Battle of the Veylo Channel

Battle of the Veylo Channel
Part of the Divide War
Syaran light cruiser RS Valorous Chronicler during the battle.
Date 30 September - 2 October 1916 Location Veylo Channel Result Cacertian Victory
Belligerents
Cacertian Empire	Republic of Syara
Commanders and leaders
Lea Davion	Filip Kostadinov
Units involved
Cacertian Grand Fleet	Navy of the Syaran Republic
Strength
12 Battleships 15 cruisers 36 destroyers	6 battleships 12 cruisers 26 destroyers 12 submarines
Casualties and losses
1 battleship sunk 1 battleship damaged 1 cruiser sunk 2 cruiser damaged 2 destroyers sunk 4 destroyers damaged	1 battleship sunk 2 battleships damaged 1 cruiser sunk 2 cruisers damaged 2 destroyers sunk 2 submarines sunk

The Battle of the Veylo Channel was a naval battle fought between the Cacertian Empire and the Republic of Syara from 30 September to 2 October 1916. The Cacertian Grand Fleet of the Cacertian Royal Navy engaged the Navy of the Syaran Republic in the Veylo Channel, between the island of Chryse and the coast of Makedon. The Cacertians were able to force the Syaran Navy to retreat, but were unable to commit to the decisive battle their doctrine called for, while the unexpected loss of the HMS Lea Colina was a blow to Cacertian morale.

Background

Following the commencement of hostilities in the Divide War, the [[[Cacertian Grand Fleet]] had expected to engage and decisively defeat the Navy of the Syaran Republic in a series of direct fleet engagements, where Cacertian superiority in gunnery, command and control, and ship design was expected to deliver an easy victory. Earlier on 17 September, the Grand Fleet under Admiral Lea Davion had engaged and defeated the Syarans in the Slaveiko Bay. After waiting for a counter-attack or a request for a ceasefire that never came, Davion sailed west and lightly shelled the city of Lira, causing minor damage and inflicting several casualties. On 27 September the fleet came under attack from a small flotilla of Syaran submarines, which did no major damage, but were able to escape unharmed.

Uncertain as to the disposition of the Syaran fleet and unaware of its intentions, the Cacertians sailed west into the Veylo Channel. The progress of the Grand Fleet was slowed considerably by the prolific usage of mines by the Syarans, coupled with frequent attacks by Syaran destroyers and submarines, who were often able to escape from counter-fire thanks to Cacertian inexperience with targeting such small, fast ships. Especially concerning to the Cacertians was the extensive use of torpedoes by the Syarans, which were of noticeably longer range and faster speeds than their Cacertianc counterparts. By 30 September the Grand Fleet had sailed just outside the Zeliat Bay, where Davion had expected to find the Syaran fleet in waiting. Forewarned by their destroyers and scouting submarines however, the Syarans had withdrawn further into the channel, forcing the Grand Fleet to pursue.

Having already been forced to deal with the abundance of naval mines and asymmetric tactics of the Syarans, Davion ordered her fleet to split up into more manageable portions, with her taking person control of a task force of 12 battleships, 15 cruisers, and 36 destroyers to lead the way into the Channel.

Battle

In the late afternoon of 30 September Davion's forward fleet passed by the western edge of the Zeliat Bay, approximately 15 kilometers from the coast of Chryse. Spearheaded by a forward screen of destroyers ahead of her battleship line, Davion made contact with the Syaran fleet at approximately 16:15 when her lead destroyer reported sighting the Syaran battleship Salvation in Purpose. Davion had 18 destroyers in front of her battle line, organized into six triads of three destroyers each. Per doctrine, they were supposed to act as escorts for the bigger ships. Davion had arrayed her cruisers along the flanks of her battleships, positioning them so they could extent the battlespace and engage on the edges of the enemy fleet, with the overall objective of keeping the Syarans together in a single group where the Cacertian gunners could concentrate their fire upon.

This deployment reflected Cacertian doctrine well but also reflected the shortcomings of decisive battle doctrine. By placing so much emphasis on the battleships while relegating cruisers to a secondary role, it wasn't uncommon for Cacertian Admirals to neglect the full usage of their cruisers. Not helping this matter was that many Cacertian cruiser designs had been neglected since the advent of the dreadnought, and thus enjoyed little advantage over their Syaran counterparts. One bigger problem was destroyers; as a navy centered around battleships, the larger warships often received priority assignment of officers and personnel allocation. As a result, destroyers were often manned by less experienced and capable crews and commanders.

Syaran destroyers in particular were a major source of trouble; their torpedoes outranged the gunnery capabilities of Cacertian destroyer crews, while they were also too fast and maneruvable to be reliably targeted by battleship batteries.

Evening Action 30 September

Admiral Lea Davion aboard the HMS Dana Baldini, the most modern warship in the Cacertian Royal Navy, ordered her ships to turn to port in a south-western direction, intent on bringing her firepower to bear on the Syaran fleet. But a torpedo volley by the Syaran destroyer force scattered her escorts.