered around publicly abiding by norms. Further adding to Nifonese hesitancy, is that unlike Inyursta, Nifonese geography makes it reliant on imports for optimum economic function. Where the former incurs an LOC by abiding by the status quo, the latter risks a significant LOC, in addition to fears of direct losses of imports and increased costs.
Inyurstan negotiators were able to secure the support of Nifon on 3 conditions: 1) any new treaty not allow for interruption of commercial trade through international waters, 2) Nifonese-flagged vessels would be allowed through all Inyurstan waters without significant or systemic hindrance, 3) Inyursta promised to export oil to Nifon on a fixed price cap, to safeguard against extreme fluctuations in the market.
Courting Cuscatlan
Gran Cuscatlan, Inyursta's land-borne neighbor and pre-SACTO ally, was initially hesitant about Calderone's claim over the Straits of Juarez and reports that the Inyurstans were planning on charging neutral and unfriendly nations to pass through into the Sea of Jaurez - this threatening business for Cuscatlan which was already making money charging ships to pass through the Martinez Canal. In response, Inyursta agreed to the Martinez-Juarez Shipping Route, a profit-sharing agreement which ensured that ships already planning on entering the Martinez Canal would be charged once entering the Sea of Juarez or once entering the Martinez Canal from the west and then passed through the secondary destination without additional charge. The subsequent profits were then split between both governments, though Inyursta was willing to agree to a biased 60-40 split, due to Cuscatlani costs spent maintaining and operating the canal (and other "administrative fees" for well-connected officials in Cuscatlan).
Courting the Merick Isles
Lastly, Inyursta approached its historic ally, the Merick Isles. The Merickis, like the other two, also saw potential flaws in Inyursta's proposition when applied to their nations. Despite their relationship, Inyursta had yet to openly declare both Raerno and the smaller Al-Tahal (also known as "Patrocium") as Mericki soil. Now, in order for the Merick Isles to sign off on anything regarding to territorial rights, the Inyurstans would have to publicly recognize the disputed islands as territory of the Merick Isles. Further, should Inyursta not recognize such beforehand, it could also have implications of where the marine border is drawn between the two states. Calderone pressured the Inyurstan Departémenté d'Estáte to formally recognize Raerno and Patrocium as Mericki territory. However, in true Mericki Bargaining, they then pushed for a secondary alliance contract, calling for Inyurstan military support in the case of "any Qaeiromani occupation of Mericki territory". Though this was later whittled down to "any Qaeiromani invasion of currently held Mericki territory", the move drew domestic criticism.
Signing
Text
Preamble
The Convention for Stability, Armament and Liberation, also known as COSTAL, seeks to define definitions, conditions and circumstances as well as recognize and solidify the mutually accepted rights of all signatory nations.
Section I: Maritime Boundaries
Section I of the COSTAL Accords hereby defines and recognizes the following definitions for the extent of a signatory nation's maritime boundaries:
Territorial Waters: Territorial waters are defined as coastal waters directly adjacent to any mass of land of the nation's homeland. Territorial waters include oceanic boundaries and shared open sea boundaries.
- In undisputed open ocean this treaty recognizes the right of members to claim up to three radar horizons (roughly 72-74km) off of the low water mark.
- In waters disputed between two nations this treaty recognizes the boundary for territorial waters as a direct bisection leaving two equal distances between either nation.
- In waters disputed between three or more nations this treaty makes no universal recognition, instead would/will declare recognition on a case-by-case basis.
Internal Waters: Internal Waters are defined as non-oceanic coastal, riverine and estuarine waters in which both sides form a contiguous coast between two bodies of a nation's homeland. Included are bays, harbors, coves, inland seas, lakes, gulfs, rivers, lagoons, ect.
- In island or archipelagic nations this is counted as space between nearby islands.
- In no instance is this to include external, territorial, colonial or otherwise non-homeland holdings.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): The Exclusive Economic Zone is defined as oceanic waters directly adjacent to a nation's coast. These waters are reserved for exclusive commercial use by said nation, but are otherwise considered international waters.
- In mainland nations this is extended out to the limit of the continental shelf or 370km (200 nautical miles) - whichever value is greater - in undisputed waters.
- In island or archipelagic nations without a continental shelf, this limit is recognized at 370km (200 nautical miles) in undisputed waters.
Section II: Rights of Signatory Nations
Signatory nations are garunteed the following rights in regards to waters under their control:
- The right to define and enforce laws over territorial waters, including the denial of foreign military vessels and the right to set designated routes of travel through these waters.
- The right to stop and search any vessel that enters territorial waters.
- The right to full and unquestioned and infinite sovereignty over internal waters as they would over land territory.
- The right to unquestioned self-defense of internal waters
- The right to exclusive commercial use of EEZ waters
- The right of unarmed and entirely civilian vessels to travel unharmed across all international waters
Section III: Trade and Economic Exchange
This convention promotes and encourages maritime trade between signatory nations, however makes no garuntee or enforcement of these ideals.
This convention also recognizes foreign trade and passage for economic reasons to be a privilege and not a right, and affirms the right of signatory nations to deny and deter unwanted foreign vessels from their waters.
