Parliamentary franchise in Themiclesia
The parliamentary franchise of Themiclesia is the extent and manner in which Themiclesian citizens may participate in democratic politics by selecting representatives to the House of Commons, the lower chamber of the country's bicameral parliament. The upper chamber, the House of Lords, is an unelected body.
Pre-modern
The deepest roots of the parliamentary franchise may be traced to institutions introduced under King Kl′ang of Tsjinh in 330. Seeking to balance heredity and meritocracy, he ordered the aristocracy houses in each county to assemble and rank candidates according to reputation, which became the ceiling of their bureaucratic career. While this process implicitly acknowledged aristocractic influence, it was very distant from classical democratic systems. The assemblies deliberated but did not cast actual ballots, and those that were rated neither met as a legislative body not acquired influence on account of their election. Instead, it permitted clans to strengthen their faction in the bureaucracy.
To facilitate such assemblies, a formal list of aristocratic houses in each prefecture was drawn up by the royal court, totalling 185 across the realm in 395. It is unclear how common houses could join the list, though public service across multiple generations seemed requisite to build up the "reputation" that aristocratic houses claimed. This institution proved resilient and withstood the revolution of royal dynasties, concretely conceived by its participants as a key entitlement. In 532, when King Ngjon of Rjang wished to appoint unelected ministers, his court successfully opposed it as a contravention of the "great law of the state" (邦憲).[1]
While colonialism in Columbia became economically significant to Themiclesia from the 1500s, the colonies had little direct influence in the royal court. The first colonists were labour camp inmates promised free land for military service, and as such few of them developed aptitude for public service, much less satisfying the multi-generation requirement before enfranchisation. The few families that did become the Camian gentry later on were mostly branches of existing Themiclesian aristocrats and were, thus, not normally considered eligible for separate enfranchisement, though their position relative to local magistrates were comparable to their metropolitan relations. In 1680, 48 aristocratic houses existed in Camia, ordered to assemble for civic elections between 1603 and 1698. The situation in Solevent is less clear, though some 20 to 30 houses there were too deemed aristocratic, yet they were never ordered to assemble.
Save for periods of political reform, the number of aristocratic houses holding the franchise remained stable. In the early 6th century, King Ngjon of Rjang encouraged houses located in the palatine states to move to his dominion, resulting in a considerable expansion to the franchise, reaching 389 by the end of his reign. When Emperor Ngjon succeeded the Rjang state in 543, his courtiers sought to establish themselves locally and began to participate in the system as well. The native houses were called "state houses" (邦氏, prong-gjê′), and those following Ngjon "migrant houses" (喬氏, kjaw-gjê′). In the late 6th century, the two amounting to about 500 houses altogether. In the middle of the Mrangh dynasty, the demesne and palatine began to merge, resulting in the addition of another 200 to 300 houses active in politics centred in Kien-k'ang. This figure again became stable through the Mrangh and then the Dzi dynasty.
There have been various discussions of clan politics under the imperial order, which grew murkier in its manifestations as the throne gained power. The final Mrangh emperor attempted to abolish civic elections and institute his hand-picked candidates, part of an ambitious package of reforms. However, he and his house were soon deposed by houses threatened by his reforms. As the new ruling clan, Dong′, was itself one of the conspirators, its power was hinged on protecting the political access centrally and financial security rurally of the other houses.
1700s
Though some Camians thinkers took civic elections as a political franchise in Casaterran terms, this thinking had little impact in Themiclesia. The 1600s and early 1700s was a period of centralization, with the crown gaining against the bureaucracy and aristocrats that controlled it. Nevertheless, the aristocracy felt little compunction to elect those opposing the crown and critical of the emperor for disregarding the views of the aristocracy, which was framed as an aberrance from the "harmony and normalcy" of former centuries. This reference to the past was a recurrent motif in Themiclesian politics, compelling monarchs exepriencing failures to reconcile his relationship with the aristocracy.
Despite such monitions, Themiclesia was in the largest part still a centralized, undemocratic state, and scattered aristocratic displeasure formed only an ineffective opposition to Emperor 'Ei and his disastrous and expensive wars. A closer reading of the history of the period reveals that the emperors acquired clout by aligning himself with the bureaucracy and nurturing his own faction within it, while still (perhaps reluctantly) respecting the rules of civic elections and the underlying reality that, without their assistance, much bureaucratic experience would simply be inaccessible.
In 1798, the aristocracy's anger manifested as a mass petition, signed by several hundred of prominent individuals, to dismiss the prime minister, the Lord of Nap, who had an interest in textile exports to the Subcontinent and was therefore endeared to the throne's desire to rebuild the navy and re-subjugate Camia and Solevent. While the crown relented, Gar-lang's faction persuaded pro-crown peers to decline the premiership, which was saddled with the task of raising an army, rebuilding a navy, and fielding them while the treasury was bankrupt. With no prime minister for over a year, the emperor was left with no option but Gar-lang himself,[2] who was a vocal proponent of disarmament. In office, Gar-lang opposed the Emperor's plans and instead dismantled Themiclesia's armed forces, while the beleagured emperor began sending letters to court his former supporters.
In previous centuries, the Emperor always chose highly-regarded men amongst recently-elects to fill the secretariat, which drafted royal edicts and letters; this was a device by which the emperor disguised his opinions as those of men elected by the aristocracy itself. Given latitude in royal appointment, the secretariat served to centralize power in some periods, while retaining the aristocracy's nominal approval, as they had elected the secretaries themselves. To counter the Emperor's epistolic manoeuvres, Gar-lang first promoted pro-crown royal secretaries to distant regions and urged his supporters to select anti-royalist candidates, who packed the secretariat. Without a secretary to draft his letters, the crown was unable to pretend support from the aristocracy. Thus, by 1801, the crown was, for the first time in history, able to control neither his secretariat nor the permiership.
Early 19th century
1801 – 1814
The 1801 civic election is often considered the first election in the political transition from monarchy to democracy. Internally, it was the first time something resembling a political party was active in Themiclesia, advertising for anti-crown candidates in many places and convicing the electorate that they held the key to establishing an anti-war government. Combined with peerage support, the party overcame royal power and reformed an existing institution for its goals, and became the dominant political body; it evolved into the Conservative Party that remains active today. Externally, it came during a period when Casaterran Enlightenment had permeated Camia and was gaining currency in Themiclesia. The success of a constitutional monarchy in Camia was, according to some authorities, indispensible in convincing Themiclesian electors to stand against royal power when used against them.
Despite a revolutionary context, the terms of the 1801 elections were the same as virtually all those that came before it. On Jun. 28, the aristocracy of each prefecture assembled in the prefectural capital and reviewed a list of male candidates who came from aristocratic backgrounds. Each aristocratic house, as a single unit, gave its ratings, from a highest of two to lowest of nine, of each candidate; each elector may only award one "two" in the entire list of candidates. The candidate who received most "two" ratings was given the Second Class ranking from that prefecture and presented to the royal court on Nov. 10, 1801 as a candidate for the royal secretariat.
7,956 houses participated out of a total of 7,989, providing a turnout of 99.58%; the prefecture with fewest electors had 25, while the one with the most, the Inner Region, had 582. Around 184 ballots were attributable to a female householder. Accounting for the number of administrative households, noble and common, the franchise was possessed by 0.43% of them. While each household made its decisions autonomously, many fell into one of two models: a patriarch making decisions alone, or a patriarch and matriarch making decisions together. The latter model was more common amongst the greater aristocracy, which married amongst itself and had more influential wifes. d While bodies of opinion have long existed during civic elections, they have generally been ephemeral, fading away once the election was over, whatever its results. The emergence of a party political in 1801 meant that the candidates were discouraged by the threat of disqualification from defecting to the throne. Furthermore, this party's influence also extended to the Council of Peers, which was another institution that checked royal power.
In 1809, the Limited Elections Act provided that the electorate of each prefecture judged the admission of new electors. Gar-lang believed this would create a conservative electorate unlikely to deviate from its current inclinations. Additionally, since the old rules stipulated that a family gained the franchise when it was in higher public service for five consecutive generations, the Emperor inevitably had leeway through to promote the clans that supportied him; the new system would, in Gar-lang's design, prevent royal meddling with the franchise. In 1810, he forbade peers from recommending their children as royal secretaries, since these individuals were, theoretically, free of the electoral will of the aristocracy, even though almost all peers backed Gar-lang.
In Jun. 1812, Gar-lang's government became aware of a plot by the Emperor to purchase the support of six royal secretaries and eventually to install a royalist as Inner Administrator, which would give throne access to receipts and outlays. Gar-lang raised the threshold in the royal secretariat to produce an official draft, from five members to half of all sitting members, which was ten in 1812. Politically, this was also Gar-lang's tactic to ensure that his party would not enact contradictory policies that undermined its unity. This was one of many reforms that eventually created a deliberative assembly out of the royal secretariat, though during this period discussions happened privately.
1814 – 1829
In 1814, Gar-lang was replaced by Lord Kjalh-djeng, who was not a member of the former's faction but appeared acceptable to them. Kjarh-djêng promised to increase the royal allowance in return for its support in a moderate, non-partisan leadership in the government. The Lord of Mjenh-lang became the senior figure in Gar-lang's party, which became sworn to defend a lowly-taxed aristocracy.
The franchise was not altered under Kjarh-djêng's administration between 1814 – 17, which was dedicated to ameliorating the strained relationship between the crown and aristocracy. Yet the political landscape began shifting during this period, under the influence of Gar-lang's policy to motivate the aristocracy to protest their political rights, for redress against inordinate taxation. While nearly all aristocratic households depended on rural income for its political activity (some of which occurred in the capital city), a growing number of them either moved or sent cadet lineages there to be closer to the organs of power and expand electoral influence. This subtle trend was explored in A New Look at Themiclesia's Road to Democracy, tracing the roots of the "conversion of elites to representative democracy".
As the gentry of each prefecture regulated its own franchise, most prefectures where Gar-lang's influence was strong happy accepted cadet branches to be added to the elector rolls, reasoning that an expanding aristocratic class made royal meddling more difficult, which infamously happened in 1812. On the other hand, aristocracies also judged whether the newcomer was of good stock and exhibited cultural, economic, and political minima. If reputed as politically corrupt or economically weak, one could be rejected. Through these changes, the franchise expanded at considerable speed, reaching 10,000 in 1829.
The Lord of Mjenh-lang took the reins of power from Kjarh-djêng in 1817, with no real policy change, except a strict stop on the exchequer.
1829 – 1845
The trickle of aristocratic movements through the country split many houses and severed them from reliance on agricultural income, and it became more accepted in cities for aristocrats to invest or engage in commerce. Formerly, they usually availed of the services of an agent, personal dealing deemed undignifying. There was no significant objection against these activities, so long as the "Conservative Consensus" was maintained—fiscal restraint and its chief adversary, warfare. While a merchant would almost always find himself excluded from electoral circles, there was no provision against existing electors deriving commercial income or advocating for his own commercial gains.
The Uzeri Rebellion of 1824 shocked Themiclesians, the Tyrannians landing and successfully taking a fortress in Menghe. Emperor K.rjang, used this issue to press for re-armament, meeting stern opposition from the Mjenh-lang, who believed that the Tyrannians have no reason to invade Themiclesia, since tariffs neared zero since 1803. Confident that the electorate would not accept the raising of agricultural taxes to fund re-armament, Mjenh-lang argued that the only source of revenues would be tariffs, the raising of which would instead provoke Tyrannian aggression.
To protect its own textiles industry, the Camians imposed a high tariff on fabrics from Themiclesia, provoking merchants to smuggle it. The Camians shot the smugglers and confiscated merchandise belonging to implicated merchants, affecting Themiclesian aristocrats' interests and generating discussions both at court and amongst gentle circles. While the public opinion universally condemned Camia for its "absurd policies", it was agreed that nothing was to be done. Export volume in porcelain, silk, and tea continued to grow throughout the 1820s and 30s, beginning the "Thirty Golden Years" (1825 – 55) in Themiclesia. Industrialists expanded from high-end products to more affordable ones with considerable success. With little to no tariff and no tax on income, a "torrent of money swept towards the nation and landed in its manufacturers' and shareholders' pockets." According to some historians, Themiclesia's pacifist and defeatist reputation allowed the owners of its products to "develop an imagination that he had participated in the taming of an empire of the Orient, and the product took on the quality of spoils".