Ministry of Defence (Themiclesia)

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Department overview
FormedOct. 30, 1970
Preceding agencies
  • Ministry of War (三十四兵部)
  • Ministry of the Navy (艦航部)
  • Ministry of Air (空航部)
JurisdictionThemiclesia
HeadquartersDormitory Building, Kien-k'ang, Themiclesia
Employees56,860 civilian staff (October 2015)
Annual budgetOSD$63 bn
Minister responsible
  • tbd, Secretary of State for Defence
Department executives
  • tbd, Minister of State for Defence
  • tbd, Permanent Under-Secretary of State
Parent departmentCouncil of Correspondence
Child agencies

The Ministry of Defence (尚書國防部, djang’-stja-kwek-bjang-be’) of Themiclesia is the government department for implementing defence policies set by the the government of Themiclesia. It is currently led by Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Sdjem Tsuih (沈最), with the assistance of four junior ministers and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, the professional head of the Ministry. Within it, there exist three subordinate departments that represent each of the three military services, the Themiclesian Army, the Themiclesian Navy, and the Themiclesian Air Force.

The principal objectives of the Ministry of Defence are the defence of Themiclesia and her interests against foreign invasions, the discharge of Themiclesia's military obligations as required by statute and international treaties, and the general maintenance of the peace and stability in Septentrion as directed by the government. The senior and responsible minister of the department, the Secretary of State for Defence, is the de facto commander-in-chief of the armed forces, under the country's statutory and customary law, cabinet ordinances, and government policy, and further is responsible politically to the country's parliament.

History

Preceeding bodies

The current Ministry of Defence is the result of the merger of the Ministry of War (三十四兵部, sem-gljep-spljih-prjang-be, lit. "ministry of 34 forces"), the Ministry of the Navy (艦航部, krams-gang-be), and the Ministry of Air (空航部, kong-gang-be) in 1970. Previous to the merger, the civilian bureaucracy that compose of their respective staff have already underwent extensive evolution, mostly under the process of centralization and simplification. This process was largely independent of the evolution of ministerial portfolios, which were created and dissolved according to policy needs.

The Ministry of War came into existence in the early 19th century, when maintenance of prefectural militias were centralized for economy. At the time, active units were subordinated to the direction of the Secretary of State for War, but their maintenance was still inextricably tied to their home prefectures. Inactive units were held by the prefecture on furlough or summoned for local peacekeeping work. An exception existed when a expeditionary army was assembled, in which case a headquarters with administrative powers would be created; otherwise, all units were administered by the prefecture, with approval or delegated dispensation, from the central government. Since, then, soldiers on furlough received compensation in land allotment and were obliged to support their active comrades with agricultural and craft products, it was convenient to administer them locally. When enlistment was made voluntary, this system which presumed that each prefecture would have a predictable amount of soldiers, proved ineffective and prone to corruption, leading to centralization and the creation of the Ministry of War's bureaucracy that managed all militias. At first, central organization imitated the local, but advancements in warfare necessitated more specialist departments; ultimately, the Ministry expanded from nine departments to 41, at the high point in the Pan-Septentrion War.

The Ministry of the Navy was created as a co-ordinating organization of the six traditional departments (Fleets, Guilds, Ancillaries, West Woods, Engineers, and Customs) that administered the Themiclesian Navy. The youngest of these departments, the Department of Engineers, dates to 1360. Until 1781, the entire naval apparatus reported to the Secretary of State for Finance, though a dedicated portfolio has been argued for and created. It was thought that the Finance portfolio was growing too busy and diffuse, with duties spanning domestic agricultural and commercial taxes, customs, poor relief, and discount medicine, palace expenditures, to naval warfare in the Helian Ocean and land warfare in Meridia; though these were all historically related, by the 1700s the incumbent was hard-pressed to attend to all of them, resulting in questionable decisions. The Ministry of the Navy thus began as the new minister's personal advisors, further to concentrate decision-making power in a well-informed departmental leader. After the naval fiasco at Rad in 1791, the Navy Ministry began reforming its six departments, though statutorily the six all survive into the modern day.

The Ministry of Air was established by statute in 1919, to manage civilian aviation in Themiclesia. At the time, several aviation clubs already existed for enthusiasts, operating largely without statutory oversight and regularly encountering disputes with local authorities. In 1921, it was decided that an air force would be strategically valuable in defending Themiclesia's very remote border regions and that it would be best managed together with civilian aviation; hence, the Themiclesian Air Force was created as a function of the League of Aviation Clubs in 1922 and became independent in 1923. At the same time, the Ministry of Air was created for both the Air Force and the LAC, which was envisioned as a reserve organization for the Air Force in wartime. In 1935, with war encroaching, civilian aviation was placed under the Ministry of Transport. The Ministry of Air is, therefore, the only ministry to have preceded the creation of its components, reflected as a much more tightly organized structure and integration with the Air Force itself.

Inter-service rivalry and merger

While many armed forces experienced inter-service rivalries, particularly if there is little notion of a more general belonging, Themiclesia's experience was less pronounced than others during the early 20th century. A number of factors may be cited to explain this observation. Foremost, there was a traditional boundary between the Army and Navy's jurisdictions: the Army focused on everything east of Themiclesia, accessible by land, while the Navy dealt with everything west and south, accessible by sea. This would not be challenged until the PSW. Later, due to a defensive military outlook and stable diplomatic relations, there was comparatively little disagreement over upcoming military activity; however, since the Liberal government prioritized economy over defence, disputes between the services still arose, albeit for financial reasons and not strategic ones; a represenatitve dispute would in replacing ageing equipment of similar function. Also, since the services were ultimately represented by the Secretary of State, an elected political figure, it was difficult for them to persuade ministers to sport their arguments in defiance of government policy.

Nevertheless, changes in perspectives still drove the two (later three) ministries towards sharing of resources, thus elucidating redundancies amongst them. These were addressed in two phases, first in the 18-19th centuries, and then after the PSW. The Navy had a large establishment, with two fleets and three land armies, each administratively and operationally independent. After Themiclesia's colonial ventures ended, there was a round of internal simplifications that eliminated all three land armies and merged the two fleets by 1800. Yet, Sngrian Gwang MP opined in 1810, "There is a miniature navy in the army and a miniature army in the navy." As a result, the Army's Lake Fleet (內航, nups-gang) was handed over to the Navy in 1815, with the proviso that the Navy's smaller ships can assist in defending Maverican encroachment by way of the Lake. Conversely, the Navy Secretary adduced that the Marines should not be handed over to the Army because "it would amount only to a renaming of the same thing, composed of the same people, doing the same jobs, and receiving the same pay; there would be no economy to be had, but disorder and expense". The War Secretary, who was focusing on building a smaller, professional army, was not interested in an extra branch under the other service. While this could be analyzed as an instance of inter-service rivalry, its resolution seems characteristic of the 19th century, when both services "kept out of each other's ways".