Gwrei-nju Policy
The gwrei-nju policy, Policy of Appeasement, or Policy of Placation is a diplomatic principle and related set of practices adopted by Themiclesia's Drjen Dynasty, with the main purport of creating alliances, reducing costly wars on foreign land, and promoting trade. The literal meaning of gwrei-nju is "sympathy and tenderness". The policy was first articulated in the report of a courtier in 1090, and the phrase sees continuous usage in similar contexts throughout history and into the 19th century.
Background
Themiclesia entered an expansionist phase in western Hemithea in 762, at the beginning of the Dzi Dynasty, which followed the Meng Dynasty. The Meng is characterized by an inward-looking foreign policy that shunned relations with foreign states, except for trade missions that the court historiographically interpreted as tributary missions. One of the attributes of a legitimate dynasty, in Themiclesian eyes, was the submission of "barbarian states" to heed the moral and ethical excellence of a legitimate ruler. As the Dzi was established under questionable circumstances and by a coup d'etat involving the military, the new state sought to disspell dissenting factions at court and to legitimize itself by launching a series of campaigns, with the object of compelling a larger number of tributary missions, than the Meng Dynasty had commanded. To this end, the first Dzi emperor, Mjen-tsung, enacted reforms with broad and lasting consequences in the military, particularly for expeditions abroad. Some historians argue that the corpus of the Themiclesian Army and Themiclesian Navy should be dated to Mjen-tsung's reforms.
Prior to his time, the Meng Dynasty had already established diplomatic relations with coastal natives in the modern Organized States. The Meng Dynasty's required an annual mission bearing a tributary gift of nominal value. By the mid 600s, the tributary missions grew infrequent, deeply injuring the perceived legitimacy of the Meng Dynasty. In 689, the court began to send expensive gifts to "induce" their mission. Such diplomatic outlays numbered in the thousands of bushels of wheat or a similar number in spokes of silk, to fulfill the "political vanity" (Barrie, 1960) of the Dynasty. Mjen-tsung, who was an admiral responsible for a convoy of gifts, privated the treasures and returned to court. Fearing execution, he heavily bribed the young Meng emperor's courtiers and the Empress Dowager. He acquired the support of a considerable number of courtiers for his bid to the throne, on the pretext that additional levies to support such massive diplomatic gifts were deeply unpopular and a sign that the Dynasty had lost the Mandate of Heaven.
Coming to the throne, he transferred the responsibility of forging weapons and armour from the palace's craftsmen to a sequestered set of military households, who had been responsible for providing soldiers. The increased production of armour allowed Dzi-era infantry to fight a larger variety of enemies, when during the Meng Dynasty only a very small portion of soldiers possessed full-body armour. He also implemented a rotational system that used a soldier's time alternately for productivity and warfare. Under it, a soldier would first work a piece of land the government granted for three years, starting from age 20; a set amount, to be used as rations, would be collected, while the rest was his to keep. Compared to land allotment to civilians, a soldier had more land to cultivate and could keep a higher portion for himself in normal years (civilian taxes during poor harvests would be significant lowered or remitted). Then, he would be rotated into a battle position for three years, serving one year at the capital city and two at various points on the border.