Operation Sagaris
Operation Sagaris (known sometimes as the Battle of the Kenderes Steppe) was an offensive launched by the Syaran Commonality Armed Forces during the Zemplen War. With more than half a million troops involved on each side, it was the largest single battle fought in the conflict.
In the spring of 2009 Syara had launched Operation Synaspismos and delivered a crushing victory against Ruvelka's Army Group South. Despite the failure to capture Aszód and the Operation Pylooros, Syaran Central Command believed a sweeping offensive into the Ruvelkan steppe south of the Matra Mountains would allow Syara to circumnavigate the mountainous obstacles of the Kurillas and allow the Syarans to push into eastern Ruvelka. Field Marshal Daniel Mladenov Todorov, commanding officer of Army Group Gamma, envisioned a major encirclement of the bulk of Army Group South to destroy Ruvelka's main fighting force in the region, with the added bonus of cutting off the supply routes from Ruvelka-aligned Mansuriyyah, which flowed through the city of Kenderes. Recognizing the danger, the Ruvelkan Imperial General Staff hundreds of thousands of reinforcements into the region, boosting Ruvelkan troop numbers to over 800,000 men and women. Army Group Gamma fielded some 600,000 troops in addition to nearly 4,000 tanks and an additional 8,500 armored vehicles, many of them donated from units from Army Group Beta.
The Syarans began their offensive on 17 April 2009, expecting that the wide open steppe would be well suited to their mechanized forces and maneuvers, but stiff Ruvelkan resistance resulted in limited gains for the first few weeks. In response the Ruvelkans executed a phased withdrawal on 28 April, allowing the Syarans to overextend themselves before launching a major counterstroke with the Eleventh and Fifteenth Armies. Devesated by Ruvelkan helicopter gunships, Syaran armor was unable to achieve a breakthrough and was forced to retreat. A Ruvelkan counter-offensive forced the Syarans back to the foothills of the Matra Mountains, and the fighting died down around 7 May.
The Syaran defeat came as a surprise to both Syaran and Ruvelkan commanders, who expected that the Syarans would enjoy a significant advantage in the open steppe compared to the thick forests and rugged mountains of much of the rest of Ruvelka. In the aftermath of the operation, Field Marshall Todorov came under fire from the SCAF for his poor planning and leadership during the course of the battle, though he ultimately remained in command of Army Group Gamma for the remainder of the war. The losses Syara suffered during the campaign, coupled with casualties during the Battle of Sagerejo and Operation Harpe led Central Command to suspend further major offensives a few months later.
Background
During the opening months of the Zemplen War Army Group Gamma had taken a relatively minor role in the conflict, confined by the mountainous terrain of southern Ruvelka to short range offensive operations. Although the Army Group took part in pitched fighting during the Ruvelkan Winter Counter-Offensive, it was not a major target for the Imperial Armed Forces of Ruvelka. As a result of its relative good standing compared to the other Syaran Army Groups, Gamma was considered the best option to spearhead further Syaran offensives. In Operation Synaspismos the Syarans furthered their gains in southern Ruvelka with a decisive victory over Army Group South, forcing the Ruvelkans to cede much of the western Matra Mountains to Syaran control. Following Syara's crushing victory at Annohk Valley, General Tibor Fehér ordered Army Group South to withdraw further south and east, allowing the Syarans to establish a strong anchor point along the western Matra Range. The encirclement of Aszód and the subsequent siege further depleted Ruvelkan forces in the region, although the failure to capture the city would force the Syaran 10th Army to permamnently commit the XXXV Corps under Lt. General Zaharinka Mitrovska to surrounding the port.
Although the offensive left Army Group Gamma in a good defensive posture, the mountainous terrain it occupied was unfamiliar to many Syaran commanders and left the Army Group in a cramped strategic position. As the winter subsided and the spring approached, Syaran Central Command devised plans for a second wave of offensives intended to destroy the bulk of the Ruvelkan Imperial Army. All the Army Group commanders were summoned to Zovahr between 13-15 March 2009 to discuss the coming operations and for their input. Chief of Staff Vakhtang Avakian led the discussion and outlined the desired course of action; all three Army Groups would launch a major strategic offensive in sequence intended to destroy the Ruvelkan Army Group opposite their forces. The decimation of Ruvelka's ground forces would cripple the Principality's ability to wage war, and compell Debrecen to sue for peace. With over 3.5 million men in uniform, over 2,000 manned aircraft and 25,000 armored fighting vehicles, the logistical burden of supporting concurrent offensives was deemed too significant. Instead, the Army Groups would launch their offensives in sequence, allowing resources and reserves to be shifted elsewhere once the fighting in a particular sector was complete. Army Group Gamma, being the most combat ready of the Syaran formations, was to launch the first strike against Ruvelka's Army Group South.
As was the case with the Syaran military, the exact details of the operations were left to their respective commands to be devised. Field Marshal Daniel Mladenov Todorov, commander of Army Group Gamma, returned to Army Group Headquarters on 17 March and directed his Opperations Senior Officer Major General Božidar Dukić to devise a plan for a major offensive aimed at the destruction of Army Group South, with input from Gamma's Chief of Staff Pavel Zajkovski. Along with the destruction of Army Group South, the offensive would also pave the way for the capture of Kenderes, a major supply route for supplies and resources from Mansuriyyah, which was backing Ruvelka.
In the Ruvelkan Imperial General Staff sentiments regarding future expectations were mixed. The failure of the Winter Counter-Offensive followed by the sharp sting of defeat in Synaspimos led to what Chancellor Edviná Molnár described as the "darkest days of the war". Despite that the mood was not entirely pessimistic; Sona Kaprielian, Director of the Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat (KNBSZ, or Military National Security Service) reported that Syaran estimates of Ruvelkan troop strength was inaccurate. Later on 11 March the KNBSZ reported that internal Syaran debate over furture strategic operations implied that Ruvelkan forces surpassed Syaran expectations.
On 13 March the KNBSZ reported that the Syarans were intending to launch another major offensive within a month. The details of the offensive were uncertain; Chancellor Molnár believed that Army Group Gamma would launch a second offensive in the south, but Chief of Staff Áron Surány disagreed, citing their recent action and estimating that Gamma would need longer to recover and prepare for another major operation. Surány instead surmised that a Syaran offensive was more likely in the north. There the Syarans would benefit from the relatively flat terrain of the Koryal Plain (better suited to Syaran armor and mechanized forces) and drive towards the vital northern port of Mateszalka. Uncertainty over Syaran intentions was finally resolved in late March when increasingly frequent reports from Ruvelkan spies behind Syaran lines reported Syaran supply columns reinforcing Army Group Gamma.
Planning
On 20 March Major General Dukić presented the first iteration of Gamma's offensive plan, codenamed Operation Sagaris. The original plan called for a transfer of 5th Army to the left flank of Army Group Gamma and for 8th Army to take up the center, with 10th Army remaining in its position. 10th and 8th Army would attack in unision against Ruvelkan forces south the Western Matra foothills. 10th and 8th Army would both draw off Ruvelkan reserves long enough for 5th Army to dispatch two corps into the right flank of Army Group South, breaking into the rear echelon and surrounding the bulk of the Army Group. Chief of Staff Zajkovski approved the plan and presented it to Field Marshal Todorov. Todorov dissaproved, citing the the transfer of two entire field armies would not only be a logistical strain, but would also take weeks and leave the Army Group exposed to attack. Compounding the problem was the Army Group's poor position; 8th Army was holding a narrow front throughout the Matra Mountains. Kenderes was just 70 kilometers from the Army Group's southern flank, but two of 8th Army's corps, XVI and XX Corps, were facing towards Püspökladány. For weeks Army Group Beta's commanding officer, Field Marshal Arisdages Koundakjian had asked that 8th Army be repositioned to better support 9th Army, which was strung out across the Balatonalmádi District. In preparation for the upcoming offensive, the request was denined.
Todorov insisted on a new plan be written, which Dukić and his staff developed and presented again on 22 March. The new plan called for multiple pincer movements by the Syaran corps from each army, with 8th and 10th Armies striking in unision to isolate the Ruvelkan fronts and allow 5th Army to roll through the batteries Ruvelkan armies towards Kenderes. The plan opted for a slower pace than the original, allowing the Ruvelkans time to deploy their reserves which the Syarans would then counter to annihilate the entire formation. Todorov again however dismissed the plan, believing the slow pace would give the Ruvelkans too much time to react and redeploy their forces. Todorov proceeded to draft up the plan himself with input from his staff and presented it to his army commanders on 25 March.
Todorov's verison of Sagaris called for a mass encirclement of Army Group South through three concurrent maneuvers. 8th Army under Emanuel Bilić would detach two corps, XX and XXV, to move south and form up on line against the right flank of Army Group South, splitting through the 3rd Derecske Front, while 10th Army under Tihomir Orlić did the same on the right flank agianst the 4th Aszód Front. While this was developing 5th Army under Kakig Torossian would launch an assault straight up the middle, south towards Kenderes and through the 6th Püspökladány Front. Once the shaping operations had completed, 8th and 10th Army would form their divisions into a coherent line and advance into the operational and strategic depths of Army Group South, destroying the formation in its entirety and securing Kenderes in the process.
The plan was not well received by Gamma's Army commanders. Colonel General Orlić commented out that the extensive maneuvers that his forces were required to conduct were illsuited towards the relatively small area of operations, and furthermore his army, which had been forced to divert some 70,000 troops to besieging Aszód, was understrength. Todorov countered by pointing out the smaller geographic area was better suited to the smaller force. Bilić expressed similar sentiments, citing that XVI Corps would be forcced to remain behind to protect the right flank of the Army Group along the Matra Mountains. Todorov responded by informing them that the 9th Army would be pivoting to help protect the flank of the Army Group, which did little to settle their concerns. Torossian expressed serious reservations about the operation as a whole, noting the difficult both 8th and 10th Army would face trying to bring their full line of divisions to bare in the face of what were certain to be fierce Ruvelkan counter-attacks. Todorov ultimately dismissed all concerns, arguing that the Ruvelkans were still reeling from their defeats earlier in the year and would not be prepared for another offensive so quickly. Such statements did not quell the uncertainty with the army commanders, who returned to their commands on 28 March with orders to begin preparing for the offensive.
On 30 March, Ruvelkan SIGINT intercepted radio transmissions from Syaran command posts within the Syaran XXV and XXII Corps indicating that the two formations are preparing to go on the attack. The information was presented to Debrecen the same day, which validated Chancellor Molnár's belief that Army Group South was the next target. This time discussion over what course of action to take was largely uniform. It was quickly decided that abandoning the Kenderes Steppe was an unnacceptable strategic move and that Army Group South would have to repell the offensive in full. On 1 April General Tibor Fehér gathered his Front commanders to inform them of the expected attack. News of the expected offensive came as an unwelcome surprise to the Ruvelkan commanders, all of whom had formations that were still recovering from the fighting during the winter. The expectation that the Army Group was expected to stand and fight did little to assuage such concerns, but Fehér stressed that withdraw was not an option and insisted that proper defensive preparations would allow the Ruvelkans to weather the Syaran assault.
Ruvelkan Defensive Preparations
Forewarning of the impending Syaran offensive gave the Ruvelkans ample time to prepare extensive defenses along the Kenderes Steppe. Fehér recognized that the generally flat terrain of the region favored the more mechanized armies of the Syaran National Army and concluded quickly that attempting to hold a single static line would not suffice. By now the Ruvelkans were aware of Syaran preferences to "bite and hold" Ruvelkan forces in place to fully employ Syaran advantages in firepower, as a result Fehér concluded that the offensive would have to be contested repeatedly through frequent counter-attacks and aggressive defensive actions. In a message to his Front and Army commanders, Fehér outlined his vision for the battle:
The enemy prefers to engage in battles of their determination where their fires and armored forces are able to define the parameters of the battlefield through rapid offensive action...disruption of their efforts by continuous engagements at the edge of their ranged weaponry, coupled with assertion of tactical airpower and frequent infiltrations will mean the difference between victory and an agonizing defeat.
The Ruvelkans were eager to avoid a repetition of Operation Aspis, where Syaran forces were frequently able to pin down larger Ruvelkan formations through artillery fire while their mechanized forces raced through the battlefield encircling and cutting off entire formations. To avoid this Fehér envisioned a "rolling defense", where expected blows from the Syarans would be met by immediate counterattacks in other sectors in order to divert Syaran attention and resources. While the Ruvelkans did not want to rely on static positions, extensive defensive fortifications were created throughout the steppe. This included the laying of more than one million anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Battlefield surveillance was conducted extensively to allow artillery to be pre-sighted. Ditches, trenches, and even earthworks were created to obscure the otherwise flat terrain. More than 700,000 Ruvelkan civilians, many of them refugees from Syaran occupied territories, were recruited to assist in the prepration of defenses before they were evacuated further east.
The Ruvelkans went to great effort to conceal the extent of their buildup. This included moving entire divisions only at night, extensive use of camouflage, and elaborate deception efforts which included leaking false information regarding Army Group South's readiness rates and dispositions. Aware that Ruvelkan spirits were not particularily high after months of heavy fighting and some bitter defeats, Fehér made a number of visits to the front during the preparation phase, tempering his usually gruff demeanor to encourage his troops. At one point Fehér invited more than a dozen veterans of the Földalatti, Ruvelka's resistance movement during the Siduri War, to speak to Ruvelkan troops to raise morale.
As the Syarans gradually became aware of Ruvelkan defensive efforts over the course of April, Syaran commanders grew increasingly concerned at the task they were faced with. Rumors of an suprise trap being laid spread through Syaran formations, not aided by frequent raids by Ruvelkan Imperial Fusiliers that flew through Mansuriyyah behind Syaran lines. Throughout April these Fusilier infiltrations were responsible for the loss of nearly 7,000 tons of ammunition.
Forces in the field
| Order of battle: Army Group Gamma (Field Marshal Daniel Mladenov Todorov) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army | Army Commander | Corps | Corps Commander | Divisions | |
| 8th Army | Emanuel Bilić | XX Army Corps | Lt. General Stamat Cilemanoff | 7th & 47th Mechanized Divisions, 30th Armored Division, 56th Motorized Division | |
| XXV Corps | Lt. General Hrvoje Jakopović | 24th Mechanized Division, 71st & 86th Motorized Divisions, 100th Armored Division | |||
| XVI Corps | Lt. General Gharib Antreasian | 62nd Mechanized Division | |||
| 5th Army | Kakig Torossian | XIX Corps | Lt. General Blagun Kostojcinovski | 6th & 25th Mechanized Divisions, 35th Armored Division, 73rd Motorized Division | |
| XV Corps | Lt. General Stoyan Becvinovski | 55th & 59th Mechanized Divisions, 72nd and 87th Motorized Divisions | |||
| XXII Corps | Samuil Yankov Glavchev | 28th Mechanized Division, 74th & 89th Motorized Divisions, 101st Armored Division | |||
| 10th Army | Tihomir Orlić | XXXVI Corps | Lt. General Yeprem Janikyan | 29th & 75th Mechanized Divisions, 91st Motorized Division, 102nd Armored Division | |
| XXXIII Corps | Lt. General Kiril Antonov Adamov | 40th & 77th Mechanized Divisions, 92nd & 110th Motorized Divisions | |||
| Order of battle: Army Group South (Vice Field Marshal Tibor Fehér) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Front | Front Commander | Armies | Divisions | ||
| 4th Aszód Front | Stepanie Yeghoyan | 15th, 16th, 18th Armies | 6 Infantry Divisions, 5 Grenadier Divisions, 3 Mountain Divisions, 2 Hussar Divisions, 1 Dragoon Division | ||
| 6th Püspökladány Front | Regina Sándor | 41st, 26th, 39th Armies | 6 Infantry Divisions, 3 Grenadier Divisions, 3 Mountain Divisions, 2 Hussar Divisions, 1 Dragoon Division | ||
| 3rd Derecske Front | Ármin Varga | 49th, 23rd, 7th Armies | 5 Infantry Divisions, 5 Grenadier Divisions, 1 Mountain Division, 1 Hussar Division, 2 Dragoon Divisions | ||
| 12th Pálháza Front | Vilmos Egyed | 33rd, 55th, 60th Armies | 5 Infantry Divisions, 4 Grenadier Divisions, 2 Mountain Divisions, 1 Hussar Division, 1 Dragoon Division | ||