User:Tranvea/Sandbox2
 From the top clockwise: Women protesters in Faidah March 2005; Komiteh members in Borazjan; Komiteh member protesting near Inqelabe Tower in Zahedan; Hamid Alizadeh with supporters following his rise to the State Presidency in July; Police standing by during protests in Sadah. | |
| Date | 16 February 2005 – 19 July 2008 |
|---|---|
| Location |  Zorasan |
| Also known as | Revolutionary Rejuvenation Mission |
| Cause |
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| Participants | |
| Outcome |
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| Deaths | Uncertain; estimates range between 3,500-10,000 |
| Missing | Uncertain; estimates range between 3,530-15,500 |
The Turfan (lit. Hurricane), also known within Zorasani historiography as the Revolutionary Correction Mission (Pasdani: اصلاح انقلابی مأموریت; Ma'muriyat-ye Enqelâbi-ye Eslah; Rahelian: مهمة التصحيح الثوري; Muhimma al'Taṣḥīḥ at'Ṯawriyy), was a sociopolitical movement and period of upheaval in Zorasan from February 2005 to July 2008. Long suspected to have been launched the Zorasani military and allies among the Neo-Sattarist right of the National Renovation Front, it began with a series of incidents in several universities where students established Revolutionary Committees (Khomiteh-ye Enqelâbi) to attack and denounce academics linked to the ruling faction of the NRF and those promoting "alien thought." Coinciding with a serious economic crisis, the initial actions of the Khomiteh's spread to wider society, sparking a period of violent civil disorder, which led to the removal of the ruling faction and the establishment of a provisional government which ultimately restored order, economic stability and in 2008 a new constitution.
The origins of the Turfan lay in the 2000 Revolutionary Command Congress which elected Fayzulla Khodzhayi as State President and Daryush Hemko as First Minister, as leaders of a second "Centrist-Reformist" leadership generation. They initially remained restrained to completing the economic reforms of their predecessors (Muhammad Al-Fayez and Hamad Niavarani), though by 2002 they opted to go further and introduced more radical neo-liberal economic reforms, the same year their government began to announce plans to reform the country politically and socially which provoked concern and tension between it and the right-wing Neo-Sattarist faction. The economic reforms were poorly executed and deepened underlying socioeconomic tensions between the urban classes and the wider poor toward a wealthy and often exuberant middle and professional class. By 2004, the NRF's right-wing together with the Zorasani military agitated the populace, provoking the emergence of the Khomiteh movement in February 2005.
On the 14 February 2005, a Khomiteh based at the Sardar Javad Jahandar School of Economics in Zahedan seized control of the main building, attacking violently a number of academics linked to the "Centrist-Reformist" faction of the NRF. They forced a televised confession by academics, denouncing the centrist leadership and demanding forgiveness for "spreading alien thought to dilute the nation's spirit." Televised by pro-hardliner outlets, Khomiteh's emerged in every university and incidents seen at JJSE were repeated across the country. In late March, Khomiteh groups began to emerge among the urban working classes, in factories and other businesses, they in turn began to agitate popular protests on the streets demanding economic stability and the resignation of the Khodzhayi-Hemko administration. These protests turned violent in early April as civil disobedience, rioting, looting and score settling erupted across the country, made possible by the refusal of law enforcement and paramilitary units to follow the orders of the Khodzhayi-Hemko administration. Fearing the country was slipping into anarchy, the Khodzhayi-Hemko administration promised emergency economic support for the poor and a new legislative agenda. This had no effect on the deteriorating situation, but enabled hardline accusations of poor government and incompetence. On 19 July, a meeting between the senior leaders of the Khodzhayi-Hemko administration and the military resulted in the former's agreement to resign, that night the military alongside Neo-Sattarists announced the establishment of a Provisional National Authority which was to last three years, during which time order would be restored, the economy stabilised and a new constitution adopted. Violence would continue until late August, while a systematic purge was conducted targeting centrist and leftist factions of the NRF. A new constitution consolidating Neo-Sattarist control over the party and granting the military considerable power was adopted, harsh crackdowns on ethnic nationalism would spark the Chanwanese War and an intensification of the Zorasani insurgency, though both would be defeated by 2011.
The Turfan was characterised by violence, chaos and mass civil unrest. The death toll varies widely depending on the inclusion of figures from the PNA-led purge or restricting it to February-August 2005. Accordingly, the period from February to August, an estimated 4,649 people were killed, primarily from score settling, assassinations and looting. Over 1,000 party members were killed during this period for real or suspected ties to the Centrist-Reformist faction. Dating from July 2005 to 2008, an estimated 15,000-20,000 people are believed to have died as a result of incarceration by the Provisional National Authority, this figure includes the disappeared. At least 3,500 were officially sentenced to death by the Provisional Security Tribunal. Various Khomiteh groups used the chaos to attack cultural and religious sites belonging to Zorasan's minorities or groups identified by the Neo-Sattarist state media machine as being "seditionist", notably destroying what few Badist temples were legally permitted. Hundreds of thousands were persecuted by either the Khomiteh movement or the PNA, notably State President Fayzulla Khodzhayi, First Minister Daryush Hemko, Majid Abdullah and Servan Khordani among other party members and civil servants; thousands were accused of being "seditionist" or "propagators of falsehoods" suffering public humiliation, imprisonment, torture, hard labor, seizure of property, and sometimes murder or harassment into suicide; scholars and academics accused of spreading "alien thought" were also targeted, with a large number of academics involved in economics or social sciences exiled abroad or disappeared.
The Provisional National Authority's purge coupled with the 2008 constitution established the near total control of government at all levels by the Neo-Sattarist faction of the National Renovation Front. A number of state owned by pro-reformist media outlets were shutdown and the media landscaped became monopolised by the hardliners, while the military was granted a considerable presence through its own outlets. The PNA oversaw dramatic reforms to the economy, rolling back many of the neoliberal policies of the previous two governments and introduced Patriotic Economic Development as its guiding principle, a neomercantilist form of state capitalism. By 2007, Zorasan's economy became one of the fastest growing globally as the developed world struggled with the 2005 Economic Crash. This economic boom was balanced out by increased repression and a return to near totalitarianism that defined the first decade of the UZIR's existence and remains today. Many historians note that the Turfan remains the most consequential event of post-unification Zorasan.
Origins
"Centrist-Reformist Faction" and the Saffron Era
Following the Zorasani victory in the Second Rahelian War and the eventual unification of the country in 1980, as the Union of Zorasani Irfanic Republics, the ruling National Renovation Front afforded itself ten years of totalitarian control over the country to “facilitate the stabilisation and rebirth of the homeland.” During the early to mid-1980s, it faced several failed revolts and uprisings in the former United Rahelian People’s Republic as the country consolidated itself. A series of crackdowns and purges retained firm control over the populace and by 1986, the situation had stabilised to such a degree that the military was steadily withdrawn from the former URPR states of Riyadha and Irvadistan.
In 1984, State President Javad Jahandar died and was succeeded by Attallah Shahedeh. He would oversee the final stages of the Consolidation Period and in the late 1980s began to implement economic reforms aimed at liberalising the economy and reducing state control. This was coupled with a steady repeal of the many draconian measures introduced post-war to stabilise the country. One such element of this effort was the “Opening of the Floor” – a policy of enabling freer debate within the NRF on the country’s direction during the 1990 Revolutionary Command Congress. The reforms of the late 1980s served to birth a faction dubbed the “Centrist-Reformist Group” (CRG) which advocated greater economic reform, closer ties to the developed world for investment opportunities and a more technocratic-authoritarian regime over the ideological and dogmatic totalitarian state of the day.
In a speech to party members in 1989, State President Attallah Shahedeh offered his endorsement of the CRG saying, “we now find ourselves in such sufficient position of peace and social harmony that we may begin the good work of lifting our nation and people up from poverty and the shadows of sacrifice into the land of plenty.” In preparation for the 1990 Revolutionary Command Congress, Shahedeh, who retained significant influence over the party orchestrated the rise of Abdulmalik Jamhour as his successor. Jamhour, who served Minister for Finance from 1985 to 1990 was elected State President, while Ershad Entezami was elected First Minister, both members of the CRG. Half of the Central Committee of State was drawn from the CRG also, while the RCC confirmed a near exclusively CRG Council of Union Ministers. This marked the beginning of the so-called Saffron Era, a period of profound change, reform and growing prosperity.
The CRG-led government in 1991 began to implement its “Comprehensive Strategy for National and Economic Transformation.” Working on from the reforms of the Shahedeh-led government of the late 1980s, the CRG-leadership continued to expand private property rights, improve business laws, privatise inefficient state-owned enterprises – though slowly as to avoid mass layoffs culminating into a employment crisis, and modernising the remaining state-owned industries. Aided by relatively high energy prices, the CRG-leadership also launched the most expansive infrastructure building campaign in Zorasani history. Throughout the early 1990s, the CRG-leadership worked to foster closer ties with Euclean countries, to boost exports and to secure foreign investments. State control over private business as well as interventionism was reduced and new joint-stock companies including banks and insurance companies were established. In 1993, Bandar e-Sattari, Chaboksar, Izidhar al-Mina and Khadal were declared “Special Economic and Industrial Zones.” These cities were also granted special political status, enabling significant autonomy and liberalisation socially speaking. By 1995, Zorasan’s economy was growing by 12% on average. This rate of growth would continue uninterrupted until 2002 when the successor CRG-led government began to mismanage the economy, during the same period until 2002, living standards improved as did disposable incomes for millions, notably for urban workers.
The success of the reforms led to a exponential rise in the number of party members affiliated with the CRG. This was the case both within the national level and below across the Union Republics and locally. The side-effect of this was that in 1995, CRG-affiliated members assumed control of significant sectors of the party and the Zorasani state apparatus. This would alienate the leftist and right-wing factions of the NRF, who saw a loss of influence and power at all three levels of government. Many historians believe the boost in CRG membership was due to a widespread belief that support for the agenda would open up financial and business opportunities for party members and their relatives, the failure of the CRG-leadership of the time to combat this ostensibly led to the establishment of patronage networks, nepotism and ultimately corruption at an unprecedented level, another factor that would lead to the Turfan ten years later.