Decisive Battle Doctrine (Cacerta)

The Decisive Battle Doctrine was a naval strategy adopted by the Cacertian Royal Navy during the Cacertian Empire’s period of expansion leading up to the Divide War. The strategy was developed from the theories of Alora Davion who believe that the Cacertian Navy would be capable of winning a war at sea by fighting and winning a single, decisive naval action. The idea became more widely accepted after the Empire’s earlier successes utilizing their dreadnoughts against Lirinya, Knichus, and Xevden; following this, much of the CRN’s operational planning was influenced by effective naval gunnery and strong central formations.

At the turn of the century, Cacertian naval strategists and tacticians believed that such a victory would be dependent on a strong dreadnought force which led to the development of a “big guns and big ships” principle. Royal Navy planning envisioned engaging enemy fleets in open water and at range, eventually closing in to destroy opposing warships in a sharp battle. Subsequent naval procurement and deployment of naval assets were thereby based on the Decisive Battle Doctrine.

Development of the Decisive Battle Doctrine

Cacerta’s Naval High Command was heavily influenced by the writings of naval historian Alora Davion who published several books on the development of naval tactics throughout the region. She had a specific interest in the nation of Ossoria, which had been widely accepted as the pre-eminent naval power in the west. As both Ossoria and Cacerta were island-based nations, Cacertians believed that analyzing Ossorian maritime military history would prove a useful tool in the development of Cacerta’s naval future.

Big Guns, Big Ships

Cacerta’s primary naval rivals in Tyran were Ossoria and Acrea and, while naval development between the three powers was relatively even, Cacertians planned that the Empire would be capable of defeating opponents who were fighting a great distance from their home ports in an unfamiliar theater. The difference in technology and training was deemed the most appropriate focus against similarly armed and industrial rivals; this assumption was built upon the concept of superior gunnery. If the Cacertians could engage opponents outside of return fire with accurate gunfire, they could effectively inflict losses before brawling an enemy at closer ranges.

Assessment

The Royal Navy’s focus on training reflected well on the performance of individual units as CRN units were often capable of fighting battles against superior numbers. Battleships worked in triads and the formations allowed their dreadnought formations to have remarkable flexibility (the triad formations were kept, even after the Divide War) and the concentration of their guns carried significant destructive potential. However, as a result of this focus, Cacertian cruiser and destroyer development was hampered and left a glaring, if not immediately obvious, weakness in Cacertian fleet tactics. The production of cruisers and destroyers were put aside in favor of building battleships that, by the end of the Divide War, were considered ineffective or saw very limited service.

The Cacertian pursuit of a single decisive battle is often believed to have been a main contributor to the Empire’s defeat and later withdrawal from Syara in 1918. Instead of a short conflict, the CRN became embroiled in a war of attrition with an enemy force that exploited their strategic weakness and grew in strength with each passing year. The Decisive Battle Doctrine against Syara proved fruitless and ultimately led to Cacerta’s military command to defer to the Royal Army which later launched the Desopya Campaign.

Lessons learned from the consequences of the Decisive Battle Doctrine led future Grand Admiral Andrea Doria to reevaluate the roles of warships in the CRN. Her reforms resulted in a refocus on cruiser and destroyer development and the abandonment of dreadnoughts. These changes proved highly effective against the Inner Sphere in the later Siduri War.