Operation Charybdis

Operation Charybdis
Part of the Western Theater of the Siduri War
Aerial view of the Syaran attack on Andria
Date 20 October 1934 Location Mansuri Sea, near Mansuriyyah Result Inconclusive
Belligerents
Cacertian Empire	Republic of Syara
Commanders and leaders
Vissia Pedrotti Ulisse Barbato	Hristijan Rajcevski
Units involved
Andria Fleet	Syaran National Fleet
Strength
3 battleships 5 cruisers 1 heavy cruiser 18 destroyers	6 battleships 2 aircraft carriers 4 heavy cruisers 6 cruisers 24 destroyers 55 aircraft
Casualties and losses
1 light cruiser sunk 2 destroyers sunk 1 battleship damaged 2 cruisers damaged 3 destroyers damaged 233 killed 607 wounded	16 aircraft lost 13 pilots killed 2 pilots captured 1 destroyer damaged

Operation Charybdis, also known as the Andria Raid, was an aerial attack carried out by the Navy of the Syaran Republic against the Cacertian Protectorate of Andria on 20 October 1934. It was the first all-aircraft ship-to-ship naval attack in history and would establish the threat of naval aviation to traditional fleet actions.

Not long after the beginning of the Siduri War and the formation of the Common Axis, the Syaran Admiralty had identified the threat posed by the Cacertian Andria Fleet to Syaran interests in the Nuadan Ocean. The strategic significance of Andria, and its control of the Sabri Sea, further cemented the importance of eliminating Andria as a threat to the Inner Sphere in western Siduri. Beginning in August 1934 the Syaran Naval Chief of Staff began planning for how to deal with Andria in the event of war with the Cacertian Empire. It was eventually agreed that Andria would have to be seized and the Andrian fleet neutralized as a fighting force. This latter task was a cause of worry for many Syaran admirals, who were uncertain about the prospect of facing down the second largest naval fleet in the world with the only recently formed Syaran National Fleet.

Admiral Hristijan Rajcevski proposed an alternative to engaging the Andria Fleet on the high seas, instead utilizing carrier borne aircraft to strike the fleet while it was still in port. While a largely untested concept, the plan won approval and was accepted in September 1934. Rajcevski had estimated his flight crews needed three months of training to successfully carry out the operation, but the expansion of the war with the joint invasions of Mansuriyyah, Tennai, and Quenmin in October forced the Syarans to accelerate their plans. On 14 October Rajcevski sailed south with the National Fleet consisting of six battleships, four heavy cruisers, six cruisers, 24 destroyers, and two Asakumo-class carriers, intent on catching the Andrian Fleet while it was still at anchor.

The Syarans had cracked Cacertian naval codes in September, but upon the outbreak of hostilities the Cacertians had changed their codes and rendered Syaran signal interception useless. Thus the Syarans did not learn that Admiral Barbato had ordered most of he Andrian fleet out to sea on 18 October; the two fleets passed within 150 kilometers of another but neither made contact during their transit. The Syarans arrived at Andria on 20 October to find most of the docks and port facilities empty; only three battleships, six cruisers, and 18 destroyers were still in Andria. Fearing that the rest of the fleet was still underway nearby, Rajcevski ordered a hasty attack on the island before the Cacertians could call for reinforcement. A total of 55 Aedon fighter-bombers armed with a mixture of bombs and torpedoes attacked the naval base at 16:35 local time, targeting the port facilities and the ships at anchor.

The attack lasted for less than an hour, before the Aedons returned to their carriers and Rajcevski ordered the fleet to withdraw, still uncertain as to the location of the Andria Fleet. The Syarans had lost 16 aircraft, including 13 pilots killed and two more captured. Despite their efforts however the Syarans had done only minor damage to the Cacertian fleet; Syaran inexperience and lack of preparation meant that many aircraft missed their targets, and many torpedoes failed to arm in the shallow waters. The battleship HMS Lisabetta Benedetti suffered two hits that partially damaged her forward most turrets, but remained unharmed otherwise. The light cruiser HMS Vefplio was hit twice by torpedoes and sunk, but the Cacertians were able to successfully raise her later in the year. Only two ships were lost completely; the destroyers Viola and Zaira.

By comparison the damage to Andria's port facilities was extensive. Many of the port's repair centers had been destroyed, including most the loading cranes, storage depots, and metal fabrication plants. Two warehouses containing most of the machine-tools on the island were destroyed, and damage to the fuel supply resulted in an oil fire that took three days to be contained, costing the island 90% of its fuel. With her port facilities in shambles, Andria was unable to effectively support the rest of the fleet when it returned to harbor on 22 October.

The strategic outcome of the operation was inconclusive. The Syarans had failed to destroy the Andria Fleet as intended, but the destruction of much of Andria's naval infrastructure meant that Cacerta now lacked a staging ground for operations into the Nuadan Ocean. Although Mansuri ports and bases were still open, after the threat of aviation to ships had been exposed at Andria the Cacertian Admiralty was unwilling to risk putting more ships within range of Syaran bombers. As a result, much of the Andria fleet was forced to temporarily relocate to Tennai while repairs to Andria were underway. Without Cacertian assistance, the Mansuri Navy was unable to mount a succesful resistance against the Syaran fleet in 1934, ceding the Mansuri Sea to the Inner Sphere.

The failure to destroy the Andria Fleet and capture the Protectorate itself would eventually lead to the Battle of the Sabri Sea, but not before the Cacertians launched their own naval aviation attack on the Syaran naval base at Moddra.