Bashurat Crisis

Bashurat Crisis
(clockwise from top) Troops from Zalim Kumar's army during the retreat from Narlajabad Satrian troops serving in the Corpo di Soldati Ausiliario Satriani in transit to the border with Ajahadya Rebel horsemen resting their mounts on the west bank of the Bashurat River Artillery of the Corpo di Soldati Ausiliario Satriani during the Siege of Satagarh Horsemen in the vanguard of Divam Hathiwala's army Troops from Ajahadyan Army shortly before the Battle of Barwani
Date July 5th 1909 - September 22nd 1909 (3 months, 2 weeks and 3 days) Location Ajahadya Result Status Quo ante Bellum Suppression of revolt Preservation of Etrurian commercial interests Expansion of extranationality to Gaullicans Extention of Etrurian commercial privileges to include Gaullicans Alignment of Ajahadya with Gaullica Growth of Pan-Satrianism and anti-colonial movements in Satria
Belligerents
Rajadom of Ajahadya Supported by Etruria Gaullica	Ajahadyan Mutineers and Peasants
Commanders and leaders
Raja Shahu II Hardas Guram  † Zalim Kumar Divam Hathiwala Srijan Chadda Giuliano Agosotini Guerrino Maro André Chevotet	Sher Wasir Pazzaq Khan Nakula Tipanis
Strength
~200,000 38,000 2,000	~100,000 at peak
Casualties and losses
~44,000 309	33,000 killed 29,000 captured

The Bashurat Crisis, sometimes referred to as the Satrian Crisis or in Satria the Parvat Uprising was an international crisis in the Rajadom of Ajahadya in 1909 over Etrurian commercial interests and nationals in the Bashurat Valley being threatened by an uprising by native workers and soldiers and the inability of the Raja of Ajahyadya, Shahu II, to protect Etrurian nationals and commercial interests. This resulted in the governor of Satria Etruriana, Salvo Lazzari, ordering Etrurian troops supported by contingents contributed by native Thakurs under Etrurian protectorate into Ajahadya to restore order.

Shahu II appealed to the Gaullican governor of Ansan for assistance, fearing that the Etrurians intended to depose him and either incorporate Ajahadya into the Etrurian Empire or restore his exiled brother, Kaval I to the throne, promising numerous concessions to Gaullica in the form of reductions in tariffs, granting of extraterritoriality and the transfer of royal lands to Gaullican companies in exchange for their support.

The two armies raced either bank of the Bashurat River while Shahu II prepared a defence of the capital, Banabadura. Scouting parties briefly clashed at the Bashurat State Railway Bridge, mistaking the other for elements of the Satrian rebels which threatened to escalate into a colonial conflict over the Bashurat river valley. Diplomats from both countries met and negotiated a compromise without the involvement of the Raja, where the Gaullicans agreed to shadow the Etrurian army while it put down the rebellion before returning to Satria Etruriana while also agreeing to pressuring the Raja to pay reparations to Etrurian companies for their losses.

The crisis ended with the Etrurian army decisively defeating the uprising and returning to Satria Etruriana, but firmly pushed Shahu II into the Gaullican sphere of influence and also showed his lack of firm control over Ajahadya. Although the revolt itself was defeated, many who had fought for it escaped into the mountains and jungles or be sheltered by locals and later formed the core of the Green Pardals after the Saahl Gold Fields Revolt in 1911. Many prominent figures in Satrian history were involved in some way with the Crisis; Mohan Balchandra, Sirjan Chadda and Jalender Sarai both fought with the Raja's army against the uprising, while Arjuna Kalsarah fought with the uprising.

Background

Following Etrurian conquest of the Alsamid Heavenly Dominion and the establishment of protectorates over many Thakurates during the early and mid-1800s, governing the former territory of the Heavenly Dominion under Satria Etruriana. The unexpected arrival and swift demise of the Alsamid Heavenly Dominion led to the Raja of Ajahadya at the time, Shahu I, making concessions of extraterritoriality and reductions of tariffs and allowing Etrurian companies preferential treatment in Ajahadya in exchange for recognition of his rule over Ajahadya in the Treaty of Vadavarja signed in 1864, aligning Ajahadya with Etruria which then was the only Euclean power in the region.

Shahu II, Raja of Ajahadya.

The arrival of Gaullica in the region through the annexation of the Ansan Empire in 18xx and Estmere through its own colony in northern Satria caused a shift in the power between Etruria and Ajahadya, with more potential benefactors in the region. Ajahadya became a battleground for influence between Etruria, Estmere and Gaullica, playing the three Euclean powers off against one another to secure Ajahadya's continued independence. This included sending one of Raja Kulachandra I's two sons to each of Etruria and Gaullica for a Euclean university education. Kulachandra I successfully preserved Ajahadyan independence, holding the potential to defect to Gaullica to prevent too much Etrurian interference in the affairs of Ajahadya and the loss of its preferential status, while also modernising the country's military and economy through Etrurian investments into the country.

Upon Kulachandra I's death in 1905, his eldest son, the Etrurian-educated Kaval I ascended to the throne of Ajahadya. His younger brother, Shahu II, led a palace coup the following year with the support of the nobility, having promised to restore their positions of prominence which were removed under Kulachandra I. Kaval I fled to Etruria, asking the Etrurian government under Alfredo Di Rienzo to restore him to his rightful throne. Shahu II likewise appealed to the Gaullicans for protection from an Etrurian invasion while simultaneously promising that despite his pro-Gaullican stance that he would uphold all the terms of the Treaty of Vadavarja. Not wanting to invade Ajahadya with a promise from the new Raja to uphold the Treaty, Etruria agreed that Shahu II could remain Raja while Kaval I was allowed residence in Etruria, where he would remain as a replacement if Shahu II needed replacing with a more pro-Etrurian ruler.

Many within Ajahadya were dissatisfied at the coup's result from Shahu II's accession to Etrurian demands, having backed him against the pro-Etruria Kaval I in the hopse of seizing Etrurian-owned properties and a purge of many of Kaval I's advisors in the following years created a feeling of discontent among military officers and nobles outside of those who had backed Shahu II's coup.

Events

Initial Events (July 5th - July 13th)

The initial center of the revolt was a cotton plantation 60 miles south-east of Parvat, near the village of Kalaghar in northern Ajahadya. The plantation was almost entirely staffed by native Ajahadyans, either as agricultural labourers or managers. Contact with the Etrurian company that owned the plantation, Cristoforo, being through their office in nearby Parvat which served as the center of the company's operations on several cotton plantations in northern Ajahadya. The strike began on July 5th, 1909, after the plantation's manager, Partap Jawanda, informed the workforce of 200 labourers that their wages were being reduced by a quarter. This reduction in wages resulted in a near-riot that Partap brought under control after elaborating that he and all other native Ajahadyan staff, including himself, had likewise had their wages cut, while Etrurian staff working in Satria did not.

Partap Jawanda declared that they would occupy the plantation until their wages were restored, sending their demands back to Parvat by telegram later the same day from the telegram station at Naiki. No reply was sent, and instead a group of three Etrurians and one translator, led by Erico Montalbo was sent to negotiate with the strikers on the 6th to prevent damage to the plantation and its crops of rubber. The delegation stated that the strikers were to return to work by the 11th and that elements of the nearby 63rd Regiment would be dispatched to retake the plantation from the strikers if they failed to do so. A debate was held among the labourers on the 11th on what course of action to take; some suggested that they burn down the plantation and fleeing into the surrounding villages with their families, others suggested that they arm themselves as best as they could to fight off the 63rd. Fearing that if they fled, reprisals would be made against the surrounding villages, the strikers took the Etrurians hostage spent the next few days preparing barricades around the plantation while Partap made the choice to negotiate with the battalion dispatched.

The unit dispatched, the 2nd Battalion of the 63rd Regiment, arrived at Kalaghar on the 11th, and were met by Partap and the Etrurian's translator. The battalion's commander, Maj. Ayush Nayar, was informed of the Etrurian hostages, and returned to Kalaghar where the 2nd Battalion had encamped to inform his superiors of the situation with the hostages.

On the 12th, Nayar received orders by telegram that the 2nd Battalion was to obtain the release of the hostages and secure the plantation by storming it with the strikers to be killed. Nayar read the orders to his subordinates on the morning of the 12th who did not voice protest initially, but upon informing the men of the 2nd Battalion, they refused to take up arms against the unarmed civilians. Nayar requested that the hostages be released on the 12th and asked the strikers to disperse, attempting to fulfil his orders peacefully. The strikers again refused to disperse or release the hostages.

On the 13th, Nayar informed his superiors by telegram that the men of the 2nd were on the verge of mutiny, would not attack the plantation and that the situation could not be resolved peacefully. Later that same day Nayar was informed that anyone who refused to attack the plantation on the 14th would be considered to be in revolt. Nayar informed his men of this on the night of the 13th, and the 2nd Battalion again refused to attack the plantation on the 14th. Unable to fulfil his orders, Nayar informed his commanders that he and the 2nd Battalion were in mutiny by telegram on the night of the 13th.  

The Revolt Spreads (July 14th to August 6th)

Nayar's men dispersed into the countryside on the 14th and 15th, fearing the inevitable reprisal against them from the other battalions of the 63rd and other regiments barracked at Parvat. Nayar advised the strikers at the plantation to do the same, and they abandoned the plantation after burning the cotton crop and executing the Etrurian hostages. The soldiers and strikers moved between villages, many of which had been similarly affected by Etrurian agricultural companies exploiting their monopolies on land to cut wages to labourers. By the 20th, several plantations had been burned to the ground with their labourers joining the uprising or returning to their villages.

By the 18th, the Thakur of Zubad, Hardas Guram, had realised that this risked turning into a region-wide uprising against both his own rule and that of Shahu II and ordered the other three battalions of the 63rd, along with the a cavalry regiment, elements of four infantry regiments, the 63rd, 71st, 82nd and the 91st, the 37th Lancer Regiment and a new regiment formed from the cadets of the Parvat Officer Academy and members of Parvat's civilian police, the 132nd. Although elieving this to be a sufficient force to pacify the countryside against what was, at the time a poorly-armed peasant revolt, Guram chose to await the arrival of the other two battalions of the 82nd and the 91st from their patrols along the border with Etrurian Satria against bandits to have a far superior force.

By the time the rest of the 82nd arrived on the 21st, however, the situation had drastically worsened for Guram. Several regiments of Togoti cavalry stationed along the eastern border, the 14th, 15th and 29th, had openly refused orders to move west to suppress the uprising and the 6th Light Infantry Regiment had openly mutinied and taken the city of Svaragni. Further worsening the situation, the 83rd, 89th and 90th Infantry Regiments along with an artillery battery that had been garrisoned in Narlajabad had taken control of the town under the leadership of the retired Major General Sher Wasir, who had been discharged shortly after the removal of Kaval I, around 80 miles south of Kalaghar declaring their intent to depose Shahu II.

The 76th Regiment during the Siege of Parvat.

Splitting his forces on the 22nd, Guram left the untested and unreliable 132nd to defend Parvat while his army of around ~8,000 men marched against Wasir's ~6,000. After being harassed on the way by peasant guerillas and many soldiers deserting, Guram's army arrived at Narlajabad on the 24th. Choosing to rest his men at the village of Barwani to attack the following day, Guram's army was surprised by a night attack by Wasir's forces in the Battle of Barwani, taking heavy losses from Wasir's artillery and forcing them to withdraw back towards Parvat in disorder, more men deserting on the way.

Guram's army arrived back at Parvat on the 26th, where he was reinforced by the remains of the 76th Regiment which had retreated from further north as the rebellious Togoti moved southwards towards Parvat, fighting them in a series of running battles until they arrived at the city. Hardas, rather than marching out to meet the Togoti in battle where their superior cavalry gave them an advantage in mobility, instead prepared to defend the city until reinforcements arrive.

The mutinous Togoti, numbering around ~8,000, united under the leadership of Pazzaq Khan, arrived at Parvat on the 27th, camping nearby while Sher Wazir's army of ~4,000 marched through the night to arrive on the morning of the 28th, encircling the city and starting the Siege of Parvat. Guram mustered his force of around ~7,000, leaving the untested but rested 132nd and the exhausted 76th, numbering roughly half of his forces, to defend the northern side of the city while the rest of his force attempted to break out of the city.

Once again, Guram's attack was thrown back by Wazir's artillery with heavy losses. Guram consolidated his forces, preparing for a final defence of the city's formidable fortifications while awaiting reinforcements from Shahu II. The news of the siege of Parvat, however, sparked further uprisings throughout both Zubad and Togotistan, resulting in the storming of armouries by peasants while bandit groups raided across the countryside. On the 5th, after several days of skirmishing, nightly raids and artillery bombardments of the city's defences, the 132nd and the city's population, pushed to the breaking point, stormed the Thakur's sanga-durga and murdered him while other parts of the regiment opened the city's gates and surrendered it to the rebels on the morning of the 6th.

Deepening Crisis and Foreign Intervention (August 6th to August 20th)

The fall of Parvat sent shockwaves throughout Ajahadya and Satria. What Shahu II had called a 'local revolt' that would be dealt with by the Thakur of Zubad had not only defeated the Thakur's army twice, but also took the regional capital of Parvat itself. Many regiments of the Ajahadyan Army in Zubad mutinied, marching towards Parvat, joined by armed peasant militias. The army of Wazir entered Parvat on the morning of the 6th, taking control of the city as the locals feared what would happen if the Togoti were allowed entry.

Although there was some looting, Wazir's diary records that he was able to largely keep his men under control, save for around Etrurian-owned properties which were frequently burned by mobs led by soldiers, their owners or inhabitants usually being shot and strung up in the streets by rural labourers from the Etrurian plantations or local craftsmen that had been forced out of business by Etrurian companies that harboured the most resentment towards them.

Shahu II's attempts to form an army to defeat the uprising were effectively paralyzed by the situation, as Wazir's revolt made it unclear what regiments of the Ajahadyan army were trustworthy enough to be called upon to form an army to put down the revolt. Many Zubadi regiments were ordered to be confined to their barracks by other regiments as Shahu II feared that they would mutiny following the fall of Parvat. In some cases this was counter-productive and incited regiments into revolt, such as that of the 46th Regiment which was barracked near the city of Phata. Assuming that the company of the 42nd Regiment sent to order them into confinement on the 7th was doing so as part of a wider anti-Shahu II plot, a firefight erupted outside the barracks which developed into the chaotic Battle of Phata as various regiments barracked nearby fought one another.

In the chaos there were actual attempts by anti-Shahu II figures to capitalise on the situation; the 94th and 95th Infantry Regiments, both under the command of Thakur of Prasumistan and Brig. Gen. Nakula Tipanis, attempted to seize the city of Vadavarja in a coup on the 8th by confining other regiments to their barracks on the same pretence and declaring Prasumistan independent, but loyal regiments were able to successfully rally under the command of Gen. Srijan Chadda and were forced out into the countryside. Similar occurrences and errors in miscommunication erupted across Ajahadya as the loyalties of regiments and commanders remained unclear. Shahu II, in response to the events on the previous days, on the 9th had the regiments of his personal guard begin to entrench around Banabadura and confine other regiments in the city to their barracks to prevent a potential coup in the city.

As the revolt spread, Wazir's forces marched southwards on the 11th after resting and resupplying in Parvat, having grown to ~20,000 men from peasants, deserters, the remains of the Thakur's army and opportunistic bandit groups joining their ranks, arriving at Narlajabad on the 13th while the Togoti moved north on the 9th to cross the headwaters of the Bashurat River on the 10th before moving southwards along its western bank, pillaging and burning as they moved through Zubad. It is unclear why the two main forces split up, as Wazir's diary, the main source for the revolt, does not explain why, but the current leading theory holds that the Togoti did not with to slow themselves down with Wazir's slow-moving artillery and infantry.

Wazir's army was met at Narlajabad on the 13th by an opposing force of the elite Etrurian-trained and equipped 101st and 102nd Grenadier Regiments, supported by the 6th Artillery Regiment under Gen. Zalim Kumar which occupied the town. Kumar, a rival of Wazir's, had been a staunch supporter of Shahu II and had mustered what forces he could to meet Wazir on the main route southwards which ran through Narlajabad. The resulting Battle of Narlajabad lasted for a week as Wazir 's forces, although outnumbering Kumar's forces, faced a dug-in, well-trained, well-led and determined opponent in contrast to the ad hoc, ill-equipped and largely untested Thakur of Zubad's army they had faced earlier.

Although Kumar's forces retreated from Narlajabad on the 20th following the arrival of lead elements of the 8th Lancer Regiment to the east of the town due to lack of certainty about the loyalty of the new arrivals, the situation had been growing untenable and Kumar wrote in his diary that he intended to withdraw in good order from Narlajabad on the 20th regardless.

Pazzaq Khan's Togoti raided down the eastern bank of the Bashurat river, encountering little resistance save for at the city of Tripur, where several regiments of the Ajahadyan army that had been barracked there or moved there from frontier garrisons earlier on on the orders of Shahu II defeated them in the Battle of Tripur on the 16th, largely ending the strength of the Togoti as a conventional force, but they remained highly mobile and dangerous in open countryside as they continued to raid further south.

Etrurian colonial troops from the Corps of Satrian Auxiliary Soldiers.

After the defeat at Parvat, the governor of Satria Etruriana, Salvo Lazzari, spent the next week in communication with the government in Poveglia as the situation worsened and the status of the Etrurians living in Parvat and Etrurian-owned properties, land and industry in the area remained unclear. Although initial correspondence shows that Lazzari believed that Shahu II would be capable of suppressing the revolt without Etrurian intervention and that it was a purely localised affair, the series of revolts in the following days and the reports from the Etrurian Ambassador in Vadavarja, Fabio Cusenza on Shahu II's own uncertainty and fear about the loyalty of his army likely caused Lazzari to send a formal request for permission to assemble a force to intervene in Ajahadya on the 12th.

The request was approved on the 14th, and the Corpo di Spedizione Satriani was formed on the 15th under the command of Gen. Giuliano Agosotini out of units from a core of regular units from the Reppublicana Esercito on overseas duties, but the vast majority of the force was formed from Satrian soldiers in the Corpo di Soldati Ausiliario Satriani and contributions from allied Thakurs in the region of Satria Libera. The force gradually assembled over the next five days, being transported to the border with Ajahadya by rail. Numbering some 38,000 men, the CSS crossed the border on the 20th with the objective being to 'restore order to Ajahadya and preserve Etrurian interests.'

Standoff and Negotiation (August 21st to September 2nd)

The CSS swiftly moved into Ajahadya, occupying the city of Vadavarja on the 21st and beginning its march up the west bank of the Bashurat river towards Parvat. Etrurian intervention caught Shahu II and his advisors completely off-guard, believing that the Etrurians would have contacted him first if they were to intervene, so the intervention in Shahu II's increasingly paranoid mind seemed to be using the revolt in the north as a pretext to invade Ajahadya to restore his deposed brother, Kaval I, to the throne of Ajahadya.

On the 22nd, Shahu II ordered the regiments previously mustered to the capital to form an army to crush the uprising released from their confinement to barracks in order to have a larger force to face the CSS when it reached Banabadura while simultaneously requesting support from the Gaullican governor of Sangté, Edouard Barreau, in exchange for concessions after the Etrurians had left Ajahadya and the revolt was defeated. Although only able to send a single brigade of ~2,000 men under Brig. Gen. André Chevotet, this force marched north into Ajahadya on the 22nd, attempting to race the CSS to Banabadura.

Wazir's army continued its march southwards, harassed by the 8th Lancers which had remained loyal to Shahu II and had intended to join Kumar's small force at Narlajabad while the rest of Kumar's army retreated, collecting more regiments as they withdrew southwards towards Banabadura. The CSS, which had originally planned to reach Banabadura, within a week, was instead slowed down after encountering the remnants of the Togoti forces of Pazzaq Khan raiding along the western bank of the Bashurat on the 23rd which constantly harrassed the advancing Etrurians, slowing them considerably.

The Bashurat State Railway Bridge in the present day.

The Gaullican force, not slowed down as the south-east had remained relatively quiet, encountered the much larger army of the Thakur of Himavanta, Divam Hathiwala, at the city of Phata on the 23rd. Hathiwala and had spent August mustering most of the regiments stationed in Himavanta, including the remains of those involved in the Battle of Phata, into a singular army of unclear loyalty, the other regiments being confined to their barracks or destroyed when they refused to comply with his orders. A tense standoff ensured as Hathiwala and Chevotet communicated with translators, eventually reaching an understanding that Hathiwala had been intending to join the army of Shahu II at Banabadura, but had been awaiting orders to do so. Joining their forces, the combined army continued to march north.

The two armies would collide two days later, on the 25th, at the Bashurat State Railway Bridge around 115 miles south of Banabadura. The bridge had been secured by two companies of the 39th Horse Regiment, one at either end of the bridge, awaiting the arrival of the rest of the army, when lead elements of the CSS' vanguard arrived. Assuming the force to be part of the revolt, the vanguard opened fire, seizing the bridge's west end but being unable to push down the bridge itself as a cavalry duel erupted across it. Both forces sent riders back to the main bodies to report the engagement. Upon hearing the news, the combined force under Hathiwala and Chevotet force-marched to the bridge, aware that this was likely the vanguard for the main Etrurian force, while Giuliano Agosotini chose to split his force, taking the majority of the slower-moving infantry up towards the bridge while leaving the cavalry and some infantry under Lt. Gen. Guerrino Maro to attempt to corner the remaining forces of Pazzaq Khan.

Etrurian artillery at the Battle of Bikanir.

On the 26th, as light revealed the arrival of a large Ajahadyan army on the opposite side of the bridge, the cavalry elements that had taken the western side of the bridge dismounted and entrenched themselves to await the arrival of reinforcements before the army attempted to force a crossing. Chevotet, not wanting to cause a diplomatic incident between Gaullica and Etruria, advised Hathiwala not to attack, saying that they didn't know why the Etrurians were there, even if Shahu II was convinced they intended to dethrone him. The rest of the Etrurian army arrived on the afternoon of the 26th, and Hathiwala and Chevotet sent three soldiers out under a flag of truce, offering to negotiate with the Etrurian commander. One of these soldiers was a Gaullican, informing Agosotini of the presence of the Gaullican contingent.

The presence of the Gaullican contingent, although small, effectively paralyzed the Etrurians; Agosotini was unwilling to advance further north while leaving such a large force on his line of retreat, while the river left the possibility of fighting an open battle impossible, as did the presence of the Gaullicans over fear of causing an international incident. Instead, Agosotini dispatched a telegram back to Poveglia to inform them of the situation on the 26th.

On the 28th, after several days of pursuit and hit-and-run cavalry engagements, Maro was able to successfully outmanoeuvre Pazzaq Khan, destroying the majority of the remaining Togoti force in the Battle of Bikanir with the remainder scattering into the countryside. Maro continued his march northwards, intending to take Parvat. The army of Kumar arrived at the Bashurat State Railway Bridge on the 29th, having fought a fighting withdrawal to slow down Wazir's force for the previous week, joining the larger force. Wazir's army, now aware of the presence of the two large armies further south, and of Shahu II's defences around Bashurat, stopped his southwards march towards Banabadura on the 28th and turned to head back to Narlajabad, intending to set up defensive positions there.

Both armies remained in a stand-off until the arrival of a company of 300 Gaulican cavalry a week later on September 2nd, informing them of the results of the negotiations between the Etrurian and Gaullican governments, and the agreement reached. The Etrurians agreed to respect Shahu II as the legitimate Raja of Ajahadya, and assured the Gaullican government that they were there to restore order in the rebellious areas of Ajahadya and to protect Etrurian interests there, and agreed that they would leave once the revolt had been put down, and that a garrison of 2,000 Etrurians would be allowed to be stationed in Parvat to prevent this happening again. Shahu II, excluded from negotiations, was to be forced to agree to their terms if he refused them, but both governments agreed that he had no reason or ability to refuse. Both armies were ordered by their respective governments to march northwards to put down the revolt.

Defeat and Dispersal (September 3rd to September 22nd)

Agosotini's army crossed the river on September 3rd, declining the offer of aid from Kumar and Hathiwala while the Gaullican contingent returned back to Sangté, having completed their mission and avoided an international crisis. Against a modern, professional, organised force under competent and reliable commanders, the rebels stood little chance. After a long, tiring march, Wazir's forces arrived back at Narlajabad on September 9th, large numbers of soldiers having deserted during his retreat, demoralised by the rumours of a large Etrurian army in the field and the withdrawal. Choosing to spare the town another battle, Wazir instead entrenched at the sanga-durga known as Satagarh nearby. Positioned up against the north bank of the Saahl River, Satagarh was, at least on paper, a formidable defensive position. Agosotini's army arrived on September 14th, and rather than attempting to assault Wazir's position, instead chose to besiege Wazir, shelling the ancient fortification for just over a week in the Siege of Satagarh. Realising their position was hopeless, Wazir's soldiers mutinied, capturing the old general and surrendered the fortress on September 19th to the Etrurian army.

Guerrino Maro, who had marched north effectively unopposed bar for some scattered opposition from bandit groups, arrived at Parvat on September 20th, with the city's civilian population opening the gates to let the Etrurians into the city as the garrison had fled, signalling the end of the revolt. Wazir was executed by the Etrurians on September 22nd, while his army was disarmed. Unsure of what to do with their prisoners, most of them armed civilians rather than professional soldiers, the Etrurians released them to return to their homes after disarming them.

Aftermath and Legacy

The Bashurat Crisis has received little interest in Euclean academic circles, usually being listed as another example of a colonial crisis in the lead-up to the Great War, but its impacts on Satria among Satrian scholars have been widely analysed. The Etrurian intervention forced Shahu II firmly into the Gaullican sphere of influence from his previously neutral stance, breaking the previous balancing act or pro-Etrurian stances taken by his predecessors and making Ajahadya's entry into the Great War on the side of the Entente 'almost inevitable' in the view of some scholars. The imposition of terms on the Raja by Etruria and Gaullica damaged the Raja's prestige internally, making it clear to the Ajahadyan nobility and military that he ruled not through his own power, but only as long as Euclean colonial powers saw fit to support him as a proxy for their own interests.

The crisis showed the unreliability of the Ajahadyan military, as well as its widely-varying levels of troop and officer quality, ranging from the dismal performance under the forces of the Thakur of Zubad, to the 'exemplary performance for a non-Euclean army' of the 100th and 101st Grenadiers under Gen. Zalim Kumar as described by one Gaullican military attache on reading Kumar's after-action reports on the two regiments. This unreliability would manifest again at the end of the Great War with the removal of the Raja from power over the terms of the Peace of Vadavarja and the resulting Ajahadyan Civil War, where the Ajahadyan military split across ideological lines and personal loyalties, as was seen during the Crisis with Wazir's revolt.

The numerous smaller, unreported mutinies, desertions and revolts that occurred through Ajahadya during this period would provide a fertile recruitment base for the International Revolutionary Army, more popularly known as the Green Pardals. Some scholars have drawn a direct link between the Saahl Gold Fields Revolt of 1911 and the events early on in the Parvat Revolt, describing it as a 'blueprint for the Green Pardals to follow after the Saahl Gold Fields Revolt'. Some Satrian scholars have called it the 'Proto-Solarian War', citing the anti-Etrurian nature that the struggle took on in its later stages.

Many crucial figures in later Ajahadyan history participated in the revolt. Arjuna Kalsarah was a bandit cavalryman who joined the army of Gen. Wazir during its southwards march, only to desert during its withdrawal northwards. Mohan Balchandra was an officer cadet at the time, but was pressed into active service with the 61st Pioneers Regiment during Shahu II's fortification of Banabadura. Jalender Sarai was a lieutenant in the 2nd Raja's Rifles and was part of a company sent to confine the 66th Zubad Regiment to their barracks without incident where they remained for the duration of the crisis.

The actions and loyalty demonstrated by Divam Hathiwala, Zalim Kumar and Srijan Chadda during the crisis made them favourites of Shahu II's, and all would go on to have leading roles in the Ajahadyan Army during the Great War and for Kumar and Chadda the Solarian War, while the reductions in the powers of the nobility that followed contributed to the attempts by Thakurs to break away in the civil war.

The fates of Partap Jawanda and Ayush Nayar remain unknown.