Sunju Protocol on International Conflict and Atomic Energy
The Sunju Protocol on International Conflict and Atomic Energy, also abbreviated as the Sunju Protocol or SPICA, is an international treaty in Septentrion regulating the treatment of civilian nuclear power plants during international conflicts. Signatories to the treaty agree not to conduct air, artillery, rocket, or missile strikes on grounds belonging to an operational civilian nuclear plant in another signatory, in order to prevent catastrophic releases of radioactive material resulting from a breached reactor pressure vessel or a loss of coolant accident. Negotiation on the treaty began in 2016, and it was signed in Sunju on March 19th, 2019, with a grace period for compliance with certain terms.
Background
In an effort to address the effects of anthropogenic climate change and reduce fossil fuel dependence, many countries in Septentrion embarked on a program of ambitious nuclear reactor construction during the 1990s and 2000s, despite opposition concerns about nuclear safety. Seen against the backdrop of a tense international situation, the construction of new reactors posed new risks.
Disasters like the Chimgu nuclear accident raised concerns about the danger that a breached reactor pressure vessel could disperse radioactive debris over a wide area, exposing a large number of civilians to lasting negative health effects. Nuclear scientists also warned that if a nuclear reactor were hit by a military strike with the threat of follow-up, it would be much harder to carry out the same coordinated response that prevented the Chimgu Number 3 reactor from melting through the base of the pressure vessel and reaching groundwater, triggering a massive steam explosion which would have catastrophic consequences for an even wider area.
Menghe emerged as a particularly strong proponent of a nuclear immunity treaty, given the geographic distribution of its energy sources. The large cities of the southern coast region had large energy demands, but were far from any coal mines or viable hydroelectric dam sites, making coastal or riverine nuclear power plants an attractive option. However, close proximity to Altagracia and the Entente forces stationed there raised the possibility that hostile forces could launch missile strikes on Menghean nuclear reactors, leaving little time to respond. At some facilities, the reinforced concrete containment chamber was engineered to withstand an external impact, but this hardening was expensive, and unnecessary at new Generation IV reactors with no threat of an internal pressure release.
Timeline
Menghean diplomats first proposed the idea of a protocol protecting civilian nuclear reactors in February 2016, following the Innominadan Crisis, which dramatically increased tensions in the region. Several years of negotiations followed, as Septentrion's major powers worked out the specific provisions of the protocol and worked to bring other countries under its coverage.
The protocol was officially signed on March 19th, 2019. The signing ceremony was held in the city of Sunju, in Menghe. Sunju is Menghe's most populous city, with a population of over 25 million people in the wider metropolitan area. It is also very close to Altagracia, and the Entente bases there, and geographically represents a prime location for nuclear power facilities. The core provisions of the treaty entered into force on the same day, though signatories were given a four-month period to ensure that they were in compliance with the separation of military and civilian enrichment supply lines.
Provisions
The core provision of the SPICA agreement states that all signatories agree not to conduct attacks against civilian nuclear facilities located on the territory of other signatories. In addition to long-range missile, bomb, and rocket strikes, the provision also encompasses efforts to storm a nuclear facility with ground troops, and efforts to damage a nuclear facility remotely through cyberwarfare.
A "nuclear facility" is defined as the grounds belonging to a nuclear power plant, fuel enrichment facility, breeder reactor, waste reprocessing facility, waste disposal facility, research reactor, or any other facility containing large amounts of radioactive material which could be dispersed by a kinetic attack. "Civilian" excludes facilities which are active military assets, part of the military supply chain, or occupied by military assets, excluding regular guard personnel used for routine plant security. Thus, a military fuel factory manufacturing fuel assemblies for a nuclear submarine would still be a legal target, as would the nuclear submarine itself.
Additionally, if SIAEA inspectors determine that a country has violated the Septentrion Treaty Against The Proliferation of Nuclear Armaments by using a breeder reactor or enrichment facility to generate weapons-grade fuel, the facility in question may be treated as a military target. If inspectors are expelled, the country loses its SPICA protections.
Because the definition of "nuclear facility" includes all buildings on the same enclosed grounds, the control building, turbine buildings, and coolant pumps are also protected, as is the open terrain between them and the enclosing fence. Protection ends on the far side of the enclosing fence. Thus if military vehicles or air defense systems are stationed outside the nuclear compound, they are valid targets, while the facility is still protected; if, however, military air defense systems are stationed on the facility's grounds, it may be designated a military target. Transformers, substations, and power lines immediately outside the facility are also valid targets.
A special article covers situations where a front-line conflict passes close to a nuclear facility. Defending forces may not station troops on the facility grounds, and should take steps to avoid intense fighting near it. Adequate civilian reactor staff must remain on-site to keep the reactor stable, and must comply with any instructions given by the authority taking control of the reactor, unless such instructions would create a serious safety risk.
Compliance with the protocol is monitored through the existing institutions of the Septentrion International Atomic Energy Agency. Within four months of the treaty's signing, each country is required to submit or update a list of all the civilian nuclear facilities which it would like to see protected under the protocol, along with detailed geolocation data specifying the facility perimeter. Confidential military facilities may be left off the list, but any facilities not on the list will not be protected. SIAEA inspectors will conduct regular visits to the listed facilities to ensure that they are not producing weapons-grade material and that they are not part of the military supply chain. As the full separation of civilian and military fuel production could take several years, signatories are given a five-year grace period during which mixed-use breeder, enrichment, and manufacturing facilities are protected, provided that the signatory submits them to the official transparency list and opens them to inspectors.
Signatories
| Country | Signatory? | Accession date |
|---|---|---|
| Template:Country data Azbekistan | Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Dayashina |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Federated Fire Territories |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Hallia |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Hanhae |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
| Template:Country data Khalistan | Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Letnia |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Menghe |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 New Tyran |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Polvokia |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Portcullia |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Sebrenskiya |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Sieuxerr |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |
 Themiclesia |
Yes | 19 March 2019 |