Battle of Pais au DuBord
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| Inyurstan Civil War | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Allíànce Contré-Revolutionaire D'Inyursta (ACRI) | Template:Country data commieinyursta AVI | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Commandante Stephano de Gèreudán |
Template:Country data commieinyursta Generále Luis-Vega Machaude | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
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x6,450 Troops |
x8,200 soldiers | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
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Inyursta | ... | ||||||
The Battle of Pais au DuBord was a large engagement in the Inyurstan Civil War, considered by many to be a major "turning point" in the war. It was also notable for being the largest armored engagement of the conflict, and until the 2006 Battle of Nun's Glade the most successful armored operation in Inyursta's history.
Background
Despite the progress of the last three years of the conflict, Colonel Enrique Javez the de-facto leader of forces in Marindino, was facing both international and internal pressure to prove that his army was capable of "escalating" from a guerrilla war into a conventional war. Javez sought to demonstrate that his faction could not only capture territory and cities, but also command a standing army capable of defending whatever gains they might have when the war ends.
Prior to the operation, Javez's right-hand man in the west-slope foothills of the Sierra Miraco Jean-Lupo Pascèses, had spent months studying the reaction tactics of AVI forces in Marindino, using "probing" skirmishes in a variety of different localities and formations to gain an idea of the enemy's doctrine. He had also pitched the hunch to Javez that enemy tank forces were not well trained or experienced in combat - or well equipped for night operations. Pascèses's regiment had tanks of their own, which had taken them weeks - if not months - to properly understand and utilize; while the enemy was seemingly rolling tanks off of foreign ships and right into contested cities. Other ACRI commanders cautioned against this assumption, believing that this was due to the enemy using foreign tank crews. Javez, under pressure, ultimately decided to trust Pascèses.
Planning for the Battle
By January 1961 it had become apparent that, despite the optimistic wishes of Carmòn Solévereu, the AVI would be hard-pressed to both lay siege to Cordoba and relieve the defenders of Fjorda de Rivera. Counter-revolutionary aligned spies had indicated that Solevereu was still pushing for a "relief corridor" between both cities, and soon after the intel would be confirmed by offensives from both the western side of Fjorda and the easternmost forces encircling Cordoba that they were trying to link up in the "prairie corridor" - a series of semi-flat grasslands dominating the table top slopes at the foothills of the mountains. With internal politics and external pressure mounting, Javez realized this would be his chance to hopefully engage and destroy an enemy army group in the field.
Part 1: Contact & Deception
Gèreudán's
The Miracle of Larou
Unbeknownst to Javez and his officers, a skirmish in the otherwise irrelevant coastal town of Larou would sway the battle in their favor. A small local force of mostly auxiliary guerrillas launched a brazen attack on the AVI & DRSE "headquarters" in Larou. The attack was believed to be utterly unsanctioned by ICRA commanders, and likely a result of personal grievances on behalf of the local auxillaries. Fortunately for both the outgunned local auxiliaries and the overall counter-revolutionary forces, the AVI defenders had been partying and drinking, and most of the small garrison was sleeping off hangovers in the early hours of the morning when the guerrillas entered the town and began setting fire to buildings which housed troops and slaughtered the DRSE agents in their sleep (all four of them). The AVI commander decided both his career (and potentially his life) were at risk for the embarrassing - albeit otherwise minor - loss at Larou, and so embellished the numbers of counter-revolutionary forces attacking the settlement by threefold. His commander, Colonel Depaire, was a quiet critic of the plan to use the prairie corridor to reinforce Fjorda, in favor of an assault along the coastal axis; and so he then embellished the numbers and force composition of enemy forces and requested immediate reinforcements. By the time this reached Machaude's desk, what had been disorganized local auxillaries sneaking past drunk soldiers had turned into a full-frontal assault by Javez's most experienced and motivated brigades.
The event was known as "The Miracle" because, while false information being passed up the chain in the AVI was common, overly negative false information was unheard of. Typically, AVI commanders would report overly optimistic assessments of their progress, which would then become more optimistic as they went up the chain - often resulting in reinforcements or resupply not reaching embattled forces; in the case of Larou, the negative assessment became more negative as it went up the chain. Machaude, used to a level of optimistic dishonesty had no reason to suspect that reports of a massive counter-revolutionary assault on the coastal axis was overblown and falsified. Generále Luis-Vega Machaude, now confident that what the forces at Pais au DuBord were encountering was a smaller grouping rather than a vanguard for Javez's main force, made a fatal mistake and cleared Colonel Olifanyé to commit his QRF.
Egalisa de Sant Patricio
With the pro-government reserves now entering the fight (and with them mobile, armored vehicles), the soldiers of the Pradiera Brigade began evacuating the wooded knoll. The plan had always been to incrementally fall back, drawing the AVI forces further and further from the main road; however, in a small rural hamlet the ACRI forces continued fighting longer than was to be expected, with a number holding out in and around a small church. Whether this was due to Gèreudán understanding and supporting Javez's desire for a propaganda victory in addition to a physical one (or perhaps wanting to prove his worth after the failure at Bellan Pass) or due to the Pradiera Brigade being recruited from the foothills and grasslands south and southeast of Cordoba and found sentimental value in defending the church is still a matter of debate.
Intense, bloody fighting continued past sunset and into the night. Estimated casualty counts vary from both sides, but historical assessments conclude them to be heavy for both attackers and defenders. By sunrise, the church was one of the only buildings left without sustaining major damage and the counter-revolutionary flag still flying above it. The story-book style morale victory was short-lived, as AVI forces would soon storm the church and kill or capture all of its defenders. A counter-attack to try and retake the small town would end in failure and more casualties on both sides; but succeed in causing the otherwise mobile QRF to "dig in" and hold their ground.
Primary Contact
At several disjunct points along the center northern line, ACRI "subcompanjes" - or "small companies" - usually consisting of 30-50 men began attacking government forces. Using narrow hedgerows, rural infrastructure and areas of tall grass to move, they attacked from the open mesas towards the road. As this stage was still part of the shaping operations, the goal was less to achieve a break-through as it was to both probe for weak points and draw AVI troops away from the roads and furthest flanks. All units involved wore patches and armbands of the Pradiera Brigade, or at least quickly made unit insignias made to mimic PB branding. This was done in effort to keep the deception that the contact was coming from a single highland brigade and not a larger force.
As noon turned into afternoon, the battle was - at least on paper - shifting towards the AVI. Said subcompanjes began taking significant casualties and were pushed back under heavy fire; but all the while in doing so drawing forward AVI units further from the road in pursuit.
Part 2: The Breakthrough
Infiltration
Armored Assault
Finger 2
A final breakthrough would come at "Finger 2", the second westernmost mesa of Pais au DuBord.
Contrary to popular belief, and propaganda of the time, the break-through was achieved with light infantry and guerrilla forces. In the morning fog, they were able to assault the line at all points and eventually spill through several locations. Those squads and "subcompanjes" that managed to break through began rushing into the enemy's softer rear line on foot under the cover of low-visibility mist and attack further points in the overstretched AVI contingent holding the mesa from both sides. Not only did this allow more points of break through to be achieved - including from ACRI's vaunted armored units - but it also created the local illusion of a larger breakthrough and/or encirclement, causing single positions of AVI troops to attempt to flee or drop their guns and surrender.
By 8:23am local time, over 80% of "Finger 2" was under the control of ACRI, with only a few AVI holdouts in a small rural hamlet and another disjunct patch of semi-wild foliage flanked on one side by an artificial pond and the other by heavily grazed pasture. At this point in the battle, Javez committed his final two brigades, the Maripaca Brigade and his own Brigade D'Implaçàbles - the former committed to launch a follow-up assault on Finger 3 and the later to hold Finger 2 against an anticipated counter-attack.
By 4:47pm local time, "Finger 2" had been completely secured; meanwhile, a second breakthrough came east the central mesa ("Finger 3"), cutting the road off through the lowland gulch and effectively surrounding the forces in the upland prairie.
Part 3: Mop-Up
Aftermath
Legacy
Historical Assessment
The tactical value of tanks on both sides has been over-stated, due in part to ACRI propaganda to prove they were capable of fighting a conventional combined arms war. Tank crews on the counter-revolutionary side complained about feeling "trapped" in their armored vehicles compared to lighter jeeps and technical (or guerrilla movements on foot), in such that visibility and target selection was considered an impediment. After-action reviews found that ACRI tanks had only killed ten enemy tanks (six T-55 and four PT-76), and only four tank crews achieved tank-on-tank kills. Likewise, kills on enemy infantry and light vehicles were nearly monopolized by ACRI infantry (though the gulch west of Finger 2 perhaps playing a role in biasing the numbers). Infantry reportedly achieved a similar number of kills on enemy tanks (six T-55, three PT-76). Most AVI tanks actually surrendered or were abandoned due to the suddenly shifting battle lines.
On the other side, captured AVI tank crews reported poor training and commanders who neglected maintenance and terrain.
However, the strategic value of tanks at Pais au DuBord cannot be stressed enough.