Operation Sagaris

Operation Sagaris
Part of the Zemplen War
Syaran troops tend to the wounded after their defeat.
Date 17 April - 7 May 2009 Location Puspokladany District, Southern Ruvelka Result Ruvelkan victory
Belligerents
Ruvelka	Syara
Commanders and leaders
Tibor Fehér Stepanie Yeghoyan Regina Sándor Vilmos Egyed Ármin Varga	Daniel Mladenov Todorov Emanuel Bilić Kakig Torossian Tihomir Orlić
Units involved
Army Group South 4th Aszód Front 6th Püspökladány Front 3rd Derecske Front 12th Pálháza Front	Army Group Gamma 8th Army 5th Army 10th Army
Strength
850,000 troops	600,000 troops
Casualties and losses
31,780 killed 92,458 wounded	28,405 killed 76,366 wounded

Operation Sagaris (known sometimes as the Battle of the Kenderes Steppe) was an offensive launched by the Syaran Commonality Armed Forces during the Zemplen War. With more than half a million troops involved on each side, it was the largest single battle fought in the conflict.

In the spring of 2009 Syara had launched Operation Synaspismos and delivered a crushing victory against Ruvelka's Army Group South. Despite the failure to capture Aszód and the Operation Pylooros, Syaran Central Command believed a sweeping offensive into the Ruvelkan steppe south of the Matra Mountains would allow Syara to circumnavigate the mountainous obstacles of the Kurillas and allow the Syarans to push into eastern Ruvelka. Field Marshal Daniel Mladenov Todorov, commanding officer of Army Group Gamma, envisioned a major encirclement of the bulk of Army Group South to destroy Ruvelka's main fighting force in the region, with the added bonus of cutting off the supply routes from Ruvelka-aligned Mansuriyyah, which flowed through the city of Kenderes. Recognizing the danger, the Ruvelkan Imperial General Staff hundreds of thousands of reinforcements into the region, boosting Ruvelkan troop numbers to over 800,000 men and women. Army Group Gamma fielded some 600,000 troops in addition to nearly 4,000 tanks and an additional 8,500 armored vehicles, many of them donated from units from Army Group Beta.

The Syarans began their offensive on 17 April 2009, expecting that the wide open steppe would be well suited to their mechanized forces and maneuvers, but stiff Ruvelkan resistance led to limited gains among the Syaran armies. After a few days of intensive fighting the Syarans had failed to make the decisive breakthrough they desired and suffered heavy losses in the process, leading the offensive to be suspended between 24-30 April. When the Syarans resumed their depleted forces were unable to make any serious progress, and the operation petered out in the first week of May.

The Syaran defeat came as a surprise to both Syaran and Ruvelkan commanders, who expected that the Syarans would enjoy a significant advantage in the open steppe compared to the thick forests and rugged mountains of much of the rest of Ruvelka. In the aftermath of the operation, Field Marshall Todorov came under fire from the SCAF for his poor planning and leadership during the course of the battle, though he ultimately remained in command of Army Group Gamma for the remainder of the war. The losses Syara suffered during the campaign, coupled with casualties during the Operation Polyandreion and Operation Harpe led Central Command to suspend further major offensives a few months later.

Background

During the opening months of the Zemplen War Army Group Gamma had taken a relatively minor role in the conflict, confined by the mountainous terrain of southern Ruvelka to short range offensive operations. Although the Army Group took part in pitched fighting during the Ruvelkan Winter Counter-Offensive, it was not a major target for the Imperial Armed Forces of Ruvelka. As a result of its relative good standing compared to the other Syaran Army Groups, Gamma was considered the best option to spearhead further Syaran offensives. In Operation Synaspismos the Syarans furthered their gains in southern Ruvelka with a decisive victory over Army Group South, forcing the Ruvelkans to cede much of the western Matra Mountains to Syaran control. Following Syara's crushing victory at Annohk Valley, General Tibor Fehér ordered Army Group South to withdraw further south and east, allowing the Syarans to establish a strong anchor point along the western Matra Range. The encirclement of Aszód and the subsequent siege further depleted Ruvelkan forces in the region, although the failure to capture the city would force the Syaran 10th Army to permamnently commit the XXXV Corps under Lt. General Zaharinka Mitrovska to surrounding the port.

Although the offensive left Army Group Gamma in a good defensive posture, the mountainous terrain it occupied was unfamiliar to many Syaran commanders and left the Army Group in a cramped strategic position. As the winter subsided and the spring approached, Syaran Central Command devised plans for a second wave of offensives intended to destroy the bulk of the Ruvelkan Imperial Army. All the Army Group commanders were summoned to Zovahr between 13-15 March 2009 to discuss the coming operations and for their input. Chief of Staff Vakhtang Avakian led the discussion and outlined the desired course of action; all three Army Groups would launch a major strategic offensive in sequence intended to destroy the Ruvelkan Army Group opposite their forces. The decimation of Ruvelka's ground forces would cripple the Principality's ability to wage war, and compell Debrecen to sue for peace. With over 3.5 million men in uniform, over 2,000 manned aircraft and 25,000 armored fighting vehicles, the logistical burden of supporting concurrent offensives was deemed too significant. Instead, the Army Groups would launch their offensives in sequence, allowing resources and reserves to be shifted elsewhere once the fighting in a particular sector was complete. Army Group Gamma, being the most combat ready of the Syaran formations, was to launch the first strike against Ruvelka's Army Group South.

Syaran convoy near the Matra Mountains in southern Ruvelka.

As was the case with the Syaran military, the exact details of the operations were left to their respective commands to be devised. Field Marshal Daniel Mladenov Todorov, commander of Army Group Gamma, returned to Army Group Headquarters on 17 March and directed his Opperations Senior Officer Major General Božidar Dukić to devise a plan for a major offensive aimed at the destruction of Army Group South, with input from Gamma's Chief of Staff Pavel Zajkovski. Along with the destruction of Army Group South, the offensive would also pave the way for the capture of Kenderes, a major supply route for supplies and resources from Mansuriyyah, which was backing Ruvelka.

In the Ruvelkan Imperial General Staff sentiments regarding future expectations were mixed. The failure of the Winter Counter-Offensive followed by the sharp sting of defeat in Synaspimos led to what Chancellor Edviná Molnár described as the "darkest days of the war". Despite that the mood was not entirely pessimistic; Sona Kaprielian, Director of the Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat (KNBSZ, or Military National Security Service) reported that Syaran estimates of Ruvelkan troop strength was inaccurate. Later on 11 March the KNBSZ reported that internal Syaran debate over furture strategic operations implied that Ruvelkan forces surpassed Syaran expectations.

On 13 March the KNBSZ reported that the Syarans were intending to launch another major offensive within a month. The details of the offensive were uncertain; Chancellor Molnár believed that Army Group Gamma would launch a second offensive in the south, but Chief of Staff Áron Surány disagreed, citing their recent action and estimating that Gamma would need longer to recover and prepare for another major operation. Surány instead surmised that a Syaran offensive was more likely in the north. There the Syarans would benefit from the relatively flat terrain of the Koryal Plain (better suited to Syaran armor and mechanized forces) and drive towards the vital northern port of Mateszalka. Uncertainty over Syaran intentions was finally resolved in late March when increasingly frequent reports from Ruvelkan spies behind Syaran lines reported Syaran supply columns reinforcing Army Group Gamma.

Planning

On 20 March Major General Dukić presented the first iteration of Gamma's offensive plan, codenamed Operation Sagaris. The original plan called for a transfer of 5th Army to the left flank of Army Group Gamma and for 8th Army to take up the center, with 10th Army remaining in its position. 10th and 8th Army would attack in unision against Ruvelkan forces south the Western Matra foothills. 10th and 8th Army would both draw off Ruvelkan reserves long enough for 5th Army to dispatch two corps into the right flank of Army Group South, breaking into the rear echelon and surrounding the bulk of the Army Group. Chief of Staff Zajkovski approved the plan and presented it to Field Marshal Todorov. Todorov dissaproved, citing the the transfer of two entire field armies would not only be a logistical strain, but would also take weeks and leave the Army Group exposed to attack. Compounding the problem was the Army Group's poor position; 8th Army was holding a narrow front throughout the Matra Mountains. Kenderes was just 70 kilometers from the Army Group's southern flank, but two of 8th Army's corps, XVI and XX Corps, were facing towards Püspökladány. For weeks Army Group Beta's commanding officer, Field Marshal Arisdages Koundakjian had asked that 8th Army be repositioned to better support 9th Army, which was strung out across the Balatonalmádi District. In preparation for the upcoming offensive, the request was denined.

Todorov insisted on a new plan be written, which Dukić and his staff developed and presented again on 22 March. The new plan called for multiple pincer movements by the Syaran corps from each army, with 8th and 10th Armies striking in unision to isolate the Ruvelkan fronts and allow 5th Army to roll through the batteries Ruvelkan armies towards Kenderes. The plan opted for a slower pace than the original, allowing the Ruvelkans time to deploy their reserves which the Syarans would then counter to annihilate the entire formation. Todorov again however dismissed the plan, believing the slow pace would give the Ruvelkans too much time to react and redeploy their forces. Todorov proceeded to draft up the plan himself with input from his staff and presented it to his army commanders on 25 March.

Todorov's verison of Sagaris called for a mass encirclement of Army Group South through three concurrent maneuvers. 8th Army under Emanuel Bilić would detach two corps, XX and XXV, to move south and form up on line against the right flank of Army Group South, splitting through the 3rd Derecske Front, while 10th Army under Tihomir Orlić did the same on the right flank agianst the 4th Aszód Front. While this was developing 5th Army under Kakig Torossian would launch an assault straight up the middle, south towards Kenderes and through the 6th Püspökladány Front. Once the shaping operations had completed, 8th and 10th Army would form their divisions into a coherent line and advance into the operational and strategic depths of Army Group South, destroying the formation in its entirety and securing Kenderes in the process.

The plan was not well received by Gamma's Army commanders. Colonel General Orlić commented out that the extensive maneuvers that his forces were required to conduct were illsuited towards the relatively small area of operations, and furthermore his army, which had been forced to divert some 70,000 troops to besieging Aszód, was understrength. Todorov countered by pointing out the smaller geographic area was better suited to the smaller force. Bilić expressed similar sentiments, citing that XVI Corps would be forcced to remain behind to protect the right flank of the Army Group along the Matra Mountains. Todorov responded by informing them that the 9th Army would be pivoting to help protect the flank of the Army Group, which did little to settle their concerns. Torossian expressed serious reservations about the operation as a whole, noting the difficult both 8th and 10th Army would face trying to bring their full line of divisions to bare in the face of what were certain to be fierce Ruvelkan counter-attacks. Todorov ultimately dismissed all concerns, arguing that the Ruvelkans were still reeling from their defeats earlier in the year and would not be prepared for another offensive so quickly. Such statements did not quell the uncertainty with the army commanders, who returned to their commands on 28 March with orders to begin preparing for the offensive.

The terrain of the Kenderes Steppe meant Syaran infantry often had to advance long distances with little cover.

On 30 March, Ruvelkan SIGINT intercepted radio transmissions from Syaran command posts within the Syaran XXV and XXII Corps indicating that the two formations are preparing to go on the attack. The information was presented to Debrecen the same day, which validated Chancellor Molnár's belief that Army Group South was the next target. This time discussion over what course of action to take was largely uniform. It was quickly decided that abandoning the Kenderes Steppe was an unnacceptable strategic move and that Army Group South would have to repell the offensive in full. On 1 April General Tibor Fehér gathered his Front commanders to inform them of the expected attack. News of the expected offensive came as an unwelcome surprise to the Ruvelkan commanders, all of whom had formations that were still recovering from the fighting during the winter. The expectation that the Army Group was expected to stand and fight did little to assuage such concerns, but Fehér stressed that withdraw was not an option and insisted that proper defensive preparations would allow the Ruvelkans to weather the Syaran assault.

Ruvelkan Defensive Preparations

Forewarning of the impending Syaran offensive gave the Ruvelkans ample time to prepare extensive defenses along the Kenderes Steppe. Fehér recognized that the generally flat terrain of the region favored the more mechanized armies of the Syaran National Army and concluded quickly that attempting to hold a single static line would not suffice. By now the Ruvelkans were aware of Syaran preferences to "bite and hold" Ruvelkan forces in place to fully employ Syaran advantages in firepower, as a result Fehér concluded that the offensive would have to be contested repeatedly through frequent counter-attacks and aggressive defensive actions. In a message to his Front and Army commanders, Fehér outlined his vision for the battle:

The enemy prefers to engage in battles of their determination where their fires and armored forces are able to define the parameters of the battlefield through rapid offensive action...disruption of their efforts by continuous engagements at the edge of their ranged weaponry, coupled with assertion of tactical airpower and frequent infiltrations will mean the difference between victory and an agonizing defeat.

The Ruvelkans were eager to avoid a repetition of Operation Aspis, where Syaran forces were frequently able to pin down larger Ruvelkan formations through artillery fire while their mechanized forces raced through the battlefield encircling and cutting off entire formations. To avoid this Fehér envisioned a "rolling defense", where expected blows from the Syarans would be met by immediate counterattacks in other sectors in order to divert Syaran attention and resources. While the Ruvelkans did not want to rely on static positions, extensive defensive fortifications were created throughout the steppe. This included the laying of more than one million anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Battlefield surveillance was conducted extensively to allow artillery to be pre-sighted. Ditches, trenches, and even earthworks were created to obscure the otherwise flat terrain. More than 700,000 Ruvelkan civilians, many of them refugees from Syaran occupied territories, were recruited to assist in the prepration of defenses before they were evacuated further east.

The Ruvelkans went to great effort to conceal the extent of their buildup. This included moving entire divisions only at night, extensive use of camouflage, and elaborate deception efforts which included leaking false information regarding Army Group South's readiness rates and dispositions. Aware that Ruvelkan spirits were not particularily high after months of heavy fighting and some bitter defeats, Fehér made a number of visits to the front during the preparation phase, tempering his usually gruff demeanor to encourage his troops. At one point Fehér invited more than a dozen veterans of the Földalatti, Ruvelka's resistance movement during the Siduri War, to speak to Ruvelkan troops to raise morale.

As the Syarans gradually became aware of Ruvelkan defensive efforts over the course of April, Syaran commanders grew increasingly concerned at the task they were faced with. Rumors of an suprise trap being laid spread through Syaran formations, not aided by frequent raids by Ruvelkan Imperial Fusiliers that flew through Mansuriyyah behind Syaran lines. Throughout April these Fusilier infiltrations were responsible for the loss of nearly 7,000 tons of ammunition.

Forces in the field

For the offensive, the Syarans employed three field armies (5th, 8th, and 10th) with a total of eight corps and 25 divisions; four armored divisions, eleven mechanized divisions, and 9 motorized divisions. This amounted to just over 600,000 troops, and around 3,750 tanks, nearly 50% of all tanks fielded by Syara. In addition, Syara fielded some 6,450 artillery pieces and heavy mortars, as well as nearly 11,000 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. 8th Army held up the left flank fo the Syarans towards the Matra Mountains in the east, 5th Army in the center, and 10th Army on the right with its flank facing the Mansuri border. Ruvelka mobilized 22 infantry divisions, 17 Grenadier (mechanized infantry) divisions, 9 mountain (light infantry) divisions, six Hussar (light cavalry) divisions, and 5 Dragoon (heavy cavalry) divisions, for a total of 59 divisions, although Ruvelkan divisions were smaller than Syaran ones, typically 30-40% smaller. This amounted to over 800,000 troops, supported by close to 8,500 armored fighting vehicles, of which 3,200 were tanks or tank destroyers. Ruvelka also brought forward just under 5,000 artillery pieces of all types and over 300 attack helicopters.

The weapon systems fielded during the Operation exemplified the distinct differences between the Ruvelkan and Syara method of war. Syara's core consisted of mechanized and armored forces backed up by copious amounts of artillery. The Myrmidon Main Battle Tank fielded by the Syarans was superior to any Ruvelkan tank in terms of armor and firepower, but it was also the newest and most expensive, which relegated mostly to Syaran armor divisions. Mechanized and motorized divisions made due with the older Minotaur and Manticore tanks, which were equipped with a similar 125mm cannon but were otherwise inferior. Syaran armored divisions were heavily equipped with main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, and tracked mechanized infantry armed with anti-tank guided missiles and mobile mortar batteries. Mechanized divisions were armed with tracked infantry fighting vehicles and fewer tanks and a mixture of self-propelled and towed artillery. Motorized divisions fielded just three battalions of tanks and made use mostly of wheeled armor personnel carriers and towed artillery. Motorized divisions were sometimes nicknamed "Azzie" divisions because they often made use of material and equipment donated or sold by Syara's ally Æþurheim. In battle Armored divisions served primarily as the main spearhead of offensive operations. Mechanized divisions either supported the armored forces or conducted their own offensive or defensive operations. Motorized divisions were generally unsuited towards rapid maneuver and were typically employed as flank guards or in defensive roles where they could better leverage their artillery and firepower.

The Ruvelkan KH2 was inferior to Syaran tanks, but found new uses during the Zemplen War.

Ruvelkan armor was almost universally lighter than Syaran models and tended to vary more in design philosophy and implementation. The TSPJ1 Uhlan Light Tank was arguably the best tank fielded by the Ruvelkans; when modified with additional composite armor and equipped with a 120mm cannon it was comparable to most Syaran tanks. The bulk of Ruvelka's armor came in lighter forms with varied levels of firepower. The KT3 Konnik Light Tank utilized a 125mm cannon similar to the ones Syara fielded (an intentional design in order to make use of captured Syaran munitions) and could penetrate the armor of most Syaran armored vehicles, but designed as airdroppable it was therefore lightly armored. The turretless KH2 Ghost Main Battle Tank and the KT2 Lancer Light Tank were both two lightly armed to challenge most Syaran tanks, but they still present a significant threat to Syaran IFVs and APCs. The Ghost in particular became heavily utilized in conjunction with Ruvelkan infantry, fufilling a role not dissimilar to the role of assault guns of the Great War era. The ability to dig in the low profile Ghost for easy concealment also made it an attractive tool of ambush tactics.

Ruvelka fielded varied unit designations and organization than Syara. The most common was the Infantry Division, essentially motorized troops armed with wheeled transport and supported by light tanks, primarily composed of reservists mobilized from the Ruvelkan Territorial Defense Force. While numerous, they were typically outgunned by their Syaran counterparts. The Mountain Divisions were similarily organized, but lacked heavy artillery and armor. Trained for mountain warfare, they were not well suited to conflict on the open steppe but retained their capability as skilled light infantry well versed in infiltration tactics. Grenadier Divisions were essentially mechanized infantry, supported by ARCV 05 IFVs and OT3 Self-Propelled Howitzers. Hussar Divisions were light cavalry and armor, equipped usually with Lancer and Ghosts but backed up by self-propelled artillery. The Dragoon Divisions were the best armed in the Ruvelkan Army, equipped with Konnik tank destroyers and Uhlans, supported by mechanized infantry and self-propelled artillery.

Order of battle: Army Group Gamma (Field Marshal Daniel Mladenov Todorov)
Army	Army Commander	Corps	Corps Commander	Divisions
8th Army	Emanuel Bilić	XX Corps	Lt. General Stamat Cilemanoff	7th & 47th Mechanized Divisions, 30th Armored Division, 56th Motorized Division
		XXV Corps	Lt. General Hrvoje Jakopović	24th Mechanized Division, 71st & 86th Motorized Divisions, 100th Armored Division
		XVI Corps	Lt. General Gharib Antreasian	62nd Mechanized Division
5th Army	Kakig Torossian	XIX Corps	Lt. General Blagun Kostojcinovski	6th & 25th Mechanized Divisions, 35th Armored Division, 73rd Motorized Division
		XV Corps	Lt. General Stoyan Becvinovski	55th & 59th Mechanized Divisions, 72nd and 87th Motorized Divisions
		XXII Corps	Lt. General Samuil Yankov Glavchev	28th Mechanized Division, 74th & 89th Motorized Divisions, 101st Armored Division
10th Army	Tihomir Orlić	XXXVI Corps	Lt. General Yeprem Janikyan	29th & 75th Mechanized Divisions, 91st Motorized Division, 102nd Armored Division
		XXXIII Corps	Lt. General Kiril Antonov Adamov	40th & 77th Mechanized Divisions, 92nd & 110th Motorized Divisions

Order of battle: Army Group South (Vice Field Marshal Tibor Fehér)
Front	Front Commander	Armies	Divisions
4th Aszód Front	Stepanie Yeghoyan	15th, 16th, 18th Armies	6 Infantry Divisions, 5 Grenadier Divisions, 3 Mountain Divisions, 2 Hussar Divisions, 1 Dragoon Division
6th Püspökladány Front	Regina Sándor	41st, 26th, 39th Armies	6 Infantry Divisions, 3 Grenadier Divisions, 3 Mountain Divisions, 2 Hussar Divisions, 1 Dragoon Division
3rd Derecske Front	Ármin Varga	49th, 23rd, 7th Armies	5 Infantry Divisions, 5 Grenadier Divisions, 1 Mountain Division, 1 Hussar Division, 2 Dragoon Divisions
12th Pálháza Front	Vilmos Egyed	33rd, 55th, 60th Armies	5 Infantry Divisions, 4 Grenadier Divisions, 2 Mountain Divisions, 1 Hussar Division, 1 Dragoon Division

Course of the operation

Central Actions

On 17 April the Commonality Air Force began striking Ruvelkan positions along the Kenderes Steppe. Primary targets were forward airfields and helipads, with ammunition dumps and fuel storage second. The Syarans ran 800 sorties on the first day of the battle, losing four aircraft shot down, all of them fixed wing attack aircraft. At 06:30 Syaran artillery began shelling the forward lines of the Ruvelkan Fronts, which continued for an hour. At 07:55 Ruvelkan artillery answered back in a short, high intensity barrage meant to disrupt Syaran troops movements as they prepared to go on the offensive. Forward elements of the Syaran Army Group began probing Ruvelkan lines around 09:45 leading to direct clashes between Ruvelkan and Syaran troops. Future Chancellor Elsa Szekeres, then a Captain in the 4th Mountain Division of the 49th Army, 3rd Derecske Front, reported to her superiors while on a reconnaisaince patrol at 09:56:

The [Syarans] began moving in clusters of roughly battalion strength, armor and infantry in close coordination backed up by batteries of self-propelled howitzers. The struck along the primary line of enagement with rapid fire from autocannons and machineguns for several minutes before the shells began falling on the pinned down infantry in their fighting positions.

At around noon on 17 April the Syaran flanking armies, the 8th and 10th under Bilić and Orlić began their movements south towards their objectives. Opposing the Syarans was the 3rd Derceske Front in the east and the 4th Aszód Front on the west flank. 5th Army under Torossian advanced straight south against the 6th Püspökladány Front. In keeping with the strategy laid out by Army Group South commander Fehér, the Front commanders avoided placing to many of their units on a single line. Instead the Ruvelkan armies were staggered with one army forward and one farther back on each flank to allow for the development of counterstrokes and reserve deployment. There was comparatively little fighting between 17-19 April as both sides focused on deploying their forces in response to one another, occasional skirmishes between the two forces as their forward elements came within range of one another.

Ruvelkan rocket artillery fires to disrupt Syaran troop movements.

On 20 April Torossian, having placed most of 5th Army in line according to the plan put forth by Field Marshal Todorov, unleashed his main offensive against the Püspökladány Front's 41st Army. Within 24 hours the forward most Ruvelkan divisions, the 63rd, 76th Mountain Divisions and the 236th Infantry Division had been driven off by the lead elements of XV Corps. Although the 63rd Mountain had been rendered combat ineffective, the 76th Mountain and 236th Infantry were able to withdraw succesfully, while the Syarans were forced to contend with the extensive minefields laid out before them. While XV Corps made its way through the minefield the 41st Army counterattacked with the 6th Dragoon Division and 54th Hussar Division. After nine hours of fighting on 21 April both Ruvelkan divisions were forced to peel off and withdraw further south with heavy losses, but in the meantime XV Corps advance had been ground to a halt and the 55th Mechanized Division had been reduced to a third of its pre-battle strength.

While XV Corps struggled through the obstalces before it, XIX Corps in the west and XXII Corps in the east continued their drive south, but by 20 April had been slowed down significantly by Ruvelkan defenses and counterattacks by the 26th and 39th Armies. On 19 April the Ruvelkans counter-attacked against XIX Corps with the 93rd Grenadier Division and the 104th Hussar Division while the Syarans were held in place by the 21st and 74th Infantry Divisions. While the 104th Hussar was largely destroyed as a fighting force, the attack succesfully bled the 6th Mechanized Division, while the 25th Mechanized Division was forced to halt its advance entirely in the face of stiff Ruvelkan resistance. Unable to achieve a breakthrough, Lt. General Blagun Kostojcinovski ordered the 35th Armored Division forward to break the deadlock. Between 20-21 April the 35th Armored Division succeeded in breaking through the Ruvelkan defenses, routing the 93rd Grenadiers in the process. Faced with a sudden breakthrough, General Regina Sándor attempted to contain the Syaran effort, but by the time the 151st Infantry Division began moving, the 21st Infantry had largely been destroyed.

Sensing a potential disaster, Fehér ordered the 6th Combat Aviation Group to attack the Syaran armored forces of XIX Corps. On 22 April a force of some sixty attack helicopters, mostly HH1 Helicopter Gunships and HH3 Attack Helicopters, attacked the 35th Armored Division and the 25th Mechanized Division. The Syarans succeeding in downing 8 Ruvelkan helicopters, but in the process lost more than 30 tanks destroyed or disabled, and more than 90 other armored vehicles destroyed. On 23 April the remnants of the 93rd Grenadier Division, the 151st and the 74th Infantry Divisions counter-attacked against the weakened 25th Mechanized Division, decimating the Syaran formation. Repeated counterstrokes by the 35th Armored and 6th Mechanized managed to repulse the Ruvelkans, but after six days of bloody fighting XIX Corps had lost most of its offensive capability and was forced to halt its efforts.

Further east the XXII Corps under Lt. General Samuil Yankov Glavchev consisting of the 28th Mechanized Division, 74th & 89th Motorized Divisions, and 101st Armored Division slammed into the 39th Army. Aided by the terrain (an abundance of hills and a series of small tributaries), the 39th succeeded in resisting the Syaran assault for three days. By 22 April the 221st and 358th Infantry Divisions, along with the 36th Mountain Division, had been forced to retreat, but the next day the Ruvelkans counter-attacked with the 68th and 124th Grenadier Divisions. Over the course of nearly 11 hours of fighting the 28th Mechanized Infantry Division was unable to breakthrough, while the 101st Armored Division lost an entire brigade's worth of tanks either destroyed or disabled.

A Ruvelkan HH1 Helicopter Gunship hits Syaran positions.

The next day Torossian ordered a temporary halt to the offensive to give 5th Army desparately needed time to regroup. After a week of fighting the Syarans had gained 20 kilometers on average, but had lost more than 200 tankd destroyed or heavily damaged, in addition to another 350 armored vehicles. 8,000 Syarans were dead, and the front line was a jagged mess as Syaran formations were scattered amid wreckage and minefields.

Although they had halted the Syarans, the 6th Püspökladány Front was in poor shape as well. Most of the infantry divisions had been shattered, with the 41st Army in particularily dire straits. General Sándor informed Fehér on 24 April that the Front had been gutted and she could not guarantee further containment of the Syaran advance. Fehér agreed and ordered General Vilmos Egyed to have the 12th Pálháza Front ready to reinforce the center as necessary.

Flanking Actions

While 5th Army slugged through the center, 8th Army under Emanuel Bilić and 10th Army Tihomir Orlić attempted to complete their part of the operation. It became clear, however, within a day of the commencement of the offensive that the two men were operating on different wavelengths. Orlić, recognizing he was outnumbered, wanted to exploit Syaran advantages in speed and firepower as quickly and effectively as possible, swinging his corps through the edge and flank of the 4th Aszód Front to break into their rear echelon and through the entire formation into dissaray. Bilić on the otherhand, well aware of Ruvelkan numerical superority and defensive posture, wanted to ensure 8th Army met the 3rd Derecske Front with all the firepower it had to bear, and thus opted for a slower advance to keep his divisions in close contact and avoid the infiltrations that had become the bane of Syaran patrols.

On the western flank Orlić had 10th Army strung out along a wide front in an effort to outflank the Aszód Front, which was holding the left flank of Army Group South. Wishing to preserve his armored formations for the breakthough 10th Army was aiming for, Orlić ordered XXXIII Corps to pivot and pin the 15th Army in place and allow for XXXVI Corps rupture through the left flank with three mechanized and armored divisions while the 91st Motorized Division held the flank. General Stepanie Yeghoyan, commander of the 4th Aszód Front, had positioned her forces well to support one another, but her troops were also occupying some of the least defensible terrain of the Kenderes Steppe. In addition, many of her divisions were composed of freshly raised troops, especially those in the 15th and 16th Armies.

A Ruvelkan TSPJ1 Uhlan Light Tank.

Intense fighting between the 4th Aszód Front and 10th Army did not begin in earnest until the early hours of 19 April due to the distances involved in the movement of forces. By noon on the 19th the bulk of 15th Army was being actively engaged by XXXIII Corps resulting in intense fighting between the 40th and 77th Mechanized Divisions against the dug in troops of the 34th, 361st Infantry divisions and the 171st Hussar Division. By the end of the day the Ruvelkans had been battered into withdrawing, but did so in good order and the 388th and 328th Grenadier Divisions were able to counterattack and halt the advance of the XXXIII Corps. By 20 April though it became clear that the action were merely a side show compared to the main body of XXXVI Corps under Lt. General Yeprem Janikyan bearing down on the 16th Army holding position along the south-western corner of the entire Army Group.

Not wanting the Syarans to set the tone for the enagement, Yeghoyan ordered the 324th Grenadier Division, 94th Hussar Division, 146th Dragoon Division, and 332nd and 323rd Infantry Divisions to attack XXXVI Corps as it maneuvered. Yeghoyan's decision to attack surprised the Syarans who were expecting to run into dug in Ruvelkan infantry but found themselves under fire from advancing Ruvelkan tanks. At around 13:15 on 20 April nearly 2,000 armored fighting vehicles of the 16th Army slammed into the 655 tanks of XXXVI Corps near the small town of Zsana. The maneuver to check the advance of the Syaran corps was the logical choice, but the confrontation forced largely inexperienced Ruvelkan conscripts to three heavy Syaran divisions. Fighting continued throughout the night into the morning of 21 April, by which the Syarans had routed the 324th Grenadiers, 332nd and 323rd Infantry, and 146th Dragoons. The Ruvelkans had managed to destroy or disable more than 300 Syaran AFVs, including over 100 tanks, but at the cost of over a thousand Ruvelkan armored vehicles.

With 16th Army shattered, XXXVI Corps stood ready to sweep into the depths of the Aszód Front, potentially throwing the entire Army Group South into chaos. Amid orders from Vice Field Marshal Fehér to stop the Syarans at all cost, Yeghoyan comitted the 16th and 318th Grenadier Divisions, along with the 10th Infantry Division from the 18th Army, while ordered the 94th Hussar Division of 16th Army to counter-attack the Syarans and halt XXXVI Corps. At around 05:15 22 April the Ruvelkans struck back, and this time the exhausted Syarans, who were beginning to run low on ammunition and fuel, were forced back. Upon learning this Orlić immediately ordered Lt. General Janikyan to turn his corps around and continue the attack, but Janikyan refused, citing the near state of collapse his forces were in after three days of continuous fighting. Upon learning of his refusal to carry out his roders, Orlić ordered Janikyan to report to 10th Army's headquarters to be relived of command, but Field Marshal Todorov intervened, citing the validity of Janikyan's concerns. On 23 April Orlić was forced to call off the attack and ordered 10th Army to regroup.

A Syaran tank destroyed by Ruvelkan attack helicopters.

On the eastern flank General Bilić's 8th Army advanced slowly towards the Ruvelkan lines held by the 3rd Derceske Front. Unlike his counterpart commanding 10th Army, Bilić, a career cavalryman, wanted to ensure that his forces had all the firepower they could bring to bear when they made contact with the Ruvelkans. The act of moving nine divisions in union with one another and to overlap fields of fire between divisional artillery and their advance guards proved to be a tedious process, and it wasn't until mid-afternoon on 19 April did 8th Army begin to seriously engage the Derceske Front. After a few hours of intermediate clashes the Syarans halted their advance; Bilić wanted XXV Corps under Lt. General Hrvoje Jakopović to swing around the far right flank of the Derceske Front and push through the boundaries of the 23rd Army while XX Corps did the same for the 49th Army. With limited roadways and extensive Ruvelkan minefields, this took until 20 April to accomplish.

Deeply entrenched, the 43rd and 123rd Infantry Divisions of the 49th Army, along with the 4th Mountain Division, were the primary recipients of the opening phases of the assault by XX Corps. Led by the 7th and 47th Mechanized Divisions, the Syarans gradually broke through the Ruvelkan first defensive belt in multiple sectors, capturing several small villages. Before Lt. General Stamat Cilemanoff could introduce the 30th Armored Division for a breakthrough effort, the Ruvelkan 49th Army counter-attacked the breach with the 112th Grenadier and 21st Dragoon Division in the evening. The fighting continued well into the night, allowing for light infantry of the 4th Mountain Division to launch several succesful infiltrations into the area of operations for both the 7th and 47th Mechanized Divisions. By midnight the increasingly chaotic fighting caused the boundaries of the 7th and 47th Mechanized to lose contact with one another. Attacks by the 43rd Infantry Division caused the 47th Mechanized to lose its cohesiveness and the division began to unravel as individual battalions became isolated. Fearing a collapse, Cilemanoff ordered the 30th Armored to assault straight through and break the Ruvelkan counterstroke.

Fierce fighting bled into the morning of 21 April. By 10:15 the 30th Armored Division had managed to restore Syaran unit cohesion, driving off the 112th Grenadiers and 43rd Infantry Division in the process. Front Commander Ármin Varga ordered the 49th Army to fall back to secondary defensive positions, which they were able to accomplish before nigthfall. The Syarans, their units now badly intermixed and disorganized, were unable to pursue.

Further issues confounded 8th Army's advance. Further east from 49th Army, the heavily armed 23rd Army, consisting of four divisions of mechanized infantry and armor, were sufficient to stonewall the advance of XXV Corps. After more than 24 hours of fighting the Syaran 24th Mechanized and 100th Armored Division had failed to break through Ruvelkan lines. The withdrawl of 49th Army however left 23rd Army with an exposed left flank. Recognizing the danger, Varga ordered the 23rd Army to fall back to the second defensive belt at 12:35 on 21 April. Before this could be accomplished however Cilemanoff noted the gap forming between the two Ruvelkan armies and immediately ordered the 30th Armored Division to swing east and strike against the flank of the 23rd Army while urging Lt. General Jakopović to continue his assault against 23rd Army.

The 30th Armored Division hit the left flank of the 23rd Army, held by the 142nd Grenadier Division, at around 16:30, while XXV Corps attempted to resume the offensive. Within the hour the 142nd Grenadiers were beginning to falter, and upon learning of the situation at 17:15, Varga ordered the 49th Army to stop its withdrawal and counter-attack immediately against XX Corps. The sudden reversal of orders prove difficult to carry out immediately, allowing the Syarans to reorient themselves somewhat to meet the Ruvelkans. As had become typical with the western section of the battlefield, the fighting carried on into the night. Hoping to repel the efforts of XX Corps, the 49th Army attacked the southern flank of the 30th Armored Division witht he 21st Dragoons while the 4th Mountain and 123rd Infantry Division attempted to hold back the 7th and 47th Mechanized along with the 56th Motorized Division.

Syaran artillery hits Ruvelkan positions near the town of Csengőd.

XXV Corps found itself engaging the 23rd Army while it was in the midst of attempting to withdraw, forcing the Ruvelkan to hastily resume their defensive positions. This sudden change to their orders did not bode well for some Ruvelkan units, who found themselves out of place while XXV Corps began to bear down on them. At around 19:00 the 100th Armored Division, supported by two brigades from the 86th Motorized Division assaulted the area of the 198th Infantry and 195th Grenadier Division. After four hours of fighting the Syarans had routed the two Ruvelkan divisions and sent them reeling. Syaran hopes that they would be able to turn the entire 23rd Army were dashed when the 232nd Hussar Division met the Syaran breach in a rapid counterstroke to contain the 100th Armored Division. By midnight the Syarans were temporarily contained, but after a three hour lull in the fighting the resurgent 24th Mechanized and 71st Motorized Divisions defeated the 24th Dragoon Division, opening another gap in the Ruvelkan lines.

Despite the success the Syarans were in a bad way. The 100th Armored Division and 24th Mechanized Division were in poor shape for further action without serious rest and refit. With both Syaran Corps unable to press home the advantage, Bilić ordered the reserve 62nd Mechanized Division to exploit the breakthrough. In the early hours of 23 April the fresh division began moving out of its staging area and moved through the gaps created by the Syaran corps, brushing aside scattered attacks by the remnants of the 49th and 23rd Armies. After advancing 15 Kilometers the 62nd Mechanized prepared to swing around to hit the 23rd Army from the rear and roll through the entire force when it ran into the 7th Army, which had been sent by Varga to take up blocking positions. Supported by the 11th Combat Aviation Group, 7th Army blunted the advance of the 62nd Mechanized with the 75th and 164th Grenadier Divisions. Unable to leverage support from the rest of 8th Army, the 62nd fell back in line with the rest of the Syaran force while the Dececske Front reconstituted itself along its second defensive belt. By 15:00 23 April Bilić reported that 8th Army would have to suspend its offensive for at least 48 hours before it could resume.

Stalemate

On 24 April Field Marshal Todorov ordered a temporary cessation of the offensive. Army Group Gamma was exhausted; more than 17,000 Syarans had been killed, and more than 1,300 armored vehicles had been lost. The mood within the Army Group's headquarters was grim; on 25 April the three army commanders were summoned to a meeting with Todorov to go over the progress of the operation so far. All three generals expressed similar sentiments; Ruvelkan defenses were much stronger than anticipated, the Syaran forces were badly damaged and needed time to reorganize and regroup, and the likliehood of the operation succeeding was low. Various other complaints emerged, including criticism that the Commonality Air Force had failed to provide adequate air support for the ground forces.

Todorov responded by stating that he was not ready to abandon the operation and pointed out that Ruvelkan losses were considerably higher. While he agreed to suspend the operation for three days, he urged his generals that a second go would be able to produce a victory. None of the army commanders were apparently convinced, but they returned to their own command posts the same day with orders to regroup their forces and then resume the offensive on 27 April.

For the Ruvelkans, the reprive was a welcome one. Caution defined the command environment of Army Group South; while it was generally understood that the Syarans had been halted, all three forward Fronts had taken serious beatings during the process. Many of the infantry divisions had been rendered combat ineffective, and many armored divisions were now considerably understrength. On 26 April Vice Field Marshal Fehér contacted Debrecen to inform Chief of Staff Áron Surány that while the Ruvelkans were holding, the situation remained "critical, with implications still to be resolved".

The Syarans inteded to resume the offensive on Monday, 27 April in the morning, but on 26 April a major stormfront rolled through and grounded many aircraft, while rain turned much of the Kenderes Steppe to mud. Wary of pushing an already tedious position too far, Todorov agreed to delay the resumption of the attack until the weather was more conducive. By April 30 the skies were finally clear and with enough ammunition and fuel in supply the Syarans resumed the offensive. There was little alteration to the main plan of attack, which still called for 5th Army to push through the 6th Püspökladány Front while 8th and 10th Armies pushed through the 3rd Derecske Front and 4th Aszód Front respectively.

The remains of a Syaran tank.

The Syarans began shelling Ruvelkan lines around 05:00, shorter in duration than the initial barrage and less intense. At around 05:30 the Syarans began their ground offensive, but uneasy about the losses they had taken prusued their objectives with noticable haste. By 2 May the Ruvelkand had been pushed back just ten kilometers and with the committment of the 12th Pálháza Front to shore up the Ruvelkan lines the Syarans called a halt. The remaining days of Sagaris had seen no major offensive maneuvers, just a slow steady battle of attrition that the outnumbered Syarans were not in position to endure.

On 4 May Colonel General Torossian arrived at Army Group Gamma Headquarters to speak with Field Marshal Todorov to discuss the situation. In his memoirs written after the war, Torossian described the situation.

I approached the Field Marshal and expressed a number of salient points, namely the damage to our technical reconnasaince means, the depletion of stockpiles of one-five-two ammunition, and the general weariness of the junior officers and their formations. I stated my belief that without significant reinforcements and rotation of our forward most units we would be unable to achieve a breakthrough into the operational echelon of the [Ruvelkans]. The Field Marshal did not respond immediately but instead asked me a number of questions of various items, such as the disposition of our reserves and my thoughts on the ability of Ruvelkan tank and artillery crews. Confused, I clarified my sentiments and asked what his future orders would be, but he again failed to answer them to a satisfactory manner. After several minutes I grew agitated and eventually pressed him on his intent for the operation, after which he finally said something akin to admitting the Army Group would most certainly not be able to achieve its objectives. After conversing with the [Army Group Chief of Staff] we agreed that a tactical withdraw was appropriate in the event Army Group South would attempt a counter-offensive.

Sporadic firefights broke out between 4-6 May as the Syarans steadily peeled back their forces and assumed a defensive posture. The Ruvelkans opted to dig into their present positions rather than attempt to reclaim their original defensive line in the event the Syaran withdrawal was a ruse. Both sides had dug in by 7 May and the fighting gradually died down, leading the 7th to be generally considered the end of the operation, though Vice Field Marshal Fehér did not communicate to Debrecen until 9 May, where he stated his belief that the Syarans would not resume the offensive.

Aftermath

News of the end of the operation was somewhat overshadowed by the events unfolding in Central Ruvelka due to Operation Polyandreion, but reports of Army Group South's succesful defense of the Kenderes Steppe were well recieved in Debrecen. Chancellor Edviná Molnár hoped that Army Group South would be able to counterattack quickly and drive the Syarans back over the Matra Mountains, potentially underming the Syaran forces in Army Group Beta, but Vice Field Marshal Fehér maintained his depleted forces needed months to reorganized and refit before they could assume an offensive posture. Ruvelkan forces would eventually force the Syarans back to the Matra Mountains in Operation Hretha.

In Zovahr news of the failure of Sagaris was a harsh blow to Syaran Central Command, when coupled with the heavy losses being sustained in central Ruvelka it painted a bleak picture of Syaran chances for success. In the weeks that followed significant criticism fell upon Field Marshal Daniel Mladenov Todorov for his role in planning the offensive. Critiques often focused on the unimaginative nature of the plan, along with the poor personnel assignment, such as having the typically cautious and slow moving Colonel General Emanuel Bilić tasked with conducting a critical flanking action, while the more maneuver minded Kakig Torossian had been forced to charge his troops straight into the teeth of Ruvelkan defenses. Some commentators saw the operation as proof of the issues with Syara's command structure, namely the inability of the Army commanders to override their orders of the Army Group commander despite shared reservations regarding the plan.

The operation set the tone for the bloody fighting that would occur throughout the rest of the year. 28,405 Syaran troops were killed, with another 76,366 were wounded. More than 735 tanks were destroyed or disable, of which 214 were eventually recovered and repaired to working order. More than 1,500 armored vehicles of all types were also destroyed, along with 26 aircraft shot down. Ruvelkan losses were equally heavy; 31,780 killed, 92,458 wounded, and nearly 2,500 armored fighting vehicles of all kinds destroyed or heavily damaged. Despite these heavy losses, the Ruvelkans viewed their victory in a positive light, as it represented the first time they had stonewalled a Syaran offensive in its tracks. The Ruvelkans had also demonstrated significantly improved ability when it came to the organizational skills necessary for coordinating large armies, while also demonstrating improvement in the conduct of armored operations.