Augsberger Affair: Difference between revisions
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Relations between Werania and Etruria were at best amicable, though they had long be strained by the Etrurian failure or outright refusal to counteract Gaullican influence. The two countries did, however, have a shared history dating back to the [[Euclean Revolutionary Wars]], in which the two had fought against Gaullica and the rest of Euclea. This relationship was undermined post-war by Etruria's earlier provision of sanctuary to numerous [[Weranic unification|Pan-Weranic revolutionaries]], in the view that doing so would keep the Euclean powers distracted by a revolution and unstable Werania. Underpinning these negatives was due to the extent of loss and destruction suffered by Etruria during its near twenty-years of conflict against the monarchies of Euclea and the stipulations of the [[Treaty of San Marino]] kept Etruria viewing military activity within Euclea with great caution. Despite the hopes of Werania the more positive historic friendship would aid them, the Etrurians were equally cautious to align the country fully with [[Estmere]], with whom they were engaged in a fierce colonial rivalry in [[Bahia]] and [[Coius]] beginning in the 1840's. On the otherhand, Weranic hopes were also fed by the rhetoric and private communications from members of Etrurian government, including Prime Minister Leopoldo d'Azeglio, who saw an alliance with Werania as the most viable option for overturning the Treaty of San Marino and breaking free of Gaullican influence. However, these hopes would be regularly dashed by the constitution and the overwhelming dominance of the monarchy in foreign affairs. | Relations between Werania and Etruria were at best amicable, though they had long be strained by the Etrurian failure or outright refusal to counteract Gaullican influence. The two countries did, however, have a shared history dating back to the [[Euclean Revolutionary Wars]], in which the two had fought against Gaullica and the rest of Euclea. This relationship was undermined post-war by Etruria's earlier provision of sanctuary to numerous [[Weranic unification|Pan-Weranic revolutionaries]], in the view that doing so would keep the Euclean powers distracted by a revolution and unstable Werania. Underpinning these negatives was due to the extent of loss and destruction suffered by Etruria during its near twenty-years of conflict against the monarchies of Euclea and the stipulations of the [[Treaty of San Marino]] kept Etruria viewing military activity within Euclea with great caution. Despite the hopes of Werania the more positive historic friendship would aid them, the Etrurians were equally cautious to align the country fully with [[Estmere]], with whom they were engaged in a fierce colonial rivalry in [[Bahia]] and [[Coius]] beginning in the 1840's. On the otherhand, Weranic hopes were also fed by the rhetoric and private communications from members of Etrurian government, including Prime Minister Leopoldo d'Azeglio, who saw an alliance with Werania as the most viable option for overturning the Treaty of San Marino and breaking free of Gaullican influence. However, these hopes would be regularly dashed by the constitution and the overwhelming dominance of the monarchy in foreign affairs. | ||
Perhaps inspired by the messaged relayed to the Weranic government through Ambassador Carraro, Minister-President [[Ulrich von Bayrhoffer]] authorised Foreign Minister [[Ludwig von Augsberger]] to begin efforts toward the recruitment of Etruria against Gaullica. | |||
==Content of the Letters== | ==Content of the Letters== | ||
Revision as of 13:32, 29 July 2020
The Augsberger Affair, also known as the Augsberger Letter Crisis, was a major diplomatic incident stemming from a series of letters sent by Weranian foreign minister Ludwig von Augsberger during the War of the Triple Alliance, which proposed a military alliance between Werania and Etruria against Gaullica. The letters indicated that, should Etruria accept the offer, they would be awarded Gaullican colonies, a strip of land along the Etrurian-Gaullican border, and the revocation of constraints placed on Etruria following the defeat of the Etrurian First Republic. The communications were intercepted by Etrurian reactionary nobles in the foreign ministry who were sympathetic to the Gaullican cause. Revelation of the content wrought popular outrage from Gaullicans, and galvinised support for the war on the home front. In Etruria, the exposure was a national embarrassment; King Caio Onorio subsequently denounced Weranian ambitions, as well as revealing the deep divisions between the monarchy and the Etrurian parliament over foreign policy.
Background
War of the Triple Alliance
The crisis unfolded as the War of the Triple Alliance was being fought across Euclea, pitting the Triple Alliance of Gaullica, Sunrosia and Narozalica against Werania and Estmere. Although the Weranians had held the advantage in the early stages of their Sunrosian campaign, by 1853 they were beginning to lose the initiative, and were at risk of being pushed back by Gaullo-Narozalic forces. As a result of this, they had begun to search for new allies to turn the tide of the war. The key aim in contacting Etruria, on Werania's part, was to enable an unanticipated attack on Gaullica's southern flank, that would catch them off-guard and force them to pull back from Sunrosia, while Etruria would be able to capture key points in southeastern Gaullica. This was ultimately misinformed; as would soon be confirmed, Etruria had little military capability to act with.
Etrurian politics
Since the Caltrini Restoration in 1810, which overthrew the Etrurian First Republic and established the United Kingdom of Etruria, there was little taste in any segment of the ruling elite for great military adventures into the Euclean hinterland. Furthermore, the Treaty of San Marino, which formally ended the Etrurian Revolutionary Wars placed considerable restrictions on Etruria's involvement in Euclean affairs and was thoroughly policed by Gaullica. The enforcement by Etruria's powerful northern neighbour resulted in a deep rooted policy of "Friendly Subordination" (Subordinazione Amichevole), in which Etruria, led by the monarchy would abide by the Treaty while concurrently pursuing close ties with Gaullica. This policy guaranteed Etrurian acquiesence and a limitation on its military capabilites, though only to an extent that Etruria would fare poorly in Euclea yet enforce its colonial ambitions in Bahia and Coius. The treaty's imposition was coupled with the 1810 Etrurian constitution's granting of full control over foreign affairs to the monarch, who not only appointed the Foreign Minister but had the power of veto on all legislation related to external affairs.
Throughout the 1830s and early 1840s, this policy was facing ever growing opposition within Etruria's parliament, where successive prime ministers sought to undermine the monarchy's hold on foreign affairs, to no avail. In 1849, Leopoldo d'Azeglio was elected Prime Minister, and was a noted opponent of Friendly Subordination. D'Azeglio also stood as a leading figure of the growing nationalistic movement within Etrurian politics, who saw the Treaty of San Marino to both be outdated and unnecessary, insofar that the chances of a renewed Etrurian revolution and rampage was "nigh lunacy." Against d'Azeglio stood the entire monarchy and aristorcracy, who had used the decades long policy to establish considerable personal, financial and political ties with their Gaullican counterparts. It was noted that both King Caio Onorio and Queen Isabella Maria were close confidants and friends of Gaullica's Queen Evelin and her children, while the King's closest allies in court had numerous business ties to leading Gaullican figures.
In the lead up to the War of the Triple Alliance, d'Azeglio and his supporters in parliament sought to wrest control of foreign affairs from the monarchy. In 1851, d'Azeglio's government sought to pass a law granting the government "significant influence" over matters of state diplomacy, especially if the "commercial and trade interests of the Etrurian Kingdom and her merchants would be violated." The Prime Minister argued in the press that any major conflict in Northern Euclea, would significantly endanger the trade and commercial interests of the Kingdom, where Etruria was purchasing vital resources to fuel its industrial revolution. The law gained swift traction in the lower-house, however, it found itself bogged down in the aristocratic dominated upper-house, where many nobles saw the bill as a violation of the 1810 constitution. King Caio Onorio threatened to veto the bill if showed signs of passing in the upper-house, stating in a speech to the parliament, "the Prime Minister should take comfort in knowing the throne will act in the interest of the realm always. This law is not needed and in relation to the great roiling of the North, this would be a great detriment to the peace and harmony of the Etrurian." The King's intervention effectively neutralised d'Azeglio's efforts and reasserted royal control over external affairs.
As the war erupted in 1852, the King would make regular comments confirming Etruria's official neutrality in the conflict. Behind the scenes within parliament, the King's intervention a year prior had triggered a significant shift among both the liberal and conservative wings. Many saw the constitutional guarantee of royal control over foreign policy as a resurrection of royal dominance prior to the Etrurian Revolution, even Alessandro Chiado, d'Azeglio's long-time liberal rival claimed in a letter to parliamentarians, "we find ourselves again subject in our affairs of state to the personal interests and curiosities of the monarch. The nation is once again subordinated to the fancies of one Man." The shift in many ways reignited republican tendacies within the Etrurian parliament, while the divisions were being relayed to wider society, where d'Azeglio enjoyed greater support among the general populace of which was significantly more nationalistic and assertive in its views of Etruria and its place in the world. D'Azeglio and many others saw the War of the Triple Alliance as an opportunity for both, the revocation of the Treaty of San Marino and possible expansion of Etruria's colonial and mainland holdings. Etruria's foreign minister at the time, Vittore Farinacci, Count of Tresana was an appointee of King Caio Onorio and was sidelined by d'Azeglio, who took to dining with former diplomats. In one such meeting, d'Azeglio succeeded in having a message sent to Alfredo Setti Carraro, the Etrurian ambassador to Werania, ordering him to inform Emperor Sigismund of Etruria's interest in "assisting Werania maintain the cherished equilibrium of Northern Euclea." Historians have since reached consensus that the D'Azeglio request of Ambassador Carraro may have been integral in sparking the Augsberger Affair, and equally the subsequent post-affair political crisis in Etruria.
Weranian-Etrurian relations
Relations between Werania and Etruria were at best amicable, though they had long be strained by the Etrurian failure or outright refusal to counteract Gaullican influence. The two countries did, however, have a shared history dating back to the Euclean Revolutionary Wars, in which the two had fought against Gaullica and the rest of Euclea. This relationship was undermined post-war by Etruria's earlier provision of sanctuary to numerous Pan-Weranic revolutionaries, in the view that doing so would keep the Euclean powers distracted by a revolution and unstable Werania. Underpinning these negatives was due to the extent of loss and destruction suffered by Etruria during its near twenty-years of conflict against the monarchies of Euclea and the stipulations of the Treaty of San Marino kept Etruria viewing military activity within Euclea with great caution. Despite the hopes of Werania the more positive historic friendship would aid them, the Etrurians were equally cautious to align the country fully with Estmere, with whom they were engaged in a fierce colonial rivalry in Bahia and Coius beginning in the 1840's. On the otherhand, Weranic hopes were also fed by the rhetoric and private communications from members of Etrurian government, including Prime Minister Leopoldo d'Azeglio, who saw an alliance with Werania as the most viable option for overturning the Treaty of San Marino and breaking free of Gaullican influence. However, these hopes would be regularly dashed by the constitution and the overwhelming dominance of the monarchy in foreign affairs.
Perhaps inspired by the messaged relayed to the Weranic government through Ambassador Carraro, Minister-President Ulrich von Bayrhoffer authorised Foreign Minister Ludwig von Augsberger to begin efforts toward the recruitment of Etruria against Gaullica.
Content of the Letters
The letters themselves were not cleverly hidden or encoded; the Weranian foreign ministry assumed that they would be kept secret by their Etrurian counterparts. Though there were a number of letters, the most important was one concerning rewards for joining Werania in the war. The letter was delivered to the Weranian ambassador at the Weranian embassy in Poveglia, and was then given by him to members of the Etrurian foreign office, for an intended transfer to King Caio Onorio and his royal court, for his eyes only. The Weranians had not anticipated the level of Gaullican sympathy in the Etrurian nobility and foreign office.
The key letter read as follows:
We are planning new, great military offences across northern Euclea. We intend to smash Gaullica's resistance, and to enforce a change in the continent's politics. Our aim is nothing less than the dethroning of the Gaullican behemoth. To this end, we propose the aforementioned alliance of war together and peace together, and promise to support Etrurian ambitions in Coius and Bahia. We offer the recovery of Montecara, control over the Holy Lands and rights to Southern Bahia. Further, the redrawing of the Gaullican-Etrurian border, in Etruria's favour. With Gaullica's defeat, the revocation and annulment of the unjust measures imposed in 1810 becomes necessary. I ask you to relay this information to the his majesty Caio Onorio, first of his name.
Signed, Ludwig von Augsberger
Interception and revelation
The letters were ultimately intercepted by a cabal of pro-Gaullican nobles who worked within the Etrurian foreign office. Distressed at the contents of the letters, they immediately informed their contacts in Gaullica of the situation, and hoped it would lead to a Gaullican intervention. The information and content of the letters was quickly leaked to news outlets, who reported the story as breaking news. Within days, it had emerged as the leading story across Euclea. For a number of days, the Etrurian foreign office refused to comment on the scandal, until it finally addressed it a month after the revelation, in November 1853.
Reception
In Gaullica, the revelation of the letters galvinised support for the war, and stirred on anti-Weranian sentiment. The popular outrage shaped government policy, with the Gaullican government exerting its commercial influence in Etruria to demand that the government denounce Weranian ambitions. Caio Onorio found himself backed into a corner, and publicly denounced Weranian ambitions. The revelation of the letters had a significantly negative affect on the perception of Werania worldwide, seriously damaging their credibility and raising concerns regarding their willingness to respect international norms.