Historic textualism (Themiclesia)
Historic textualism or uniform textualism is the main school of statutory interpretation in Themiclesia up to around 1950, in the tradition of legalism in that country. This school, formalized by theorists in the 6th century, asserts that statutes must be interpreted purely on the words that make up the statute, independently of the legislative intent, purpose, or historic context; however, it also assumes that one word can only have one interpretation, consistent across all statutes, passed in any time (hence uniform textualism).
Methodology
The challenge in interpretation, therefore, is stipulating a definition for a word that does not generate unacceptable results when applied to other statutes; if a definition is self-contradicting or produces results unacceptable to the jurist proposing it applied to other statute, the definition is considered unacceptable. Legislatively, it means that a word can never be redefined, regardless of how actual language has evolved, to avoid introducing contradictions to the corpus of statutes; this didactic adherence necessitated tribunes to compare bills to statutes and advise the house on any conflicts. In execution of statutes, civil servants were expected to interpret the statutes by their own devices; disputes were tried by Tribunes, who test the controverted interpretation with previous statutes. As such, a working knowledge of historic textualism was deemed a fundamental skill to any bureaucrat.
Assessment
Legal historian Benjamin Percy remarked in 1768 that Themiclesians "sanctify their laws that no doubt should arise from its explanation." In the 19th century, judicial writers tended to praise Themiclesian interpretation for its "impartiality, clarity, and strictness of method", i.e. comparing definitions to see whether a given one would stand up to multiple statutes reduced the role human intervention and thus potential controversy. Nathan Count professed a dissenting voice in 1878, calling the method "impartial, accurate, incorruptible, and uncontrovertible, but tending away from justice," that is, the system tended towards logic without regard for justice. He continued to say that Themiclesians judges are "jurists but not justices."
Response
Chŏndoism
As the dominant and orthodox school of statutory interpretation in Themiclesia, it was not challenged for centuries, surviving multiple dynasties, until the arrival of Menghean Chŏndoism in the 14th century. Proponents of Chŏndoism criticized what they observed as "juristic government", where every act of government was contoroted by a thorough round of legal debate and produce results they deemed philosophically unsound, and what they saw as an elite but immoral group of jurists controlled the results of government policy. Despite their opinions, the government ignored and criminalized their beliefs.
Liberalism
Jurists of the Liberal school have criticized historic textualism as leg irons that binds Themiclesia's modern statutes to its past, however irrelevant it may be. A number of notable commentators have arisen from the Liberal party, thus the school's name. Liberal MP Min said, in 1850, that the "task of averting an already-defined term is so monstrously large, it is often impossible to express what you want expressed in a reasonable number of words". In 1884, another Liberal MP commented that obedience to historic textualism has a substantial impact on the legislative power of Parliament by restricting new expressions, thus favouring existing concepts and measures and therefore a Conservative slant to any new legislation. A number of Liberal editors have also commented that historic textualism "summarily denies any difference between antiquity and the modern world, forcing the regulation of the latter to be done through the language of the former."
Certain scholars have also criticized the orthodox view for creating unnecessary clutter in legal language, citing the string of phrases "dismissed, removed, or expelled" in a statute in 1942, as the words "dismiss", "remove", and "expel" each have a specific and contrasting usage in other statutes; he says that this list is repeated at least 400 times through the entire statute. While Liberals sought to introduce a bill concerning the Themiclesian Army in 1920, the Tribunes objected that the term "Themiclesian Army" was already used in the 5th century to refer to a different set of entities and may not now be re-used. As a result, each time the bill referred to the Army, it recited the (then) 189 statutory entities that composed it.
The evolution of the actual meaning of terms have also introduced a great rift between what a term means in statute and in daily life, even in government organizations. The consequences of this rift is that officers had to spend an increasing amount of time perfecting their understanding of relevant laws and regulations pertaining to their offices. This became a great problem in the Army in the Pan-Septentrion War, as below discussed.
Reforms
The impetus for reform was first vocalized on the floor of Parliament in the late 1800s, when Progressive MPs complained that their legislative proposals were being frustrated by "unelected juricrats".[1] In this they were often in alliance with parliamentary Liberals. However, a long Conservative majority in parliament stifled their voices between 1892 and 1921.
Between 1921 and 1936, several minority governments came and gone, leading to the Pan-Septentrion War. The great scale of warfare necessitated the appointment of officers who did not have as expansive a grasp of the Army's statutes as previously required; when these officers issued instructions without giving adequate consideration for these words' statutory uses, they were questioned for variance. The Ministry of War had no satisfactory solution to this problem.
References
- ↑ Generally interpreted as a prerogative terms for someone who exercises undue political power through their knowledge of law.